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ABSTRACT 
 
This study is about Confucian humanism as the foundation of human rights and 
economic ethics. The study covers the three industrial non-socialist nations of Confucian 
East-Asia, i.e., Korea, Japan and the Republic of China.   
 
The main research question lies in how Confucian humanism emerged as an enduring 
tradition, and how it impacts upon human rights and economic ethics of the three nations 
on their individual paths towards globalizing civil societies.   
 
There were three elements to the research strategy: (i) literature review, (ii) focus group 
discussions and (iii) documentation corroborations.   The literature reviewed have been 
selected mostly from the scholarly works of the three nations and also drawn from those 
of non-Asian international scholars. Narrative data were obtained from the focus group 
discussions from the three sectors of discussants representing, firstly, academic-
research groups, secondly, public policy groups and, lastly, the diverse practitioners in 
the public and private sectors. Altogether 54 people from the three nations shared 
expertise and interest in Confucianism, Confucian humanism and its implications for 
human rights and economic ethics.  Documentation corroboration complemented what 
the focus groups expressed through their unstructured discussions.  
 
The study explores the origin of Confucianism and proceeds to examine how the 
Confucian philosophical tradition gave naissance to Confucian humanism as a living 
tradition. From Confucian humanism, the thesis proceeds to examine Confucian 
governance (ching shih) that remained the central theme of Confucian scholar-
officialdom when the orthodox Confucianism was adopted as the state ideology.  While 
the Confucian ideal of the ‘sagely sovereigns’ persists as an enduring governance model, 
complementary and alternative political views of more egalitarian inclinations such as of 
Mencius also take up a good part of the governance theme. The role of life long self-
cultivation applicable to all from sovereigns down to commoners emerges as the 
foundation of character-building for respective societal roles within Confucian ethics and 
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social ethos. The modern democratic institution of human rights emerged from the fertile 
demo-centric Confucian social psychology, but benefited directly from the Western 
institutional models.  
 
Discussions on the tradition of Confucianism and that of Confucian humanism progress 
through the important turning points throughout history. They are the Classic age of 
Confucius, the Neo-Confucian reformation, the Practical Learning sub-era of the Neo-
Confucian era, and, finally, the contemporary Neo-Confucian era that provides 
intellectual responses to the modernization processes of the three nations.  
 
The discussions highlight that the Confucian tradition of ‘humanity’ that Confucius and 
his disciples formulated in the Classical age endured through the ages to modernity.  
They also point to the notion that Confucians pursued their intellectual, moral and 
aesthetic ideals to the highest possible level through the system of learning, 
philosophizing, and practicing in the tradition.   
 
The Confucian cosmology of the ‘human to nature’ nexus and the Confucian spirituality 
of cosmic immanence in the ‘self’ provide clues to the multi-layer structure of Confucian 
consciousness of self, selves and the greater self, namely society or the Heaven itself.  
The Neo-Confucian school of ‘mind and heart’ learning reinforced the inquiry into selves 
in nexus to nature and the universe.  
 
Religious tolerance and the adaptability of Confucianism have stood out as important 
qualities in the globalization of East-Asian values and ethos, i.e., Confucian ‘souls and 
decorum.’  Japan, as an island nation with a unique perception of its self-identity, 
employs Confucianism, still considered fundamentally as the philosophy of China, to 
reinforce the national identity without compromising the integrity of the Japanese 
tradition and sensitivity. Japanese aesthetic sensitivity would place aesthetic unity with 
nature on equal footing with that of moral unity with the world.  Secularism and 
spirituality of Confucianism benefited from the peaceful co-existence amongst the three 
great philosophical traditions of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism.  
 
The thesis as an inquiry into Confucian humanism as a living tradition concludes by 
answering the main research question and its three associated postulates. 
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Chapter One: About the Thesis 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This study is about Confucian humanism. Confucian humanism is studied as the 
foundation for the human rights and economic ethics as related to the three non-socialist 
industrial countries of East-Asia, i.e., Korea, Japan and Republic of China (aka Taiwan).  
This study will focus on Confucianism as the common philosophy and its humanism in 
these three nations.  It will cover Confucianism and Confucian humanism from their origin 
and in their evolution.  The study will also endeavour to shed light on how Confucian 
humanism and its governance framework such as the observance of human rights and the 
application of economic ethics impact upon the individual path of these nations towards 
becoming globalizing civil societies.  
 
The primary motivation behind the study comes from the researcher’s experience as an 
industrial executive engineer and his participation in Asian business life over the past two 
decades in these three nations of contiguous cultures.  During this period and 
subsequently, the overriding question that has developed in the researcher’s mind has 
centred around the cultural and philosophical factors as well as what may be termed 
‘Confucian humanism’ behind the stupendous economic, social and political rise of the 
countries in Northeast Asia that in some way parallels and resembles the thesis of the 
influence of the spirit of Protestantism on the rise of capitalism in Western Europe as 
developed by Weber.  In spite of the overwhelming Westernization that has characterised 
their processes of industrialisation, there has always existed persistent evidence, easily 
recognizable, that the habits of the mind and heart1, exemplified in both word and deed in 
these countries, seem to have influenced individual livelihood, social ethics and political 
governance.  Confucian thinking and behaviours in expressions of Confucian humanism 
have always been at the forefront, and in alliance with other belief systems such as 
Buddhism and Taoism, but also Christianity.  As such, the theme of Confucian humanism 
emerged.   
 
                                                
1 Sire, James W 2000, ‘Introduction’, in Habits of the Mind: Intellectual Life as a Christian Calling, InterVarsity Press, 
London.  
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As the research topic was being contemplated, there was the necessity to set boundaries 
around such a broad question and to narrow down to a workable yet meaningful topic.  A 
choice has been made to focus on Confucian humanism as the foundation of human rights 
and economic ethics.  In the mind of the researcher, the overriding humanism embedded 
in Confucianism and its founding of governance through the critical societal elements of 
human rights and economic ethics represent the most acute and profound challenges of 
Northeast Asia now and in future.  How Confucian humanism as such and its implications 
over human rights and economic ethics play out will most certainly have repercussions 
upon their socialist neighbours, the People’s Republic of China in particular, and North 
Korea, though perhaps to a lesser extent.  
 
The study examines the dynamic interplay in and amongst these three nations of their 
intellectual, economic and social currents. This interplay is explored through 
trans-temporal, cross-cultural, and inter-disciplinary discussion focussed around the 
origins and evolution of Confucian humanism and its implications upon human rights and 
economic ethics.  Hence the research questions can be formulated as follows:    
 
‘How has Confucian humanism emerged from the tradition of the commonly shared 
Confucian philosophy in the industrial non-socialist East Asia of Korea, Japan and the 
Republic of China, and how does it relate to Confucian governance in regard to human 
rights and economic ethics on their individual paths towards globalizing civil societies?’  
 
1.1.1 Aims 
 
This study has its aims encapsulated under the following postulation, and argues for the 
validity of these postulates. 
 
Postulate 1:  
 
Confucianism as one of the common philosophies and beliefs of contemporary 
Korea, Japan and Republic of China (aka Taiwan) has evolved into Confucian 
humanism.   
 
Postulate 2:  
  3
 
Confucian humanism advances governance as expressed in the observance of 
human rights and the evolution of economic ethics. 
 
Postulate 3:  
 
Confucian humanism and its ideals accord with the humanism and ideals of a 
globalizing civil society.  
 
1.1.2 Rationale  
 
This study has found its rationale in trying to elaborate the following points of significance. 
 
• This study may help uncover the cultural and intellectual understandings of 
the rise of so-called Confucian East Asia, in contrast to the hitherto 
dominance of economic and political paradigms.   
 
• This study may help bridge prevailing dichotomies regarding 
traditional/modern, the West/the East and the local/global, and help move 
beyond them and facilitate dialogue within the global community. 
 
• This study may help uncover how the processes of modernization, 
democratization and globalization have, both in common such as through 
Confucian humanism, and differently in interactions with the West, impacted 
on each nation through particularized circumstances and strategies. 
 
• This study may help uncover why the Confucian tradition in spite of its 
over-arching concern for humanity failed to develop democratic institutions, 
to create a civil society, and to enhance the sustaining economy.  
 
• This study may respond to and offer support for the resurgence of the 
contemporary Neo-Confucian movement and its inter-tradition contribution.  
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1.2 HUMAN RIGHTS AS AN EMBODIMENT OF CONFUCIAN HUMAN DIGNITY   
 
Human rights in its contemporary meaning first appeared both in the Northeast Asian 
world as a transliterated word in the mid- to late-nineteenth century vernacular editions of 
European social science and in law texts.  The word ‘right’ both in Korean kwŏlli, and in 
Japanese gen-ri 2  uses the same Chinese character ch’üan-li. 3    The first Chinese 
language translation of an international law book4 contained the word ch’üan-li.  Japanese 
influence on Korea and partly on China through the earlier imports of Western scientific 
texts into Japan expedited the interchange of translated literatures and the discourse 
which was of Western origin.   
 
While this linguistic perspective relates to the legal and institutional aspects of human 
rights ideology, the underpinning notion of human dignity that forms the basis of respect 
for and observance of human rights has long remained in Confucian habits of heart and 
mind.  The sagely teachings of Confucianism uphold human dignity as the foundation 
underpinning respect for and observance of human rights.   
 
Confucius himself mentioned the equality of humanity.  He said in the Analects 17:2: By 
nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be wide apart. (Legge translation)  In 
intrinsics, people are alike.  With practice, they diverge. (David H. Li translation)  Mencius 
(ca. 372-289 B.C.E.) taught the moral imperative and universal human duty to respond to 
the needs of those who are human equals and of their families in times of crisis, 
irrespective of their social standing.  Mencius went further in support of the political rights 
of the populace and their entitlement even to revolution and rebellion when all means of 
peaceful remedying to ill behaved monarchs have been exhausted.5 
 
Such humanism, moreover, has remained in the orthodox teachings of the 
scholar-officialdom.  The common people with no resources for their self-protection have 
                                                
2 See Glossary (Appendix 2) 
3 ibid 
4 W.A.P. Martin (1827-1916), the founder of the Presbyterian mission in Beijing, first used the word ch’üan-li equal to 
‘rights’ in his translation (1863) of the most prominent book on international law at that time written by Henry Wheaton in 
1836 titled Elements of International Law.  
5 Legge, James 1960/1970, ‘Mencius 1B:8’, in the Chinese Classics (The Four Books of Confucianism), Hong Kong 
University Press, Hong Kong. 
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had to survive on their own against the injustices inflicted by social superiors.  Modern 
constitutionalists6 agree that in spite of an overarching humanism in the Confucian and 
Buddhist traditions, these belief systems often were not sufficient to defend those who 
needed access to defence.    
 
The first drafters of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) were very cognizant of 
the cultural gap in their earnest pursuit to incorporate the humanist concerns of the 
Confucian tradition.  Accordingly, they enthusiastically embraced the participation by 
Confucian social scientists of Sinic tradition7 in the drafting process of the first version of 
the Declaration.  Such effort to overcome these cultural and linguistic barriers is thus as 
old as the history of global human rights conventions represented in the first important 
instance by UDHR.   
 
Intercultural dialogue on human rights discourse has been continuous from the birth of the 
first human rights convention.  This contradicts the common myth that the West has a 
monopoly on the conceptualization and institutionalization of global human rights as we 
understand them today. 
  
Confucius and his contemporaries were born into unstable social settings of warring states.  
Hence the primary concern in the process of organizing a comprehensive system of 
educating the commoners was to create a system of sustainable social stability.  Such a 
system would be a holistic one of governance founded upon Confucian humanism.  This 
was not a new approach at all, according to Confucius himself.  He limited his credit to 
being a ‘transmitter’ of knowledge and wisdom of the ancient.  Analects 7:1: The Master 
said: ‘I am a story-teller and not a writer, a seeker and follower of ancient history and 
culture – I secretly compare myself to Lao Peng.’  (Lao Peng was a minister in the 
Shang/Yin dynasty.) (David H. Li translation)   
 
There was thus a form of collective intentionality.8  Such intentionality and the associated 
social and political agency brought legitimacy to Confucian scholar-official rule.  The 
                                                
6 Henkin, Louis 1998, ‘Epilogue: Confucianism, Human Rights, and Cultural Relativism’, in Confucianism and Human 
Rights, de Bary, Wm. T & Tu, W,  eds., New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 312-313. 
7 P. C. Chang of the Republic of China and Professor Wu Teh Yao were the founding members of the Human Rights 
Commission of 1946 and key drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. 
8 Bratman, M 1999, ‘Introduction’, in Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
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Neo-Confucian era with Chu-Hsi at its lead saw the state adopting the Confucian canon as 
orthodox text used for the state examination, as the sole path to coveted membership of 
the bureaucracy.  This shared intention of harmonizing Confucian human morality with 
state governance underpins an ongoing tradition of Confucian governance in Korea, 
Japan and the Republic of China.  Northeast Asian society with such a philosophical and 
psychological endowment now faces a challenge of harmonizing with the global system of 
upholding human dignity, conversely, the embodiment of global humanism as represented 
in the spirit and mechanics of  the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 
two subsequent and related covenants that came into force in the mid-1970s (jointly known 
as The International Bill of Human Rights),9  as well as in subsequent treaties and 
conventions. 
 
In the process of economic and social development as a model of the so-called 
‘developmental economy’, Korea’s approach in interacting with the processes of 
globalization carried recognizable Confucian traits in its orientation.  While the economic 
drivers were capital-technology-market oriented, social mobilization was based on a 
Confucian social capital model of ‘new village movement (saemaul undong).10   Parallels 
are found in mid-nineteenth century Korea, Japan and Taiwan.  Attempts were made by 
societal leaders to maintain Confucian moral integrity in the process of nation-building, 
under the onslaught of Western science and technology.11 
 
This shared intention for a dynamic harmony emanating from Confucian intuition has 
found a prototypical example in the works and teachings of Korean Neo-Confucian 
T’oegye (scholarly name for Li Hwang: 1501-1570).  T’oegye offered a ‘Ten Diagrams’ 
governance text for the sagely rulership. 12   His diagrams encompassed Confucian 
cosmology and worldviews, ethical metaphysics, governance of the bureaucracy, 
self-cultivation and education, Confucian psychology on ‘heart and mind,’ self-discipline 
and daily industry.   His work is based on his own scholarship, but also modelled upon Chu 
                                                
8 Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm>, 
viewed 27 June 2006.  
10 <www.saemaul.or.kr>, viewed 27 June 2006. 
11  ‘Eastern Way-Western Vehicle’ (dongdo sŏkiron) by Kim, Yoonsik (1835~1922), ‘Japanese Spirit-Western 
Technology’ (wagon ryozairon) by Sakuma Shōzan (1811~1864), ‘Chinese System-Western Vehicle’ (zhōngtī xīyònglùn) 
by Zeng, Guofan (1811~1872). 
12 ‘Ten Diagrams to become a sagely sovereign’ (sŏnghak sipdo) 
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Hsi (1130-1200) and Chang Tsai (1020-1077) of China.  His work was also eagerly 
studied by the then leading Neo-Confucian students in Japan of the Tokugawa era.13  
 
1.3 ECONOMIC ETHICS AS AN AMPLIFICATION OF CONFUCIAN HUMAN RIGHTS  
 
These central Neo-Confucian figures continue to influence the contemporary strands of 
Neo-Confucian thinking.  The Non-socialist industrial East-Asian nations of Korea, Japan 
and the Republic of China, commonly termed as the developmental model economies, 
conduct economic planning and implementation in such a way that those modern day 
leading planners and doers are behoven to the same Confucian ideals of harmonizing 
social resources in the contemporary modern context.   
 
Entering the new millennium, Confucian social sensibility has engaged in a new dimension 
of economic ethics, namely the pressing issue of global ecology and environment.  This 
concern assumes a macro global dimension additional to the micro local focus of 
Confucian economic ethics as it pertains to individuals as well as to the economic domain 
as a whole.   
 
The Confucian tradition of harmonizing humans to Heaven or to Mother Nature emerges in 
sharp contrast to that of the Western ideals coming from the Enlightenment.  The latter is 
partly a tradition of human conquest and the manipulation of nature and ecology.  This 
also implies an indisputable trust in the ultimate goodness of science and technology, at 
times aided by the Christendom concept of the stewardship of nature.14   
 
The global ecological situation is in such a dire state that it now compels a new outlook 
and attitude.  As the major economic actors and ecologists on the global stage, industrial 
East-Asia now has a unique role to play in terms of self-reform and collegial contribution 
befitting its global accountability.  
 
Economic ethics in the conduct of economic policy and implementation now becomes an 
integral part of human rights in the contemporary setting.  Global human rights 
conventions and concerned leaders look to the sources of strength in the Confucian 
                                                
13 Fujiwara, Seika (1561-1619) 
14 Pojman, Louis P 2005, Environmental Ethics, Thomson/Wadsworth, Belmont, CA, pp 19-21. 
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interpretation of its ‘interrelation of heaven, earth, and humans.’ 15   The Confucian 
‘human-cosmic’ worldview may offer an alternative to the current practices based on the 
proven inadequacy of the human-centric worldview and its inclination to conquest of 
nature.   
 
Contemporary Confucian economic ethics has emerged as an important pillar of human 
rights in terms of globally shared critical concerns.  Both human rights and economic 
ethics are complementary on the continuum and amplification of human and social ethics. 
 
The first covenants on human rights are the Universal Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the Universal Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.  The latter is 
an ‘economic and social “Bill of Rights’ which has expanded into the broader spectrum of 
the just and ethical allocation of natural and economic resources, including the protection 
of ecology without which myopic attention to individual rights alone is no longer meaningful.  
The global human rights community expressed their concrete views both in the Vienna 
Convention of 1993 16  and in the Social Summit in Copenhagen of 1995. 17   The 
agreements reached in these conventions support the notion that broader human and 
natural environments are protected in the interest of human rights observance.   
 
A dichotomy arose in the industrial East-Asia between an innate Confucian respect for 
nature on the one hand and ecological destruction on the other hand as a result of 
industrialization at home and abroad.  The East-Asian agenda for further development 
now needs to be re-examined in terms of a holistic economic ethics.  East Asians need to 
earnestly engage in spiritual self-renewal and open dialogue.  They have to take a fresh 
look at the status quo and its current paradigm in order that they re-position themselves on 
the issues of economic development, nation-building and social stability.  Otherwise, 
further progress will be devoid of its own cultural identity with authentic ethical moorings.  
 
                                                
15 Tucker & Berthrong, eds.1998, Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
16 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Article 11: ‘The right to development should be fulfilled so as to meet 
equitably the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations. The World Conference on 
Human Rights recognizes that illicit dumping of toxic and dangerous substances and waste potentially constitutes a 
serious threat to the human rights to life and health of everyone.’ 
17 World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995), <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/wssd/>, viewed 03 July 
2006. 
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Hence, this study looks at economic ethics on the continuum of individual, community, 
corporate and global economic behaviours as an extension of human rights through the 
rediscovery of the Confucian ideals of the Classical and Neo-Confucian eras. 
 
As regards how Confucianism contributes to economic creativity and also to creative 
humanism, this study will discuss in detail in the ensuing chapters the Confucian concepts 
of the productive person in relation to family and the broader community of state and 
society.18   
 
1.4 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
In addressing the research question: ‘How has Confucian humanism emerged from the 
tradition of the commonly shared Confucian philosophy in the industrial non-socialist East 
Asia of Korea, Japan and the Republic of China, and how does it relate to Confucian 
governance in regard to human rights and economic ethics on their individual path 
towards globalizing civil societies?,’ the ‘three research methodological elements’ have 
been deployed in the research strategy in order to generate data conducive to answering 
the question.   
 
The first element is Literature Review, comprising review of the current and past scholarly 
works considered of importance and closely related to the topic.  The articles are selected 
from the works by the scholars of the three nations, and also those by non-Asian 
international scholars. 
 
The second element is Narrational Data, based on the discussions among the ‘focus 
groups’ that met in small groups of three to five persons to discuss the topics around 
Confucian humanism and its governance implications such as human rights and 
economic ethics. The ‘five thematic questions’ 19  have been provided to trigger the 
unstructured free discussions amongst the focus groups.  
                                                
18 Analects, ‘Harmony without Conformity’ (ho-erh-pu-t’ung) being one of the central ideas of ‘harmony making for 
prosperity’. 
19 Questions employed to trigger the ‘Unstructured Discussions’: 
Q1. Do Northeast Asians in Korea, Japan and Republic of China (aka Taiwan) follow Confucianism as one of their    
       major common philosophies and beliefs? 
Q2. Is Confucian philosophical and belief tradition the bedrock of Confucian humanism? 
Q3. If so, does the Confucian humanism advance governance such as the observance of human rights?  
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Discussants have been selected from Korea, Japan and the Republic of China. Selection 
has been made on the basis of depth of knowledge about and/or intensity of interest in 
Confucian humanism and its implications upon its governance issues.  
 
The first group of discussants are from the academic or research sector. Research or 
teaching interests are in East-Asian philosophy, cultural theory, religious study, and 
economic history among others. The second group of discussants are from the public 
policy sector.  Policy interests are in human development, economic planning, research 
and development and education. The third group of the discussants are from the 
practitioners in diverse social sectors, such as industry, media, and advocacy of human 
rights or ecology.  The invitation letter sent out since 2005 for the focus group discussions, 
including the ‘confidentiality terms,’ and the list of discussants with acronyms have been 
appended within the Appendix 5, under the headings: Appendix 5-1 for the ‘invitation 
letter’ and ‘confidentiality terms, and Appendix 5-2 for the list of discussants whose 
occupational descriptions were given acronyms, bearing no direct relations to the persons 
pursuant to the ‘confidentiality terms’ for those participating in the focus group 
discussions.20 Meetings for focus discussions took place in the respective capital cities 
and their suburbs, namely, Seoul, Tokyo and Taipei. English was used as the main 
languages for discussions and note-taking, with help of respective national languages, 
i.e., Korean, Japanese and Chinese  (Mandarin), if/when necessary, thanks to the 
researcher/moderator’s familiarity with each language.  The table (Table 1) below is a 
condensed summary of the ‘focus group’ discussants,’ their ‘areas of expertise and 
interest’ and assigned acronyms as indicated above.  Appendix 5-2) provides further 
information on their fields of engagement.  
 
The third element is Documentary Data, comprising sagely writings, writings of the state 
authorities, scholarly and philosophical writings, historical writings of the past, biographic 
records and writings of current and past leaders, and articles focussed on Confucian 
traditions and other belief systems. These documentary supports will be deployed as 
complements to and corroborations of narrative data in Chapter Three.  
                                                                                                                                              
Q4 Does Confucian humanism foster economic ethics?  
Q5 Does Confucian humanism accord with the humanism and ideals of a globalizing civil society and its   
     governance, as expressed in human rights and economic ethics especially in relation to the global ecological    
     crisis? 
20 Appendix 5: 5-1) Invitation Letter with Confidentiality Terms and  5-2) ‘Focus Group’ discussants and Acronyms 
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Table 1 
‘Focus Group’ Discussants: ‘Areas of Expertise and Interest’ and Acronyms 
 
Korea Japan Republic 
of China 
 
Acronyms Areas of Expertise and Interest    
(1) Academics and Researchers  
 
KAP JAP 
 
CAP 
 
Specialists in East Asian Philosophy 
 
KAC JAC 
 
CAC 
 
Cultural Theorists 
 
KAH JAH 
 
CAH 
 
Educators (Human Development) 
KAS JAS 
 
CAS 
 
Sociologists (Social Development) 
 
KAE JAE 
 
CAE 
 
Science and Technologists 
KEH JEH 
 
CEH 
 
Economic Historians 
 
(2) Public Policy-persons 
KHR JHR CHR 
 
Human Rights Policy Specialists 
KPS JPS CPS 
 
Social Policy Developers 
 
KPR JPR CPR 
 
Research and Development Policy Specialists 
KPH JPH CPH 
 
Human Resource Policy Developers 
KPE JPE CPE 
 
Economic Planners 
KCG JCG CCG 
 
Corporate Governance Policy Specialists 
 
(3)  Practitioners in Public and Private Sectors   
KHA JHA CHA 
 
 Human Rights Advocates 
KTE JTE CTE 
 
Ecology and Business Ethics Specialists 
KSS JSS CSS 
 
 Social Policy and Welfare Advocates 
KTS JTS CTS 
 
Industry Strategy Specialists 
KTI JTI CTI 
 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship Specialists 
KMC JMC CMC 
 
Mass Media Contributors 
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In order to further complement the above three research elements, appendices are 
provided at the end of the thesis.  Chronology, Glossary and Biographic Digest are 
appended among others.  ‘Chronology’ chronicles major eras and events.  ‘Glossary’ lists 
those diverse Korean, Japanese and Chinese vocabulary items and their meanings.   
‘Biographic Digest’ presents a brief introduction of those figures whose ideas or 
statements are quoted in this study.  
 
1.5 ROADMAP OF THESIS 
 
This chapter, namely Chapter One, is a chapter of introducing the thesis and providing an 
overview of the thesis, including the main research question, aims, rationale and research 
strategy.  
 
Chapter Two will be the literature review that examines the scholarly works of the past and 
present and of East Asian as well as international origins. The literature review follows the 
theme of the research question and also broadly follows the temporal sequence of those 
ideas and occurrences covered under the review.  
 
Chapter Three is the chapter of data. It will present the narrative data of ‘focus group’ 
discussions undertaken in the field of the research area, namely, Korea, Japan and the 
Republic of China (aka Taiwan). The narrative data comes with the support of 
documentary corroborations that complement the spoken data.  
 
Chapter Four is a chapter of critical analysis and interpretation of the narrative data and its 
summary. Through such analysis and interpretation, this chapter will provide this study to 
what extent the data support the main research question and its three postulates.    
 
Chapter Five, also the final chapter, constitutes the synthesis of the outcomes both of 
Chapter Two and Chapter Four.  The Chapter Four outcome of analysis and interpretation 
of the data will synthesise with the Chapter Two outcomes of the literature review in terms 
of views and themes, within the framework of the main research question and the three 
postulates. With the research findings thus established, this chapter will lead to the 
conclusions of the thesis.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This literature review of Confucian thought as it has evolved over many centuries 
constitutes the second chapter of the thesis.  The review is a critical examination of the past 
and current scholarly works that relate to the research question.  It also represents the first 
of the three elements of the research strategy.  The review has been drawn from several 
pools of Confucian scholarship, firstly of Korean, Japanese and Sinic origins and, secondly, 
from non-Asian scholars who have examined ancient and contemporary Confucianism.  In 
this chapter, the examination of articles is framed within the broad parameters of identified 
themes and concepts.  Inevitably, some articles discuss more than one theme or concept.  
 
Firstly, the foundations of Confucianism are examined.  Secondly, examination is made on 
those articles discussing how Confucian humanism emerged from such foundations.  Next 
articles examined are on how Confucian humanism fosters governance, once the 
foundations of humanism were in place.  Articles on Confucian governance are examined 
as a part of Confucian humanism in interplay with the philosophical foundation and its 
evolution. 
 
Then, there is a leap forward in time to the new millennium beginning with the eleventh 
through to the thirteenth centuries, when Neo-Confucianism emerged and flourished at a 
time when medieval scholasticism was emerging in Europe.   The Neo-Confucianism era 
brought with it a regained vibrancy thanks to a host of major historical figures.  It also meant 
the revitalising of the Classical heritage, re-examining and re-synthesising the whole 
spectrum of Confucianism, both orthodox and heterodox.  Articles covering this era have 
been examined, together with those examining a later era. That period in the great 
Neo-Confucian legacy is called the Age of Practical or Real Learning.1  It was more 
conspicuous in Korea and Japan.  It perhaps promised the dawn of an eventual industrial 
East Asia.  This period is also characterised by the first early interactions with the West 
brought on by a missionizing Catholicism that was also accompanied by the first 
introduction to Western science. Science as a new form of learning appealed to the ruling 
                                                
1 Practical or Real Learning is a transliteration of Sirhak (Korean) or jitsugaku (Japanese) 
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class with their innate interest in searching for practical ways of bettering the lives of the 
populace.    
 
The next group of articles is related to human rights in the context of Confucian humanism.  
This selection includes not only key Confucian concerns in human rights matters as an 
expression of Confucian humanism, but also includes some critical views such as 
‘institutional gaps’ in Confucian humanism, commonly ascribed as the very cause behind 
the so-called ‘Confucian lag’ on human rights development.  
 
The next section discusses Confucian humanism and economic ethics as another form of 
human rights.  Confucian economic ethics would be an economic extension of ‘Confucian 
humanism’ in real world situations.  The articles about economic ethics start from those on 
Confucian ‘human-to-nature’ ethics such as ecological ethics at the macro level, and 
continue on about trade and business conduct at the micro level.  
 
2.2 CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS AND THE FOUNDATION OF CONFUCIANISM  
 
The foundational work by the first disciples of Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) on his teachings is 
contained in the Analects.  This work has heavily influenced the philosophy and moral 
values of East Asia and become a cornerstone of Confucianism itself.  Together with the 
other three volumes of the so-called ‘four books’2 of Confucianism, it has become the first 
canon.  Its teachings were underpinned by the central concept of Confucian ‘humanity.’3  
Upon this foundational concept, the pillars of Confucian values have been built, including 
propriety,4 righteousness,5 loyalty6 and filial piety.7 
 
                                                
2 Legge, James 1960/1970, The Chinese Classics (The Four Books of Confucianism), vol. 1(the Analects, the Great 
Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean), Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, vol. 2 (Mencius), Dover Publication, New 
York.  
The Four Books are the Chinese classical texts that Chu Hsi selected in the Sung dynasty, as an introduction to 
Confucianism. Each of these four books will be looked at in this literature review and referred to in the ensuing chapters. 
3 jen (ren), translated as humanity and humanness. 
4 li: referred in Appendix 2 (Glossary) 
5 i: ibid 
6 chung: ibid 
7 hsiao: ibid 
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This review has examined the Analects in the original text, and the accompanying 
commentaries and interpretations.  This examination has utilized Legge’s8 translation and 
also a contemporary interpretation by Hall9 and Ames10 in their co-authored ‘Thinking 
through Confucius.’11 
 
The Analects is comprised of twenty chapters with a distinct topic for each chapter.   
Excerpts from these chapters have melted into the daily thoughts and narratives of 
East-Asians.  Frequent quotes continue to find their way into the domains of learning, 
thinking, rituals, propriety, aesthetics, social engagement and cosmology.  Its antiquated 
expressions continue to preserve its integrity and have assumed renewed meanings as 
they communicate to the modern mind.   
 
Hall as a systematic philosophical theologian and Ames as a Sinologist shed light on the 
philosophical and psychological background behind the birth of the Analects.  Their 
contribution firstly lies in exploring three major philosophical assumptions implicit in 
Confucianism.  The first major assumption refers to the Confucian ‘immanent cosmos’ in 
contrast to the ‘transcendence’ of cosmic beings commonly perceived in the philosophical 
tradition of the West.  The second assumption refers to ‘conceptual polarity’, namely, yin 
and yang.12   The third assumption lies in the perception of ‘tradition as interpretive 
context.’13   Through exploring these three aspects in the late 1980s, Hall and Ames made 
a substantial contribution towards a better understanding as to where the Confucian 
themes diverge from those of the West.  Their limitation lies in not sufficiently incorporating 
compelling social and political factors in their epistemological and ontological analysis in 
reflecting the conditions surrounding the warring states.  The first readership of the 
Analects were part of a particular historical context in that the preceding century had had a 
major political and moral thinker in the governorship of Kuan Chung,14 hence any emerging 
ideology on governance most certainly had to contextualize the status quo of the era. This 
                                                
8 Legge, James (1815-1897), Scottish Congregationalist missionary to China and a Sinologist 
9 David L. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso. 
10 Roger T. Ames is a professor of Chinese philosophy at the University of Hawaii and the editor of the journal Philosophy 
East and West. 
11 Hall, DL & Ames, RT 1987, Thinking through Confucius, SUNY Series in Systematic Philosophy, SUNY Press, Albany, 
NY.  
12 Ibid, p.13, ‘Yin does not transcend yang, nor vice versa. Yin is always becoming yang and yang is always becoming 
yin, night is always becoming day and day is always becoming night.’ 
13 Ibid, p. 21, ‘Confucius is a community, a society, a living tradition’. 
14 Kuan Chung (Kuan Tzu) (d. 645 B.C.E.) 
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approach, taken by Hall and Ames, however, provided a further opening to new research 
by those of different backgrounds, in particular, Confucian and Christian backgrounds.  
This aspect has particular practical implications in the explanation of the interaction of the 
two religious and philosophical traditions. 
 
2.2.1 Collective Intentionality  
 
A series of related articles by a group of social philosophers namely, Searle, Bratman, 
Gilbert and Tuomela showed a common interest in ‘collective intentionality.’ 15   Their 
interest in this construct was not about the collectivization of individual intentions 
subservient to society at large.  Their interest was about how individual intentions would 
evolve into the communal interest under the influence of self-realization, common ethics 
and shared social goals.  In parallel to the social capital concept of communal trust as the 
building block of civil society, this structural approach provides useful intellectual support in 
understanding the ‘construction of social reality.’16  
 
Searle discusses ‘the building blocks of social reality’ and notions of ‘collective intention 
and belief.’  Bratman17 in turn discusses in his Faces of Intention how ‘shared social 
agency’ evolves in its acceptance, and through shared cooperative activity, it matures into 
stability.  Tuomela18 reinforces the importance of perceiving the collective identity of ‘us.’ 
Wray 19  explains how ethical norms, tasks and ‘we’-attitudes bring about collectively 
intentional joint actions.  When such a social process nurtures collective beliefs, it will also 
lead to a positive social dynamic working in the collective interest based on common 
human dignity, rights and duties, and also the ethical sharing of limited economic resources 
in the collective interest.   
 
The concept of collective intentionality helps explain how a given society comes to 
crystallize its ethical, psychological and political framework.  This approach has the 
                                                
15 Searle, JR, Bratman, ME, Gilbert, M & Tuomela, R 2006, ‘Collective Intentionality’, 
<http://www.iep.utm.edu/c/coll-int.htm>, viewed 15 January 2006. 
16 Searle, John R. 1995, The Construction of Social Reality, Free Press, New York.  
17 Bratman, Michael 1999, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
18 Tuomela, Raimo 1995, The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, CA.  
19 Wray, K. Brad 2001, ‘Collective Belief and Acceptance’, Synthese, vol. 129, no. 3, pp. 319-333.  
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potential to explain the motivation behind the design of the Confucian moral and political 
framework.  The ideas common to its humanism and its holistic collective interest would 
influence individual and collective will.  They would also determine the roles of agency by 
key actors and how they would interact with the circumstances of the time.   
 
Searle and his colleagues have had only limited exposure to the Confucian tradition.  
However, potentially a major contribution could be made in being able to clearly define a 
process to ‘construct social reality,’ to recognize ‘us,’ to crystallize ‘collective belief’ without 
collectivization and to arrive at ‘collective acceptance’ as a basis for social norms and 
societal dynamics. 
 
2.2.2 The Crowning Achievement of the Korean Neo-Confucian T’oegye  
 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, T'oegye (1501-1570), was a leading Neo-Confucian 
scholar of the Yi Dynasty in Korea.  He was unique in terms of, firstly, summarizing the 
orthodox Neo-Confucian works of Chinese origin, the scholarly leaders of China,20 and 
then applying their concepts and frameworks to the intellectual and social circumstances of 
Korea.             
 
The monograph in 1999 by Yun,21 a leading contemporary Neo-Confucian scholar from 
modern Korea and that of de Bary,22 introduce and summarize the thoughts and works of 
T’oegye’s opus magnum on Korean Confucianism.  Writing in the sixteenth century, 
T’oegye employed the Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning as a program of comprehensive 
self-cultivation for the young king Sŏnjo (who reigned from 1567 through to 1608) and also 
as an ongoing reminder to him throughout his kingship.  It was based on Neo-Confucian 
ethics and its new metaphysical foundation.  It was prompted by the earlier works of Chang 
Tsai and his Western Inscription, 23  but the greatest influence came from Chu Hsi 
(1130–1200), the central figure in China of the Neo-Confucianism of that era.  The most 
                                                
20  The most noteworthy scholars of early Chinese Neo-Confucianism are Chou Tun-i (1017-1073), Chang Tsai 
(1020-1077) Ch'eng Hao (1032-1083), Ch'eng I (1033-1108) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200).  They are also quoted in the works 
of T’oegye and other Korean and Japanese Neo-Confucian students. 
21 Yun, Sa-sun 1999, Critical Issues in Neo-Confucian Thought: the Philosophy of Yi T’oegye, Kalton, trans. C. Michael, 
Korea University Press, Seoul.  
22 De Bary, Wm. Theodore 1989, The Message of The Mind In Neo-Confucianism, Columbia University Press, New York, 
pp. 54-70.  
23 Kasoff, Ira E 1984, The Thought of Chang Tsai (1020-1077), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1-13.  
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important ingredients were Confucian ethics placed on a new foundation of ‘humanity,’ 
weaving a new pattern of meanings and a framework of governance drawn from the old 
Classical Confucian moral tenets.  They offered in a way an objective norm or standard to 
the subjective judgments of the ruler and the ruled. 
 
Yun’s analysis has made a substantial contribution as a contemporary reinterpretation of 
what the major Neo-Confucian scholars thought, wrote, taught and practiced.  Bilingual 
texts also offered a bridge between those familiar with the philosophies either of the West 
or of Asia.  The article by de Bary was instrumental in articulating alternative frameworks.  
While both articles eruditely examined the key turning points in the East Asian 
philosophical tradition, they fall short in explaining how fundamentally this political 
philosophy failed to impact on social welfare policy and where the flaws lay.  This is crucial 
to discussions on human rights and economic ethics, since both are intrinsically practical 
ethics or practices of ethical norms that played so central a role as the core value of 
Confucianism or Neo-Confucianism.  While new heights were certainly reached in the 
philosophical and ethical spheres of Neo-Confucianism, the Yi Dynasty was plagued by 
incessant factionalism amongst Neo-Confucian elite groups either in government or in 
scholarly circles.  Such division in the various philosophical approaches sometimes meant 
outright atrocities were committed on opposition groups.24  As regards why and how the 
‘nobility and civility’ of the Confucian elites succeeded or failed, de Bary offered another 
viewpoint in his book of the same title.25    
 
2.2.3 Self-cultivation and Humanism 
    
Tu Wei Ming’s26 article on 'the value of the human' in classical Confucian thought discusses 
how humans are at the centre of discussion on values in the teachings of Confucius as 
reflected in the Analects itself.  He argues that the root metaphor in the Confucian classic of 
the Analects is the Way (tao). To understand and lead the Way, learning27 becomes the 
central pursuit in life.  This learning is not just to acquire more knowledge.  It is rather a way 
                                                
24 sa hwa (literati purge) 
25 De Bary, Wm Theodore 2004, Nobility and Civility: Asian Ideals of Leadership and the Common Good, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 119-146.  
26 Tu, Weiming 1985, 'The Value of the Human in Classical Confucian Thought', in Confucian Thought: Selfhood as 
Creative Transformation, SUNY Press, Albany, NY, pp. 67-80. 
27 hak (learning: Korean), hsüeh (learning: Chinese) 
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to be truly human.  One is also encouraged to study poetry28 since this is considered a 
necessary means of communicating in a civilized world, and forms a ritual29 in order to in-
ternalize day-to-day life events characteristic of one's particular community.  Learning 
hence becomes a process whereby one enriches oneself, elevates one’s character, and 
also refines one’s wisdom so that one can be considerate of others and remain true to 
oneself. 
 
Tu also emphasized the significance of Mencius in thinking about the cultivation of the 
heart by making our desires few, but without any imposition of asceticism.  Tu continues to 
refer to Mencius’ suggestion that the basic bodily and metaphysical needs of all human 
beings should be recognized and met to a reasonable degree.  Mencius indeed stressed 
the duty of the political rulership to meet the sustenance needs of the people before 
educating them.  Such prioritization on the basic needs of living ahead of the Confucian 
aspiration for a holistic moral society comprised of many learned people remains a 
significant philosophical and sociological pillar of the Confucian worldview. 
 
Tu has made a significant attempt in bridging the gap between Confucian ideals and actual 
reality. The reality becomes acute, when this very reality lived by the people as they 
struggled to survive was far removed from the lives of the learned elite.  
 
This bridging of the ideal and the actual can be an important contribution to exploring the 
Confucian approach to the contemporary rebirth of human dignity in Classical and 
Neo-Confucian idealism and realism.  This also implies that the building blocks of human 
rights and economic ethics can be drawn from the crucible where such idealism and 
realism are harmonized in the context of applied ethics.   
 
Tu’s argument is admirable, yet it remains an idealistic discourse, not fully bringing into 
play the apparent tendencies of the aberrant application of Confucian ritualism to the 
political expediency of the privileged few, often at the expense of the underprivileged many.  
The literati purges of the Yi Dynasty of Korea more than amply attest to this side of the 
empirical evidence, not to mention the frequent references of modern autocratic rulers to 
the Confucian legitimation for their conduct.  Hence, a further path for this discourse 
                                                
28 si (poetry: Korean), Shih (poetry: Chinese) 
29 ye (ritual: Korean), li (ritual: Chinese) 
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remains to confront the undiminished challenge to the contemporary Neo-Confucian 
school, and Tu has opened the dialogue and the debate on a positive note.   
 
2.3 CONFUCIAN HUMANISM 
 
2.3.1 Confucian Humanity 
 
Hsiao in his book chapter30 on the political thoughts of Confucius argues that the departure 
points of Confucian political ideology are from two key concepts, namely, 1) ‘following 
Chou’31 and 2) ‘rectification of names.’32   
 
Following in the political footsteps of the Chou Dynasty implies that Confucius was 
reasonably satisfied with the style of governance of the Chou sovereign and found its political 
embodiment of social and political ethics compatible to Confucian ideals.  The political 
preference of Confucius was to maintain and nurture a good political ethic as a tradition, and 
he was not inclined to generate revolution through a new political ideology that would 
probably involve violence and social insecurity.  
 
The rectifying of one’s names implies that, should every citizen bear the responsibility of 
acting in accordance with the natural principle that defines his or her social position, then 
there would always be harmony.  ‘Let the ruler be ruler, the minister minister, the father 
father and the son son.’  Name rectification implies that Confucius placed strong emphasis 
on the orderliness of the political and social hierarchy for the common good of society.    
 
Hsiao further argues that these two ideological pillars as mentioned above support the 
government through the four instruments, namely, ‘virtue, rites, politics, and punishments.’33  
In turn, these four instruments make government run smoothly and ethically acceptable 
through deployment of the three desirable strategies, namely, ‘nourish, teach and govern.’  
 
                                                
30 Hsiao, Kung-chuan 1979, 'Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.)', in A History of Chinese Political Thought, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ, pp. 79-142.  
31 Chou Dynasty (1050-256 B.C.E.) 
32 cheng-ming (rectification of names), The Analects of Confucius, book 13, verse 3. 
33 te (virtue), li (rites), cheng (politics), hsing (punishments) 
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This political ideology is an embodiment of the foundational virtues of the Confucian 
teachings encapsulated in ‘humanity, righteousness, rite and wisdom’.34  This also broadly 
defines humanism in the Confucian context, while ‘humanity’ remains at the core of his 
teachings and political ideology. 
 
Hsiao made a contribution in his explication of Confucian political foundations with great 
clarity.  He has not extended his analysis on how such Confucian political design would 
impact upon the applied ethics such as the human rights of the greater society and the fair 
application of economic ethics in the management of livelihood of the commoners.   
    
Tu in his article35 argues that Confucian humanism begins with genuine knowledge of the 
self and self-cultivation.  Such self-knowledge implies simultaneously to perfect oneself 
and a transforming act upon the self, also to shape and create.  This Confucian perception 
of self-knowledge and cultivation has been ingrained in the humanism of East Asians.  
 
Parallel to the four virtues, each human being is endowed with a set of inherent moral 
senses known in Confucian terminology as the four basic human ‘feelings’ (or 
‘beginnings').  These are ‘commiseration,’ ‘shame and dislike,’ ‘deference and 
compliance,’ and ‘right and wrong.’36  These four human ‘feelings’ (or ‘beginnings') are to 
be cultivated and perfected into the four virtues, which become the cornerstone of 
humanism.  According to Tu, moral universality assumes a twofold significance.  The first 
part of the significance lies in the fact that all humans are fundamentally moral with a 
self-perfecting potential.  The second part of the significance comes from the fact that all 
humans are inescapably biological, psychological and social.   Hence, in order to realize 
themselves, all humans must gain knowledge as to how to overcome their limitations and 
to turn them into instruments of service in the interest of self-development.  Tu also 
emphasizes the ethos of empathy as an important aspect of Confucian humanism by 
quoting Mencius, who said ‘if we can fully extend the common experience of feeling 
unable to bear the sufferings of others, our humanity will become inexhaustibly 
abundant.’ 
                                                
34 ‘jen (humanity), i (righteousness), li (rite), chih (wisdom)’ as quoted by Dongyang Munhwa Yŏnguso (the Oriental 
Culture Research Centre), Seoul, <http://my.netian.com/~bookac/index.htm>, viewed 26 July, 2006. 
35 Tu, Op. Cit., 1985, 'The Moral Universal from the Perspectives of East Asian Thought', pp.19-33. 
36 Mencius 1970, The Works of Mencius, Legge, J. trans., Dover Publications, New York., ‘szu-tuan’ (four beginnings or 
feelings)  
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Tu has offered an important contribution by expounding upon the psychological and 
sociological angles to Confucian moral universality as a defining element of Confucian 
humanism.  His argument can have questionable empirical support, depending on whether 
the intentions and circumstances of the social constituents are broadly in agreement with 
the propositions of self-perfection and willing capacity to translate limitations into 
instruments for self-development.   
 
2.3.2 Confucian and Mencian Humanism 
 
Mencius built on the ethical foundation of ‘humanity’ as taught by Confucius.  He, however, 
expanded it substantially into the practical applications of such ethics into personal lives, 
filial piety in the family, service as servant-officials, the centrality of people’s well-being and 
the legitimate political governance of sovereigns.  While he is highly and rightly acclaimed 
as the protagonist of ‘human centrism,’37 he also became one of the reference points for 
the moral legitimation of certain major political decisions, at times related to rebellion or 
acts of war.38  His philosophical works, active social participation and political consultations 
left indelible marks on such diverse topics together with self-realization, education, ethical 
economic policy with primacy given to popular sustenance, and human centrality at the 
very origins and foundations of political power.   
 
In this section of the literature review on Mencius and Confucian humanism, the focus will 
be on the diversity and the broad spectrum of Mencian thought and his teachings.  Min39 
has contributed his thoughts on the ‘ideal world in the philosophy of Mencius.’  Lim40 
discusses the ‘relation between Heaven and the human being,’ and Kim, JY 41  has 
expounded on the debate on the fundamental goodness of human nature as understood at 
                                                
37 Min, Hwang Ki 2000, ‘Mengja ch’ŏrhage issŏsŏŭi isangjŏk salmŭi segye (Ideal World in the Philosophy of Mencius)’, 
Journal of Confucian Studies, vol. 8, pp. 383-404. 
38 Tucker, John Allen 1997, Two Mencian political notions in Tokugawa Japan. (Rebellion and Martyrdom; 1603-1867), 
Philosophy East and West, vol. 47, no.2 (April), pp 233-253.  
39 Min, Hwang Ki 2000, Op. Cit. 
40 Lim, Chong-Hwa, 1999, 'Mengjaŭi sasang’e issŏ chŏnin kwan’gye’e kwanhan kochal (A study of the Relation between 
Heaven and Human Being in Mencius Thought)', Nonmunjip (Theses Collection of Chongju National University of 
Education), vol. 36, pp. 31-54. 
41 Kim, Jin-Yun 2001, 'Mengjaŭi  tangwijŏk sŏngsŏn’gwa Kojaŭi chonjaejŏk musŏngsŏn (The Dispute of Human Nature as 
Fundamentally Good or not in Mengzi and Gaozi)', Korean Journal of Political Science, vol. 9, no 2, pp. 187-201. 
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the time of Mencius and Gao Tzu.   HM Kim42 has contributed to thinking on self-cultivation 
and its importance while Cho43 has explained rite and its role in governance.  Xiao (Hsiao)44 
has shed light on the importance and centrality of the populace, leading to the Mencian 
principle of demo-centrism or the centrality of the people as the fundamental principle.  
Tucker45 has examined the ambivalence in the practical application of Mencian teachings 
in the Tokugawa era in Japan.  These seven articles together form a reasonable overview 
of Mencian teachings and their impact. 
 
While Confucius implicitly disapproved of any rebellion or political revolution, Mencius 
chose to differ and explicitly so.  Mencius was against any resort to violence or rebellion as 
a political means, but made his support clear about having to allow popular opposition in 
the case of incorrigible rulers.  Mencius continues to provide a philosophical base for 
contemporary human rights thinkers and economic ethicists within the Classical Confucian 
tradition.  
 
Mencius taught the four virtues to be the basis of moral foundation.  These apply to all 
levels of personal and social relationships from individuals up to the sovereign.  The four 
virtues are ‘humanity (or benevolence), righteousness, rite (or propriety) and wisdom (or 
knowledge).’46  These virtues, Mencius believed and taught, originate from the innermost 
epicentre of the human soul.  They are seen as the fruition in deeds of every human’s 
innate sense of ‘commiseration, shame, respect and right and wrong.’  This belief is based 
on the assumption that the benevolent mind is something common to all and all humans 
are fundamentally born with moral goodness.47    
 
Extending from personal moral practice to forming a sense of unity with the universe one is 
born into, Mencian ideology also upheld the ‘unity between heaven and humans.’48   This 
sense of unity has no boundary in scale as one is relating to being filial to one’s parents, 
                                                
42 Kim, Hak-Mok 1995, Mengjaŭi suyangnon: insŏngnon’gwaŭi kwan’ge ha’esŏ (A consideration on the self-training 
shown in the works of Mencius)', Taehagwŏn Haksul Nonmunjip (Journal of Graduate Academic Research), vol. 41, pp. 
41-56. 
43 Cho, Jun-Ha 1992, ‘Mengjaŭi yerone  kwanhan yŏn’gu (A Study on the Rites of Mencius)', Tongyang Ch’ŏrhak 
Yŏn’gu(the Study of Eastern Philosophy), vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 43-66.           
44 Xiao, Gongquan 1998, ‘Importance of Populace’, in Chungguk chŏngch’i sasang’sa (History of Chinese Political 
Thought), trans. M Choi & MH Son, Seoul National University Press, Seoul, pp. 148-166. 
45 Tucker, JA  1997, Op. Cit.. 
46 Min, Hwang Ki 2000, Op. Cit., ‘jen‘ (humanity), i (righteousness), li (rite), chih (wisdom)’ 
47 Kim, Jin-Yun 2001, Op. Cit. 
48 Lim, CH 1999, Op. Cit. 
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loyal to the state, and also in serving the world and being gentle to nature.  Mencius 
considered self-cultivation as a way to be followed, as it would enable people to elevate 
themselves to an ethical and harmonious plateau, finding themselves at peace with this 
sense of unity between themselves and the moral universe.49 
 
Mencius’ teachings encapsulated in his Seven Books reflected his concern for people’s 
livelihood, lightening the burden of taxes and avoiding wars and conflicts.   Mencius also 
encouraged the thinking that sovereigns should ‘let the people share the same pleasures 
as his own’.50  This has been politically idealised and often quoted in current politics as the 
‘bliss of sharing happiness with the populace’.51  Mencius, coming from the perspective of 
his primary interest in the importance of the people, also discussed the duties of the 
servant-officials, in that they were at the service of the people, shouldering the 
responsibility on behalf of sovereigns to deliver on the sovereigns’ commitment to the 
well-being of the people.  Hence, they bear their ultimate accountability to the people 
through the medium of sovereign rule. On the essentials of his concept of nourishing the 
people, Mencius tirelessly reiterated and expanded his views.  But he usually treated the 
subject of teaching the people as something subsidiary to it, and set that forth only in its 
larger outlines.52 
 
As to why Mencius needed to discuss the theory of the ‘importance of the people’53 as of 
such a high priority, we can note that in his time the dynasties of Wei and Ch’i were 
struggling for political supremacy, while the influence of the Ch’in was just beginning its 
ascent to future greatness.  In the midst of these great contests for power, the feeding of 
the people had to be regarded as the first principle of government. 
 
But the Mencian principle of respect for the people went beyond sustenance and well-being.  
He also advocated the importance of the people’s opinions.  He felt that popular consensus 
                                                
49 Kim, HM 1995, Op. Cit. 
50 Legge, 1970, Op. Cit., The Works of Mencius:  Book 1, King Hui of Liang, part II, p. 151.” “When a ruler rejoices in the 
joy of his people, they also rejoice in his joy; when he grieves in the sorrow of his people, they also grieve at his sorrow.  A 
common bond of joy will pervade the kingdom; a common bond of sorrow will do the same.” 
51 yŏmin dongnak (Korean), (bliss of sharing happiness with populace) 
52 Xiao (Hsiao) 1998, Op. Cit. 
53 min kuei lun (importance of the people) 
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on repudiating a particular rulership should be the ultimate point for considering a change 
of power, or for choosing or abandoning any government policy.54 
 
While such ideas held by Mencius could become equivalent to the notion of the people’s 
sovereignty, it falls short of a working democracy as understood in the modern context.  
Mencian demo-centrism meant ‘for the people’ and perhaps ‘of the people.’  It certainly did 
not mean ‘by the people.’  The opinion of the people was capable only of passive 
manifestation, while political authority was to be exercised exclusively by those who also 
had superior knowledge.  If the sovereign defaults to an intolerable degree, the people had 
no other choice but to wait for heaven’s medium to undo tyrannical sovereignty.  The 
struggle to search for working institutions in the service of the people in accordance with 
Mencian ideals did not begin in earnest during the time of Mencius.55  
 
The ethical teachings of Mencius point to the use of ‘rites’ as the correct and desirable 
means of governance.56  However, the teachings of Mencius also left doors wide open to 
diverse interpretations.  There were repeated references made to Mencian teachings at 
times of historical significance.  In the beginning of the Tokugawa period of Japan 
(1603-1867), Mencian views on rebellion and political martyrdom became important topics 
of discussion.  Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543-1616), the founder of the Tokugawa samurai 
shogunate, consulted Confucian courtly scholars such as Hayashi Razan (1583-1657), on 
the moral legitimacy of militarily preempting the loyalists of his suzerain, Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi (1537-1598).  Razan’s advice was ambivalent.  Razan quoted the two paths of 
Mencian teachings that were not reconcilable.  He quoted the ethical ‘middle path’ as 
taught by Mencius on the one hand.  He also referred to the ‘expedient path,’ on the other 
hand, as recognized by Mencius for the greater good of the populace.  
 
The motivation behind the sagely teachings would reflect different historical periods, each 
period generating a different impact and perspective. While the teachings of Mencius 
represent the cornerstone of Confucian humanism and humanisms in action, the breadth, 
diversity and pliability of his teachings evidently present substantial challenges, unless they 
are understood and applied in the proper context.  
 
                                                
54 Kim, JY, Op. Cit., p. 191.  
55 Xiao (Hsiao) 1998, Op. Cit., pp. 159-161. 
56 Cho, JH 1992, Op. Cit. 
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2.3.3 Chung-Yung (The Doctrine of the Mean):  'Superior Personhood, Community of Trust  
and  Sincerity' 
   
Chung Yung (Doctrine of the Mean),57  constitutes an integral work in the Confucian 
tradition.  It is said to be a composition by Confucius' grandson, Tzu Ssu.58  The Doctrine of 
the Mean is one of the four Confucian canonical books, and came from the Records of 
Rites, as the Great Learning did.  Its title is translated into English in various ways, such as 
‘the mean,’ ‘the constant mean,’59 ‘the middle way,’60 ‘the middle use,’61 ‘the common 
centrality’62 and ‘the unwobbling pivot’ or ‘the pivot.’63   
 
Chung Yung, with its first character chung signifying the mean, centre or centrality and the 
second character yung denoting commonality, constancy or harmony, represents thinking 
on the three cardinal concepts of ‘superior personhood, community of trust and sincerity.’  
Firstly, it means a moral call and the status of a ‘superior person’64 achieving the highest 
possible level of self-cultivation through lonely ethical struggles.  Secondly, it means to 
strive for and attain a state of harmony through the dynamic process of ethical socialization 
or harmonization, realizing ‘rectification’ or ‘community of trust.’ 65   Thirdly, it means 
reaching the character ideal of ‘sincerity’66 universally acceptable and beholden in the eyes 
of all. 
 
The period in which this work emerged points to and implies the political confusion and 
abject social distrust between the states embroiled in a series of political and military 
struggles.  Yang,67 in his textual analysis of the work and his findings on the deeper moral 
implications, argues that the primary motivation for this opus was based on the intent to 
produce a moral platform that works through from the individual constituents of society up 
to the sovereigns, to eventually bring everything back to a common moral ground to serve 
                                                
57 Legge 1960, Op. Cit. Chung Yung (the Doctrine of the Mean)  
58 Tzu Ssu (Zisi,Kong Ji, circa 483-402 B.C.E.) 
59 as translated by Legge, James 
60 as translated by Waley, Arthur (1989-1966) 
61 as translated by Leys, Simon (b. 1935) 
62 as translated by Tu, Wei-Ming (b. 1941) 
63 as translated by Pound, Ezra (1885-1972) 
64 chün tzu 
65 cheng 
66 ch’eng 
67 Yang, Seung-Kwon, 2000, Chungyong changguŭi todŏkkwan yŏn’gu (Study on Moral Outlook reflected in the texts of 
'the Doctrine of the Mean'), Su Seon Bulletin, vol. 25, pp. 1-46. 
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their peoples and enhance their personhood. Such intent was visible in this small opus of 
twenty three chapters.  It states that the ‘way’68 as prescribed by a heavenly mandate 
applies not only to the ruler but to everyone. 
 
‘Centrality and commonality,’ as Tu69 suggests in his 1989 essay, characterizes the work 
for its fundamental yet far reaching aphorisms unfolding page by page in a mix of social 
psychology and meta-physics.  It has been a central document for more than two thousand 
years and has continuously been a source of inspiration for creative minds in East Asian 
scholarly history.  Every East-Asian literatus was expected to learn the work by heart 
before he reached adolescence.  The book has remained a basic text for civil-service 
examinations both in China from circa 1313 to 1905, and in Korea circa 958 to 1910, up 
until both countries became republics in the twentieth century.  The mode of thinking 
presented in Chung Yung is still readily perceivable.  It also closely typifies how ideas are 
developed and refined in contemporary East-Asia. 
 
This highly influential classic could have been a response to the growing influence of 
Buddhist metaphysics during the writer’s time.  This classic of Confucian metaphysics is 
firmly rooted in Confucius' teachings. It relates to the psychological tension and spiritual 
dichotomies between self and society, and the conflict between personal ethics and social 
norms.70 
 
Chung Yung points to a direction as to how a person can sublimate his or her personhood 
to a ‘superior man, or profound person’ in the process of social and political rectification or 
bringing about a type of community where trust reigns, not power, and where peoples of 
the ruling or the ruled classes alike cherish a level of integrity called ch’eng, namely, 
‘sincerity.’  Learned by heart through intellectual internalization or by rote just to meet the 
needs of the scholar examination, this message of harmonization,71 as Cheng argues in his 
article, was centrally placed to serve all aspects of the understanding of selves and in the 
interests of the greater good of the society.  This message prescribes for a continuing 
                                                
68 tao (dao) 
69 Tu, Wei-Ming, 1989, Centrality and Commonality: an Essay on Confucian Religiousness, State University of New York 
Press, Albany. 
70 Tu, Ibid. 
71 Cheng, Chung-ying 1991, 'Toward Constructing a Dialectics of Harmonization: Harmony and Conflict in Chinese 
Philosophy', in New Dimensions of Confucian and Neo-Confucian Philosophy, State University of New York Press, Albany, 
pp. 185-218. 
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process toward an ever-deepening self-knowledge through a spiritually and morally 
elevated personhood.  It also subscribes to the idea of society as a ‘fiduciary community’72 
rather than as an adversary system.  The prescription for such is called ‘sincerity’ as a 
primary concept in the construction of a moral metaphysics as an integral approach to 
meeting human concerns. 
 
The book begins with the vital and self-evident introduction:   
 
What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature. To follow human nature is called 
the Way.  Cultivating the Way is called teaching.  The Way cannot be separated from us 
for a moment.  What can be separated from us is not the Way.  Therefore the profound 
person is cautious over what he does not see and apprehensive over what he does not 
hear.73  
 
Hence, to cultivate centrality and harmony with thoroughness is the way to bring heaven 
and earth to their proper place and all things their proper nourishment.74  In the modern 
context, building a liveable society through forming a community of trust has a significant 
bearing on governance.  Levi75 argues, in her article on ‘a state of trust’ and governance, 
that social constituents sharing trust with others in the community stand an excellent 
chance of building social capital.  Yang76 further argues that Chung Yung is consistent with 
the broad psycho-analytical guidelines of Freud77 in that the ‘ego’ undergoes a process of 
overcoming the ‘id,’ then transcending to the ‘superego.’  Chung Yung is compatible with 
the argument of Lacan78 in that individuals go through the dialectical process of mirroring 
themselves against the prism of social self-images, overcome the ‘psychological structure 
of social symbolism embedded in subconsciousness,’ and proceed to the ‘reality’ of 
self-realisation in the social context. 
 
                                                
72 Tu, 1989, Op. Cit. 
73 Legge 1960, Op. Cit., chapter 1. 
74 Tu, 1989, Op. Cit. 
75 Levi, Margaret 1998, 'A State of Trust', in Trust and Governance, eds. V Braithwaite & M Levi, Russell Sage Foundation, 
New York, pp. 77-101. 
76 Yang, SK, 2000, Op. Cit. 
77 Freud, Sigmund 1999, Anthology of Freud, trans. Hui-Gui Yoon, Open Book Publication, Seoul.  
78 Evan, D 1998, Anthology of Lacan’s Psycho-analysis, trans. Jong-Joo Kim, In’gansarang Publication, Seoul. 
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Both Cheng and Tu have offered unique insights as Sinic scholars very much in the midst 
of a cross-cultural discourse with clear conceptualisation and selective discourse 
intelligible to both East-Asian and English readers.  Yang contributed with his attempt to 
applying the Freudian psycho-analytical framework, and to bridging the subconscious 
selfhood with the social domains of moral teachings.  Levi exhibited a contemporary 
parallel to the social capital discourse and the place of trust in it.  As reviewed through the 
minds and eyes of the diverse writers, Chung Yung’s psychological, philosophical and 
socio-political implications are significant and diverse in relation to our discourse on 
Confucian humanism, and how it plays out in terms of the ethics on human dignity and 
economic means as studied under the theme of human rights and economic ethics. 
 
2.3.4 Confucianism and its Encounter with Taoism and Mahayana Buddhism 
 
While Confucianism has remained at the forefront of personal moral and governance 
ideology in East Asia, other important streams of thinking and worldviews co-existed either 
in opposition or through syncretic interactions.  Taoism was in large part a philosophy of 
retreat and withdrawal on the part of thinkers.  They were wary of perpetual warfare, social 
instability and destruction.  Taoism provided a mental shelter to turn away from the struggle 
for power, status and wealth.  The teachings on the tao or the way opened mental windows 
to infinite time and space.  In this spatial and temporal infinity, the subjectivity of human 
individuals assumes a position of unimportance, unless it signifies the individual 
manifestation of vast cosmic forces.  This philosophy often thrived as a protest of common 
men against the mounting tyranny of the ruling class.  It also expressed the rebellion of the 
very uncommon man of intellect or sensitivity against the growing rigidity of the Confucian 
moralists.  The Taoist great Lao Tzu79 starts his celebrated Tao Te Ching (The Book of the 
Way)80 by dismissing the very core of the Confucian concept of the way.  Lao Tzu also uses 
the same term ‘way,’ but only in a context diagonally opposite to Confucius.  As exemplified 
in this initial part of Tao Te Ching teachings, Taoists subscribed to a way of life that let 
people enjoy the independence of individual mental space, and also staying in harmony 
and peace with nature.81  Interactions between Confucianism and Taoism were wide and 
                                                
79 Lao Tzu (Laozi; c. 4th century B.C.E.) 
80 Star, Jonathan, tran. 2001, Tao Te Ching (the Book of the Way), Jeremy P. Tarcher/Putnam, New York, p. 14. ‘A way 
that can be walked is not The Way. A name that can be named is not The Name.’ 
81  Fairbank, JK, Reischauer, EO & Craig, AM 1999, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, Houghton Mifflin, 
Washington DC, pp. 46-49. 
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diverse from adversarial to complementary, in particular, for those not holding offices.  The 
tao or the way meant to Confucius the ideal for the social system.  Taoism gave it a new 
metaphysical dimension and, for the common people, a powerful alternative to the 
orthodoxy of Confucianism in coping with their daily lives.    
 
Taoists did not always stay away from government.  Xiao82 argues that Taoists on the 
contrary wanted to restore the right balance of humility and respect for the spiritual integrity 
of the people that had been lost in the complexity of bureaucracy and conflict of interests 
that Confucian officialdom brought to the system of government.  They wanted to bring 
back ‘nature’s rhythms’ to all aspects of human endeavour. 
 
The Taoist ideal of return to nature also opened up freedom of thinking.  Such freedom and 
flexibility proved instrumental in the introduction of the new foreign religion of Mahayana 
Buddhism.  Fang83 argues in his seminal work that the nature of Buddhist metaphysics 
owed a lot to Taoism as it intellectually fertilized East Asia.  Instead of facing only 
Confucian morality and restrictive social conformity potentially hostile to non-conformity 
represented by an alien philosophy, Buddhism could find more receptive hearts and minds 
in East Asia.  
 
While a person in power usually is a Confucian positivist intent on the saving of the ‘world’ 
or society, at the same time the same person might cherish a strong aesthetic urge that the 
individual freedom of Taoism and its mystical unity with nature nurtures.  Hence, East 
Asian artists and poets, closely identified with the Confucian tradition, have usually been 
Taoists at heart.84  Popular attraction also came from the potent weapon of humour that 
Taoists such as Chuang Tzu (Zhuang Zi; ca 369-286 B.C.E.)85 employed against the pomp 
and the staid character of the Confucian establishment.  Humour was an important 
ingredient in their teachings and literature, more readily mobilizing popular confidence in 
the validity of their assertions.   
 
                                                
82 Xiao (Hsiao) 1998, Op. Cit., pp. 283-293. 
83 Fang, Thomé H 1981, 'Taoism and its Impact upon the Early Development of Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism', in 
Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and its Development, Linking Publishing, Taipei, Taiwan, pp.119-172. 
84 Watson, Burton. trans. 1968, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 3-28. 
85 Watson, Ibid.  
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Such psychological, aesthetical and philosophical flexibility through its duality of yin-yang 
has provided a space for humanism, even under the worst adversity, until modern times.  
Since neither Confucianism nor Taoism were jealously exclusive religions, the individuals 
and even the whole of society could be Confucian and Taoist at the same time, achieving 
perhaps a healthier psychological balance on these two bases than could have been 
achieved on only one.86   
 
From the births and syncretic interactions of primordial Confucianism, Taoism and other 
indigenous creeds such as Mohism,87 the period of further interaction with the major foreign 
religion of Mahayana Buddhism ensued and its influence was substantial enough to last as 
one of the major religious and philosophical traditions of East Asia, either on its own or as 
inculturated into the other major religions.  Such interaction impacted on the evolution of 
Classical Confucianism nearly a millennium later cascading into the three major trends of 
Neo-Confucianism, namely, the idealistic, realistic and naturalistic trends,88 spawning new 
breeds of diverse creeds under the common Confucian tradition.   
 
Seung89 has recognized in his article on Ch’oe Ch’iwon90 who flourished in the second part 
of the ninth century that he was one of the first leading Korean Confucians who integrated 
and made indigenous the influences of Buddhism and Taoism in a trilogy.  Syncretism as 
such often characterizes Korean intellectual and aesthetic traditions up to modern times.  
Seung’s article highlights the significance of Ch’oe Ch’iwon’s achievements, and his 
discussion serves as a broad sweep of the subject. 
 
Ishida91 argues in his book on the history of Japanese thought that the syncretic influences 
of the foreign religions, namely, Confucianism introduced circa 405 C.E. and Buddhism 
circa 538-552 C.E. helped in the formation of the Japanese state ideology of Shintoism and 
strengthened the emperor system, as also recorded in the Nihon Shoki (Chronicle of 
Japan) completed in 720 C.E. 
                                                
86 Fang 1981, Op. Cit. 
87 Mohism as started under the leadership of Moh Tzu (Mozi; ca 470-390 B.C.E.) and his followers. 
88 Fang 1981, Op. Cit., pp. 331-334. 
89 Seong, Gyo-Jin 2001,‘Koun, Ch’oe Ch’iwŏnŭi kyonghaktaejang’e natanan sŏnghangnon (Choe Chiwon's Governance 
Ideals reflected in his work Kyonghaktaejang [the Anthology of the Sovereign's Learnings])', in Ch’ŏrhak Nonch’ong 
(Journal of the New Korean Philosophical Association), vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 205-239. 
90 Choe, Chiwon (born 857-died unknown):  a Korean Confucian official, philosopher, and poet of the late Unified Silla 
period (668-935) 
91 Ishida, Ichirō 2001, Shi-sō-shi (History of Japanese Thought), Yamakawa Publising, Tokyo, pp. 77-91. 
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Confucianism not only interacted with the major belief systems of Taoism and Mahayana 
Buddhism, but also with the indigenous folk beliefs extant in the Korea and Japan of that 
time such as shamanism and animism.  Such an evolutionary process with its own and 
widespread influence on others had bearings over the nature of the humanism that 
emerged.  Watson highlighted the critical aspects of Taoist influence in his translation work 
of Chuang Tzu.  Fang offered an erudite analysis into the symbiotic dynamics and 
processes of major interacting creeds.  Seung elaborated on a broad scenario the Korean 
trilogy of ‘Confucianism-Buddhism-Taoism,’92 as firstly made apparent in the works of 
Ch’oe Ch’iwon.  Ishida has described how the formative process of the Japanese state 
ideology of Shintoism has been under the influence of the imported religions of 
Confucianism and Buddhism.  He also argues that through this syncretic process, the 
formation and further strengthening of the emperor system followed.    
 
This aspect has a significant implication in the understanding and recognizing of the human 
dignity of individuals.  Such an admirable balance between the dominant official culture and 
centralization of power would undoubtedly expand space for human freedom and 
potentially contribute to human rights observance and the economic ethics of a given 
society.     
 
2.3.5 I Ching: Source of Imagination for Confucian Creativity  
 
I Ching or the Book of Changes93 came as an ancient composition of oracles in an archaic 
script during the Bronze Age of China in the period circa 2500 B.C.E. through to the 
Classical Confucian period of age 300 B.C.E.  It was a book of divination of the courts and 
people.  In the age when I Ching came into being, divination was an important act of 
governance, and certainly a critical influence on individual lives.  I Ching went through 
many changes and developed into varied versions.  One version acquired Confucian 
orthodoxy through its editing by Confucius and his disciples.  This version is the I Ching we 
are discussing.  Changes and development of this widely used book meant in turn a 
pervasive influence upon the evolution of written and spoken languages in forms, 
symbolism and meanings.  Apart from its age, I Ching’s impacts are far-reaching and wide, 
                                                
92 yubulsŏn literally means ‘Confucianism-Buddhism-Taoism’ in Korean vernacular. 
93 Wilhelm, Richard, ed. 1983, I Ching or Book of Changes (Zhouyi), trans. R Wilhelm and CF Baynes, Arkana, London.  
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not only upon Confucianism, but also on Taoism in particular, and to a substantial extent on 
Mahayana Buddhism in the East Asian sphere.  By the second century C.E., eight 
explanatory tractates called 'Ten Wings' were added.94  I Ching or the Book of Changes 
would refer to the book, including the Ten Wings.   
 
Twentieth century historians and philologists, aided by advances in archaeology and 
linguistics, continue the work of bringing a modern context to this book, encompassing 
‘changes of nature and humanity.’  While it is a book of early Sinic mathematics, natural 
science and wisdom sayings, it also has been a source of imagination and symbolism for 
all who chose their way of applying it to their lives in divination,95 cosmology, calendaring, 
politics, warfare, farming and many other human endeavours.       
 
Ha,96 in his article on ‘signs and symbols” of I Ching, describes how I Ching develops from 
the basic elements of trigrams into the symbols and meanings of hexagrams.  Ha argues 
that I Ching represents a universal and perennial resource of metaphysical and 
methodological thinking.  According to Ha, I Ching also represents a wonderful well-spring 
of philosophical inspiration and reinvigoration.  As such a source, it serves as a 
methodological and metaphysical vehicle for philosophical comprehension and integration. 
 
Ma,97 in his article on the ‘symbolic system’ of I Ching, relates how I Ching helps humans in 
their struggle for the realization of meaning in life.  In the process of striving for meaning, 
Ma argues, I Ching is a guide with which one can find a unity through the complementing of 
the opposite elements of yin and yang and arrives at the tao or the way in life.  Ma called 
this dialectic the ‘paradoxical intention.’98  Ma also argues that this dialectic is not mutually 
confrontational.  It is rather a process of naturalization in the paradigm of the I Ching mode 
of thinking.   
                                                
94 Rutt, Richard, trans. 2002, the Book of Changes (Zhouyi): A Bronze Age Document, Curzon, London, pp. 26-43. 
95 Divination was a formal ritual conducted in courts to interpret omens of significance for state affairs.  It is to be 
distinguished from fortune-telling.   
96 Ha, Chun-Deuk 1988, ‘Chuyŏk yŏn’gu ki’il (Hamgwe)’, in Chŏrhak Ch’ongnon (Journal of the New Korean Philosophical 
Association), vol. 4, pp. 63-74. 
97 Ma, Kwang-Su 1986, ‘Chuyŏgŭi sangjing ch’egye yŏn’gu: yŏksŏljŏk ŭidowa kwallyŏnhayŏ’ (A Study on the Symbolic 
System in I Ching relate to 'Paradoxical Intention'), in Inmun Kwahak (Yonsei University), vol. 55, pp. 1-30.  
98 Frankl, Viktor 1967, ‘Psychotherapy and Existentialism: Selected papers on Logo-therapy, Simon and Schuster, New 
York, p. 139.  ‘Paradoxical Intention’ implies that a person can overcome what one fears through a therapeutic process of 
intensifying the underlying anticipatory anxieties and also by concurrently helping in the development of human capacity 
for self-detachment, often with a sense of humour. Due to the use of seemingly paradoxical means to obtain the intended 
result, such intents are termed by Frankl ‘paradoxical Intention’.  
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I Ching’s timeliness lies in its philosophy of transformation, when ‘i’ literally means change 
and ‘ching’ means canon.  This canon of changes has played a determining role in 
philosophy for broadening creative thinking and enriching divergent thought parameters. 
Such vision and the methodology of so-called ‘i-thinking’ brought with it a wealth of fresh 
meanings to the commonplace aspects of life and nature.   
 
The signs and symbols found in humans and nature assume ‘signification’99 in the ‘i-mode’ 
of thinking.  Signs noticed in life and nature would become the ‘signifier’ through human 
interactions with I Ching, and find their new meanings in the ‘signified’ objects in human, 
political and social relations.  Symbols in nature such as ‘sun and moon’ which formed the 
ideogram character of ‘i’ of I Ching, would transform through I Ching signification and 
acquire such orthodoxy as to become national flags and other symbols of power and 
legitimacy.  Once new meanings are awarded power and legitimacy, these new signs are 
no longer benign objects detached from humans.  The sign becomes invariable in the given 
social framework.  The Korean flag design incorporates the circle of sun and moon and 
strokes of I Ching trigrams.100  It demands the respect of Koreans.  The Shinto emblems of 
Japan embody numerous I Ching-based designs with specific signification both as the 
signifier and the signified, assuming deified importance,101 demanding the respect of all 
Japanese.  Over time, these signs and meanings do change and become variable.  Hence 
these aspects in the I Ching context have both ‘invariability and variability,’ characteristic of 
signs and symbols.102   
 
I Ching also played an important role implicitly as an area of interest shared by the 
competing ideologies of Taoism, Legalism and the major foreign religion of Mahayana 
Buddhism.  It opened up to all an extra space for inspiration and insight for reorganization, 
reintegration, and reconstruction, in so far as any of these traditions singularly or together 
is capable of new structures and new processes.103 
 
                                                
99 De Saussure, Ferdinand 1990, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Roy Harris, Duckworth, London, pp. 65-66. 
100  Ng, Wai-ming 2000, 'The I Ching in Late-Chosŏn Thought', Korean Studies, vol. 24 (January), pp. 53-55, 
<http://www.proquest.com/>, viewed 03 August 2006. 
101 Ng, Wai-ming 1998, ‘The I Ching in the Shinto Thought of Tokugawa Japan’,  Philosophy East  and West, vol. 48, no. 
4, pp. 568-570. 
102 Ibid. pp. 71-78. 
103 Cheng, CY 1991, Op. Cit., pp. 27. 
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Gu,104 in his article on ‘images in the Book of Changes’ in relation to ‘ancient insights into 
modern language philosophy and hermeneutics’, sheds light on how ‘images’105 and signs 
or symbols take on a linguistic form of  ‘words,’106 and then how ‘thoughts’107 assume 
‘letters,’108 to form the ‘idea-image’ formats109 of Sinic ideography.  This linguistic process 
goes beyond its domain to the one of   philosophical anthropology, according to Gu.110  This 
lingual and philosophical landscape enjoys a broad sweep over East Asia. 
 
Barthes,111 in his discussion on ‘mythologies’ introduced in the lectures given by McNeill, 
expounds upon the ‘politics of mythologies’ born of signs and symbols embedded in 
language and the psyche.  East Asian nations share a long history and a great mix of 
memories and national mythologies.  Such a mix has political implications, when these I 
Ching-based national signs and symbols are represented in the modern context.   
 
Ding,112 in his article on ‘I Ching’s implications on modern technology’, refers to the Sinic 
technical minds attuned to the cultural patterns of I Ching.  Since I Ching builds up its signs 
and symbols with the use of binary elements, it would certainly make modern computing 
science and its use of algorithm more familiar.  He further argues that I Ching’s quality of 
being able to open minds not only of religious or philosophical orientation, but also of 
scientific curiosity would be conducive to innovative research and the development 
pursuits of industrial East Asia.  
 
The idea of I Ching as a source of imagination and also of Confucian creativity has been 
broadly supported by Rutt’s argument for its openness and transformative capacity, and 
                                                
104 Gu, Ming Dong 2004, 'Elucidation of Images in the Book of Changes: Ancient Insights into Modern Language 
Philosophy and Hermeneutics', Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 469-488. 
105 hsiang (xiang: image) 
106 yen (yan: word) 
107 i (yi: thought) 
108 wentzu (wenzi: letter) 
109 i-hsiang (yi-xiang: idea-image) 
110 Gu, MD 2004, Op. Cit., p. 469: ‘I Ching is a book about images; the images are symbolic resemblances of things.  The 
eight trigrams having been arranged in proper order, images of myriad things are immanent within.  Indeed, I Ching was 
born out of the attempt to represent the myriad things and conditions under heaven through imagistic symbolism.  The 
hexagram images are so called because the sages were able to discover the complex rationale behind the phenomena 
under the sky and represented it in images and shapes used to symbolize the meanings appropriate to a particular object.  
This was how hexagram images came to be designated.’ 
111 McNeill, Tony 1996, Roland Barthes: Mythologies (McNeill Lectures), the University of Sunderland, Sunderland, UK, 
<http://orac.sund.ac.uk/~os0tmc/myth.htm>, viewed 12 August 2006. 
112 Ding, Daniel D 2003, 'The Emergence of Technical Communication in China-Yi-Jing (I Ching): The Budding of a 
Tradition’, Journal of Business and Technical Communication, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 319-345. 
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also by Ha on its being a resource of metaphysical and methodological thinking.  Ma 
argued that challenges of a personal psychological nature can be overcome by letting 
‘paradoxical intentions’ play out within the parameters I Ching would allow.   Saussure 
expounded on the signification process and impacts of signs and symbols in close parallel 
to the paradigm of I Ching.  Ng offered examples of such impacts noticeable in Korea and 
Japan.  Gu’s contribution lay in his linguistic reinterpretation in terms of ‘idea-image’ as 
evolved from sign and symbol.  Barthes saw another parallel to I Ching in the ‘mythologies’ 
extant in contemporary age as the off-spring of signs and symbols and also as the ongoing 
mutations.   Ding saw in I Ching a direct technical parallel to I Ching in the application of 
binaries.  As such, I Ching represents a source of imagination and also of how Confucian 
creativity presents itself through the diversity of its nature and applications.  
 
2.4 CONFUCIAN GOVERNANCE 
 
2.4.1 Governance: ‘Sovereign as a Sage’ Ideal  
 
The orthodox Neo-Confucian canon on governance rests in the Great Learning as one of 
the four key Confucian canons.113  Its emphasis is on the ethical foundation and practice of 
duties required both of the governing and the governed at all levels, including the sovereign, 
the ministers, the government administrative officials and the common people.   
 
Chi’s article114 discusses such ethical foundations and practices under the ‘three headings, 
namely, ‘1. making one’s ‘bright virtue’ brilliant, 2. making the people new, 3. dwelling in the 
‘highest good,’ and the ‘eight particulars,’ namely, ‘1. straightening out affairs, 2. extending 
understanding, 3. making intentions genuine, 4. balancing the mind, 5. refining one’s 
person, 6. aligning one’s household, 7. ordering the state, 8. setting the world at peace.’115  
His discussion elucidates on how this framework of personal and social virtues in the 
Confucian context should relate to the ‘way of kingship.’116  This way of kingship effectively 
laid the foundation of governance for the society of the Yi Dynasty in Korea.  One important 
                                                
113 taehak (Korean), ta-hsüeh (Chinese) 
114 Chi, Doo-hwan, 1993, ‘Chosŏn chŏn’gi [Taehak yŏnŭi] yihae kwajŏng (The Understanding Process of ‘Taehak yŏnŭi’ 
the Great Learning in the Earlier Period of Choson Dynasty)’, in T’aedong Kojŏn Yŏn’gu (T’aedong Classical Research), 
vol.10. 
115 samgang; Korean, san-kang (sangang: Chinese): the Three Headings, paljomok; Korean, pat’iaomu (batiaomu; 
Chinese): the Eight Particulars  
116 paedo (Korean), wang-do (Korean)  
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aspect is that the sovereign is not considered the absolute being beyond fallibility and 
moral challenge.  Rather the status of the sovereign is the ‘first among equals.’117  This 
horizontal accountability finds its way into T’oegye’s Ten Diagrams118 that defines kingly 
behaviours in relation to governance.   
 
T’oegye’s contribution was in explaining how this political philosophy, encapsulated in the 
Great Learning which originated from the Classical Confucian text of the ‘Book of Rites,’119 
inculturated itself into the style of Korean kingship.  His contribution, however, did not 
elaborate on the alternative thinking that was often opposed to such orthodoxy.   
 
The most prominent counter-arguments came from the so-called Legalists.120  Positioned 
between these two nearly diagonally opposed views, is the eclectic school of ‘universal 
commonwealth’ or ‘great unity.’ This group which emphasized great unity drew their core 
inspiration from a classical text, namely, the Book of Rites.121       
 
2.4.2 Legalism: An Alternative to Confucian and Mencian Views  
 
Jeon122 discusses in his article the political thoughts of Hsün Tzu (310-237 B.C.E.) and the 
works written under the same name.123  While Hsün Tzu was in agreement with the 
teachings of Confucius and Mencius, he chose to differ in the way their ideas are projected 
into real world situations.  The stark difference lies in that he considered the negative side 
of intrinsic human nature, contrary to the departure points of Confucius and Mencius who 
focussed on the human potential of goodness.  He emphasized the need for personal and 
social discipline that needs to be institutionalized and made apparent to all in the form of 
laws and royal edicts.  This view was further hardened by his pupils such as Han Fei Tzu (ca. 
280-233 B.C.E.) who preferred to have laws at centre-stage together with the associated 
                                                
117 Chi, Op. Cit. 
118 Yun, SS 1999, Op. Cit. 
119 lichi (liji : Chinese) 
120 Fachia (fajia: School of Legalism): It refers to a pragmatic political philosophy, near the end of the Zhou dynasty from 
about the sixth century B.C. to about the third century B.C.E., with maxims like "when the epoch changed, the ways 
changed" as its essential principle. "Legalism" implies a form of political philosophy that upholds the rule of law and 
practical institutionalization.  
121 ta-t’ung (datong)  appears in lichi (the Book of Rites), chapter of liyün. 
122 Jeon, SY 1996, ‘Sunjaŭi chŏngch’i sasang yŏn’gu (A Study of the Political Thoughts of Hsün Tzu: with Special 
Reference to his Viewpoint of Government)’, Ch’odŭng Kyoyuk Yŏn’gu, vol. 8, pp. 1-19. 
123 Watson, Burton, ed. 1967, Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu, Columbia University Press, New 
York. 
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moral teachings as the means of personal cultivation that would help lessen both the 
number of legal cases and the amount of litigation.  
 
Jeon argues that the legalists still maintained their ethical moorings in Classical Confucian 
governance thinking while their real sights are on the practical policies and measures such 
as the use of ‘li (rites)’ as social behavioural norms and the implementation of a ‘social 
division of labour.’124  This expansion of these moral dictates into all areas of society 
certainly brings Confucianism face-to-face with realities.  Hsün Tzu’s contribution lies in 
making the ethics of Confucian sages operational and objective in terms of discernment by 
a third party and opening the possibility for objective criticism based on outcomes rather 
than any potentially subjective ethical guidelines.  This is why Hsün Tzu was repeatedly 
quoted by posterity and is relied on as a powerful ethical source for challenging the 
orthodoxy and political supremacy of mainstream Classical Confucianism.   
 
Jeon rightly brought into focus the centrality of a legal framework in delivering a system of 
governance based on the sagely teachings.  When he claimed that this is the beginning of 
‘popular centrism,’ meaning the people coming to the front of the political and moral stage 
or the centring of the interests of the people, he over-emphasized the conceptualistic or 
even overly-idealistic beginning in an age of warring states.  Most monarchs were averse to 
this level of openness in exercising power when an intense struggle to consolidate power 
was occurring.  As Jeon has indicated, this alternative view could open the way through 
wider interpretation to the extreme challenge produced by ‘revolution.’125  
 
Chung and Cho126 have written on the same subject as Jeon but with a different angle.  
They emphasized the role of ‘rites’ as advocated by both Mencius and Hsün Tzu, agreeing 
on their centrality, but differing in their application to the governance process.  In spite of 
this difference, Mencius and Hsün Tzu believed firmly that the mainstay of governance 
should remain the permanence and legitimacy of royalty as Heaven-endowed.   
 
                                                
124 Ibid: Hsün Tzu wrote a chapter on ‘the Regulations of a King’, in which he literally describes how ministers in the court, 
craftsmen at work, merchants in market, farmers at farms etc should behave and perform.  
125 The Socialist China of the People’s Republic has a number of scholars making references in between Marx-Leninist 
revolution and the Chinese version of Classical openness to revolutionary challenges. 
126 Chung, YS & Cho, HK 1987, ‘Sunjaŭi chŏngch’i sasang yŏn’gu (Political Thought of Hsün Tzu)’, Journal of Social 
Sciences of Kyungbuk National University, vol. 6, pp. 68-86.  
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Chung and Cho brought into the picture the notion that the social context must have the 
right conditions and they made a critical evaluation of both kingship and informed 
sovereignty and the critical importance of the ‘right balance’127 between the two.     
 
The Korean courtly scholars of the Yi Dynasty such as T’oegye with their inclination 
towards mainstream moderation prevailed, whereas in Tokugawa Japan (1600-1868) the 
influence of both mainstream Confucianism and the alternative views heavily influenced 
the leading political ideologues such as Yamaga Sokō (1622–1685), Ito Jinsai (1627-1705), 
Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714) and Ogyu Sorai (1666-1728).  Chung and Cho shed light on 
this balance and its practice implications that abounded in the Tokugawa era that still 
impacts on the intellectual traditions of contemporary Japan. 
 
2.4.3 School of Great Unity (Universal Commonwealth) 
 
Liang (1873-1929),128 himself a major political thinker, wrote about another major political 
thinker, namely, his teacher K’ang Yu-wei (1858-1927).  Both were educated into the 
Confucian tradition but vigorously sought the recovery of the Chinese position in the world 
through political participation as ranking members in the midst of the political upheavals in 
the later part of the Ch’ing Dynasty (1644-1912).  Their struggle was to find a Chinese 
solution to the modernizing of China whilst resisting the aggressiveness of Western and 
Japanese influences and yet accommodating their strengths, where necessary.   K’ang in 
his epochal work of the Great Unity (tat’ung) envisaged a system of universal governance 
both in the tradition of Confucian belief and propriety following the teachings of the great 
Classics of the Book of Rites.  K’ang called not only for the protection of the nation, but also 
for the preservation of the traditional faith in being Chinese.  He supported the spiritual 
revitalization of Confucianism and the promotion of its teachings as the state religion.  The 
decay in governance with the Ch’ing Dynasty prompted this position which K’ang held as a 
response to the cultural and political crises that China was undergoing in the late 19th and 
                                                
127 Watson 1968, Op. Cit., Hsün Tzu quoted his adage ‘King and people are like a boat and water.  Water keeps the boat 
afloat.  Water also capsizes the boat’.   
128 Liang Ch’i-ch’ao (1873-1929) wrote about the work by his mentor K’ang Yu-wei (1858-1927) titled ‘K’ang’s Ta-t’ung 
shu (datong shu: the Great Unity/the Universal Commonwealth).  The transcript of this document has been quoted in the 
book authored by Immanuel Hsü, who also translated the text into English: 
 <http://www.renditions.org/renditions/authors/liangqc.html>, viewed 18 March 2007. 
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early 20th century. By revitalizing Confucianism, Kang hoped to revitalize China's 
self-esteem and national solidarity.  
 
Liang’s article still carries a strong historical message and its context has modern 
relevance.  He rightly criticized some aspects of K’ang’s policy proposals which went as far 
as the dismantling of the family system and state control over it as a starting point from the 
ground up in overhauling the Chinese social system.  In spite of some extremist aspects, 
K’ang’s utopian worldview under the umbrella of unity is basically supporting the 
universality of humanism and also outlines how this universal humanism can be translated 
into practice through the deployment of necessary social policies.  His plunge into a frantic 
intellectual search typifies his peers of the same era.  He came under the influence of 
various non-Confucian persuasions, especially Mahayana Buddhism, philosophical 
Daoism when he was young, and Western learning, when grown up.  K’ang in the Great 
Unity presents a worldview that sees the essential and ultimate state of the cosmos as a 
selfless all-encompassing whole.  Also his definition of moral perfection bears the profound 
influence of non-Confucian thought, for his vision of the ideal society, the "great unity" 
(tat’ung), was that of a universal moral community where egalitarianism, libertarianism and 
the pursuit of personal happiness, including material abundance, would prevail.129  
 
2.4.4 Confucian ‘Power-Knowledge’ (‘governmentality’), Hierarchy and Governance 
 
All forms of power, including political power, critically impact upon human rights and 
economic ethics.  In 1999 Chŏng130 discussed Confucian political philosophy, stressing the 
centrality of the Great Learning together with its accompanying anthology of political 
practices under the title of ‘Extended Meaning of the Great Learning.’131  The ‘Learning of 
the Monarch’132 centred on the Great Learning and its exegeses served the sovereign and 
officialdom on the fundamentals of governance.  Chŏng has very closely traced the 
embedding of such governance principles throughout the changing social and political 
circumstances of the Yi Dynasty in Korea.  The main theme remained with the orthodoxy of 
the Neo-Confucian classics, while flexibility is open only to different interpretations and 
                                                
129 Xiao, Gongquan 1998, Op.Cit, pp. 1109-1136. 
130 Chŏng, Chae-hun 1999, The Ta-hüseh and Political Philosophy in the First Half of The Chosŏn Dynasty, Korean 
Social Science Research Council, UNESCO, Seoul, pp. 177-205. 
131 Taehak Yŏnŭi (‘Extended Meaning of the Great Learning’ as translated by The Academy Of Korean Studies, Seoul) 
132 Chewanghak or sŏnghak (Learning of Monarch) 
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applications fitting new social circumstances and the political orientation of incumbent 
sovereigns and serving ministries.  While Chŏng has examined how the orthodoxy of 
Confucian rule came to reinforce its political legitimacy, his angle is restricted to the ruling 
class of a highly stratified society, where the majority certainly do not belong to the ruling 
class.   
 
Foucault133 through Ransom’s explanation in plain English discusses the interrelationship 
of knowledge and power, and the inter-changeability between the two.  Dynastic rule by the 
Confucian learned results in an extreme concentration of knowledge as the first element of 
power in the hands of the few.  Foucault defined ‘disciplines’ as micro-mechanisms of 
power whereby individuals are to serve the needs of power.  When political supremacy is 
reinforced by Confucian moral orthodoxy, the power service mechanism would inevitably 
work in favour of the upper echelons of government, community, family and seniority with 
masculinity as the privileged gender.  Foucault also discusses the close relationship 
between ‘disciplines and punishment’ in the exercise of power.  Governance through the 
implicit or explicit exercise of power assumes the conflictual and political nature of power.  
Foucault uses the concept of ‘rationality’ that underpins the exercise of power through the 
art of government at the intersection of disparate influences and realities.  He also warns 
against the ‘contingent and makeshift character of power constructs’, including implied 
aggressive responses.  
 
Intense concentration of power combined with and originating from knowledge and moral 
legitimacy produces diverse cultural and social phenomena.  Hofstede134 discusses how 
such cultural and social phenomena would determine behaviours of constituents in a given 
society with its own cultural characters that would affect the manifestation of power.  
Confucianism implicitly and explicitly supports masculinity, ‘power distance’ of elites and 
literati, ‘collectivism over individualism’, and ‘uncertainty avoidance.’  In a Confucian 
society such as the Yi Dynasty of Korea, where distinct social classes of yangban 
(scholarly ruling elite) and sangmin (commoners) existed separated by an insurmountable 
social barrier; ‘ascription’ would often gain the upper hands over ‘achievement.’135  This 
                                                
133 Ransom, John S 1997, 'Governmentality and Population', in Foucault’s Disciplines, Duke University Press, Durham, 
NC, pp. 59-77. 
134 Hofstede, Geert & Hofstede, Gert Jan 1997, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, McGraw-Hill, New 
York.  
135 Trompenaars, F & Hampden-Turner, C 2000, Riding the Waves of Culture, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
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inherent structural distortion of power has remained a fundamental challenge for universal 
human rights observance and exercise of a fair economic ethics.   
 
2.5 CONFUCIAN REFORMATION: REDISCOVERY AND PRACTICAL LEARNING 
 
Confucian orthodoxy over the philosophy of governance enjoyed a long period of influence 
until the dawn of the first millennium C.E.  Confucianism then came to face formidable 
challenges in the new millennium.  The philosophical challenge came from Mahayana 
Buddhism.  Mahayana Buddhism was considered a superior transcendental religion, 
already on the ascent to intellectual dominance.  Confucian thinkers and officials were 
gravely concerned over the popularity of Buddhism on every social tier.  They began to 
fight back in earnest.  The most prominent in this endeavour was Chang Tsai.136  Chang 
made a significant contribution during his lifetime in seeding a major turnaround that could 
be deemed a Confucian reformation.  The creative seeds of his thoughts and works 
prompted the watershed of a next generation of great thinkers such as Chu Hsi.137  Chu Hsi 
is the person who succeeded in the reformation and reintegration of the Confucian 
Classical tradition into a new tradition commonly called Neo-Confucianism. 
 
2.5.1 Chang Tsai and the Coming of Neo-Confucianism 
 
Chang Tsai born in 1020 started by initiating an offensive against Buddhism.  Chang’s main 
critique of Buddhism was its nihilism that Chang feared would permeate the minds and 
hearts of people on every level.  He worked on an intellectual change of air, to recover and 
reassert Confucian realism combined with a positive outlook on life and an optimistic 
worldview.   
 
Huang,138 in her book on ‘Essentials of Neo-Confucianism’, argues that Chang considered 
humans worthy to be at the highest level among all creatures and things.  This view runs 
directly contrary to the Buddhist view, according to Chang, that highlights infinite smallness 
compared to the great universe.  Huang explained Chang’s reason for heavenly worthiness 
                                                
136 Chang Tsai (Zhang Zai, 1020-1077) 
137 Chu Hsi (Zhu Xi, 1130-1200) 
138 Huang, Siu-Chi 1999, Essentials of Neo-Confucianism: Eight Major Philosophers of the Song and Ming periods, 
Greenwood Press, London, chapter 4 (Zhang Zai). 
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of humans. According to Chang, humans alone are endowed with a heaven-like ‘nature’139 
and ‘mind.’140  
 
Lee,141 in his article on ‘innate nature and acquired affect under mind and heart,’ sheds light 
on how Chang envisaged humans reaching heavenliness in a meaningful way.   Chang 
saw the potential of the human spirit ascending from the state of ‘unenlightened nature,’ 
going through moral self-cultivation, to finally attaining a new level of nature called 
‘heavenly nature.’142  This is an antidote to Buddhist nihilism, as this human to universe 
unity does away with the nihilism that Chang abhorred.  
 
Kang,143 in his article on ‘edification of the unenlightened,’144 offered an insightful analysis 
of how Chang developed his humanistic cosmology of the Great Void145 in syncopation 
with the Great Harmony146 in his understanding of the universe where humans and the 
cosmos are not two separate entities.  Chang in his celebrated work titled the Western 
Inscription147 epitomizes his compassionate belief in the following way: 
  
Heaven148 is my father, and earth149 is my mother; I, as a small, finite being, occupy a 
central position between them.  Therefore, what fills heaven and earth is my body,150 
and what commands heaven and earth is my nature.151  All men are my brothers, and 
all things are my companions. 
 
Chang then sends this admonition to the rulers: 
 
                                                
139 hsing (xing, nature) 
140 hsin (xin, mind or ‘mind and heart’)   
141 Lee, Jong-Heun 1999, ‘Changjeŭi simt’ong sŏngjŏngnon (A Study on the theory that innate nature and acquired 
affection are ruled by a mind and heart in the philosophy of Chang Tsai)’ in Ch’ŏrhak Ch’ongnon (Journal of the New 
Korean Philosophical Association), vol. 17. 
142 t’ien hsing (heavenly nature) 
143Kang, Jin-Seuk 1993, ‘Changje-ŭi ‘chŏngmong’ sasang yŏn’gu (Chang Tsai’s Thought on ‘Correction of 
Unenlightened ’, HUFS Journal of Philosophy, vol. 2, pp. 73-96. 
144 cheng meng (Zheng meng, proper use of term or correcting the unenlightened)  
145 t’ai-hsű (the Great Void) 
146 t’ai-ho (the Great Harmony)  
147 Hsi-ming (Ximing, the Western Inscription), introductory part. 
148 t’ien (tian: heaven) 
149 k’un (kun: earth) 
150 t’i(ti: body), 
151 hsing (xing: nature) 
  
 44
The great ruler is the eldest son of my parents [i.e., heaven and earth], and the 
ministers [of state affairs] are his stewards.  [One should] pay respect to the aged and 
extend mercy towards the orphans and the helpless because they deserve such 
treatment.  The virtue of the Sage is in complete union [with that of heaven and earth], 
the wise man is the most accomplished [above all ordinary men, therefore,] all under 
heaven, the aged, the weak, maimed, crippled, helpless, lonely, widow, and widower, 
who are in distress and have no one to appeal to are my brothers.  To care for these in 
times of need is to pay reverence [to heaven and earth]. 
 
Beyond the moral tenet, Chang worked on the vital link between moral ideology and 
material realities.  He perceived it in the ‘vital force’152 or ch’i.  This ‘vital force’, according to 
Chang, is the fundamental substance by which all processes of the universe can be 
explained.   Chang was in broad agreement with the idea proffered by Chou Tun-i153  on the 
evolution of the cosmos as expounded in the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate.154  Chang 
and Chou both trusted that this ‘vital force’ begins with the invisible realm and proceeds to 
the more concrete and tangible world of myriad things.  Chang endeavoured to overcome 
speculative abstraction around moralistic cosmology in order to bring the universe onto a 
more intelligible basis.  Hence, he emphasized the ‘vital force’ as the one element that 
makes the Supreme Void not a vacuum but the ultimate source of the world of nature. 
 
Aided by this philosophical generalization, Chang went on to place a heavy emphasis on 
and maintained a personal interest in exploring astronomy, biology, physics and other 
studies of the physical world.  Chang was an inspiration for Chu Hsi, who came a century 
later and went on with further work on the cardinal concept of ‘investigation of things.’155  
The ‘investigation of things’ came to be enshrined in the Great Learning, and became the 
core orthodoxy of governance studies.  
 
Chang develops his ideas through the process of reasoning.  However, his pattern of 
reasoning differs from what is perceived as rationalization in the Western context of the 
Enlightenment.  It is neither dualistic, nor reductionist.  What Chang considers as 
                                                
152 ch’i (qi: the vital force, material force, force, ether) 
153 Chou Tun-i (Zhou Dun-yi: 1017-1073)  
154 t’ai-chi (the Supreme Ultimate)  
155 ko-wu (ge wu: investigation of things) 
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‘reasoning’ is an extension of ‘returning to nature.’  It resides inherently in the nature of 
things, not just in the nature of humankind.156   
 
2.5.2 Chu Hsi: Reformation and Integration into Neo-Confucianism 
 
Chu Hsi (1130-1200) is commonly regarded as the greatest Confucian philosopher since 
Confucius and Mencius.  He wrote commentaries on the four Confucian canonical books, 
namely, the Analects, Book of Mencius, Great Learning, and Doctrine of the Mean.  As 
indicated earlier in this thesis, his commentaries became the basis of the civil service 
examinations in the year of 1313 of the Yuan dynasty (1260-1368) under Mongolian 
dominance.  This also was one of the most significant acts of the Mongolian adoption of 
and indigenising into the Chinese system of knowledge and governance.  This examination 
system remained in force until its abolition in 1905 in the late Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1912).  
Chu effectively gave Confucianism a new meaning, and, for centuries, the 
Neo-Confucianism that he most prominently represents dominated not only Chinese 
thought, but Korean and Japanese thought as well.157  
 
In the comprehensive framework of Chu Hsi, we can see evidence of the influences 
exerted by a host of contemporary thinkers as teachers and debaters, and also the 
religious and philosophical traditions under which he lived and personally experienced 
through study and firsthand practice, namely, Classical Confucianism, Buddhism and 
Taoism.  While he tried to establish the orthodox line of the Confucian Way, he was 
inspired by and benefited from the leading thinkers.  This matter is well documented and 
known to us. Such thinkers are Chou Tun-i,158 Chang Tsai159 and the Ch’eng brothers160 
who top the list as major influencers as well as Lu Hsiang-shan161 as a serious opponent.  
Chu saw himself as a successor on the extant line of intellectual tradition.  
 
The political milieu he was born into was a challenging one.  The Song dynasty (947-1126), 
although culturally outstanding, was militarily not as powerful as the Han and T’ang 
dynasties, and was under constant threat from outside tribes in the north and north-west.  
                                                
156 Fang 1981, Op. Cit., pp. 427-471.  
157 Huang, SC 1999, Op. Cit., chapter 4.  
158 Zhou Dunyi (1017-1073) 
159 Chang Tsai (Zhang Zai: 1020-1077) 
160 Cheng Hao (1032-1085), Cheng Yi (1033-1107) 
161 Lu Xiang-shan (1139-1193) 
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Its greatest catastrophe came when it lost its capital to the Jurchen, a Tungusic tribe from 
the northeast, and was compelled to re-establish itself south of the Yangtze River in 1127.  
This event marked the division of the Song dynasty into two lesser parts:  the Northern 
Song (960-1126) and the Southern Song (1127-1279). Chu Hsi was born in the Southern 
Song.162 
 
He pursued his intellectual challenge relentlessly by firstly absorbing the then existing 
frameworks of knowledge and wisdom, then reinterpreting them, and also making them 
more cogent and usable in the forms of commentaries and other outputs for use in all 
pursuits of human affairs.  He, as a high achiever, was also aided by his linguistic skill as an 
accomplished poet.  His works covered not only the usual domains of Confucianism, but 
also cosmology, psychology, the governance system for the economy in the provinces, the 
state exam system for new public officials and further advanced metaphysics. 
 
Fung,163 in his seminal work on the ‘history of Chinese philosophy’, also describes Chu Hsi 
or Chu Tzu164 as being ‘a philosopher of subtle argument, clear thinking, wide knowledge 
and voluminous literary output.’  His Recorded Sayings165 alone amounted to one hundred 
and forty books.  With him, the philosophic system of the ‘Ch’eng-Chu school’, also known 
as the ‘School of Principle’166 reached its culmination.  Though the supremacy of this 
school was several times to be disputed, notably by the Lu-Wang school167 and by certain 
scholars of the Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1912), it remained the most influential single system 
of philosophy until the introduction of Western philosophy. 
 
Chu was motivated or even compelled to write and respond to meet the various types of 
challenges he faced.  He had to respond, firstly, to the stagnation of Classical 
Confucianism, popular Buddhism and Taoism, and, secondly, to the political and 
intellectual divisions and rivalry amongst the South and North Song dynasties and the 
Jurchen challengers in northern China.  
                                                
162  Fung, Yu-Lan (Feng, Yu-Lan) 1948, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derek Bodde, The Free Press, 
New York, p. 294. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Chu Tzu: an honorific name awarded that means the Master Chu. 
165 Chu Tzu Yü-lei (Classified and Recorded Sayings of Master Chu).   
166 Li hsüeh (School of Principle) 
167 The School led by Chu’s contemporary opponent Lu, Xiang-shan (1139-1193) and Lu’s posterity protégé Wang, 
Yang-ming (1472-1529). 
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Thompson,168 in his article on ‘immanence of principle169 and appropriateness170’ of the 
Chu Hsi philosophy, explains how principle immanent in humans proceeds, through the 
creative processes of appropriateness, to the concrete embodiment of the principle.  Chu 
Hsi expanded and deepened the concept of the Great Ultimate171 proffered earlier by Chou 
Tun-i (1017-1073).  Thompson made a contribution by expounding on how Chu Hsi’s 
philosophising on principle and appropriateness immanent in humans parallels the Kantian 
concept of ‘reason and duty.’172 
 
Further to the above, Tillman,173 in his article on ‘consciousness of Heaven (T'ien) in Chu 
Hsi's thought', explained how Chu‘s formulation of Heaven, as developed from that of the 
Ch’eng brothers’, proceeds to establishing a more rational and metaphysical philosophy.  
This shift with the worldview represents a milestone analogous to that of Confucius 
(551-479 B.C.E.) fifteen centuries earlier.  According to Tillman, Confucius was the one who 
transformed the primordial moral tenet of the humanistic Heaven as represented in the 
Book of Documents174 and the Book of Poetry175 into a ‘new Heaven’ based on moral 
reality. 
 
Lim,176 in his article on ‘the concept of the Great Ultimate comprising fundamental elements 
of principle and material force,177 argues that Chu Hsi firmly believed in the presence of 
principles in all the things in the world, and came to declare that there is a ‘Great Ultimate’ 
in everything and in every person.  Hence, Chu Hsi used the Great Ultimate as the 
cornerstone of his principle and material force.  The principle undertakes to define the 
reality and universality of things.  Material force on the other hand enables the formation of 
physical beings, their individuality and transformation.  It becomes the agent of creation.  
                                                
168 Thompson, Kirill 1988, ‘Li and yi as Immanent: Chu Hsi’s Thought in Practical Perspective’, Philosophy East and West, 
vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 30-46. 
169 li (principle or pattern) 
170 i (yi: appropriateness or righteousness) 
171 t’ai chi (the Supreme Ultimate) 
172 Mou, Zongsan (1909-1995) 1983: ‘Introduction’, in Kangde de dao de zhe xue (Moral Philosophy of Kant), Taiwan xue 
sheng shu ju, Taipei. 
173 Tillman, Hoyt Cleveland 1987, 'Consciousness of T'ien in Chu Hsi's Thought', Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol. 
47, no. 1, pp. 31-50. 
174 Shu ching (Shujing: the Book of Documents) 
175 Shih ching (Shijing: the Book of Poetry) 
176 Lim, Jong-Jin 1993, ‘Chujaŭi [Insŏl] yŏn’gu (On Humanity of Chu Tzu)’, T’aedong Kojŏn Yŏn’gu (T’aedong Study of 
Classics), vol. 10, pp. 865-906. 
177 ch’i (qi: material force) 
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This implies that Chu Hsi has absorbed mind into nature.  For him, nature is ontologically 
given and the mind is epistemologically given.178  The mind is embedded in nature so that 
the mind can seek guidance from nature.  Nature in turn has its fulfilment in the mind, since 
the mind directly controls human action.  Chu Hsi’s dualism, however, is about duality, 
because principle (li) and material force (ch’i) are inseparable.  Principle needs material 
force in order to have something to adhere to, and material force needs principle as its form 
or essence.  Principle and material force are not reducible to each other.  Each will maintain 
its own identity and special characteristics.  Chu Hsi can be said to have taught a 
‘constitutional dualism’ or ‘functional monism.’179  
 
Another important concept in Song-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophy was ch’i (material 
force or vital force).  Mencius was the first to urge us to cultivate this vital force in ourselves, 
implicitly assuming a correlation between Heaven and man, or macrocosm and microcosm.  
The yin-yang school then understood yin and yang as two vital forces explaining the 
formation of the natural universe and human society.  The interaction of the yin and yang 
results in the production of the Five Elements, and from these the physical universe as we 
know it is produced.  In his cosmological theory, Chu Hsi endorses most of the theories of 
Chou Dun-i.180 
 
As a corollary, Park,181 in his article on ‘tri-parts of mind, human nature, and emotions,’ 
argues that the tripartite division of the mind, human nature, and feelings relates to an 
existential concern, which forced him to develop a metaphysics of mind and nature by 
following Cheng I’s thought.  The mind is the agent that acts out principles inherent in 
human nature.  The contrast between the two is that nature is transcendent while mind is 
immanent.  But there is also a correlation between the two.  Nature provides a solid 
foundation for the mind to act, so that the mind will not go astray and become lost; the mind 
has the ability to put principles in nature to work in real life.   
 
                                                
178 Huang, SC 1999, Op. Cit., chapters 7 & 8 (Chu Tzu).  
179 Cheng, CY 1991, Op. Cit., pp 389-393. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Park, No-Hong 1992, ‘Chuja’ŭi Sim-Sŏng-Chŏng’e kwanhan yŏn’gu (A Study on Chu Hsi's Hsin-Hsing-Ch’ing)’, in 
Chŏrhak-Sasang (Dongguk University), vol. 13, pp. 57-92. 
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Lee, KR,182 in his article on ‘Chu Hsi’s mind philosophy’, further details on how the ‘tri-parts 
of mind, human nature, and emotions’ interact.  He explained the steps of the pre-animated 
state of mind being the nature, and post-animated mind as the emotions. 
 
Lee, DH,183 in his article on ‘Chu’s textual analysis of the Great Learning’, argues that the 
‘investigation of things’184 as the core concept in the Great Learning’, brings such mind in 
the unison of ‘tri-parts of mind, human nature, and emotions’ to exercise a creative 
observation of nature, so that it goes beyond cosmological speculation to the existential 
problems of the self and the world.  
 
Bethrong, 185  a theologian, in his article on ‘Chu’s self-realization and the role of 
‘earnestness,’ 186  argues that ‘earnestness’ brings into play the ‘organic process’ of 
self-realisation through the creative interaction of such tri-parts.  He has made an attempt 
to inter-relate Chu’s philosophy with that of ‘process philosophy.’187 
 
For Neo-Confucians, study is not a means for gaining a position.  From the very beginning, 
promising young scholars must set their minds on the way.  Chu made great efforts to 
revive some of the ‘colleges.’188  His effort made a significant impact, and also attracted the 
jealousy of people in power.  
 
As witnessed in one of his major works such as ‘Reflections on Things at Hand,’189 a 
Neo-Confucian anthology compiled by Chu and his friends, his accomplishment exerted a 
profound influence on the minds of East Asia for more than seven centuries.  The term 
‘things at hand (chinssu)’ comes from the Analects of Confucius.  Its suggestion is that 
reflection of ‘things at hand’ is the way to approach humanity.190   Chu brought the way 
closer to his contemporaries and for subsequent generations. 
                                                
182 Lee, Kwang-Ryul 1993, ‘Chuja chunghwa sinsŏrŭi hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng yŏn’gu (Chut Tzu’ Mind Study: Its Formation 
and Process) in Nonmunjip (Kyŏngsan Univesity), vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 155-178. 
183 Lee, Dong-Hi 1981,‘Chujaŭi Taehak Changgu’e taehan yŏn’gu: Kyŏngmulsŏrŭl chungsimŭro (A study on the 
Chu-Hsi's Ta-Hsueh Chang-Chu)’, in Tongyang Ch’ŏrhak Yŏn’gu (the Study of Eastern Philosophy), vol. 2, pp. 109-132. 
184 ko-wu: ‘investigation of things”. 
185 Berthrong, John 1993, ‘Master Chu’s Self-Realization: The Role of Ch’eng’, Philosophy East and West, vol. 43, no. 1, 
pp. 39-64. 
186 ch’eng (earnestness; sincerity) 
187 Whitehead, Alfred North, 1979, ‘Introduction’, in Process and Reality:An Essay in Cosmology, Free press, New York.  
188 hsüeh-yüan (xueyuan: colleges) 
189 Chin-ssu-lu (Jinsi lu: Reflections on Things at Hand) 
190 jen (ren, humanity; humanness) 
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2.5.3 The ‘Lu-Wang School’: a Major Challenge to Chu Hsi’ Orthodoxy of  
Neo-Confucianism  
 
Lu Hsiang-shan191 as a contemporary of Chu Hsi had differences in views that could not be 
bridged in spite of their debates mostly in writing.  Their irreconcilable differences were 
over such fundamental tenets of Chu Hsi’s humanistic cosmology, based on the Supreme 
Ultimate.  It was re-interpreted in the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate Explained.192  Lu 
could not agree to its validity. 
 
Lu endorsed the traditional interpretation of li or principle as developed by the Song 
Neo-Confucians.  It was valid in that, firstly, the orderly principle underlies the universe as 
well as each individual, and, secondly, it also remains a moral criterion for human conduct. 
Lu, however, emphasized the second point much more.  He saw the so-called 
‘investigation of things’193 originated in the Classical canon of the Great Learning as the 
starting point for virtue. 
 
Huang,194 in the chapter of her book on Lu, explains where Lu’s primary interest lay, 
namely, in mind.195  She also clarifies how he pursued his philosophical grounding in the 
recovery or restoration of original mind.196  This concept of mind follows the teachings of 
Mencius.197  Lu further developed this philosophical concept of mind and made an original 
contribution by establishing a new philosophical school called “Learning of the Mind.”198  
This new school attracted a substantial following amongst those who had no way of having 
access to the sophisticated learning in Chu Hsi’s orthodox way.  This also brought an extra 
appeal to those already comfortable with the more flexible Taoist way, perceived as more 
commoner-friendly or with the ‘Ch’an Buddhist’ 199  way focusing on meditation and 
enlightenment through reflections of mind.  
                                                
191 Lu Xiang-shan (1139-1193) 
192 Chou Dun-i’s concept endorsed and explained in commentary by Chu His. 
193 ko-wu (ge wu: investigation of things) from the Great Learning 
194 Huang, SC 1999, Op. Cit. chapter 9. 
195 hsin (xin: mind or ‘mind and heart’) 
196 pen hsin (ben xin: original mind) 
197 “The way to acquire learning is none other than to seek for one’s lost mind.”   
198 Hsin hsüeh (Xin xue: Learning of the Mind) 
199 Ch’an or Zen in Japanese is a Buddhist tradition emphasizing personal meditation and intuitional enlightenment, firstly 
led by Huineng (Hui Neng, 638 -713). 
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For Lu, principle and the mind should meet to form a perfect unity between the two.  In his 
view, the objective mind is universal and can be known and apprehended by the subjective 
finite minds, which in turn express the all-comprehending mind.  It is universal mind with 
which the principle is identified.  This principle, the governing principle of the universe, 
constitutes the unity, coherence, sequence, and, above all, goodness of the world. Each 
individual mind has the capacity of understanding this goodness, and man is expected to 
live in accord with such goodness.  In other words, for Lu, mind is all-embracing.  It is the 
embodiment of principle.  Study of mind has had ongoing adherents all over East Asia.   
Lu was benefiting in the strengthening of his Study of mind from the teachings and 
practices of the emerging Ch’an (or Zen in Japanese) Buddhist sect.200  Under this 
influence, Lu promoted a practice called ‘quiet sitting.’201  The teaching of Lu’s ‘quiet sitting’ 
is under another influence coming from Taoism, such as from the writings of Chuang 
Tzu.202  Chuang Tzu sought and taught about a deeper and free-spirit inner search and 
enlightenment that came along with the daily practice of quiet sitting.  
 
Ch’an Buddhism has left significant influence all over East Asia.  Certainly in Japan, the 
Ch’an sect saw a high level of inculturation into Zen Buddhism.  The Ch’an Buddhist sect 
had originated partly as a reaction against the metaphysical obscurities of Indian thought. 
The term Ch’an or Zen comes from the Sanskrit dhyāna, meaning ‘meditation, thought, and 
reflection’, especially profound and abstract religious contemplation.  When Lu 
emphasized the teaching of ‘quiet sitting’ as an important means to mental enlightenment, 
he was seen by his critics such as Chu Hsi as neglecting the written texts of Confucian 
canons, with an over-emphasis on mind culture.  
 
While Lu was open to learning from Ch’an Buddhism, he was against what he perceived as 
the Buddhist negative, ascetic and pessimistic outlook on life.  He remained loyal and 
truthful to Classical Confucianism.  He worked on what he considered the realistic 
alternative or even better way so that the broader community may engage in a more 
meaningful life, without having to rely on the sophisticated systematic learning only 
available to the privileged minority.  He firmly believed that each individual has infinite 
                                                
200 Ibid. 
201 ching-tsou (jing-zou: quiet sitting) 
202 Chuang Tzu (Zhuang Zi: circa fourth century B.C.E.)   
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worth and is capable of developing his ‘original mind’203 and restoring it to its original state 
of perfect goodness, even if it has been corrupted by desire.  As a realistic moralist, Lu 
emphatically insisted that life is real and good.204  In opposition to the passive attitude of 
Buddhism that maintains the obliteration of individual activities as the way to get rid of evil 
in this world, Lu as a faithful Confucian encourages all to engage in moral struggle.   
Lu’s accomplishment and his influence were substantial.  However, he is not to be 
compared with Chu Hsi in depth and reach of a well-rounded philosophical system built 
around extensive commentaries on the Classics of mainstay Confucianism.  It was only 
with the advent of Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), his protégé of circa three centuries later, 
that Lu’s ‘mind school’ was revived and began to flourish.  
 
2.5.4 Wang Yang-ming and ‘the School of Yang-ming’ 
Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) is often considered the greatest philosopher of the Ming 
dynasty (1368-1644).205  As an ardent soul searcher since his youth, with no success in 
finding answers to his question, Wang is known to have had a major awakening.206  The 
awakening was that the classic doctrines of ‘investigation of things’207 and ‘extension of 
knowledge’208  are merely objects of man’s consciousness or mind.  He was convinced that 
this is the solution to those philosophical issues that had concerned him.  He also found out 
that his awakening found a great reassurance and support in the works of Lu Hsiang-shan 
(1139-1193).  He adopted Lu’s thought openly, and proceeded to strengthening it in his 
creative way, to form what is called ‘Lu-Wang School’ and also a new tradition of thought in 
what his followers called ‘School of Yang-ming’209 or simply ‘Wang Study’ in his honour. 
 
Kim TH,210 in his article on the ‘philosophical characters of Yang-ming and sectarian 
outgrowth,’ argues that Wang’s most remarkable achievement in the course of one decade 
and a half after his sudden enlightenment was the full development of his own 
philosophical system.  Works by Wang were posthumously dedicated by his pupils in 1572, 
                                                
203 pen hsin (ben xin, original mind) 
204 Huang, SC 1999, Op. Cit. chapter 9. 
205 Ibid., chapter 10. 
206 Ibid.: “One night in 1508 at the age of thirty-seven, he suddenly gained enlightenment.” 
207 ko-wu (gewu: ‘investigation of things’ from the Great Leaning) 
208 chih chih (zhi zhi : ‘extension or administering of knowledge’ from the Great Leaning). 
209 Yang-ming hsüeh (Chinese), Yangmyŏnghak (Korean), Yōmeigaku (Japanese):  the School of Yang-ming. 
210 Kim, Tong-Hyok  2001, Yangmyŏnghag’ŭi ch’ŏlhakjŏk t’ŭksŏnggwa kŭ p’yŏnp’ajŏk chŏn’gye (Philosophical Characters 
of Yang-ming and its Spawn of Sects): Hye-Jeon College Journal, vol. 19, pp. 35-60. 
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entitled the ‘complete writings of Wang Yang-ming,’211 consisting of thirty-eight books.  Kim 
further noted that in the year of 1527, Wang summarized the main emphasis of his 
philosophy, which became his ‘four maxims.’212  
Kim also argues that Wang’s talent was not limited to scholarship.  Wang also was a keen 
military strategist, and took on government assignments to suppress provincial rebellions 
from 1516 to 1519.  He emerged successfully from these tasks. His military strategy and 
operations combined with his political career added to his fame and influence.  
 
Yun Sasoon,213 in his article on ‘Hagok’s approach to the Wang School,’ has provided 
further insight into the philosophy of Wang.  According to Yun, Wang’s departure point was 
an explicit refutation of Chu Hsi’s philosophical dualism.  Wang’s ontological view on the 
universe was one of the ‘unified whole’, not to be divided into the two levels, namely, the 
level of ‘above form’214 and the level of ‘below form.’215  Division into the two levels was 
asserted by the school of Ch’eng-Chu, i.e., Chu Hsi’s orthodoxy.  Wang claimed that Chu 
Hsi’s understanding erred, in that the mind is the same as principle, without exclusion of 
one or the other.  Knowledge and understanding emanating from intuition permeate the 
reality of the external world.  Such intuitive knowledge enters into the inner presence of self, 
making unnecessary any attempt to divide between ‘reasoned knowledge’ and ‘perceptive 
knowledge’. Both Chu Hsi and Wang agreed on the goal of spiritual search as taught earlier 
in the Classic age by Confucius and Mencius.  The goal remains in ‘becoming a sage.’ 
They differed only on how to become one. 
 
It was Wang who coined the notion ‘intuitive knowledge.’216  Intuitive knowledge prescribes 
for the right way to self-presence and self-understanding as one seeks to become a sage.  
Wang rejected Chu’s view that knowledge and virtue are obtained through the investigation 
of the principle of objects external to the mind of man.  On the contrary, Wang held the view 
                                                
211 Wang Wen-cheng gong quan-shu (1572, Complete Writings of Wang Yang-ming), It consists of thirty-eight books or 
juan. 
212 ‘1) The mind in its original nature in neither good nor bad. 2) The will when activated is either good or bad. 3) The 
[function of] intuitive knowledge (liang-chih) is to know good and evil. 4) The [purpose of] investigation of things (ko-wu) is 
to do good and rid of evil.’ 
213 Yun, Sasoon 1992, ‘Cheng Chedu (Hagok) Yangmyŏnghag’ŭi yŏn'gu (Study of Hagok’s Approach to the Wang Study)’, 
Journal of Korean Studies, vol. 4 , pp. 133-177. 
214 hsing-erh-shang (xing-er-shang) 
215 hsing-erh-hsia (xing-er-xia) 
216  liang-chih (liangzhi): intuitive knowledge (Derk Bodde and Carson Chang), innate knowledge (W.T. Chan), 
conscientious wisdom (Thome H. Fang), good conscience (Tu Wei-ming) 
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that principle permeates everywhere in the universe.  This principle also resides in the mind 
of man, according to Wang.  Hence, it is essential to search within one’s own mind instead 
of investigating things outside.  Wang’s philosophical system is primarily value-oriented 
with ‘intuitive knowledge’ at its core.    
Wang’s moral philosophy drew inspiration from the basic teachings of Mencius, whereupon 
Wang elaborated.  The integral Mencian concept favoured by Wang was that the 
Confucian cardinal virtues of ‘humanity, righteousness, propriety and wisdom’217 are not 
infused into humans from without. 
Yun also discusses how Wang further developed the Learning of the Mind that Lu 
Hsiang-shan initiated.  Wang worked on the concept of ‘intuitive knowledge’ in parallel to 
that of Lu’s original mind.218  It meant that humans are endowed with an innate knowledge 
that is essentially good and able to distinguish intuitively between right and wrong.  Wang 
made it clear that this intuitive knowledge of goodness is not only bestowed upon the mind 
of the great man, but also unto that of the ordinary man.  This egalitarian thinking219 
enjoyed a wide-spread resonance among those disenchanted with the orthodox school. 
 
Chung, CG,220 in his article on the ‘Yang-ming School in the Yi dynasty of Korea,’ offers an 
explanation on how Wang evolved his next cardinal teaching of ‘unity between knowledge 
and action.’.221   Wang developed the doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action, during 
his exile in the year of 1509, at the age of thirty-nine.  He inherited the concept222 from 
Ch’eng I (1033-1108) and strengthened it.  Wang emphasized the identity of intuitive 
knowledge and practical moral action.223  Wang’s theory of the unity of knowledge and 
                                                
217 jen (ren: humanity), i (yi: righteousness), li (li: propriety), and chih (zhi: wisdom) 
218 pen hsin (ben xin: original mind) 
219 Yun, SS 1992, Op. Cit., Wang’s egalitarian thinking is clear in his own illustration: ‘To love one’s father and brother is 
the root of humanity, just like the sprout of a tree.  To have the feeling toward other people and all things is the extension 
of humanity, just like the growth of the trunk, branches, and leaves of the tree.’  Wang reinterpreted the viewpoint held by 
Mencius to the effect that it is natural for one to begin loving one’s parents and brothers before extending to other people 
with unequal degrees. Humanity remains a natural principle of ethics discernible within human intuitive knowledge and this 
principle makes distinctions in human relations possible.  
220Chung, CG 1986, ‘Chosŏn wangjoŭi yangmyŏnghage kwanhan yŏn’gu’ ( A Study on the Yang-ming School in Cho-Sun  
dynasty), Nonmunjip of Graduate School Kon-Kuk University, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 217-243. 
221 Chih-hsing-ho-i (zhi-xing he-yi: unity of knowledge and action). 
222 Chung, CG 1986, Op. Cit., ‘There is no knowledge which cannot be put into action, knowledge which cannot be put 
into action is superficial only.’   
223 Huang 1999, Op. Cit. chapter 10, ‘When the sages and worthies taught people about knowledge and action, it was 
precisely because they wanted to restore them to the original state….I have said that knowledge is the guide for action and 
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action is a reaction against Chu’s view that knowledge is to be obtained objectively and 
therefore separated from action.  In other words, the two attributes of human beings as 
knower and doer ought to function simultaneously and inseparably toward the same goal in 
the process of moral endeavour.  According to Wang, ‘knowledge is the key direction of 
action, and action is the effort of knowledge.’  Conversely, ‘knowledge is the beginning of 
action, and action is the completion of knowledge.’  Contrary to the position of Chu, there is 
no prerequisite for reaching the state of sage-hood. Sage-hood, according to Wang, can be 
reached through the unity of knowledge and action.  There is no set rule, no special 
technique, and no need to acquire knowledge of the external world as claimed by Chu.224 
 
Choi, JM,225 in his article on ‘Wang’s philosophy and its development in East-Asia,’ sheds 
light on the broad landscape of Yang-ming School philosophy.  The phrase of ‘unity and 
creativity of the mind in consummation’226 was employed to represent the heart of Wang’s 
philosophy in a nutshell.  The extension of intuitive knowledge as the method of moral 
cultivation of the self requires special effort, including self-examination, self-transformation, 
self-discipline, self-reflection, and most importantly, the sincerity227 of one’s will.  On this 
last point Wang says: ‘The effort of the sage to extend his knowledge is characterized by 
utmost sincerity and ceaselessness.’  In the final analysis, the ultimate concern of man is to 
be in dynamic unity with all things in the universe, in which the heavenly principle may be 
manifest in light of the extension of his intuitive knowledge. 
Lee, MH,228 in his article on ‘Japanese accommodation of the Yang-ming School and 
further progress,’ introduced an overall picture of how the Yang-ming School impacted on 
the Japanese intellectual and political heritage after its relatively quick arrival from China.  
A seventy-eight year old Japanese Buddhist monk named Keigo Ryōan 229 represented the 
court of Japan in the Ming dynasty and met Wang in the year of 1513 to discuss this 
                                                                                                                                                
action is the effort of knowledge, and that knowledge is the beginning of action and action is the completion of knowledge.  
If this is comprehended, then when one speaks only of knowledge, action is implicitly included, and when one speaks only 
of action, knowledge is implicitly included.’ 
224 Ibid. 
225 Choi, Jae Mok 1993, ‘Tong Asia’e issŏsŏ yangmyŏnghagŭi han chŏn’gae yangsang (Development of Yangming 
School in East-Asia)’, Ch’ŏhrak Ch’ongnon (Journal of the New Korean Philosophical Association), vol. 9, pp. 287-326. 
226 chih-liang-chih (zhi liang zhi : unity and creativity of the mind in consummation) 
227 ch’eng (sincerity) 
228 Lee, Myong-Han 1993, ‘Ilbonŭi yangmyŏnghak suyonggwa chŏn’gae (Japanese Accommodation of Yang-ming 
School and Further Progress)’, Inmunhak Yŏn’gu (Chung-Ang University), vol. 20, pp. 303-311. 
229 Keigo Ryōan (1425-1515): A Japanese scholar-monk who visited Wang Yangming in 1513. 
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emerging philosophy in person.  Japan embraced Wang’s philosophy in earnest and this 
triggered widespread further studies, which in some way still continues.  
While Chu’s interpretation of the classics remained orthodox for those seeking success 
such as through the civil service examinations, Wang’s Learning of Mind brought a 
dynamic intellectual vigor to the philosophical circle of the Ming dynasty and East-Asian 
neighbours, in particular Japan.  The Cheng-Chu orthodox school, on the other hand, was 
comparatively neglected by the outstanding thinkers of the dynasty and developed little 
beyond what Chu achieved.  In China proper, Wang’s advocacy of practical conduct has 
exerted considerable influence on modern thinkers, including the first president of the 
Republic of China (1911-current) Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) and the major Confucian 
scholars such as Hsiung Shih-li (1886-1925) and Liang Shu-ming (1893-1988).230 
 
2.5.5 Practical Learning: Sirhak in Yi dynasty Korea and Inculturation in the Tokugawa Era  
 
The Yang-ming School emerged as a potent alternative to the Chu orthodox system of 
thought in Confucian East-Asia, with the exception of the Yi dynasty in Korea where it was 
officially considered heterodox.  The era of active Neo-Confucian development also 
witnessed significant political upheavals in the region. Neo-Confucianism as the official 
doctrine of governance likewise faced severe challenges, namely, its legitimacy as the 
state ideology, its efficacy in being able to offer solutions to  grave challenges, and, most of 
all, in meeting the demands of people’s needs in overcoming their trying times.   
 
Sixty-eight years after the demise of Chu Hsi, the Mongolian domination of the Yüan 
dynasty (1279-1368) came to an end and the new dynasty of Ming (1368-1662) began.  
This meant the return of political dominance from the grip of foreign marauders to the 
Chinese proper Han ethnic group.  Korea also shifted from the Koryŏ dynasty (918-1392) to 
the Yi dynasty (1392-1910), also realigning its political weight from the Mongols to the Han 
Chinese.  The Mongols made two abortive invasion attempts231 on Japan, only to be 
protected by what the Japanese believed was a divine intervention of ‘godly winds’232 that 
stopped the Mongolian navy from crossing to Japan.  With such historical memories, Japan 
watched events on the continent with great suspicion.  A generation after Wang Yang-ming 
                                                
230 Huang, SC 1999, Op. Cit., chapter 10. 
231 Mongol’s attempts on Japan: in the years of 1274 and 1281. 
232 kamikaze (godly winds) 
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(1472-1529)’s activity, the so-called ‘practical or real learning’233 movement emerged, most 
notably in the Korean Yi dynasty.  This movement was made concrete by the major 
contribution of Yu Hyŏng-wŏn.234  The Yi dynasty of Korea was yet to recover from the 
devastating invasion (1592-1598) by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-1598) forces of Japan.  
Toyotomi reunited Japan, taking over the political control of Japan from Muromachi rule 
(1336-1573), and targeting the Ming dynasty of China (1590)235 to assert its suzerainty 
over Asia.  Post-crisis, the Yi dynasty needed to respond in real terms to the popular 
demands for a total recovery to normalcy of life on every level.  Hence, the practical 
learning school came to the fore in that the official orthodox Neo-Confucianism, despite its 
philosophical sophistication and refinement, failed to deliver on what was perceived as 
practical or real demands and the needs of the populace.  A comment much earlier by 
Chen Te-hsiu,236 a leading exponent of Neo-Confucian after Chu Hsi, resonates to this call. 
 
Practical learning, however, does not imply the overturn of Confucian learning, whether of 
the Classical or Neo-Confucian heritage.  It was rather to find ways of practical relevance to 
the reality it faced so that the valuable heritage could continue or even strengthen.  Active 
scholars in this task mostly remained outside the mainstream political machinery of the 
then government.  To gain an entry into officialdom, one still had to pass state 
examinations based on the orthodox Neo-Confucian texts. 
 
Choi, SC,237 in his article on the ‘reformation philosophy of practical learning,’ discusses 
the areas of main concern to the practical learning school.  Priority was placed on what was 
perceived as the most urgent and significant matters.  It covered bringing fairness to 
agricultural tenancy, fairness to all in compulsory military service, taxation, reform of the 
                                                
233 sirhak (jitsugaku in Japanese: practical learning), practiced by Neo-Confucians in the later Yi (Chosŏn) dynasty of 
Korea.    
234 Yu, Hyŏng-wŏn (1622 -1673) in 1670 completed the Pan’gyesurok that was comprised of a complete reformation 
package on public policy matters of the Yi dynasty in Korea.  
235 Toyotomi made a decision in 1590 to invade the Yi dynasty in Korea and the Ming dynasty of China to assert his 
emperorship over the entire region, and also to provide an external outlet for the warrior groups overriding their military 
ambitions. 
236 Chen Te-hsiu (1178-1235), ‘In all the world there are no concrete forms without their ordering principles and no 
principles without concrete forms.  If there is a concrete form to be investigated, there will be its principle inherent in it.  
Thus with Heaven-and-earth there are their regulating principles, and with bodily forms there are the principles of their 
natures and feelings. . . . If one leaves out concrete forms in the search for principles, one inescapably falls into vain and 
empty theories.  This is not the real, practical learning of our Confucian school.  The reason why the Great Learning taught 
men to investigate things and extend knowledge is that principles are found in things.  Thus scholars should have the solid 
ground of reality on which to exert their efforts and not chase off into the realms of empty nothingness.’ 
237 Choi, Sung-Chul 1984, ‘Chosŏn hugi sirhagŭi kaehyŏk sasang (A Study of the Reformation Philosophy of Sirhak in the  
Later Period of the Yi Dynasty)’, Han’gukhak Ch’ongnon (Journal of Korean Studies), vol. 6, pp. 107-153. 
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state examination system, development of commerce and trade, and reform or abolition of 
the slavery system.  Such emphasis on the social and economic aspects did not overlook 
the philosophical and political aspects in order to obtain official support for such reformist 
ideas. 
  
Chung, CS,238 in his article on the ‘comparative moral cultures of Neo-Confucian Korea and 
Japan’, argues that the Japan of the Tokugawa era embraced Neo-Confucian learning 
from China and through Korea in a very unique Japanese way.  Governance at the top 
echelon as well as at the ‘clan’239 level was in the hands of samurai warriors who carried 
out their own code of conduct, namely, bushido.240  Within the culture of military supremacy 
and militaristic masculinity of the shogunate, the actionable side of Neo-Confucian 
teachings was more digestible.  In the orthodox Neo-Confucian terms, material force or 
‘chi’ takes precedence over principle or li.  Scholars in Japan emphasized usability, 
practicality and, most of all, acceptability to the Japanese indigenous culture and traditions.   
 
There was a persistent reluctance about Sino-centric ideological reliance not only in the 
Neo-Confucian metamorphosis but also in the Japonization of Buddhism.  To extricate 
Japanese scholarship from Neo-Confucian philosophy emanating from China both of the 
Ming dynasty (1368-1644) and the later Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1911), Tokugawa scholars 
launched a new school of learning called ‘Ancient Learning’ or ‘kogaku’241 that literally 
meant learning of the ancient texts of Classical Confucians or the era preceding it so as to 
avoid ‘second-hand learning’ through Chinese or Korean Neo-Confucianism.  Such 
philosophical nationalism enjoyed consistent support throughout the Neo-Confucian 
journey of Japan from the official ascent to the semi-state ideology adopted by the court of 
the first shogun.   
 
Chung further argues that such an idiosyncratic Japanese approach goes beyond ‘ancient 
learning’ as proffered by Yamaga Sokō (1622-1685).242  Other likeminded scholars also 
                                                
238 Chung, Chai-sik 2006, 'Between Principle and Situation: Contrasting Styles in the Japanese and Korean Traditions of 
Moral Culture', Philosophy East and West, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 253-281. 
239 han (clan) 
240 bushidō:  The ‘Bushidō’ is the ‘way of the warrior’ and  an important Japanese mainstay code of conduct and a way of 
life.  Its development dates back to the Muromachi era and spanning over 11th through 14th centuries. Its unique 
philosophy (ronri) crystallized into the core tenets of Japanese feudal law of the Tokugawa era. 
241 kogaku (ancient learning) 
242 As a reaction to the continental Neo-Confucianism, Yamaga proclaimed that the unadulterated truth could be found 
only in the ancient original teachings of Confucius or before him. Subsequent developments within the Confucian tradition 
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amplified the ancient learning agenda and its ‘ancient legitimacy’ to further deify and enrich 
the origin of the incumbent powers of shoguns and emperorship.  
 
Nosco,243 in a chapter of his book on ‘Confucianism and Tokugawa culture’ based on the 
outcome of an international conference on the topic, discusses how diversity in the ways of 
thinking transpired in the Japanese mind in the process of those orthodox and 
non-orthodox Neo-Confucian learning becoming more attuned to the traditions of Japan.  
 
The legacy of scholarship in the court of warrior-turned rulers is deeply rooted in the 
Japanese mental platform.  During the military campaign of 1592-1598 by Toyotomi over 
the Yi dynasty of Korea, his entourage included a retinue of court scholars including 
Confucians and Zen Buddhist-scholars.  These scholars found the Korean interpretation of 
Classical and Neo-Confucian orthodoxy very useful for the furtherance of Japanese 
scholarship.  The Neo-Confucian compendium edited by T'oegye (Yi Hwang, 1501-1570) 
of the Yi dynasty of Korea was appealing to the leading court ideologues of Japan such as 
Fujiwara Seika (1561-1619) and Ito Jinsai (1627-1705).  A host of scholars who followed 
them, associated either with courts or with Zen monasteries, strengthened and indigenized 
Neo-Confucianism.  This surge of intellectual work changed the intellectual landscape of a 
now united Japan in search of a lasting peace, wisdom and prosperity, heavily influencing 
the existing intellectual strands of Zen Buddhism, including the home-grown deism of 
shintoism.  
 
Confucianism at first remained an ‘interesting extra subject’ mainly to the Buddhist 
monk-scholars, until the first shogun Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543-1616) who took up the 
service of the Confucian Hayashi Razan (1583-1657) as a court retainer-scholar, hence 
the concurrent elevation of Confucianism to the status of semi-state ideology.  The 
Neo-Confucian teachings of Chu orthodoxy strongly resonated with the Zen Buddhism of 
Japan or with the mind-set of their adherents through a common interest in the ‘learning of 
mind and heart.’244  
                                                                                                                                                
of Japan include ‘holy learning (seigaku)’ and ‘national learning (kokugaku)’.  A central concern to Yamaga was the 
political and class security of warriors in the non-war era governments.  Yamaga was instrumental in establishing the code 
of honour and conducts for warriors, namely, bushido, that found its legislative form in Feudal Law.   
243 Nosco, Peter ed. 1997, ‘Introduction’, in Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, 
pp. 3-26. 
244 shingaku (learning of mind and heart): This japonized version of ‘learning of mind and heart’ was formulated in earnest 
by Ishida Baigan (1685-1744).  He is the founder of Sekimon School named after the first character of his surname.  He 
  
 60
 
The indigenous shintō tradition also went through a careful selective application of 
Confucian or Neo-Confucian ideas insofar as it suits the soil of Japan.  Practical learning as 
such carried many different meanings as it became assimilated into each branch of 
Japanese culture and tradition.  The Yang-ming school of thought was more visibly 
embraced, whereas Chu’s orthodox Neo-Confucianism remained at the centre of 
philosophical studies in spite of widespread criticism.    
 
The practical or real learning, namely, jitsugaku,245 advocated principles of reality which 
are verified by real forms and judged by actual things.  This school influenced and was 
influenced by the Yang-ming school, namely, yōmeigaku.246  Some scholars belonged to 
the two schools.  Orthodox teachings often remained in the undercurrents of practical 
learning with or without cognizance of those professedly belonging to either the orthodox or 
non-orthodox camps.  
 
De Bary,247 in his book on ‘practical learning under the title of principle and practicality’, 
views the Neo-Confucian interactions with other traditions and belief systems in terms of 
the ‘humanism and secularism’ paradigm.  He argues that, while humanism and secularism 
are often considered essential characteristics of modern thought as key criteria for the 
passage from medieval to modern thought, Confucianism, including Neo-Confucianism, 
was fundamentally very humanistic and secular from its inception.  He also argues that 
secularization was accompanied by the rise of new religious attitudes from the confluence 
of earlier humanisms and a new impulse to spiritualise.  The development of new and 
deeper forms of humanism came about not only through the opening up of new dimensions 
of social experience in an ever more complex society and culture, but also through the 
regeneration of traditional ideals and the reconsecration of secular activities. 
 
He continues to contextualize on the spirituality of Neo-Confucian interaction with practical 
learning.  He argues that spirituality is the most distinctively ‘human’ aspect of humankind, 
                                                                                                                                                
was born of a ‘tradesman (chōnin)’ class family and known as having made a great contribution in the boosting of 
commerce and trade of his era as well as contributing to the modern industrialization of Japan through providing a 
philosophical foundation for the commerce and trade leaders of the future. 
245 jitsugaku (practical learning in Japanese) 
246 Yōmeigaku (Yang-ming school in Japanese) 
247  de Bary, Wm. Theodore & Irene Bloom, eds. 1979, 'Introduction', in Principle and Practicality: Essays in 
Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning, Columbia University Press, New York. 
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and the secular should be viewed as sacred.  Neo-Confucian soul searching in East-Asia 
was also a deepening and broadening of spirituality in the midst of secular change.  In such 
a context, the movement from ‘medieval’ to ’modern’ cannot be taken simply as one from 
the sacred to the secular or from the metaphysical to the material, but rather must be seen 
as a complex ramification and interaction of individual and social needs; moral, intellectual, 
and religious concerns; rational and intuitive methods. 
 
Maruyama,248 in his seminal book on the ‘intellectual history of Tokugawa Japan’, argues 
that the Japanese indigenization of Neo-Confucianism involved a shift of philosophical 
paradigm.  The shift was from the ‘reorganization’ paradigm of Chu Hsi to that of a unique 
Japanese philosophical ‘invention’ or ‘willed design’, namely, ‘sakui.’249  
 
Lévi-Strauss,250 in his book on ‘belief, myths, and rites,’ made representation on how a new 
belief system of philosophical sophistication can envelope itself in a system of deified 
myths.  The linguistics, symbols and other forms of signification proceed to putting on the 
clothing of ‘rites’, in this case, well familiarised Confucian and Shinto rites.  Such evolution 
ends up with the development of an entirely new system, including a new system of 
governance and cultural compliance.  This suggestion provides a window of understanding 
of how Neo-Confucian branches both of Chu’s orthodoxy and heterodox Yōmeigaku 
interacted with Zen Buddhism and poly-theistic native Shintō traditions. 
 
Ahn, Byung-Jik,251 in his article on ‘economic thoughts of practical learning of the Yi 
dynasty Korea,’ argues that the Korean practical learning school, having stayed outside 
officialdom, did not emerge to give birth to a new secular and humanistic ideology, 
intensely interacting with the needs of the reality as Tokugawa Japan experienced.  Ahn 
further suggests that in spite of the non-mainstream status of those thinkers and their ideas, 
their contribution was to reap the harvest in the generations still to come.  Key Korean 
figures in the practical learning school include, but are not limited to, Yu, Hyŏng-wŏn (1622 
-1673), Yi, Ik (1681-1763), Park, Chi-wŏn (1737-1805), Park, Che-ga (1750~1805) and 
                                                
248 Maruyama, Masao 1974, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, trans. Mikiso Hane, University of 
Tokyo Press, Tokyo, pp. 206-273. 
249 sakui (literally means ‘intention’ or ‘by design’, but the translator of Maruyama’s book chose to use the word ‘invention’) 
250 Lévi-Strauss, Claude 1985, The View from Afar, trans. J Neuroschel & P Hoss, Penguin Books, Reading, UK, pp. 
177-242.   
251 Ahn, Byung-Jik 1987, Sirhag’ŭi kyŏngjesasang (The Economic Thoughts of 'Sirhak'), kyŏngjeronjip (Korean Economic 
Journal), vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 419-427. 
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Chŏng, Yagyong (1762-1836).  Their ideas on comprehensive socio-economic reforms 
inspired the subsequent group of leaders to engage in the nation-building of modern Korea.  
Fundamentally Korean practical learning scholarship was about the Neo-Confucian 
extension of secular humanism in responding to the social conditions of the era. 
 
In the non-official domains of the Yi dynasty of Korea, life under Neo-Confucian dominance 
yet imbued with implicit or explicit rival worldviews was revealed through the literary works 
of Hŏ Gyun252  and Kim Man-jung.253   Both writers came from Neo-Confucian family 
backgrounds and followed bureaucratic careers.  Yet, their sense of social justice and its 
vindications shown in their works much to the delight of readers sharply contrasted to the 
noble moralistic Neo-Confucian statecraft.  The works of these two very popular writers 
were heavily influenced in their literary sensitivity by then non-official Taoists and 
Buddhists known for their compassionate feel for commoners.  Kim Man-jung’s work is 
additionally significant in that his language moved away from the classic Chinese literary 
orthodoxy to the easy to read Korean spoken language, fitting in with the commoners’ 
linguistic discourse of that time.  Both writers represent the social undercurrents of the 
majority of the populace who went through the major political upheavals and consequential 
hardships, resulting from the Toyotomi invasion of 1592-1598 and the Chinese invasion of 
1627 and 1636-1637.254  Notwithstanding, the orthodoxy of Neo-Confucian state ideology 
stood the tests of time over the next three centuries during the Yi dynasty of Korea. 
 
On a similar note, the lives of commoners and non-incumbent scholars in the 
Neo-Confucian era of China were imbued with Confucian ethics and ethos.  While state 
ideology was based on the high morality of Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, the lives of the 
non-royal classes were far from being comfortable in terms of economic wellbeing or social 
justice.   
 
                                                
252 Hŏ Gyun (1569-1618): a major literary writer of the Yi dynasty Korea who wrote a scathing critique of his contemporary 
Confucian officialdom through a novel, involving a humanized ‘tiger hero’ scolding corrupt and incapable mandarins. 
253 Kim Man-jung (1637-1692): a major literary figure and official-scholar of the Yi dynasty Korea who wrote the first 
vernacular novels particularly earmarked for those under-privileged readers in non-official domains such as female 
homemakers, including his own aged early widowed mother.    
254 Ching’s first emperor invaded the Yi dynasty of Korea twice, first before his enthronement and next thereafter, 
demanding the Yi dynasty sever its ties with his rival Ming dynasty, which Korea contumaciously refused and which 
brought on the invasions. 
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 Ko, MH,255 in her two articles on ‘the major Chinese Classical saga of Hong Lou Meng 
(Dream of the Red Chamber),’256 discusses how ‘non-royal’ people lived day to day lives 
with a Confucian mind and heart under the statecraft of Neo-Confucianism.  Men outside 
officialdom and women led the lives of the underprivileged.  Ko introduces the social 
background and most probable human scenarios.  These scenarios reflect the downside of 
Confucian social reality at best in the interaction between those privileged and those not.  
In this most acclaimed saga, women survive the atrocious injustices imposed on and 
inflicted by what is a supposedly moral hierarchy owing its legitimacy to Confucian social 
ethics.  People succeed in finding for themselves the mental space of emotionally or 
intellectually resisting irregularities.  Neo-Confucian morals were not rigid in enforcing their 
values.  Neo-Confucian morals were realistic, secular and cognizant of social realities.  
Neo-Confucian philosophy and its cohabitation with the undercurrents of Taoist aesthetics 
and Buddhist transcendentalism characterize the mental and emotional soil of the majority 
of the populace going through political upheavals and economic uncertainties.  
 
The era of the Tokugawa shogunate in Japan that embraced orthodox Neo-Confucian 
philosophy as a complement to the state ideology saw a substantial surge in trade and 
industry.  This surge in the real economy accompanied a rise of ‘townsman’ or chōnin257 
class that comprised merchants and craftsmen.  On the official social class levels, 
‘townsmen’ would belong to the mid to lower class.  However, economically they were in a 
superior position and also enjoyed freedom as long as their pursuit of economic success 
stayed clear of politics.  Mid to lower levels of samurais, after the successful establishment 
of the shogunate, assumed roles of administrators and came to rely economically on the 
working relationship with ‘townsmen.’  This sector of social class with its economic vibrancy 
provided a fertile environment for a new trend of urbane culture, such as rakugo258 satire 
                                                
255 Ko, Min-hee 1994, ‘Myŏngmal ch’ŏngch’oŭi kyemong sajowa [Hongrumong] (The Influence of Enlightenment Thought 
around the Late Ming and the Early Qing Dynasty on the Hong Lou Meng’, in Chungguk Ŏmun Nonch’ong (Journal of 
Chinese Language and Literature), vol. 7, pp. 221-258. 
      ________ 1999,  ‘Hongrumong’e panyŏngdoen 18 segi Chungguk (China of 18th century reflected in Hong Lou Meng)’, 
Journal of Chinese Language and Literature, vol. 12, pp. 323-366. 
256 One of the masterpieces of Chinese fiction also considered one of the greatest novels. It was composed sometime in 
the middle of 18th century during the Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1911), and its authorship attributed to Cao Zhan (Cao Xueqin: 
circa 1715-1763). 
257 chōnin (townsman) was a social class that emerged in the early years of the Tokugawa era. The majority of chōnin 
were merchants, but it also included craftsmen. Farmers were not included. The chōnin class would be equal to the urban 
bourgeois in the modern context. 
258 Rakugo (literally "fallen words") is a Japanese entertainment form based on comical monologues. It was originally 
known as karukuchi (jokes).  
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literature and ukiyoe259 ‘impressionist’ fine arts.260  The art forms as such brought about a 
new dimension of values and ethos to the commoners’ lives.  They grew at a distance from 
state ideology without running counter to its legitimacy.  Social mobility advanced on a 
wider platform without jeopardizing the centrality of orthodox ideology.  The secularization 
of Neo-Confucian philosophy such as yōmeigaku, namely, the japonized Yang-ming 
school of Neo-Confucian teachings laid a firm foundation for the economic advancement of 
Japan through the emergence of such a vibrant industrial middle class.  Some of the major 
industry enterprises of today261 are offspring of the ‘townsman’ class.  The evolution of 
those holding no office into the mainstream of society also brought substantial pressure 
upon the statecraft based on orthodoxy into a broader embrace of the practical or real 
learning school of Neo-Confucian thinking.     
 
Practical learning was indeed a response to the dominance of Chu’s orthodoxy.  
Conversely, the intellectual depth of practical learning was often facilitated through 
reflection in the mirror of Chu Hsi’s thought system.  The strength of the Chu Hsi mode of 
thought was that it was both scholarly and spiritual.  It nonetheless provided for the 
development of the individual mind, recognizing the spiritual dimensions of such 
development.  Chu was transforming both the ends and the means by making use of a 
genuinely Confucian doctrine.    
 
It is a historical irony that Chu’s Neo-Confucianism survived due to its most severe 
challenges, and vice versa.  The common goal for Neo-Confucian humanism was to 
remain focused on the self-cultivation goal of ‘becoming the Sage’ as a microcosm as well 
as a model of human integrity.   Self-fulfilment in action is shown by the Way as a 
macrocosm as well as an overarching unity and ultimate process.  As the separate 
                                                
259 ukiyo-e (pictures of the floating world), is a genre of Japanese woodblock prints and paintings produced between the 
17th and the 20th century, featuring motifs of landscapes, the theatre and pleasure quarters.  Ukiyo, meaning ‘floating 
world’, refers to the secular culture that bloomed in the urban centres of Edo (modern-day Tokyo), Osaka, and Kyoto that 
were a world unto themselves. It is also an allusion to the homophone term ‘sorrowful world’, the earthly plane of death and 
rebirth from which Buddhists sought release.  
260 MacPhail, Aiko Okamoto 2001, Imagining modernity: European Japonism and Japanese Westernism, Indiana 
University, Bloomington, IN, pp. 15, 153, 176, 242, 290, 322, 375. 
261 Fairbank, JK, Reischauer, EO & Craig, AM 1989, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 
MA, p. 416: ‘A number of great merchant houses developed during the Tokugawa period.  The house of Mitsui started in 
the province of Ise in sake brewing, added pawn-brokerage and money-lending, opened a dry goods store in Edo in 1673, 
established branches in Kyōto and Ōsaka, became official banker to the shogunate in 1691 and the banking agent of 
several daimyo, and survived to become in modern times one of the largest private economic enterprises in the world . . .  
Sumitomo, starting in iron goods and drugs in Kyōto, became a major trader and refiner of copper.’ 
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branches in the Neo-Confucian synthesis underwent their own development in constantly 
changing and ever more complex historical and cultural circumstances, their evolving 
meaning and validity were also reflected in the unifying concepts of Confucian humanism 
and secularism. 
 
2.6 CONFUCIAN HUMANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
2.6.1 Confucian Humanism and Political Thought 
 
Confucian political thought about humanism and human dignity is as old as the history of 
China and Korea.  Mythological tales about the first founding fathers of China and Korea 
carry comments about the centrality of serving the people as the foundation of nations.  
The mythological first emperor of China called the Yellow Emperor or Huang-ti262 is known 
to have had his political thought based on the principle of ‘non-action (wu wei),’ resonant 
with the Taoist teachings by Lao Tzu (ca. 4th century B.C.E.).  Instead of interventionist 
top-down rule by willful political design and state violence, the governance ideal was 
perceived as one coming from the voluntary acceptance by the populace of  sovereigns 
and their sagely rules.  This political paradigm commonly referred to as ‘Huang-Lao 
principle of governance’ has enjoyed longevity.  
 
Csikszentmihalyi 263  discusses, in his dissertation on the ‘Huang-Lao principle of 
governance and practice,’ how the sovereigns of the Han dynasty (180-141 B.C.E.) of China 
successfully abided by this principle.  He further argues that this principle has been widely 
emulated by posterity.  Not only those governing, but also those governed used this 
principle as the point of reference in the judgment of righteous rules.  The Huang-Lao 
evolved from a mere regional tradition of the golden rule of the Ch’i dynasty (1046-221 
B.C.E.)264 to become a lasting tradition of governance.  This tradition flourished, in particular, 
during the reigns of Emperors Wen (188–141 B.C.E.) and Ching (202–157  B.C.E.) of the 
Han.   
                                                
262 Huang Ti (huangdi, the Yellow Emperor) is a legendary Chinese sovereign and cultural hero who is said to be the 
ancestor of all Han Chinese. One of the Five Emperors, the Yellow Emperor is said by tradition to have reigned from 2698  
to 2599 B.C.E.  He is known for the introduction and invention of Chinese medicine, compass and sexagenary cycles 
Chinese lunar calendar. His wife Lei Tsu is credited for the discovery of sericulture and introduction of silk weaving looms. 
263 Csikszentmihalyi, Mark 1994, Emulating the Yellow Emperor: The Theory and Practice of Huang-Lao, 180-141 B.C.E., 
Stanford University, Stanford. 
264 Ch’i dynasty (Qi dynasty, 1046-221 B.C.E.) 
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A more concrete history following the footsteps of the Huang-Lao golden rule was made by 
Kuan-Tzu.265  Master Kuan-Tzu as he is commonly called was a scholarly Taoist patriarch.  
He lived until 645 B.C.E. to become a prime minister of this Ch’i dynasty in his lifetime.  In his 
celebrated work on statecraft bearing his own name, he wrote his first chapter on how to 
serve the people. This chapter in the ‘Book of the Master Kuan-Tzu’266 was titled the 
‘shepherding for the people’ or ‘mu min.’267  The message was a clear directive of placing 
the first priority of officialdom upon the securing of people’s well-being above all other 
matters of importance.  In the first chapter of the book, it is written: ‘When the granaries are 
full, the people will know propriety and moderation.  When their food and clothing is 
adequate, they will know the [distinction between] honour and shame.’   
 
This statement reflective of practical thinking has been cited by historians and social 
reformers throughout East Asian history.  While emphasizing the rule of law and peace of 
the state, it stresses social well-being based on humane values and governance by men 
with possessing virtues.  His legacy left an indelible mark on Classical Confucianism that 
was to emerge in the following century.  The primary focus of humane governance has 
been summarized in the ‘four codes of cardinal virtues’, namely, ‘propriety (li)’, 
‘righteousness (i)’, ‘integrity (lian)’ and ‘sense of shame (ch’ih).’ 
 
The mythological founding father of Korea, the Tan’gun,268  has been known for the 
foundation principle of ‘the broadest benevolence for humanity.’269 
 
Kim, HK,270 in her article on the ‘broadest benevolence for humanity in the epiphany of 
Korea’, argues that this concept was developed in parallel to the I Ching from where the 
design and context of the Korean national flag also derived.  The first historic references 
                                                
265 Kuan Tzu (Guanzi: d. 645 B.C.E.): He was born with the name Kuan Chung and became a prime minister of the Ch'i 
dynasty.  His teachings are represented by the voluminous work bearing his honorific name of Kuan-tzu. He is also 
regarded as one of the three patriarchs of Taoism, the other two being Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu.  
266 Guanzi 1985, Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China, vol. 1, trans. WA Rickett, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 51-57. 
267 mu-min (shepherding for the people), a term used for ‘civic service’ in the modern context.  
268 Tan’gun is the legendary founder of the first kingdom of Korea, in present-day Pyongyang in 2333 B.C.E.  
269 hong’ik In’gan (the broadest benevolence for humanity): this founding ideology of Korea is broadly applied in the 
official documents such as ‘article 1 of the Law of Education’ of Korea. 
270  Kim, Hae Kyong 1987, ‘Hong’ik in’ganŭi i’nyŏm yŏn’gu (Studie zum Koreanischen Idealtyp des souveraenen 
Menschen [Hong Ik])’, in Nonmunjip (Faculty Research Papers), no. 5, pp. 5-37. 
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appear in ‘Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms’271 which remains one of the key history 
books of Korea.  This founding ideology based on universal humanism represents a 
striking resemblance to the ‘universal benevolence’272 of the teachings of Mo-Tzu (Mozi),273 
considered the most significant sage who opposed mainstream Confucianism.  While 
Mo-Tzu does not negate the Confucian teaching of humanity, he proffered the more 
egalitarian form of mutual respect and ‘benevolent love’ amongst equals rather than any 
vertical social hierarchy that Mo-Tzu claimed represents the foundation of and the 
motivation for the teachings of Confucius.  Universal benevolence was also welcomed by 
Mencius as a laudable social ethic.      
 
In spite of a mushrooming diversity of moral and social philosophers of the era of the 
so-called ‘Hundred Schools’274 during the fifth to third century B.C.E., it was Confucius who 
established a new form of humanism based on the key tenet of humanity.  
 
Fingarett275 argues in his mini-book on the ‘secularity and sacredness of Confucius’ that 
Confucius achieved a unique consummation of humanism into a new lasting philosophical 
tradition by being able to recast ‘human community as a holy rite.’  Fingarett further argues 
that Confucius made it possible for what can be termed ‘Confucian humanism’ to emerge 
both in the framework of secularism and religious piety.  The article by Fingarett reinforces 
the point that the foundation was laid by Confucius and his first disciples by the 
encapsulation of his teachings in the Analects as the first cornerstone of Confucian 
humanism.  The so-called ‘four canon books’ of Confucianism not only prompted 
enthusiastic study, but also spawned further branches of knowledge and wider 
communities of scholarship.  This mini-book emphatically supports the modern relevance 
of Confucian teachings and his humanism, in that the foundational concept of ‘humanity,’ 
and its four pillars, namely, ‘propriety, righteousness, loyalty and filial piety’ have remained 
                                                
271Samguk Yusa (Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms), authored by the Buddhist monk Iryeon (1206-1289) is a collection 
of legends, folktales, and historical accounts of the Three Kingdoms of Korea, namely, Koguryŏ (37 B.C.E.- 668 C.E.), 
Paekche (18 B.C.E.- 663 C.E.) and Silla (57  B.C.E.- 935 C.E.) of the period , as well as other periods and states before, during, 
and after the Three Kingdoms period. This is the earliest extant record of the Tan’gun legend, the founding father of the 
first Korean nation. 
272 Ch`ien ai (qian ai, universal benevolence) was a key concept of the teachings by Mo-Tzu (Mozi, ca. 470 -390 B.C.E.).  
273 Watson, Burton, trans. 1967, Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsun Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu, Columbia University Press, New 
York, pp. 39-49.  
274 Chutzu Paichia (Zhuzi Baijia, hundred schools) 
275 Fingarett, Herbert 1998, Confucius: the Secular as Sacred, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, Ill., pp. 1-17. 
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meaningful, and continue to influence cosmology, learning, and aesthetics as well as social 
rituals and propriety.  
 
Legal institutions based on Confucian and Neo-Confucian political moral tenets have roots 
in pre-Confucius China and continued to develop into a major framework of key laws and 
implementation statutes.   
 
Kwak and Lee276 made a contribution through an article on the ‘origin and evolution of 
Chinese laws and statutes in terms of ‘criminal codes (lü),’ ‘civil administrative codes (ling),’ 
‘legal reform updates (ko)’ and ‘legal application cases (shih).’  They argue that the legal 
framework as such underpinning Confucian governance in fact originated from the ‘Spring 
and Autumn Era (770~476 B.C.E.).277  The ‘Commentary to Spring Autumn Annals,’278 
believed to have been authored by Tsuo Ch'iuming (556-451 B.C.E.),279 carries written 
records about basic laws and statutes that were already in force.  This legal tradition helped 
the premier of the Ch’i dynasty (ca. 770-221 B.C.E.), Kuan Tzu (d. 645 B.C.E.)280 to author a 
law book bearing his own name with comprehensive legal answers to specific political 
needs with chapters on ‘serving people, defence, budget, law enforcement, education’ and 
other matters of government. 
 
Shim, WS,281 has made a contribution through his article on ‘modern reflections on the 
political philosophy of Mencius.’  In the Classical age of Confucianism, Mencius, as 
discussed earlier in this literature review, has remained unparalleled in his support for 
‘human centrism’, socio-political participation, and providing an ultimate point of reference 
as a final resort in the event of incorrigible sovereigns and subsequent denial of 
empowerment.  Shim argues that the added modern relevance of Mencian teachings is 
due to the timelessness and practicality of his teachings such as sagely kingship together 
with clear moral reminders for institutional governments.  Shim interprets the Mencian 
political view that governance, based solely on legalistic, political and economic 
                                                
276 Kwak, Dong-Heon & Lee, Sang-Yul 1983, ‘Chunggugŭi yullyŏng kyŏksik ko (A Study of Chinese Lü-Ling-Ko-Shih)’, 
(Kyongpook Taehakkyo)Tongyang Munhwa Yŏn’gu (Oriental Culture Research), vol. 10, pp. 163-197. 
277 Ch'un ch'iu (Chun Qiu: ‘Spring and Autumn’ Era of China) 
278 Ch'un ch'iu tso chuan (Chun Qiu zuozhuan: Commentary to Spring and Autumn Annals) 
279 Tsuo Ch'iuming (Zuo Qiuming): commonly believed to be the author of ‘Commentary to Spring and Autumn Annals’, 
but some modern scholars dispute this authorship.  
280 Guanzi 1985, Op. Cit., p. 51-456. 
281 Shim, Woo Seup 1998, ‘Mengja chŏngch'i ch'ŏrhak sasang’ŭi hyŏndaejŏk chomyŏng’ (Modern Reflections on the  
Political Philosophy of Mencius), in Tongyang Ch'ŏrhak Yŏngu (The Study of Eastern Philosophy), vol. 19. 
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motivations, would not serve its ultimate purpose of bringing about humane and secular 
social cohesion.  
 
Kwak and Lee282 have also expounded upon how Confucian humanism and its governance 
framework have evolved into a legal framework in the major dynastic traditions.  The T’ang 
dynasty (618-907) produced one of the most comprehensive legal frameworks in ‘Legal 
Code with Commentary (635).’283  The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) promulgated the ‘Great 
Ming Legal Codes (1397)’284 with reflection of contemporary Neo-Confucian thinking.  The 
‘Great Ch’ing Legal Code with sub-statutes (1740)’285 emerged in the Ch’ing dynasty 
(1644-1911) as the central legal framework.  These legal and governance instruments 
were considered a part of broader Confucian ethics and governance in China and its 
Confucian neighbours.  Neighbouring countries such as Korea and Japan evolved their 
own versions of indigenous laws that answered to their social conditions.  There was no 
separation between Confucian humanism and legal institutions. 
 
Lee, KW,286 in his article on ‘ancient Japanese law and official hierarchy’, explores how 
legal traditions of China, mainly, that of the T’ang dynasty and partly through the Paekche 
dynasty in Korea, influenced the Japan of the seventh and eighth centuries in their 
development of the first legal frameworks.  Acting on the directive from the Empress Suiko, 
Prince Shōtoku (574-622) 287  in the year 604 C.E. completed ‘the Seventeen Article 
Constitution.’288  The articles 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15 and 17 under this constitution provide 
practical legal prescriptions such as ‘welfare for the poor’, ‘governance by mutual trust’, 
‘impartial administration and law enforcement’, ‘prevention of excessive taxation on the 
populace’ and ‘recommendation for decision-making on important state matters through 
consensus-building.’  
 
This constitution is featured by Buddhist compassion and social empathy, encapsulated in 
a Confucian framework of fair social hierarchy.  This constitution also became a foundation 
                                                
282 Kwak & Lee 1983, Op.Cit., pp. 182-196. 
283 T’anglü shui (Tanglü shuyi: Legal Code with Commentary) (635) 
284 Ta Ming lü (Ta Ming lü: Great Ming Legal Codes) (1397) 
285 Ta Ch’ing lüli (Da Qing lüli: Great Ch’ing Legal Code with sub-statutes) (1740) 
286 Lee, Keun-Wu 1999, Ilbon kodae yullŏng kwanwije yŏn’gu (Study of Ancient Japanese Law and Official Hierarchy), 
Busan Sahak, Busan Society of History, Pusan, pp. 1-16. 
287 Shōtoku Taishi (Prince Shōtoku): refer to Appendix 3 Biographic Digest.   
288 De Bary, Wm. Theodore 1958, Introduction to Asian Civilizations: Sources of Japanese Tradition, volume 1, Columbia 
University Press, New York, NY, pp. 47-51. 
  
 70
for a much more concrete legal framework in the same century commonly called the 
‘criminal and administrative codes (ritsuryō).’289 
 
In spite of the strong presence of Confucian morals allied with legal institutions, there have 
been numerous thinkers with concerns about the inadequacy of Confucian orthodoxy and 
its monopoly of power over laws and institutions.  One of the most prominent among those 
was Huang, Tsung-hsi (1610-1695).  Huang lived through the last period of the Ming 
dynasty and the early part of the new dynasty of Ch’ing (1644-1911).  Huang was not only 
a political theorist and philosopher, but also a military person.  His father as an official of the 
Ming court led a political reform movement.  His reform agenda made many enemies in the 
Ming court.  Huang joined the movement led by his father who died in prison due to a 
conspiracy.  He wrote the celebrated book titled ‘Waiting for the Dawn: a Plan for the 
Prince,’290 in which he severely attacked Neo-Confucian orthodox governance of the late 
Ming dynasty.  Huang emphasized that strong and fair legal institutions are a prerequisite 
for any successful sagely governance.  This bold move presaged an era of 
constitutionalism yet to come.  He strongly argued in the book as well as in the courtly 
political debates that the decline of governance and also that of the Ming dynasty itself are 
attributable to over-concentration of political power in the feudal system.  He made a 
particular reference to corruption-prone administration and allocation of farming land.  He 
advocated what we can consider in the modern context as the rule of law for survival of the 
dynasty and revival of Confucian legitimacy for government. 
 
Likewise earlier in the Yi dynasty in Korea (1392-1910), a similar constitutionalism or ‘rule 
of law’ was advocated by the court reformist, Chŏng, Tojŏn (1342-1398).  Chŏng was a 
leading Neo-Confucian statesman in the founding of the Yi dynasty in Korea.  As a part of a 
sweeping reform, Chŏng drew up a momentous constitution.  When the previous Koryŏ 
dynasty (935-1392) came to an end, its ending left a legacy of pervasive Buddhist 
economic intervention associated with dynastic property and a slavery system.  Through 
                                                
289 ritsuryō (ritsu and ryō: criminal and administrative codes): Emperor Temmu (631-686) made legal reforms and 
established a new system of eight honorary ‘cognomens’ (yakusa no kabane) in 684, and initiated the compilation of legal 
statutes that were distributed in 689 as the Asuka Kiyomihara Code.  This was the first Japanese legal code to be divided 
into criminal laws (ritsu) and administrative regulations (ryō), and it formed the basis for the more comprehensive Taihō 
Code of 701. 
290 Huang, Tsung-hsi, 1993, Ming-i-tai-fang lu (Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince), trans. Wm. T de Bary, 
Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 2, 99. 
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his work titled ‘an array of critiques on Buddhism,’291 Chŏng attacked the inadequacy of 
widespread Buddhist influence on the national economy.  Energized by the wellspring of 
Neo-Confucian idealism, he worked vigorously to bolster a new politics befitting the spirit of 
the new era.  
 
Tokugawa Japan, in addition to the inherited ‘criminal and administrative legal codes 
(ritsuryō),’ introduced a new law commonly called the ‘feudal law (1615-1710).’292  This 
feudal law was mainly a military code of conduct subsequent to the unification of Japan 
under the Tokugawa shogunate.  It was also called ‘laws governing the military 
households’ 293  and focused on political stabilization and peace time management of 
warrior classes.  Legal edicts with specifics on the desirable behaviour decorum of warriors 
came to pass in a series over a period of years 1615-1710.  These laws, however, did not 
displace conventional civic laws applied to non-warrior classes.  These civic and samurai 
laws were in force throughout the Tokugawa and Edo eras (1600-1864), until the Meiji 
Restoration (1866-1869) engendered a new constitution, i.e., the ‘Constitution of the 
Empire of Japan (1889)’ commonly called the ‘Meiji Constitution.’  The ‘Constitution of the 
Empire’ was modelled after those of the parliamentary monarchies of Europe.  The 
Emperor was at the centre of power and endowed with the powerful symbolism of the 
modern empire of Japan. 
 
From the first quarter of the twentieth century, there has been a serious effort made by the 
so-called contemporary Neo-Confucians to revive the Confucian tradition of moral 
philosophy, religion and social mores in face of its declining fortune under the West-led 
modernization.  Their opponents were many among those who equated modernization to 
Westernization, throwing Confucianism into the waste bin of history as a symbol of 
hindrance to progress and modernity.  At the forefront among those who vigorously 
resisted such setbacks and worked in earnest on the rebirth of the Confucian legitimacy in 
the modern context, was Mou, Tsungsan (1909-1995).294  He led the organizing of what 
was to emerge as the official start of the modern contemporary Neo-Confucian movement 
                                                
291 Bulssijappyŏn (an array of critiques of Buddhism) released in 1398. 
292 De Bary, Wm. Theodore 1964, Op. Cit., pp. 326-329. 
293 Buke shō hatto (1615-1710: laws governing the military households):  this series of legal edicts was intended for 
prevention of rebellion and social stability governing over warrior class. 
294 Mou Tsungsan (Mou Zongsan: 1909-1995):  refer to (Appendix 3) Biographic Digests.  
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which became a global movement.  This movement had a clear turning point through the 
‘Declaration of Chinese Culture and Civilization’ in 1958.   
 
Song, JS, 295  in his article on the ‘new Confucian theory of modernization and Mou 
Zongsan`s inward sage-hood and outward governing,’ provides a substantial background 
of Mou’s intellectual search. Song argues that Mou followed in the footsteps of the 
Classical and Neo-Confucian tradition both of Chu Hsi’s orthodoxy and Yangming’s school 
of mind studies.  Song also discusses Mou’s lifework of comparative study between 
Confucianism and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).  Mou worked diligently to 
refresh Confucian ‘moral philosophy’ and re-establish it as ‘moral metaphysics’ in a clear 
response to Kantian ‘philosophical metaphysics.’   
 
The new term Mou gave to this outgrowth of the Confucian ‘moral philosophy’ was ‘life 
Confucianism’ or ‘Confucianism of vitality.’296  By ‘life,’ Mou meant ‘moral life’ rather than 
‘natural life.’  His intellectual pursuits, with emphasis on life, living and moral vitality, also 
find a parallel in the works of Jean Piaget.297  Piaget argues that intelligence or intellect as 
philosophical capability is both logical and biological.  Through ‘life Confucianism,’ Mou 
intended to bring back the vitality to Confucianism consistent with Classical Confucianism 
and also with those of the various Neo-Confucian schools of ideas.  Song argues that the 
idea of Mou is attuned to mind studies in the legacy of the Yangming School.  
 
Mou also offered his ideas on governance consistent with this ‘life Confucianism.’  Umberto 
Bresciani, 298  in the chapter of his book on ‘reinventing Confucianism through the 
contemporary Neo-Confucian movement,’ made a contribution in a summary of this idea 
on governance that supports Confucian humanism and human dignity in the modern 
context.  Mou found the concept in the words of Taoist sage Chuang Tzu, namely, ‘sagely 
within, kingly without.’299  Mou found it essential to bring about a Confucian modernity in the 
current language of ‘democracy and science’ that the inner moral awakening and 
                                                
295 Song, Jong-Suh 2005, ‘Sin’yuga’ŭi hyŏndaehwaron’e taehan pip’anjŏk koch’al: Mojongsam’ŭi  [Naesŏng Oewang] ŭl  
chungsimŭro (A Critical Study on New Confucian Theory of "Modernization": Focussed on Mou Zongsan`s Theory of 
"Inward Sagehood-Outward Governing")’, Yangmyŏnghak, vol. 15, pp. 301-341. 
296 Saengmyŏng yuhak (Korean), shengming ruhsüeh (Chinese): Life-Confucianism or Confucianism of vitality 
297 Piaget, Jean 1971, The Psychology of Intelligence, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, pp. 3-17. 
298 Bresciani, Umberto 2001, 'Mou Zongsan (1909-1995) and Kant', in Reinventing Confucianism: the New Confucian 
Movement, Umberto Bresciani & Ricci Institute for Chinese Studies, Taipei, (chapter 13).  
299 neisheng weiwang (sagely sovereign within and kingly governance without):  a term appeared first in Chuang Tzu’s 
chapter on ‘Heaven and earth (t’ien hsia).’ 
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cultivation, i.e., ‘sagely within’ took place, before achieving external governance, i.e., 
‘kingly without.’  This fundamentally moral approach of Mou’s political philosophy and its 
implications for governance represented a sharp contrast to the popular position of the era 
that was accustomed to generalizing modernity around Western rationalism and 
positivism.  
 
Mou later came under criticism for being less than emphatic about ‘constitutionalism’ that 
was at the centre of the intellectual pursuits of the mainstream social reformers.  The 
reformers’ agenda in the period of ‘East and West Culture Debate (1915-1927)’300 was 
revolving around the ideas mainly focused on ‘modernization’ proffered by the key figures 
of the era such as Kang Yü-wei (1858-1927) and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao (1873-1929).  Yet, Mou 
remained firm on his ‘life Confucianism’ and political philosophy of ‘sagely within, kingly 
without.’ 
 
2.6.2 Confucian Human Rights, Rule of Law and Constitutionalism 
 
In order to realize the Confucian ideal of the ‘sagely within, kingly without’ governance in 
globalizing industrial economies, the foremost objective is to bring about the ‘rule of law.’  
Confucian ideals need to keep up with the relentless pace at which nations based on the 
Confucian tradition progress in their globalizing processes.  Confucian humanism was born 
into an agrarian non-urban pre-industrial society with its primary concern being with the 
domestic economy with little or no international exposure.  The founding sages would have 
had difficulties in foreseeing such changes in magnitude and inter-connectedness that the 
globalizing urban post-industrial societies usher in.  Confucian humanism was born in the 
age of those sovereigns with mandates coming from the mandates of Heaven.  Such 
mandates included implicit and explicit respect for human dignity including for those of 
inferior social standing.  Confucian teachings encouraged civility and inspired mutual 
respect for human dignity within the well-defined moral framework.  Such a moral 
framework expected that human dignity is honoured by enlightened emperors and 
incorruptible officials committed to Confucian virtues, with just behaviour and the impartial 
exercise of power in the interest of justice for the people.  
 
                                                
300 Tunghsi wenhua chenglun (1915-1927, East and West Culture Debate): a period of intensive intellectual debates, 
occasioned around the May Fourth Movement of 1919. 
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It goes without saying that modern societies, Confucian or not, unequivocally call for the 
rule of law as the main social foundation.  Citizens in contemporary societies count on a 
reliable, predictable, and transparent system of legal governance that ensures equality 
before the law and promises reparation in case of injustice.  Effective governance in the 
service of contemporary society rests on the ideal of effectual rule of law endowed with 
sufficient resources ready for its practical implementation.   
 
Articles dealing with Confucianism and legal governance, covering from the Classical to 
the contemporary period were reviewed to explore the question whether Confucianism is 
fundamentally compatible or not with contemporary notions of the rule of law and 
constitutionalism. 
  
Shim, JW,301 in his article on ‘modern reflection on traditional legal thoughts of the East 
such as on rule of virtues, rule of rites and rule of law,’ discusses the writings of Classical 
age Confucian legalists such as Han Fei Tzu302 and how their legal principles fared in an 
interplay with virtues, rites and written laws.  Shim argues that the ‘legalists’ idea about the 
rule through laws were not equal to what we perceive as the rule of law.  Han Fei Tzu 
emphasized the need for the concentration of all legal powers into the hands of the 
sovereign for effective sovereign ‘rule by law.’  The ministers would only administer the law 
on behalf of the sovereign.  Sovereigns were advised by Han Fei Tzu to deploy ‘strategies’ 
to enhance effective rules through laws handed down from sovereigns.  These strategies 
about laws were, firstly, ‘rule by law (fa chih)’, secondly, ‘rule by tactics (shu chih)’ meaning 
tactical management of ministerial power to prevent any attempt upon the power of 
sovereigns, and, finally, ‘rule by influence (shih chih)’ that prescribed for absolute 
sovereign power as a mean of unchallenged perpetual rule.  Shim argues that Han Fei 
Tzu’s interest was primarily in ensuring sovereign power as the bedrock for a stable society, 
made more secure through deployment of the legal system complemented by an 
unchallenging ministerial bureaucracy so as to preserve sovereign power.  This approach 
to law and governance as applied to the social conditions of the era is at variance with what 
we perceive as ‘rule of law.’  Shim’s description of the so-called legalist views is rather 
                                                
301  Shim,JW 1997, ‘Tongyang’ŭi pŏpsasang’ŭi chae chomyŏng: Tŏkch’ijuŭi, yech’ijuŭi, pŏpch’ijuŭirŭl chungsimŭro 
(Reflection on Legal Thoughts of the East: Rule of Virtues, Rule of ‘Rites’ and Rule of Law)’, T’onga Pŏphak , no. 23, pp. 
345-368. 
302 Han Fei Tzu (ca. 280-233 B.C.E.).  A philosopher who, along with Li Ssu, developed Hsün Tzu’s  philosophy into the 
doctrine embodied by the School of Law or Legalism.  Refer to (Appendix 3) Biographic Digests for more details. 
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restrictive in not sufficiently factoring in the fact that Han Fei Tzu harboured a political 
agenda in overcoming the division of China during the ‘Spring-Autumn era (770-221 
B.C.E.).’  The legal idea of Han Fei Tzu paid off as a political strategy, since the first emperor 
and his premier of the Ch’in dynasty (221-206 B.C.E.) used his advice in the process of 
unifying the warring states under one imperial rule.  This legalist rise and the despotic rule 
it helped create were short-lived, lasting less than two decades and was then replaced by 
Confucians.  
 
Shin, KY,303 in his article on the ‘rule of law in sociological context,’ discusses how 
philosophical traditions undergo the processes of accommodation, assimilation and finding 
a new level of equilibrium with the new sociological conditions.  He explores how new forms 
of governments such as republics, being the most common form, in fact realize 
centralization of power under the constitutional rights of ‘republics.’  By so doing, republics 
become ‘states representing public interests’ in concert with empowerment given by 
citizens’ rights.  He argues that both Confucian leaders of the past and leaders of 
contemporary republics are equally enjoined to reflect impartiality, rationality and 
compassion.  The departure points are, however, different in that the former comes from 
the inner moral framework, and the latter from the outer constitutional framework.  
Confucian humanism has long been firmly rooted in its ‘humanity’ as the bedrock of 
Confucianism.  Contemporary human rights regime was born during the modern age 
moving to the Industrial Revolution, to parliamentarianism, hence moving toward societies 
under a ‘single world.’  Human rights as values were considered natural and inherent in the 
minds of earlier thinkers, but they came effectively from the will of the people.  The will of 
the people crystallized itself into the constitutions of nations, both as the final prize for their 
struggle and also as the lasting framework of mutually agreed governance.  
 
Julia Ching,304 in her article on ‘Is human rights a valid Chinese concept?,’ discusses as to 
whether Confucian humanism is restricted to a particular cultural framework, and hence is  
incompatible with the modern social and political demands of contemporary nation states.  
Ching, as a significant contributor to the global human rights advocacy and a sinologist, 
argues that those dwelling on cultural particularity as a basis for the curtailment or 
                                                
303 Shin, Kwang-Young 2003, Sahoehagesŏ bon pŏpch’iju’ŭi (Rule of Law in Sociological Context), in Chibang Chach’i 
Chŏngbo (Hanyang University), No. 141,  pp. 57-65. 
304 Ching, Julia 1998, 'Human Rights: A Valid Chinese Concept?', in Confucianism and Human Rights, eds. Wm de Bary,  
& Tu Weiming, Columbia University Press, New York, NY, pp. 68-82. 
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deferment on human rights are belittling the social resilience of the Confucian tradition that 
has withstood two and half millennia of tests of all kinds.  She uses as examples the 
industrialized Confucian states of Korea, Japan and the Republic of China (aka Taiwan) 
where modern legal institutions made progress, not in spite of Confucianism, but because 
of its overarching humanism to their advantage.  She emphasizes that the so-called 
‘Confucian exceptions’ to the universality of respect for human dignity such as in 
observance of human rights are fundamentally politically motivated arguments.   
 
In a parallel to the points raised by Ching, it is noteworthy that a Chinese scholar of 
educational theory, Dr. Chang, Peng-chun (1892-1957),305 represented the Republic of 
China as the vice-chairman responsible for the first draft of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.  As the world was working on post-World War II global realignment and 
strategies for peace, a permanent global system on human rights was one of the central 
enterprises for securing a global platform for peace.  He, together with other ranking 
members such as the chairperson Eleanor Roosevelt, was encouraged to come up with a 
draft in the interest of broadest possible humankind by reflecting multicultural values. 
Chang was also a powerful voice for those Asian nations, concerned over the possibility 
that the Declaration would represent too parochial a view of human rights in the Western 
context.  Chang insisted ‘it should incorporate the ideas of Confucius as well as Thomas 
Aquinas.’ 306  
 
The first team of leading members in the drafting process of UDHR already foresaw such a 
culture-based difficulty for the future currency of the Declaration, and made a conscious 
effort in bringing a visible diversity of representation, in particular  that  of cultures.307 
 
Mo, Jongryn,308 in his article on ‘Checks and Balances of the Yi dynasty Korea legal 
system’, argues that a critical element of any legal system in terms of checks and balances 
                                                
305 Dr. Chang, Peng-chun’s dissertation in 1924 was titled ‘Education for Modernization In China; A Search for Criteria of 
Curriculum Construction in View of the Transition In National Life, with Special Reference to Secondary Education, Ph.D., 
Columbia University’ 
306 Asian Centre for Human Rights, <http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2004/15-04.htm>, viewed 18 September, 2006.  
307 Eleanor Roosevelt the first UN High Commissioner for Human Rights wrote in her article in April, 1948 issue of Foreign 
Affairs that the Commission she chaired has Dr. Chang from Republic of China in vice-chairmanship, and has Commission 
members from the nations of ‘Australia, Belgium, Byelorussia, China, Chile, Egypt, France, India, Lebanon, Panama, the 
Philippines, Ukraine, the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Uruguay, the United Kingdom and the United States.’ 
308 Mo, Jongryn 2003, ‘The Challenge of Accountability: Implications of the Censorate’, in Confucianism for the Modern 
World, Bell, DA & Hahm, CB, eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 54-68. 
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did exist in the Yi dynasty of the Korea Confucian law enforcement system.  To prevent 
power abuse and enhance accountability for enforcement institutions, the so-called 
‘Censorate’ legal hierarchy was deployed.  The Censorate consisted of three censoring 
organs, namely, the Office of the Inspector-General (OIG), 309  the Office of the 
Censor-General (OCG),310 and the Office of Special Counsellors (OSC).311  The three 
institutions were designed to prevent abuses in the exercise of political and administrative 
authority.  The main functions of OSC were to search out administrative and legal 
precedents, write major state documents, and advise the king on public affairs.  Among the 
three, the OIG and the OCG represented the two main agents of accountability within the 
government.  Officially, the OIG was charged with ‘criticizing public policy, scrutinizing the 
conduct of the officialdom, rectifying mores, redressing public wrongs, and preventing 
forgery and fraudulent misuse of public credentials.’  The authority of the OCG, on the other 
hand, was to remonstrate with the king and to lodge complaints against office holders.   
 
While Mo argues that checks and balances were already in place with the Korea legal 
system of the Yi dynasty, including the restraint on the conduct of the king himself, we 
cannot deny the king had a singular power to hire and fire all the personnel working in these 
institutions, implying that only limited independence was allowed from sovereigns.  Mo 
further claims that, in view of such an innovative legal tradition with a functioning horizontal 
accountability, the Confucian tradition in East-Asia did not lack an institutional framework 
for the rule of law, contrary to what some sceptics claim.  Mo’s concern lay rather in the 
strong Confucian inflexibility “not to negotiate or compromise” political positions at 
negotiating tables. 
 
Lee, KH,312 in his article on the ‘Meiji constitution and the constitutionalism of Japan,’ 
argues that the Meiji constitution is a product of a major compromise on political thinking 
between the new political-military mainstream and the liberals who sided with the 
European models of constitutions.  The political-military mainstream was born of the old 
                                                
309 sahŏnbu (the Office of the Inspector-General) 
310 saganwŏn (the Office of the Censor-General) 
311 hongmun’gwan (the Office of Special Counsellors) 
312 Lee, Kyu-Ha 1986, ‘Meiji kenbōni okeru rikken shugino kōsatsu (A Study on Constitutionalism in Japan: Under Meiji 
Constitution Law)’, Ilbonhakchi (Journal of Institute for International Studies Department of Japanese Studies, vol. 5, pp. 
1-25. 
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major warrior clans of Chōshū and Satsuma.313 The two clans united politically and brought 
about the successful undoing of the Tokugawa bakufu era and reintroduced emperorship 
opening the era of the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912).  Primary motivation behind the 
introduction of this constitution was consolidation of power in the emperor, not 
empowerment of the public which normally represents the rationale for democratic 
constitutions.   
 
Empirical evidence seems to support Lee’s argument.  The Meiji constitution (1889-1947) 
was introduced during the period in which imperialist ambition was rampant in the 
East-Asia.  The first premier of contemporary Japan was Itō Hirobumi (1841-1909).314  He 
represented the leading warrior clan of Chōshū and was the primary mover behind the Meiji 
constitution.  He organized study tours of Europe to evaluate European government and 
legal systems.  He made it clear what was the intention behind the introduction of this 
constitution.  It was consolidation of power in the person of the emperor, while people were 
forced to subordinate popular sovereignty to the emperor’s.  The Neo-Confucian ethos and 
vocabulary permeated the Meiji Constitution to the extent that the sovereign-to-subject 
relation is portrayed as a quasi-Confucian moral ideal.  In his address on February 15, 
1889 commemorating the Constitution, Itō said:  
 
The Constitution recently promulgated is, needless to say, a constitution by imperial 
grant.  As you well know, the term ‘imperial grant’ means that it was initiated by the 
sovereign himself and that it was sanctioned and granted to his subjects by the 
sovereign.  It is my hope that you will always remember this fact—and inscribe it in your 
hearts—that this constitution is the gift of a benevolent and charitable emperor to the 
people of his country.315  
 
                                                
313 ‘Chōshū han’ and ‘Satsuma han’: two leading samurai military clans who brought down Tokugawa bakufu rule to 
reintroduce emperorship of Meiji era of Japan. 
314 Itō, Hirobumi (1841-1909) A Japanese politician and the country's first Prime Minister (and the 5th, 7th and  
10th). He came from the leading political force of Chōshū samurai clan.  He headed a number of missions to study foreign 
governments. Based on European ideas, he established a cabinet and civil service in 1885. He supervised the drafting of 
the Meiji Constitution of 1889.  
315 De Bary, Wm. Theodore 1958, Introduction to Asian Civilization: Source of Japanese Tradition, vol. 2, Columbia 
University Press, New York, NY, p. 159: From an address on to the Conference of Presidents of Prefectural Assemblies, 
February 15, 1889 Itō Hirobumi den (Biography of Marquis Itō Hirobumi), pp. 651-657. 
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This constitution was in force until it was replaced by the so-called Peace Constitution316 of 
1947.  The ‘Peace Constitution’ owes its name to Chapter II of the Constitution for the 
‘renunciation of war.’  This constitution, a product of the Supreme Command of Occupation 
Forces (1945-1952), spelled out the ‘rights of citizens’ in its Chapter III, consistent with the 
political principles of contemporary Western liberal democracy.  
 
Lee, YR,317 in his article on the ‘birth of the first Korean constitution,’ discusses the 
circumstances under which the first draft of the Korean constitution came into being in 
1947-1948.  Post-World War II Korea came under the separate influences of the US in the 
South and the Soviet Union in the North.  In response to drafting the constitution for the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (aka North Korea), South Korea or the Republic of 
Korea commenced its own drafting of a separate constitution.  Lee argues that the leading 
law scholar, namely, Dr. Yu, Jin-O (1906-1987), was familiar with the legal system of Japan 
and its prototypical source of Prussian laws.  South Korea in the period of 1945-1948 was 
under the military administration of the US.  In the midst of political turmoil in South Korea, 
the US supported as the future president, Dr. Syngman Rhee (1875-1965), a 
Princeton-educated political philosopher and independence movement leader. This 
political motivation and the US influence left marks upon the constitution.  Lee further 
argues that this constitution driven in its birth by political imperatives is a product of 
compromise between Korean indigenous values, foreign influence (particularly of the US 
Constitution) and legal scholarship acquired during the Japanese Annexation of Korea 
(1910-1945).  The majority of scholars and lawyers in the constitution draft committee were 
familiar with the Confucian ethos, but the articles of this new constitution mirror the liberal 
democratic constitutions of the West, with little trace of Yi dynasty Korean laws of the 
Confucian tradition of the Yi dynasty.  The Korean constitution went through a series of 
amendments.  Lee argues that the ‘Constitutional Court’ formed in 1988, one year after the 
fall of the ‘military governments (1961-1987),’ is a milestone in the history of Korean rule of 
law, in that it serves as an assurance against any unconstitutional legislations or 
interpretations.  
 
                                                
316 ‘Peace Constitution’ is a common name given to the Constitution of Japan introduced in 1946 and put in force in 1947.  
Chapter 2 of the Constitution is for ‘renunciation of war.’  Chapter 3 prescribes for the citizen’s rights consistent with liberal 
democratic principles.  
317 Lee, Young-Rok 2002, Taehanminguk hŏnbŏbŭi chejŏng gwajŏng: puranhan iphŏnjuŭi’ŭi ch’ulbal (the Establishment 
of Korean Constitution: Unstable Start of Constitutionalism)’, in Pŏphak Nonch’ong (Chosun Law Journal), vol. 8, pp. 
67-89. 
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The Republic of China (aka Taiwan) was born as a consequence of the Hsinhai 
Revolution318 in the year of 1911, signifying the demise of the Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1911).  
The parliament of this republic drafted its first constitution in 1912 under the title of 
‘Provisional Constitution.’  It was a reflection of the ‘social revolution’ agenda followed by 
Sun, Yatsen (1866-1925).  He developed the idea into the so-called ‘Three People’s 
Principles.’  These principles comprise the tri-polar underpinning for the new republic he 
wanted to realize, namely, ‘patriotism, People’s Rights and People’s Livelihood.’319  Sun 
proudly compared them with the famous expression ‘of the people, by the people, and for 
the people’ coming from Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865). 
 
Hsü, Immanuel,320 in his book on ‘modern China,’ argues that each of the three principles 
represents responses to the political situation of the era.  The first principle, nationalism, 
called for not only the overthrow of the alien Manchu rule, but also the removal of the 
foreign imperialistic yoke.  The second principle aimed at People’s Rights as the bedrock of 
democracy.  The third principle, People’s Livelihood, stressed the need for regulating 
capital and rationalizing land rights.  This constitution calls for ‘Four Rights’ of people and 
‘Five Powers’ for the government.  The four rights are to empower people on ‘initiative on 
political affairs, referendum as a democratic decision-making process, free elections and 
rescinding of public servant appointments.’  The five powers for the government include 
those of ‘executive branch, legislature, jurisprudence, supervision or censorate, and state 
examination.’  These powers and rights reflect a mixture of the liberal democratic system 
and the Confucian governance tradition such as censorate and state examination system 
which are distinctly of the Neo-Confucian heritage.  
 
The ideal of Sun Yatsen and his Three Principles became the backbone of the current 
constitution of the Republic of China promulgated in 1946.  The preamble of the 
constitution spells out how central a role Dr. Sun played in the creation of this modern 
constitution of the republic.  The foundation for the rule of law and constitutionalism 
herewith came into being.  The preamble reads ‘The National Constituent Assembly of the 
Republic of China, by virtue of the mandate received from the whole body of citizens and in 
accordance with the teachings bequeathed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in founding the Republic 
                                                
318 Hsinhai (Xinhai) Revolution (1911) that brought down Ch’ing dynasty and gave birth to the Republic of China. 
319 Sanmin chu-i (Three People’s Principles) comprises Nationalism (Min-tsu), People’s Rights (Min-ch’üan) and People’s 
Livelihood (Min-sheng). 
320 Hsü, Immanuel C.Y. 2000, the Rise of Modern China, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 459. 
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China….do hereby adopt this Constitution….’321 
 
Societies under the rule of law uphold human rights.  The three countries we are discussing 
are in principle countries under the rule of law.  They are also signatories to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and related Covenants.  As such, each nation recognizes civil, 
political, economic and social rights.  Each society must also provide remedies in the event 
of violations of these rights.  The next chapters will further examine how the current 
constitutions of Korea, Japan and Republic of China (aka Taiwan) subscribe to the 
conditions of human rights covenants.  
 
2.7 CONFUCIAN HUMANISM, ECONOMIC ETHICS AND ECOLOGY  
 
Confucian East-Asia now that it has entered the twenty-first century has emerged as one of 
the mega-zones322 of the global economy.  With this new importance in the global economy 
comes a comparable share of responsibility, i.e., economic ethics.  In spite of the rich 
economic dividends that have benefited the so-called ‘developmental economies’ of 
East-Asia, the economic and industrial progress also has incurred an unprecedented cost 
to the globe as a habitat for humankind and all forms of life.  Confucian humanism has had, 
since its birth in the Classical Age, a belief in the ‘continuity of being,’323 whereby humans 
are in a nexus with both earth and Heaven.  As East-Asian minds re-examine the relevance 
of Confucian teachings in the contemporary context, they are awakened to the appalling 
global dilemma such as the global crisis of ecology.  Such a crisis is in large measure due 
to the unbridled pursuit of maximal economic development at a severe cost 
environmentally to the earth and at the social cost of denying a sustainable future to the 
global community that inhabits it.   In this crisis, East-Asians are both part of the problem 
and solution-seekers.  In this global dilemma, the East-Asian challenge is whether to play a 
minimal role to the extent of slowing down the vicious circle, or to respond to the 
‘awakening’ and follow on none other than the ethical tradition of Confucianism of 
respecting Mother Nature as a part of the ‘Confucian family nexus.’  
 
                                                
321 Constitution of Taiwan, <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/tw00000_.html>, viewed 22 September, 2006. 
322 Dicken, Peter 2004, Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st Century, Sage, London, pp. 73-74. 
323 Tu, Weiming 1998, 'The Continuity of Being: Chinese Visions of Nature', in Confucianism and Ecology: The 
Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, Humans, eds. ME Tucker & J Berthrong, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 
105-121. 
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Jung and Jung,324 a couple known as political phenomenologists, echo this concern in their 
article on the ‘new humanism through the social principle of human and nature.’  Their 
argument is to the effect that the current global crises arose due to the dominance of a 
homo-centric social philosophy.  Homo-centrism is the doctrine which claims the centrality 
of a human through dominion over nature by the ‘enlightened humanity.’  Homo-centrism 
prescribes to ‘technological thinking’ and possessive individualism. 
 
Jung and Jung call upon East-Asia and the global community to adopt a ‘new’ social 
principle of human and nature.  This new social principle implies recovery of the 
‘inextricable nexus of relationships both between human and human, and between human 
and nature.’  They identify a potential solution to the current global dilemma in the 
philosophical anthropology of, but not limited to, Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism. 
 
Classical and Neo-Confucians, together with Taoists, have expressed their unity of 
presence with nature in a number of ways.  Ahn, KS,325 in his article on ‘civilization in crisis 
and the ecological environment ethics of Lao Tzu,’ discusses whether the Taoist Lao Tzu’s 
teachings of ‘unity with nature’ could offer a philosophical and religious solution to the 
global environment crisis.  Ahn argues, resonant with Jung and Jung, that the current crisis 
is ascribable to the inadequacy of religious, philosophical and anthropological 
undercurrents that determine current responses.  He believes this matter is not confined to 
technical aspects of ordinary public policy, but concerned with how humankind perceives 
its relationship with nature.  Ahn argues that no solution is likely, unless humanity is willing 
to change its ‘enlightened worldview’ rooted in scientific rationality, materialism and social 
utilitarianism that has hitherto served the interest of ‘progress.’  Ahn considers Lao Tzu’s 
teachings of ‘unity with nature’ as a viable solution.  Lao Tzu’s teachings call for ‘freedom 
from artificiality and arbitrariness’ of the homocentric way of thinking that separates 
humankind from nature. 
 
Contemporary Neo-Confucians are keen on the discovery of what modern relevance or 
even the outlines of a solution they could draw from Classical and Neo-Confucian 
teachings.  As regards the foundation relationship between humankind and nature with 
                                                
324 Jung, Hwa-Yol & Jung, Petee 1994, Toward a New Humanism: The Social Principle of Man and Nature, the 
International Cultural Foundation, pp. 1031-1049, < http://www.riss4u.net/index.jsp>, viewed 26 August, 2006. 
325 Ahn, Kwan-Soo 2000, ‘Munmyŏng’ŭi wigiwa Nojaŭi saengt’aehakchŏk hwan’gyŏng yulli (Civilization in Crisis and  
Ecological Environment Ethics of Lao Tzu)’, in Kyoyuk Yŏn’gu (Educational Research), no. 19, pp. 219-236. 
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practice implications on the economic ethics issues such as global ecology, there are two 
distinctive schools of thoughts.  The first school is the Confucian dialectic school based on 
the dualism of ‘principle’ and ‘material force’326 represented by Chu Hsi.  The other is the 
monistic Confucian metaphysical school based on the unity of ‘principle’ and ‘material 
force.’  
 
In the earlier part of the Northern Song dynasty (960-1126 C.E.), Confucians faced a 
significant intellectual challenge from the popular Buddhists.  ‘Flower Garland’327 or the 
Huayan School among others of Mahayana Buddhism had a high profile.  ‘Substance and 
function’328 was one of the indigenized metaphysical concepts of this branch of Buddhism 
that also reflected the traditional Confucian way of thinking.   
 
Kang, JS,329 in his article on the ‘substance and function’ or t’iyung in the era of the 
Northern Song dynasty (960-1126 C.E.),’ argues that the conceptual pattern of ‘substance 
and function’ was based on an old tradition.  It came from the literal meaning of ‘body’ as 
‘substance’ corresponding to the letter t’i and ‘function’ as ‘action’ corresponding to the 
letter yung.  Ssuma Ch'ien (ca. 145–90 B.C.E.) commonly known as the Grand Historian330 
referred in his ‘Grand Scribe’s Records’331 to the Spring and Autumn Annals332 as a means 
of ‘substance,’ whereas he referred to the I Ching or the Book of Changes as that of 
‘function.’  Kang further argues that such a pattern of conceptualization has persisted 
throughout the intellectual history of East-Asia.  The ‘substance and function’ or t’iyung 
discourse was very much a part of Chinese intellectual debate during the late nineteenth 
century through to the first quarter of the twentieth century.  The discourse was on how 
China could accomplish modernization on Chinese terms by having the philosophical core 
of Chinese ‘substance’ with the instruments of Western technological ‘function.’ 
                                                
326 ch’i (qi : force, material force or ether) 
327 Huayan (or Avatamsaka in Sanskrit) or Flower Garland is a tradition of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy that flourished 
in China during the Tang period. It is based on the Sanskrit scripture of the same name and its Chinese interpretation, the 
Huayan Lun. The name “Flower Garland” is meant to suggest the crowning glory of profound understanding. 
328 t’i yung (tiyong: substance and function) 
329 Kang, Jin-Seuk 2001, ‘Puksong yugaŭi ch’eyongnon yŏn’gu (Study of ‘Substance and Function’ or t’iyung in the era of 
Northern Song dynasty)’, Chungguk Yŏn’gu (Chinese Studies), vol. 28, pp. 243-258. 
330 Ssuma Ch'ien (Sima Qian: ca. 145–90 B.C.E.) the Prefect of the Grand Scribes of the Han dynasty, commonly known 
as the Grandmaster Historian. 
331 Shih chi (shiji: Grand Scribe’s Records) 
332 Ch’un ch’iu (chunqiu, also known as Linching: the Spring and Autumn Annals): The official chronicle of the dynasty of 
Lu covering the period from 722 to 481 B.C.E.  It is the earliest surviving Chinese historical text arranged according to the 
proper annalistic principles. 
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In a direct parallel to Kang’s argument, Kim, TK attempts to apply the ‘substance and 
function or functional action’ to the global concerns about ecology in his article333 on the 
‘environmental ethics education from the perspectives of chae-yong-sang334 theory.’  Kim 
argues that, for the development of new thinking about economic activities in direct nexus 
with ecology, the Confucian and Buddhist intellectual tradition of ‘substance and function’ 
or t’iyung should be given a new currency.  In terms of human-to-nature ecological and 
economic relations, ‘substance’ or t’i also meaning body would represent the essence of 
every reaction in the cosmos, while ‘function’ or yung would refer to every-day economic 
activities.  Kim further argues that the recovery of ‘substance and function’ relations would 
bring about the appropriate ‘phenomenon’ or hsiang representing a desirable environment 
suitable to living conditions for all forms of lives.  
 
Such streamlined ecological thinking in terms of a ‘earth-human-cosmos continuum’ 
consistently appears in the teachings of the Neo-Confucian doyens such as Chang Tsai 
(1020-1077), Chu Hsi (1130-1200) and Lo Ch’in-shun (1465—1547) as well as T’oegye 
(1501-1570) of Korea and Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714) of Japan.  
 
T’ang Chun’i,335 in his article on ‘Chang Tsai’s theory of mind and its metaphysical basis,’ 
provides an insight into how Chang Tsai through his seminal work of ‘Western Inscription’ 
336 establishes the unity of moral philosophy and cosmology.  His ‘inscription’ carries in 
plain terms what Chang Tsai believes is a Confucian ideal on human to nature 
metaphysics:  
 
Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I find an 
intimate place in their midst.  Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body 
and that which directs the universe I consider as my nature.  All people are my brothers 
and sisters, and all things are my companions.  In life I follow and serve [Heaven and 
Earth].  In death I will be at peace. 
                                                
333 Kim, Tae-Kyong 2000, ‘Hwan’gyŏng yulligyoyugŭi ch’eyongnonjŏk chŏpkŭn bang’an (An Alternative Approach to  
Environmental Ethics Education from the perspectives of Chae-Yong-Sang Theory)’, Hwangyŏng Kyoyuk (Journal of 
Environmental Education), vol. 13 no. 1, pp. 96-110. 
334 chae-yong-sang (substance-function-phenomenon in Korean) 
335 T’ang Chun’i 1956, ‘Chang Tsai’s Theory of Mind and its Metaphysical Basis’, Philosophy East and West, vol. 6, no. 2, 
pp. 113-136. 
336 Hsi-ming (Ximing: Western Inscription) 
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T’oegye (1501-1570) of Korea highlighted the same teaching by offering the second 
diagram in his edition of ‘Ten Diagrams.’337  Kaibara Ekken, known as the synthesizer of 
Neo-Confucian scholarship in the Tokugawa era (1600-1868), also used plain language to 
convey his view on the human to nature metaphysical continuum by saying: 
 
Heaven and earth are the heart of living things.  Humans receive this heart and it 
becomes their own.  This is humaneness.  Nourishing life and [practicing] humaneness 
are not two different things.  Nourishing life belongs to heaven and humaneness belongs 
to humans.338 
 
These Neo-Confucian scholars of Korea, China and Japan as mentioned above not only 
philosophized about the human-to-nature cosmology and morality, but also undertook on 
putting these principles into practice within the communities they were teaching or 
governing.  Such community practice took the form of ‘community compact.’   The concept 
of ‘community compact’ emerged in China during the Northern Song dynasty (960-1126 
C.E.).  The so-called ‘Lü Community Compact’339 was proffered by the Lü brothers, and 
completed by Lü, Ta-chün340 in 1076.  This compact was later picked up by Chu Hsi 
(1130-1200) who made it thorough.  
 
Such communal practices of Confucian worldviews were either completely voluntary with 
passive understanding by central governments in recognition of limited governmental 
resources in meeting communal needs on a timely basis.  Or they were pre-approved by 
central governments on recommendations from the recognized senior community leaders 
such as Chu Hsi, T’oegye (1501-1570) or Yi, Yulgok (1536-1584) of the Yi dynasty in 
Korea.   
 
                                                
337 Sŏnghak sipto (Ten Diagrams): An anthology of cosmology, moral and governance teachings for incumbent and future 
sovereigns edited by T’oegye.   
338 Ekken Society 1973, Ekken Zenshu, Kokusho Publishers, Tokyo, vol. 3, pp. 182-183. 
339 Lü shih hsiang yao (Lü shi xiang yao: Lü Community Compact) 
340 Lü, Ta-chün (Lü, Da-jun): He is known to have completed ‘Lü Community Compact’ in the year of 1076 C.E., the same 
edition later utilized by Chu Hsi. 
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Kim, KS,341 in his article on the ‘Korean community compacts of the Yi dynasty,’ has argued 
that communal practices were closely linked with popular education regarding the 
Confucian moral codes and with economic fairness, particularly in farming.  Kim further 
argues that ‘social learning’ over the centuries through such a compact has inculturated 
human to nature cosmology in the hearts and minds of East-Asians.  
 
Lew, Chang and Kim,342 in their article on ‘affective networks and Korean modernity,’ argue 
that Korea, Japan and China historically share a sociological learning regime moulded from 
philosophical tenets of affective networks such as community compacts.  Such 
accumulated learning would minimize the transaction cost of adopting or reviving a desired 
social principle such as eco-friendly economic ethics and behaviours.  They also argue that 
Korea, Japan and the Republic of China (aka Taiwan) alike benefited from the shared 
culture of community compacts that perpetuated themselves into varied forms.  The rapid 
adaptation by Japan to modernity during the Meiji Restoration (1868) was based in large 
measure on communal activities.  The so-called ‘New Village Movement’343 of Korea is 
known to have aided in rapid industrialization.  
 
As we have already referred to earlier, among the twentieth century Confucian scholars, 
Mou, Tsung-san (1909-1995) stands out in awakening East-Asian minds to the ‘life-world 
philosophy’ as the central idea of contemporary Confucian teachings. Mou,344 in chapters 
six and seven of his book on the ‘right way to govern,’ reasons that modern Confucian 
challenges are firstly to ‘subjectively overcome the contradiction between life and reason’ 
through a renewed Confucian ‘philosophy of life,’ and secondly to ‘objectively overcome a 
contradiction between life and reason’ through respect for the creativity of the nature that 
sustains all forms of lives and the environment that embraces them.  
 
                                                
341 Kim, Kyong-Sik 1990, ‘Chosŏnjo hyang’yagŭi insige kwanhan kwan’gyŏn (A Study on Hyang-Yack of Chosŏn) ’, 
Hanguk Kyoyuk Sahak (Journal of Korean Education History), vol. 12, pp. 91-122.  
342 Lew, SC, Chang, MH & Kim, TE 2003, ‘Affective Networks and Modernity: the Case of Korea’,  in Confucianism for the 
Modern World, eds. DA Bell & Hahm Chaibong, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 201-217. 
343 Sae’maŭl undong (New Village Movement): economic and social drive on community level in Korea during 1960’s 
-1980’s.  
344 Mou, Zongsan 1996, ‘Chapter 6 & 7’, in Zheng dao yu zhi dao (The Right Way to Govern), Taiwan xue sheng shu ju, 
Taibei shi. 
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As regards the ‘life-world philosophy’ in the thoughts of Tokugawa Japan, Maruyama, 
Masao,345  in his chapter on the ‘historical significance of the transition from nature to 
invention in the intellectual history of Tokugawa Japan,’ argues that Tokugawa era thinkers 
helped overcome the potential risk of social stagnation that could have been precipitated, if 
Japan had uncritically absorbed the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy of China and Korea, 
particularly that of Chu Hsi.  Maruyama believes that the historical shift in Japanese 
philosophical orientation occurred thanks to the intellectual labour of those thinkers of the 
era such as Ogyu Sorai (1666-1728), Andō Shōeki (1703-1762) and Motoori Norinaga 
(1730-1801).  Maruyama further argues that the gist of this intellectual shift was from the 
‘nature’ as the centrepiece of Chu Hsi’s system of thought to the ‘invention’ or ‘design’ 
school of thought that these thinkers believed was necessary to realize a more affluent and 
egalitarian society.  These three intellectual figures are also credited for the creation and 
flourishing of ‘National Learning’346 that, Maruyama argues, laid an important cornerstone 
for modern Japanese systems of thought.  This view of Maruyama resonates with the 
concept of ‘collective intentionality’ that was discussed earlier in this literature review, 
reflected in the article by Searle, Bratman, Gilbert and Tuomela on ‘collective 
intentionality’347 and another by Wray, on 'collective belief and acceptance.’348   
 
In another strand of Japanese thinking on the harmony between humans and nature, 
Ishida, Ichiro,349 offers his contribution of alternative views through his book on the ‘history 
of Japanese thinking.’  He maintains that Japanese Zen Buddhism represents one such 
sense of harmony both in preserving nature and beauty for humanity.  He argues that this 
unique Japanese sense of harmony owes its origin to the indigenous antiquity of nature 
worship under the philosophical influences of Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, in 
particular, that of yōmeigaku.  
 
Dilworth, Viglielmo and Zavala350 have written on Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945) known as the 
greatest philosopher of modern Japan.  Their writing on Nishida was motivated by the fact 
that Nishida offers an important parallel argument to that of Ishida.  Further to Ishida’s view 
                                                
345 Maruyama, Masao 1974, Op. Cit., pp. 223-273. 
346 Kokugaku (National Learning) 
347 Searle, J, Bratman, ME, Gilbert, M & Tuomela, R 2006, Op. Cit.  
348 Wray, KB 2001, Op. Cit. 
349 Ishida, Ichiro 2001, Sisōsi, vol.1 (History of Japanese Thoughts), Yamakawa Publishers, Tokyo, pp. 318-332. 
350 Dilworth, DA, Viglielmo, VH, & Zavala, AJ trans. & eds. 1998, ‘Chapter one: Nishida Kitarō’, in Sourcebook for Modern 
Japanese Philosophy: Selected Documents, Greenwood Press, Westport, pp. 54-72. 
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of the above, Nishida emphasizes the spiritual attainment of ‘pure experience’ in his 
seminal work on the ‘study of Zen,’351 whereby there is no longer any division between 
‘subject’ and ‘object.’  Nishida maintains that self-awareness derives from this pure 
experience which in turn defines ‘self-hood.’  Through Zen one attains harmony and beauty 
in peace with Mother Nature. 
 
Confucian humanism such as proposed in the ‘philosophy of life’ emphasizing a 
human–to-nature nexus resonates with the principles of global economic and ecological 
ethics.  Hence, East-Asian Confucians were in search of a new paradigm for a worldview, 
consistent with their belief system, but also amenable to meeting the common concerns of 
the global community.   
 
As regards Confucian exercises of economic ethics in the community and industry spheres 
of East Asia, Onatowski352 contributed an article on the ‘boundary between the religious 
and secular: the idea and practice of Neo-Confucian self-cultivation in modern Japanese 
economic life.’  In this article he gave a chronological overview of how economic thinkers 
and actors in the Neo-Confucian era of East-Asia, particularly in Japan, internalized 
Confucian teachings in the exercise of economic ethics.  Onatowski argues that economic 
ethics adopted in the Neo-Confucian era owes their origin to the Classical age Confucian 
teachings, particularly of Confucius and Mencius.  The Neo-Confucian doyen of the 
Tokugawa era, Fujiwara, Seika (1561-1619) is the proponent of what can be termed the 
first Neo-Confucian tradesman’s code of conduct of Japan.  He called it the ‘Code in the 
Boat.’353  Literally, this code proscribed how an economic actor or tradesperson should 
conduct himself in transaction aboard ‘boat’ in the midst of the sea.  Even where there is no 
intervention such as of laws on the open sea, the Neo-Confucian tradesperson is expected 
to follow Confucian teachings and act in good conscience.  It is noteworthy that this regime 
of Confucian economic conduct came from Fujiwara, who also happen to be the most 
significant scholarly counsel for the first shogun of the Tokugawa era.  Onatowski argues 
that Fujiwara remonstrated with the shogun and tradesmen equally on the ‘religiosity’ and 
‘secularity’ of Neo-Confucian philosophical tenets.  This code fundamentally calls for 
                                                
351 junsui keiken (pure experience) 
352 Onatowski, Gregory 1998, ‘On the Boundary between Religious and Secular: the Idea and Practice of Neo-Confucian 
Self-cultivation in Modern Japanese Economic Life’, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, vol. 25, no. 3-4, pp. 345-376,  
 <http://www.nanzan-u.ac.jp/SHUBUNKEN/publications/jjrs/jjrs_cumulative_list.htm>, viewed 30 September 2006. 
353 Shūchū Kiyaku (Code in the Boat) 
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application of ‘humanity, righteousness, rite and wisdom’354 in the market as much as in the 
court of the sovereign. In 1726, Osaka merchants funded the establishment of a 
Neo-Confucian academy for future tradespersons.  It was called ‘Kaitokudō (Merchant 
Academy)’ and it educated industry leaders until it was replaced by modern universities in 
1868 during the Meiji Restoration.  This Neo-Confucian principle of industry and business 
also evolved the concept of kyōsei, 355  literally meaning ‘symbiosis,’ ‘co-existence’ or 
‘co-prosperity.’ The principle of kyōsei has become the core philosophical underpinning of 
the Japanese Confederation of Economics and Industry, namely, Keidanren.356  The 
concept of kyōsei became the founding principle of an international business ethics 
initiative, namely, the ‘Caux Round Table’357 born of tripartite efforts by Europe, the US and 
Japan.  In this initiative, Japan offered the foundational principle of kyosei and the 
Europeans and Americans contributed another principle of ‘human dignity.’  These two 
principles combined are to serve in the interest of sustainable ecology and environment on 
the same continuum as the human and industrial ends of global business endeavours. 
. 
In collaboration with Japanese colleagues, Hans Küng,358 a dissident Catholic theologian 
and a renowned global ethicist together with Helmut Schmidt, a former German chancellor, 
offered an important platform of global ethics complementary to the current human rights 
regime, namely, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  They organized two global 
declarations under ‘A Global Ethic and Global Responsibilities’ in 1998.  They called for a 
philosophical turnaround so that ethical awakenings coupled with readiness for human 
responsibilities could work hand in hand with the current regime of human rights. Such a 
holistic approach with combined ethical forces of human responsibilities and human rights 
would be both necessary and practical in order to meet the current challenges of the globe 
in peril.  This philosophical approach resonated with the Confucian ethos of East-Asia.  The 
Küng and Schmidt initiative received substantial support from East-Asian nations and 
leaders in both scholarship and politics.   
 
                                                
354 jen,i, li and chih (humanity, righteousness, rite and wisdom): the four cardinal teachings of Classical Confucianism. 
355 kyōsei (symbiosis, co-existence or co-prosperity) 
356 http://www.keidanren.or.jp/ viewed 30 September, 2006. 
357 Curtin, Leah L. 1996, The Caux Round Table principles for business’, in Nursing Management, Chicago, vol. 27,  no. 
2,  p. 54-56. 
358 Küng, Hans & Schmidt, Helmut eds.1998, A Global Ethic and Global Responsibilities: Two Declarations, SCM Press 
Ltd, London. 
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Westra,359 an environment ethicist and policy practitioner, offered an article on the ‘Earth 
Charter.’  She described how a global awareness to bring back a just balance to the human 
to nature relation led to intellectual and organisational activities to meet the challenge.  In 
1972, nations gathered at Stockholm and agreed that environmental protection should be 
added to the core agenda of the United Nations.  They agreed that a new global regime of 
environment and ecology should be deployed in conjunction with peace, human rights and 
equitable social and economic development.  This belief was at the 1992 Earth Summit at 
Rio de Janeiro.  In 1994, the Earth Charter Initiative worked to develop a document that 
would start by accepting the complete interdependence of humanity with global natural 
systems and was intended to involve all countries and nationalities.  This initiative was 
calling for ethical compliance or ‘soft law’ abidance.  This Charter and other efforts by the 
likeminded also led to the creation of an ‘International Draft Covenant of Environment and 
Development,’360 with the third draft of 2004 under evaluation at the UN since 2005.  
Whereas the Earth Charter is an ‘ethical vision’ or ‘soft law,’ the International Covenant of 
Environment and Development, once agreed to and ratified by nation states, would 
become an international “hard law” to observe.  Westra argues that the global belief 
systems such as the Confucianism of East-Asia that supports reciprocity of respects for 
humanity and nature now face challenges to deliver on their belief in terms of ethical action 
beyond the self-interest of preserving the economic status quo. 
 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
 
This literature review has been conducted to explore into the past and present intellectual 
background of Confucianism based on scholarly works as related to the main research 
question and the three point research postulation.  The review has become a short 
intellectual journey through the philosophical tradition of Confucian humanism that stays at 
the centre of this study.  Through the minds of scholars, this review has examined 
Confucianism in its birth and evolution into Neo-Confucianism through Practical Learning 
and various ramifications of the inculturation process.  Concurrently, it has traced evidence 
of the emergence of Confucian humanism and its sustaining impacts on human dignity and 
governance that would have direct practical implications on human rights and economic 
ethics.  
                                                
359 Westra, Laura 2005, ‘The Earth Charter: from Global Ethics to International Law Instrument’, in Environmental Ethics: 
Readings in Theory and Application, ed. LP Pojman, Wadsworth, Toronto, pp. 590-596. 
360 <http://www.iucn.org/themes/law/cel07.html>, viewed 12 September 2006. 
  
 91
 
While laying foundations for what would become Confucianism, the Classical Confucian 
sages were emphasizing continuity of the tradition of ancient wisdom they inherited.  The 
‘life-world’361 they lived through was the one of extreme political and social instability, with 
economic hardship for the commoners.   
 
On the one hand, Classical Confucianism was profoundly religious in terms of upholding 
the sacredness of humans as the vehicles of ‘immanent cosmos.’362  On the other hand, it 
was genuinely secular in terms of searching for ways of re-establishing the ‘sagely 
kingship’ on earth amongst the virtuous inner beings as individuals, irrespective of social 
standing whether as commoners or sovereigns.  Confucius and his disciples of the first and 
next generations helped establish a ‘way’363 to both the ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’364 ideals 
through the central concept of Confucian ‘humanity.’  This ‘humanity’ had the ‘four cardinal 
virtues’ built around it, namely, ‘propriety, righteousness, loyalty and filial piety.’  These 
virtuous teachings have been encapsulated in the ‘four canonical books,’ including the 
Analects. 
 
‘Collective intentionality,’ as examined, was to help explain how Confucius and his 
disciples endeavoured to realize their ideal of ethics, minds and hearts, and sagely politics.  
This ‘intentionality’365 was to bring a fresh consciousness of the selves and to reposition 
themselves meaningfully in relation to the given ‘life-world’ conditions.  This intentionality 
also meant a design for the Confucian moral framework that helped overcome the polarity 
of the ‘governing’ and the ‘governed’ by meeting communally on the common platform of 
Confucian ‘humanity’ and the ‘four cardinal virtues.’ 
 
The seminal work of T’oegye (1501-1570) was examined as an eminent example of how 
the Confucian tradition could consolidate Confucian philosophy and holistically be applied 
to ‘life-world’ conditions.  The systematic approach and thoroughness of T’oegye’s vision 
and framework of Confucian moral ideals and governance were officially acknowledged 
                                                
361 Tu, Weiming 1993, ‘Confucianism’, in Our Religions, Sharma, A ed., Harper Collins, San Francisco, Chapter 3. 
362 Hall, DL & Ames, RT 1987, ‘Some Uncommon Assumptions’, in Thinking through Confucius, SUNY Press, Albany, NY, 
pp. 11-25. 
363 Star, J, tran. 2001, Op. Cit., Introduction. 
364 Fingarett, H 1998, Op. Cit. 
365 Kwon, GC 1996, ‘Hüsserl hyŏnsanghage Issŏsŏ ŭisik chonjaeron (Die Ontologie des Bewusstseins und der Begriff  
Intentionalität in der Phaenomenologie Hüsserlis)’, Inmunhak Yŏn’gu (Chung-Ang Univesity), vol.25 , pp. 85-112. 
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and attained by the state orthodoxy.  T’oegye declared his intellectual indebtedness to 
Chang Tsai (1020-1077) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200), and was proudly committed to the 
continuum of the Classical and Neo-Confucian tradition.  T’oegye successfully proceeded 
to the inculturation of this tradition into the conditions and circumstances prevailing upon 
the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) in Korea. 
 
Living a worthy life under such a Confucian tradition meant firstly dedication to 
self-cultivation and holistic learning as a life-long endeavour.  Such a devotion to 
knowledge and wisdom entails the ‘dialectics of knowledge creation.’366  It would firstly 
‘adopt’ Confucian teachings, secondly ‘assimilate’ and internalize such knowledge, and 
thirdly ‘accommodate and apply’ the ‘schemes of knowledge’ 367  to self-realization, 
enhancing communal interest starting with family, and sustaining public-spiritedness ready 
for serving the common good. 
 
Resonant with the achievement of T’oegye in the Yi dynasty in Korea, Kaibara Ekken 
(1630-1714) of the Tokugawa era (1600-1868) in Japan also achieved, as discussed 
earlier, a systematic and thorough framework of Confucian learning, enjoying wide 
acceptance and longevity.368   
 
As regards Confucian governance, the inner rule of mind was more pronounced than the 
outer rule by laws or institutions.  Alternative views came from those of the ‘School of 
Legalism’369 headed by Hsün Tzu (310-237 B.C.E.) and Han Fei Tzu (280-233 B.C.E.), who 
emphasized the necessity of a legal framework to complement the dictates of ethics. 
 
Mencius highlighted an essential condition to the construct of Confucian governance.  This 
condition was about the moral legitimacy of political power and its exercise by sovereigns.  
He went as far as to morally justify the ‘commoners’ rights to revolution’370 as the last resort 
to correcting the incorrigible sovereign. 
 
                                                
366 Furth, HG 1980, ‘Piaget’s Theory of Knowledge’, in Piaget, Philosophy, and the Human Sciences, ed. HJ Silverman, 
Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, p. 1. 
367 Ibid. 
368 Tucker, ME 1989, Moral and Spiritual Cultivation in Japanese Neo-Confucianism: The Life and Thought of Kaibara 
Ekken 1630-1740, State University of New York Press, NY, pp. 53-84. 
369 fa-chia (School of Legalism): Op. Cit. 
370 Tucker, JA 1997, Op. Cit.  
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The ‘Doctrine of the Mean’371 serves as the central canon for Confucian governance.  The 
‘Doctrine of the Mean’ teaches how a person can sublimate his personhood to a ‘superior 
man, or profound person’ in the process of social and political rectification and also of  
bringing about a type of community where trust reigns, not power, and where peoples of 
the ruling or the ruled classes alike cherish a level of integrity called ‘sincerity.’372   
 
Such reciprocity of intellectual and moral internalization represents a ‘message of 
harmonization,’373 as one endeavours to gain the ‘true understanding of selves’ or ‘learning 
to be human,’374 as a launch pad to serving the interests of the greater good of the society.  
It is also a process of continually ‘restructuring’ intellectual and social governance built 
around the ‘empiricism’375 that such intellectual and moral internalization engenders. 
 
This review also discussed the intimate encounters amongst Confucianism and other 
major East-Asian philosophical traditions of Taoism and Mahayana Buddhism both in 
competitive and complementary ways.   
 
The review touched upon the significance of I Ching or the Book of Changes376 as an 
ancient composition of oracles, predating the Classical Confucian age. Although it came 
into being as a book of courtly divination, it continued to exert a pervasive influence upon 
the evolution of linguistics and symbolism.  I Ching’s impacts were far-reaching, not only 
upon Confucianism, but also on Taoism and Mahayana Buddhism.  
 
The major reformation of Confucianism occurred with the emergence of a host of 
Neo-Confucian scholars.  What is termed Neo-Confucianism started with the pioneering 
efforts of the Ch’eng brothers (1032-1108) and Chang Tsai.  The consolidation of the 
rejuvenated Confucian tradition took place through the masterly works by Chu Hsi.  
Reformed Confucianism assumed state orthodoxy firstly in the Yüan dynasty (1279-1368) 
                                                
371 Legge 1960, Op. Cit. Chung Yung (the Doctrine of the Mean)  
372 ch’eng (sincerity) 
373 Cheng, CY 1991, Op. Cit. 
374 Tu, Wei-ming 1985, “A Confucian Perspective on Learning to be Human” in Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative 
Transformation, SUNY Press, Albany, pp. 51-66.  
375 Lévi-Strauss, Claude 1985, ‘Chapter 8’, in The View from Afar, trans. J Neuroschel & P Hoss, Penguin Books, Reading, 
UK. 
376 Wilhelm, R, trans. 1983, Op. Cit.  
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in China, followed by the Yi dynasty in Korea.  The Tokugawa shogunate accommodated it 
within the fold of the political framework of the military government. 
 
The orthodoxy of Chu Hsi-led Neo-Confucian mainstream faced a major challenge.  An 
‘epistemological divide’377 arose between the orthodoxy and the School of Lu-Wang or the 
School of Mind and Heart Study.  The orthodoxy had its cosmological understanding based 
on the duality of ‘principle’ and ‘material force.’  The School of Mind and Heart were 
opposed to it and insisted instead on the unity between the two.  The engulfment of this 
divide was serious enough to engender the separate strands of Confucianism in China, 
Korea and Japan.  The alternative school in Japan developed into Yōmeigaku378 and 
became important elements of the Practical Learning379 and the National Learning.380  Zen 
Buddhism and the evolution of Shintoism into its diverse versions have actively interacted 
with this school of Neo-Confucianism, leaving indelible marks on the philosophy and 
aesthetics of Japan.  Branches of Neo-Confucianism survived the severe political changes 
in each nation through diverse adaptations.  Adaptations by the Neo-Confucians during the 
period of the Practical Learning included accommodation of Western science and certain 
aspects of Western learning, i.e., Catholicism.    
 
The commoners’ life reserved their own space of spiritual freedom despite the Confucian 
orthodoxy of the ruling class that dominated knowledge and power.  Such spiritual freedom 
was eminently expressed in the major literary works enjoyed by the commoners and 
scholar-officials alike.  The two very popular Korean writers, namely Hŏ Gyun381 and Kim 
Man-jung,382 were heavily influenced in their literary sensitivity by then non-official Taoists 
and Buddhists known for their compassionate feel for commoners.  The Chinese saga of 
the ‘Dream of the Red Chamber’383 is another major example.  It vividly depicted in its 
                                                
377 Kim, Tae-An 1985, T’oegye ŭi insingnonjŏk pangbŏb ko (A Study on the Epistemological Methology of T’oegye), 
Andong Taehak Nonmunjip, vol. 7 no. 1, pp. 113-128. 
378 Yōmeigaku: Japanese inculturation of Yangming School or the School of Mind and Heart, started by Lu, Hsiang-shan 
(1139-1193) and Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529). 
379 Jitsugaku (Practical Learning) 
380 Kokugaku (National Learning) 
381 Hŏ Gyun (1569-1618): a major literary writer of Yi dynasty Korea who wrote a scathing critique on his contemporary 
Confucian officialdom through a novel, involving a humanized ‘tiger hero’ scolding corrupt and incapable mandarins. 
382 Kim Man-jung (1637-1692): a major literary figure and official-scholar of the Yi dynasty Korea who wrote first 
vernacular novels particularly earmarked for those under-privileged readers in non-official domains such as female 
homemakers, including his own aged early widowed mother.    
383 Hong Lou Meng (Dream of the Red Chamber): One of the masterpieces of Chinese fiction and also considered one of 
the greatest novels. It was composed sometime in the middle of 18th century during the Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1911), and 
its authorship attributed to Cao Zhan (Cao Xueqin: circa 1715-1763). 
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storytelling how ‘non-royal’ people with no official privileges, in particular, womankind, lived 
day to day lives under the statecraft of Neo-Confucianism, kept up their spiritual freedom 
and, at times, fought with gusto the hypocrisy and injustices of Confucian mainstream.   
 
Review of Confucian political thought about humanism can be traced back to the origin of 
political thought and human dignity thinking as far back as to the ancient era of the Yellow 
Emperor or Huang-ti,384 the mythological first emperor of China, and also to the foundation 
mythology of Korea, i.e., the founding father of Korea, the Tan’gun,385 known for the 
principle of ‘the broadest benevolence for humanity.’386  This tradition of governance would 
have practical implications on the approaches to human rights observance under 
contemporary modern social conditions. These approaches are at variance with the 
legalistic approaches that the Western tradition would take to the question of human rights. 
 
In discussion of the rule of law and the legal tradition preceding modern constitutionalism, 
the review touched on the ‘origin and evolution of Chinese laws and statutes in terms of 
‘criminal codes (lü),’ ‘civil administrative codes (ling),’ ‘legal reform updates (ko)’ and ‘legal 
application cases (shih).’  Such a legal framework consistent with the Confucian 
philosophical mainstay underpinned Confucian governance.  It originated from the ‘Spring 
and Autumn Era (770~476 B.C.E.)387 in the form of the ‘Commentary to Spring Autumn 
Annals,’388 and made its way into the governance code of the premier of Ch’i dynasty (ca. 
770-221 B.C.E.), Kuan Tzu (d. 645 B.C.E.).389  Such tradition of laws remains in the modern 
constitutions despite heavy influences from the Western constitutions. 
 
The emergence of the contemporary Neo-Confucian scholarship was discussed in the 
review in that contemporary Confucians endeavour to find the modern relevance of the 
Confucian tradition.  They share a concern about the global crisis, in particular, about 
                                                
384 Huang Ti (huangdi, the Yellow Emperor) is a legendary Chinese sovereign and cultural hero who is said to be the 
ancestor of all Han Chinese. One of the Five Emperors, the Yellow Emperor is said by tradition to have reigned from 2698  
to 2599 B.C.E.  He is known for the introduction and invention of Chinese medicine, compass and sexagenary cycles 
Chinese lunar calendar. His wife Lei Tsu is credited for discovery of sericulture and introduction of silk weaving looms. 
385 Tan’gun is the legendary founder of the first kingdom of Korea, in present-day Pyongyang in 2333 B.C.E.  
386 Hong’ik In’gan (the broadest benevolence for humanity): this founding ideology of Korea is broadly applied in the 
official documents such as ‘article 1 of the Law of Education’ of Korea. 
387 Ch'un ch'iu (Chun Qiu: ‘Spring and Autumn’ Era of China) 
388 Ch'un ch'iu tso chuan (Chun Qiu zuozhuan: Commentary to Spring and Autumn Annals) 
389 Guanzi 1985, Op. Cit., p. 51-456. 
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ecology.  The Confucian view of human-to-nature unity would have different implications 
on economic ethics as related to the preservation of ecology.   
 
The Confucian tradition, after the two millennia and half since its birth, still maintains the 
footprints of the Classical Confucianism. Its birth was universal in that people came to think 
anew of themselves, the world and beyond, rising to a new plateau of a ‘civilization as ways 
of thought.’390  The Classical Confucianism on this new ‘ways of thought’ foundation was 
profound and cogent enough to warrant ‘continuity as civilization.’ 391   The pillar of 
‘humanity’ still remains at the centre of what became the tradition of Confucian humanism.  
In search of a new meaning, contemporary Neo-Confucians go through a process of 
finding a new equilibrium, i.e., ‘re-equilibration.’392  This new equilibrium, the modern 
Confucians hope, would emerge from the productive encounters between the 
contemporary modern conditions of life-world and the Confucian philosophical tradition.  
 
This review has provided a foothold towards the central theme of Confucian humanism, 
with which the research can proceed to exploring its implications on the question of human 
dignity in practice, namely, human rights.  It can also proceed with exploring the question of 
economic humanism, namely, economic ethics, with special attention to the challenges of 
the global environment.   
 
With this intellectual picture on hand, this research will now move to the next chapter where 
narrative data and corresponding documentary evidence will be examined to explore 
further the research question: Confucian humanism and its implications for human rights 
and economic ethics in the non-socialist East-Asian nations of Korea, Japan and the 
Republic of China (aka Taiwan).     
 
 
 
                                                
390 Braudel, Fernand 1993, A History of Civilizations, trans. Richard Mayne, the Penguin Group, New York, pp. 21-23. 
391 Ibid, pp. 24-35. 
392 Piaget, Jean 1975, The Development of Thought: Equilibration of Cognitive Structures, Basil, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 
4-7, 73-80. 
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Chapter Three 
 Confucian Humanism, Human Rights and Economic Ethics: Discussants’ Views  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Following upon the review of scholarly literature in the preceding chapter, this chapter 
summarizes the narrative data.  This narrative data comprises the summary of focus group 
discussions and documentation corroboration in relation to the discussion content. 
Discussions followed within a thematic framework with the help of ‘discussion questions.’1  
These questions relate to how Confucianism has evolved into Confucian humanism, what 
impact such Confucian humanism has had on the governance framework, especially in 
relation to human rights and economic ethics.  The last one of these questions relates to 
whether Confucianism and its societal implications are in accord with the globalizing civil 
society and its ideals.  The narrative content was obtained through a series of small ‘focus 
group’ discussions during 2005-2006.  For those discussants who could not attend the 
small group meetings, ‘one-on-one’ interviews were conducted. These groups averaged 
three to five persons excluding the convenor, namely, the researcher. The small groups 
were composed of those with similar intellectual interests or occupational pursuits. The 
‘focus group’ approach was a part of the research strategy to collect qualitative data.  This 
approach was adopted in order to facilitate joint exploration into the key ideas. Selection of 
discussants has been made on the basis of depth of knowledge about and/or intensity of 
interest in Confucian humanism and its implications upon its governance issues. The 
‘invitation letters’ containing the ‘confidentiality terms,’ appended as Appendix 5-1, have 
been sent out since 2005 for those discussants selected. The discussions and interviews 
took place in Korea, Japan and the Republic of China (aka Taiwan).  Meetings for focus 
discussions took place in the respective capital cities and their suburbs, namely, Seoul, 
Tokyo and Taipei. English was used as the main languages for discussions and 
note-taking, with help of respective national languages, i.e., Korean, Japanese and 
Chinese (Mandarin), if/when necessary, thanks to the researcher/moderator’s familiarity 
with each language. Follow-up communication ensued via email and phone. On 
                                                
1  Questions employed to trigger the ‘Unstructured Discussions’: 
Q1. Do Northeast Asians in Korea, Japan and Republic of China (aka Taiwan) follow Confucianism as one of their    
       major common philosophies and beliefs? 
Q2. Is Confucian philosophical and belief tradition the bedrock of Confucian humanism? 
Q3. If so, does the Confucian humanism advance governance such as the observance of human rights?  
Q4 Does Confucian humanism foster economic ethics?  
Q5 Does Confucian humanism accord with the humanism and ideals of a globalizing civil society and its   
     governance, as expressed in human rights and economic ethics especially in relation to the global ecological    
     crisis? 
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completion of the focussed discussions and interviews, participants totalled eighteen for 
each nation and fifty four in total.  Details are given in Appendix 5-2 about their expertise, 
areas of interest, and fields of engagement.   
 
In compliance with the ‘ethics guidelines’2 for this research, anonymity and confidentiality in 
respect of discussants’ identities and their views were assured.  Discussants have been 
given acronyms bearing no relation to their real names.  Appendix 5-23 carries these 
acronyms with aggregated occupational descriptions.  
 
Most of the discussants showed substantial interest in the research topic and the 
discussion themes. The small groups gathered in relaxed atmospheres, mostly of two hour 
duration, and they enjoyed the conversational dialogues. There was a consistent sense 
that discussants were participating in the ‘creation of communal knowledge’ rather than 
simply responding to a research questionnaire. The convenor refrained from offering any 
opinion, with his function in the gatherings limited to that of facilitator. 
 
The thematic summary follows the main narrative themes and the contents of the focus 
group discussions.  The themes relate to and come under the headings of: (3.2) whether 
Confucianism is the common philosophy of East-Asia, (3.3) how Confucian humanism has 
evolved, (3.4) whether Confucian humanism supports governance ideals such as human 
rights, (3.5) whether Confucian humanism advances economic ethics, and, finally, (3.6) 
whether Confucian humanism accords with the globalizing civil society and its ideals.  
 
3.2 CONFUCIANISM AS THE COMMONLY EMBRACED PHILOSOPHY OF EAST-ASIA 
 
In this thematic discussion, each national group was asked to respond to the question, “Do 
Northeast Asians in Korea, Japan and the Republic of China (aka Taiwan) follow 
Confucianism as one of their major common philosophies and beliefs?”  The outcome of 
the discussions was as follows: 
3.2.1 On the Diverse Identities of Korean Confucians  
                                                
2 RMIT University Ethics Clearance of this research was made on the basis of anonymity of the discussants and 
confidentiality of their material. 
3 Table 1 appearing in the research strategy part of Chapter One is a condensed tabulation of discussants’ representation 
in terms of expertise and areas of interest.   
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Korean responses were quite diverse and somewhat controversial as to whether 
contemporary Koreans believe they are Confucian adherents or not.  As to whether 
Koreans live Confucian lives, most discussants agreed that their family lives and 
interpersonal relations are based on Confucian ethical principles.  
 
The leading religions of Korea, according to the latest governmental census of 2003 as 
attached in Appendix 6-14, are Buddhism (25.3 per cent), Protestant Christianity (19.8 per 
cent), Catholicism (7.4 per cent), Confucianism (0.4 per cent), other religions (1.0 per cent) 
and no declared religious affiliation (46.1 per cent). 
 
One discussant (KAP) who convenes interfaith gatherings was familiar with the reason 
behind such a surprisingly low percentage who declared themselves Confucians.  He 
mentioned: ‘Statistics can be quite misleading.  According to the 2003 census of Korea, 
declared Confucians are 0.4% of population or 0.7% of those declared religious adherents.’    
He suggested more factual findings were possible through in-depth surveys with the use of 
more concrete questions such as those regarding Confucian practices, e.g. ancestral 
worship and family rituals.  He argued that more than half of the non-religious adherents 
together with the Buddhists, Protestants and Catholics follow ancestral veneration in some 
form based on Confucian norms. They maintain their family and other human relationships 
broadly based on Confucian ethics.  KAP mentioned: ‘The official statistics about 
Confucianism is confounding our belief that Korea is one of the most Confucian nations in 
East-Asia. This official figure is extremely low.  But it actually reassures us that 
Confucianism still remains the mental undercurrent of nearly all Koreans, while it may not 
be an organized religion.’ 
 
Another discussant (KAH) who researches in social theories offered the parallel argument 
that Confucianism is not an organized religion. He suggested that the low official figure is 
misleading in that Confucian values and norms still remain deeply rooted in the minds of 
the religious adherents of any persuasion and also of those with no declared religious 
persuasion.  He emphasized that this low figure reassuringly indicates how deeply 
Confucianism has become entrenched in the Korean tradition. Organized proselytizing 
                                                
4 Appendix 6-1: Korea National Statistical Office 2003, Religions of Korea: Number of Declared Participants per Each 
Religion, <www.nso.go.kr>, viewed 07 October 2006. 
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religions have not succeeded in eliminating Confucian thinking and rituals from the minds 
of their followers.   
 
3.2.2 Confucian Influence over Education in Korea  
 
Nearly all discussants agreed that the central importance Koreans place on education 
reflects the Confucian mentality.  The Confucian emphasis on self-cultivation calls for 
incessant self-education and broader learning.   
 
The first discussant (KEH) as an economic historian on ‘knowledge economy’ argued that 
the extraordinary zeal for education mirrors the struggle for survival under the rigid 
hierarchical society that Confucian state ideology helped create.  Confucian knowledge 
was directly aligned with power and career. He further argued that the current state 
examination system in Korea for public offices 5  still maintains the Confucian value 
orientation. The better educated command the trust of the society.  The fairness of the 
examination system in the choice of the best candidates for high administrative office 
remains largely unchallenged.  
 
The next discussant (KPH) as an advisor on resource policy suggested that the Confucian 
zeal for education also is reflected in the private sector, in particular in the prominent large 
corporations.  He argued that those who have not made it into officialdom achieve their 
comparable ambitions in the large hierarchical industrial corporations.  This phenomenon 
in the economic sector, he insisted, provides another venue for contemporary Confucians 
in their pursuit of self-realization.  An industry career in East-Asia at times is seen as a 
vehicle of worthy Confucian legitimacy as was officialdom in the past.  This view probably 
reflects his interest in human development policy.   KPH also mentioned how ‘The state 
examination system of Korea became formal in 1949.  It is a direct heir to the system used 
by the imperial Japanese government since its introduction during the Meiji reign.’  
   
                                                
5 The Meiji era introduced the ‘state examination  for civil administrators’ in 1887 in the old Confucian state examination 
tradition, but also modelled on the German state examination system as recommended by the Japanese study visitors.  
This state examination system of imperial Japan was adopted in Korea through the Japanese annexation of the Korean 
peninsula during 1910-1945, Secretariat of Administrative Reforms, Government of Japan (www.goukaku.go.jp), viewed 
09 October 2006. 
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The next discussant to make a contribution (KAS) as a social development specialist  
brought up another Confucian aspect related to the Korean education system and its 
syllabus selection process from years one through twelve, i.e., six years of elementary 
school, three years of middle school and three years of high school. The core Confucian 
virtues and other Confucian teachings remain central in the ‘morality’ subject starting at the 
very first year, and becoming more formal with the year three learners.  They also remain 
central themes in the ‘civic ethics’ subjects compulsory for middle school years and an 
elective for high school. 
 
3.2.3 Existing Confucian Institutions in Metropolitan and Provincial Korea 
 
As to whether there still exists any institutional vestige of Confucianism, one discussant 
(KMC) as an advocate of participatory civic society referred to the ‘National Confucian 
Academy’ or ‘Sŏnggyun’gwan.’  This state Confucian academy was established by the 
Koryŏ dynasty (935-1392) of Korea in 992 and became the central academy of advanced 
studies for those select scholar-officials chosen to serve throughout the period of the Yi 
dynasty (1392-1910).  This institution remains in existence today, albeit without the state 
imprimatur it formerly enjoyed.  Its current abode is within the campus of the 
Seongkyunkwan University in Seoul. This institution lost its status and influence, simply 
because no religion by law can be a state religion in contemporary Korea.  On the origin of 
the word ‘Sŏnggyun’gwan’ that is comprised of ‘sŏng-gyun’ (realisation of equality)6  and 
‘gwan (institution),’ the discussant (KAC), drawing on his knowledge of the cultural history 
of Korea, explored the motivation behind the decision on the naming of this critical 
institution.  He suggested that ‘sŏng-gyun’ came from a verse in the Rites of Chou.7   Its 
intention was self-explanatory in that this institution was established to educate and train 
the scholar-officials to serve the people and the sovereign alike in order to ‘realize the 
equality of benefits’ to all.   
 
The next discussant (KPS) with an interest in social policy added that ‘sŏng-gyun’ 
represented the principle of balancing the ‘sagely rule of the sovereign’ in the interest of 
                                                
6 Sŏnggyun (‘realization of equality) was one of the key concepts of governance and of the principles of building 
institutions, including the education of promising scholar-officials, as a tradition of empirical political philosophy handed 
down from the era of the Chou dynasty (ca 1122-256 B.C.E.) to the Koryŏ dynasty (935-1392) of Korea.   
7 Chouli (Zhouli: the Rites of Chou): Authorship is credited to the multiple writers during the period of ‘Warring States’ 
(403-221 B.C.E.): Wilkinson, E 2000, Chinese History: a Manual, the Harvard University Asia Centre, Cambridge, MA, 
p.468. 
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social stability vis-à-vis the ‘potential abuses of sovereign power.’  He highlighted the 
significant historical role played by Tung Chung-shu (circa 195-115 B.C.E.)8.  Tung was the 
leading Confucian scholar of the Han dynasty and played a pivotal leadership role in the 
elevation of Confucianism to be the state orthodoxy.  It was a major triumph over the 
diverse philosophies and ideologies that mushroomed during the period of the Hundred 
Schools of Thought.9  Tung re-emphasized the Mencian virtue of maintaining political 
equilibrium between the sovereign and the commoners as well as the need of factoring in a 
remedy against the possible abuse of power.10 
 
Further to the centrality of the state academy, two discussants (KAC) and (KPR) as a 
research and development policy person shared their views about the important social and 
political roles played by those ‘private Confucian academies (sŏwŏn)’ located in the 
provinces outside the capital. Establishment of these academies was encouraged by the 
leading Confucian scholars such as T’oegye (1501-1570) to make Confucian education 
and self-cultivation available nationwide though under the constraint of the national 
resources available to the central government.  The discussant (KAC) mentioned: ‘the 
number of private Confucian academies (sŏwŏn) peaked to approximately one thousand 
during the era of King Yŏngjo (reign 1724-1776), which the central government reduced to 
approximately seven hundred to stem overgrowth.’  These academies not only grew in 
number, but also became bastions for philosophical and political factions.  From them, 
provincial power struggles arose and the factions built their political influences around them.  
The Yi dynasty (1392-1910) of Korea saw the extremities of factionalism spilling over to 
bloody political struggles.   
 
A discussant (KSS), with an interest in the advocacy of civic rights, argued that this 
factionalism was due to political intolerance engendered by the orthodox Confucian 
monopoly over knowledge and power.  Those orthodox Confucians, according to him, 
could not avoid the responsibility for spawning the protracted struggle for legitimacy among 
the intransigent regional Confucian factions.   
 
                                                
8 Tung Chung-shu (Dong Zhoungshu: circa 195-115 B.C.E.) was a scholar in the era of the former Han dynasty (206 
B.C.E.-8 C.E.).  He is credited with the elevation of Confucianism as the official state ideology of China. 
9 chu-tzu pai-chia (zhuzi baijia:The Hundred Schools of Thought) was an era of great cultural and intellectual expansion in 
China which lasted from 770 to 222 B.C.E., also known as the Golden Age of Sinic philosophy and which spanned the 
Spring and Autumn period and Warring States period. 
10 Min, HK 2000, Op. Cit. 
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On this point, one discussant (KHA) offered his view that the modernization of the Yi 
dynasty in Korea had to go through the institutional reform of Confucian education as a 
start of national policy.  The Regent Taewŏn’gun (reign 1863-1886) 11  closed down 
approximately six-hundred and fifty provincial Confucian academies out of seven hundred 
in a gargantuan sweep, leaving only forty-seven academies.  The discussant added that, 
while this regent was fully Confucian in heart and mind, he had to rid his government of 
faction-hardened Confucian academism in order to advance a reform policy.  KHA also 
mentioned: ‘The provincial academic factions were also associated with the major family 
clans who produced influential political figures.  The regent Taewŏn’gun had to contain 
political pressures exerted by the leading family clans such as of Kwangsan Kim and 
P’ungyang Cho.’ 
  
3.2.4 Religious Embeddedness of Confucianism: ‘Christians Without, Confucians  
Within’?  
 
Two discussants (KAP and KAH) had earlier expressed the view that Confucian traits are 
nearly omnipresent in the Korean mentality irrespective of religious affiliation.  However, 
another discussant (KSS) offered a contrary view.  He asserted that the pragmatic impulse 
of secular Confucianism recognized the overarching implications of the new political 
paradigm arising from Western science, economic supremacy and democracy that were 
and are identified with the newly arrived Christianity, in particular, Protestantism.   
 
The discussant further argued that the majority of the Confucian students studied this new 
Christian paradigm as a major new discipline to learn in earnest rather than for religious 
conversion.  Conversion took place as a consequence of the intellectual pursuit.  He 
commented: ‘Today almost every Korean in four is Christian.  Then, nine Koreans out of ten 
are Confucian in all practical aspects.  These figures, evidently contradictory, can be 
illusory, since they merge into each other as mutually non-exclusive identities.’  
 
Another angle to the above observation was added by KPH, who ascribed such Confucian 
universality and tolerance to its humanistic moral teachings free of any allegiance to a 
messianic saviour or any promise of salvation.   He argued that the pains of hardship 
                                                
11 Regent Taewŏn’gun (1820–1898) with the birth name of Yi Ha-ŭng was the father of the reigning monarch and 
conducted three periods of regency in the years of 1863 through 1896, exercising  royal powers effectively equivalent to 
the reigning sovereigns. 
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experienced throughout the convulsive history of modern Korea called for messianic 
salvation beyond any passive moral teachings.  The Protestant Christian mission from the 
West filled this void. The discussant added: ‘Confucianism has no specific venue for 
salvation.  It offers a way instead.  Those in hardship and despair look for spiritual 
consolation and would tend to turn to religions with promises of salvation.  In this respect 
Confucianism on the one hand and Christianity or Buddhism on the other can be 
complementary.’  
 
The above has summarized Korean discussants’ responses to the question: ‘Do Northeast 
Asians in Korea, Japan and the Republic of China (aka Taiwan) follow Confucianism as 
one of their major common philosophies and beliefs?’  
 
 The next section that follows below covers the responses to the same question asked of 
the discussants in Japan.  
 
3.2.5 Confucian Influence over Education in Japan 
 
Regarding Japan, two discussants (JAH) as a human development researcher and (JPH) 
as a human resource policy person shared the view that the understanding and actual 
practice in Confucian ethics firstly occurred through school education.   They suggested 
that the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890)12 introduced during the era of the Meiji 
Restoration commencing in 1868, set a modern Japanese education agenda in a 
breakaway from the Tokugawa tradition.   The discussants pointed out that, despite the 
compelling national drive to modernization on Western models including education, the 
internal ethos of this new imperial edict on education remained very Confucian.   Externally, 
this legal deed utilized Western terminology, but internally it incorporated the four 
Confucian virtues as its mainstay, i.e., humanity, righteousness, loyalty and filial piety.   
 
One discussant (JMC) as a contributing writer for media offered another angle as to why 
Confucian virtues made their way into such an important national decree.  He argued that 
this decree on school education is one of the numerous imperial governance edicts that 
were intended to elevate the Meiji imperium to a religious level in association with the long 
                                                
12 Kyōiku Chokugo: Imperial Rescript on Education was signed by Emperor Meiji in 1890, laying the foundation for the 
modern Japanese education system, featuring Confucian civic ethics.  
  105
and holy imperial ancestry.  He mentioned: ‘The benevolent and celestial voice from the 
exalted palace of the Meiji emperor to his subjects brings a magnificent message of the 
Way to national well-being.’  He continued his point by expounding upon the key Confucian 
figure behind the epochal change in Japanese education ideology and institution.  The 
figure was a Confucian scholar-samurai Motoda Nagazane (1818-1891) who became the 
imperial tutor for the incumbent sovereign Meiji.  Motoda edited the Great Principles of 
Education13 proffering a framework of public education of Japan built around the Confucian 
teachings. 
 
One discussant (JPS) as a welfare policy developer, however, pointed out that this project 
by Motoda met substantial resistance and he had to settle on a compromise amongst those 
competitive yet complementary sources of influence, i.e., Confucian teachings, National 
Learning, Shinto state-centrism and Western learning.  All of these elements interacted, 
compromised and amalgamated into a new national cause of modernization. Competing 
strands of thought became united in order to uphold the Meiji aspiration for the elevation of 
modern Japan to an equal footing with Western powers.    
 
Two discussants (JAH and JPH) shed light on the evolution of textbooks on civic ethics in 
Japanese primary and secondary schooling.  These textbooks carry significant implications 
in that they would leave indelible marks on the impressionable minds and hearts of the 
students, as they undergo the formative period of their lives.  The discussants observed 
that at every important political turn, significant changes took place with the embedded 
moral tenets of these textbooks.  Visible changes took place with the Meiji Restoration and 
World War II.  After the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), a series 
of school books appeared, closely attuned to the guidelines of this decree.  The 
discussants commented that the episodes in the Japanese ‘national language’ or kokugō 
textbooks carried stories about renowned national figures, which were heavily imbued with 
the Confucian moral ethos.  ‘The Common Primary School Moral Textbook’ (Jinjō shōgaku 
shūshin-sho)14 featured Confucian teachings and exemplar conduct.  This textbook also 
has a separate note for the teachers that manifested the philosophical intention behind the 
editing of the texts in plain terms. These books clearly mentioned the name of Confucius 
                                                
13 Kyōgaku taishi (1879, the Great Principles of Education) drafted by Motoda Nagazane at the Emperor Meiji’s 
commissioning which based the public education of Japan on Confucian teachings. 
14 Kim, Sun-jeon & Kim, Young-In 2003, ‘Meiji-Taishsō ki [imsangsohak susinsŏ] yŏn’gu (A Study on the Transformation 
of Illustrations in the Shūshin Textbooks of the Meiji and Taisho Eras)’, in Ilbon Ŏmunhak (Japanese Language and 
Literature), vol. 18, pp. 151-170. 
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and his teachings on rightful relationships about brotherhood, sisterhood, relatives, 
friendship and neighbourhood. JPH quoted the two chapters in the notes for the teachers: 
‘the purpose of this chapter is to teach the pupils due diligence with cultivation of their 
morals, to turn themselves into faithful subjects of ability, and strive to become figures of 
national importance.’  ‘The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the true meaning of the 
family in our country so as to teach the children to respect our ancestors and family, and to 
carry out their national duties.’  
 
Another discussant (JSS) as a social policy advisor observed that these civic ethic books 
were in use until the outbreak of the Second World War. With the nation engaged in the war, 
the textbooks assumed more nationalistic tones, fitting students to the social ethos of the 
embattled nation.  He added that the textbooks during 1940-1945 had a more selective use 
of Confucian teachings with emphasis on loyalty, filial piety, propriety, humility and 
diligence,   with less importance accorded to the basic Confucian virtue of ‘humanity.’  
 
3.2.6 The Confucian Family and the Japanese Civil Code 
 
On the Confucian influence on family, a discussant (JCG), drawing on his familiarity with 
the intellectual history of Japan, pointed out that Confucian influence during the Tokugawa 
era in Japan was evident, but it shared its influence with native Shintoism and Zen 
Buddhism among others.  The discussant introduced the important roles played by ‘the 
school of mind and heart study’ or Shingaku group of thinkers and educators who were the 
followers of the Yōmeigaku branch of Confucianism.  These philosopher-educators offered 
youth education for the commoners with no access to official education.  The texts they 
edited for use in such education initiatives exhibit a syncretic mix of Confucian ‘Elementary 
Learning,’15  the Zen practice of quiet contemplation and rules of Shinto decorum.  The 
discussant quoted the leading educator Teshima Toan (1718-1786) and his textbook called 
‘Early Lessons’16 which exhibits the threefold ethos of Confucian morals, thoughtful inner 
observation of selves taught by Zen and Shinto loyalty. The discussant also noted that 
Teshima Toan and his teacher Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714) with his more Confucian text 
                                                
15 Hsiao hsüeh (Elementary Learning): Confucian classic text for the young beginners with emphasis on the essential 
decorum of daily life. 
16 Zenkun (Early Lessons): Teshima Toan’s edition of the basic studies for the youth in daily morals and industriousness. 
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‘Common Lessons for Youth’ 17  are still highly regarded in modern Japan, as those 
teachings are considered a contribution to family values and social cohesion.  
 
A different opinion was offered by JHA as a human rights advocate to the effect that there 
was ambivalence towards Confucianism in the Tokugawa era in Japan.  Namely, 
Confucian rites were adopted mostly by those coming under the direct political influences 
of the shogunate such as aristocrats, feudal landowners, senior samurais and wealthy 
merchants, whereas commoners remained less influenced by the Confucian mores, 
staying with their traditional native family conventions.  Confucian-educated leaders such 
as Teshima and Kaibara helped close the gap by imparting Confucian ideals through their 
bona fide community education for the under-resourced families as both the teachers and 
institutes where they taught refused to accept any remuneration.    
 
These two discussants (JHR and JHA), both familiar with the legal framework in the history 
of Japan, emphasized the importance of the Meiji Civil Code (minpō)18 introduced in 1898 
and its clauses related to family relationship, in that this modern civil code eliminated the 
traditional inequality related to gender and primogeniture. The discussants held the opinion 
that the Meiji government purposefully overrode some aspects of Confucian family 
conventions in order to bring about national unity and achieve the goal to fast-track the 
catch-up with the Western powers.  The discussants also pointed out that this change did 
not affect other aspects of Confucian family tradition such as inheritance and marriage, 
maintaining the Confucian tradition of family ethos in the modern legal framework. JHR 
mentioned: ‘The Meiji Civil Code remained in force in the next half century.  It exerted 
substantial formative influence over Japanese families and their relationship until it was 
replaced by the post-war civil code in 1947.’ 
 
Another discussant (JPS), however, attached much more importance to the Meiji Civil 
Code in that it has dismantled not only Confucian but also indigenous family practices of 
gerontocracy and patriarchy, bringing in a more egalitarian relationship to family hierarchy 
based on either gender or age.  His view, reflecting his concern with welfare policy matters, 
was that the Confucian ethos identified in the modern Japanese family is due to the cyclical 
rises and falls of Confucian influences over public policy such as the 1920s through to the 
                                                
17 Wazoku dōjikun (Common Lessons for Youth): 1710 first systematic textbook for public education in Japan 
18 Minpō (Meiji Civil Code), modelled on European common law, was introduced in 1898 thirty years after the start of the 
Meiji Restoration.  This law replaced the feudal law of the Tokugawa era. 
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1930s when conservatism was on the ascent in Japanese politics, and also during the 
Pacific War era (1939-1945) with nationalism at its peak.  He added that the official claim 
on the nation constituting an extended family under the near deistic rule of the imperium 
evaporated with the end of the war and introduction of the liberal democratic system of law 
and governance during the Occupation (1945-1952).  However, he doubted that the 
embedded Confucian values had disappeared altogether, since the rural population is 
known to have maintained traditional Confucian and agrarian values and rituals.  
 
The next discussant (JTS), being conversant with industry perspectives, concurred with the 
view that Confucian ethos and mores survived in modern Japanese society by quoting the 
examples of Japanese companies and public service officials openly calling their 
employees and public servants as ‘life-long family members’ with maintenance of the 
Confucian tradition of a ‘parent-to-children’ moral hierarchy.  This hierarchy calls for 
harmony (wa) in dealing with relationships vertically and horizontally within organizations, 
as if they are replicating Confucian family rituals and ethics.  Such a selective use of 
Confucian teachings is evident in any sector of the society where the ‘family-like mental 
nexus’ is considered to strengthen societal solidarity.  
 
3.2.7 Confucian Context of Japaneseness: Literary Aesthetics and Nihonjinron 
 
As regards whether the Confucian context still remains integral to ‘being Japanese’ in 
contemporary Japan, two discussants, JAC as a cultural theorist and JMC as a media 
person pointed out that there have been a series of intellectual discourses in Japan since 
the Meiji Restoration (1868), but two epochal events stand out.  The first is the literary 
discourses of the 1920s through to the 1940s and the second is the so-called 
'Japaneseness (Nihonjinron)' nationwide debate of the 1980s through to the 1990s.  The 
discussants also added that the former was instigated by the intellectual conflict between 
the mainstream of the modernization drive leading the nation toward imperialism, and the 
liberal thinkers in academia and literature.  The latter were prompted by the former Prime 
Minister Ōhira Masayoshi (1910-1980)19 who stage-managed an intellectual campaign on 
the ‘redefining of Japaneseness.’  Ōhira represented the Japanese mainstream with a 
renewed national confidence based on the phenomenal post-World War II economic 
                                                
19 Ōhira Masayoshi (1910–1980) was a Japanese politician and the 68th and 69th Prime Minister of Japan from 1978 to 
1980. 
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success, and with an intellectual hunger to move beyond economic success to ‘culturally 
advanced nationhood.’  The title of this campaign was ‘Beyond the Modern Age.’20  
 
The next discussant JAP as an East-Asian philosophy researcher concurred with the 
significance of the afore-mentioned two momenta as representing Japanese 
soul-searching for identity.   The discussants took up the historical burden brought on 
Japan by the imperial cultural policy of ‘subjectification,’ 21  a vocabulary shared with 
Foucault 22  in the same context. This policy was pursued during the war period of 
1939-1945, and was named among others ‘Principles of National Entity’23 and ‘the Way of 
the Subject.’ 24   The discussants held the opinion that the then military government 
selectively used the Confucian ethos of ‘one large family nation,’  in seeking the structural 
dominance of imperial political power, intentionally ignoring the Confucian sense of 
balance advocated by the Classical sages, in particular, Mencius.  The immediacy of this 
historical struggle overrode other considerations such as Mencian warnings against abuse 
of sovereign power.  Confucian moral education was restructured as a means of 
transmission of the Way of the imperial ancestors and gave a new contour to Japanese 
civic morality at the time of national crises and opportunities.  
 
The two discussants (JAC and JPH) shared their thoughts on how the shogunate court 
culture as shaped under Confucian intellectual and institutional influences evolved through 
‘National Learning,’25 a Japanese philosophy of study advocated by Motoori Norinaga 
(1730-1801).  Norinaga perceived Confucianism as more attuned to the political realities of 
China, finding it at a substantial distance from the native Japanese court culture, coming 
down from the Heian era (794-1192).  Norinaga enjoyed lasting support by insisting on the 
tradition of Japanese aesthetics and sensitivity reflected in the court culture that he 
considered the ultimate form of grace and beauty in life.   The discussants also observed 
                                                
20 Nagatomi Yūichiro 1983, ‘Introduction’, in Kendai o koete (Beyond the Modern Age), Ōkura Zaimusho Kyōkai (Treasury 
of Japan Society), Tokyo. 
21 Shinminka (subjectification)：As a part of the national unity campaign during the war period of 1939-1945, the imperial 
government of Japan pursued an intense cultural policy of ‘subjectification’ of all Japanese citizens and those of occupied 
or annexed territories under the ‘homogenization’ drive.   
22 Foucault, Michel 1982, ‘the Subject and Power’, in Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, p. 208. 
23 Ministry of Education Imperial Government of Japan 1937, Kokutai no hongi (Principles of National Entity), Ministry of 
Education, Tokyo. 
24 Ministry of Education Imperial Government of Japan 1941, Shinmin no michi (the Way of Subjects), Ministry of 
Education, Tokyo. 
25 kokugaku (National Learning) 
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that Norinaga, in spite of his extensive study of the Confucian Classics, struggled to 
overcome what he perceived as the rigid Confucian moral thesis of ‘encouragement of 
goodness and castigation of evils.’26   He revisited the Japanese classics of the Heian era, 
in particular, ‘the Tale of Genji’27 which was considered immoral in the Confucian context.  
Conversely, Norinaga found in this precious work of literature a source of inspiration and 
liberating freedom from the confines of Confucian morality.  He found in it a natural 
Japanese sensitivity and aesthetics of ‘sorrow at evanescence’28 that Norinaga claimed 
forms the essence of Japanese minds.  The discussants also quoted Yasuda Yojūrō 
(1910-1981)29 as a twentieth century successor to Norinaga’s legacy.  Yasuda lamented 
the way Japan had pursued modernity, since the Meiji Restoration had steered the nation 
away from the tradition of ancient Japanese ‘court culture and its ultimate form of grace and 
beauty in life’.  In his work on ‘Japanese Bridges,’30  Yasuda attempted the elevating of the 
natural Japanese values of ‘emotion (jyō) and beauty (bi)’ out of those sets of values and 
principles then existing in Japan, that originated from orthodox Confucianism and the 
Japanese indigenous tradition.  Namely, one came from ‘intellect (chi), will (i) and emotion 
(jyō)’, and other from ‘truth (shin), good (zen) and beauty (bi).’ 
 
Another discussant (JTE) as a sustainable enterprise advisor observed that Yasuda and 
other prominent literary figures enjoyed a period of unprecedented freedom of ideas and 
expressions during what was called the era of ‘Taishō Democracy,’31 i.e., the reign of 
emperor Taishō (1912-1926).  During this period, Confucianism came under attack from 
both sides of the ideological fence.  JTE added that the Japanese victory in the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904 -1905 resulted in a political confidence, which was 
encouraged by the war spoils of Liaodong Peninsula of Northern China and the near 
annexation of the Korean Peninsula.  The discussant observed that from the end of World 
War I, the Japanese imperial government switched to the so-called ‘cultural policy’ in order 
to elevate the prestige of the Japanese imperium on an equal plateau to the Western 
                                                
26 kanzen chōaku (encouragement of goodness and castigation of evils) 
27 Genji Monogatari (the Tale of Genji): the first Japanese novel of a grand scale written by the courtly writer Murasaki 
Shikibu (circa 973 -1025), considered one of the most important Japanese literary works 
28 mono o aware (‘sorrow at evanescence’): a unique Japanese concept of penetrating sensitivity into the meaning and 
hidden sorrows of all lives and things 
29 Yasuda, Yojūrō (1910-1981): a literary critic known as the leader of the school of romanticism in the post-war era of 
Japanese literature  
30 Yasuda, Yojūrō 2001, Japanese Bridges (Nihon no Hashi, first published in 1936), Shingakusha, Tokyo. 
31 Taishō demokurashii (‘the Era of Taishō Democracy’): The reign of emperor Taishō  (1912-1926) was characterized as 
an era of the full blossoming of democracy and multiplicity of global ideologies, including liberalism and socialism among 
others. 
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powers in terms of both soft and hard power.   Such a policy switch also gave rise to a 
dialectical struggle between the elite mainstream of state bureaucracy and the populace.   
 
JSS also commented on the ‘Taishō Democracy’ as an important era for the maturation of 
Japan as a modern nation-state.   He argued that Japanese modernization subsequent to 
the Meiji Restoration was a project of both ‘nation-building’ and ‘empire-formation.’    
Building of nation and empire was a contradictory as well as a complementary process, 
heightening the internal and external cultural conflicts beyond political frictions.  He further 
observed that the ‘Taishō Democracy’ witnessed Japanese minds struggling to find 
common ground by unifying fragmented and conflict-ridden social discourses.  They 
longed for an alternative trajectory of modernity, free from what they believed was the yoke 
of a stagnant Sinic tradition, filled with the viscerally comfortable native Japanese-ness, in 
particular, their sensitivity and aesthetics.  The discussant held the opinion that the 
so-called Confucian intellectual and social context was explicitly a hurdle to overcome, but 
it was implicitly a contributor, since the collective social consciousness behind the quest 
was replete with the well-rehearsed Confucian sense of the unity of the individual with 
society. 
 
Another discussant (JAC) contributed another angle to the immanent cultural tension that 
the Japanese modernization intellectuals went through in this era of ‘Taishō Democracy 
(1912-1926)’ which extended through to the 1930s vis-à-vis Sinic and Western traditions. 
He indicated that this period coincides with the intensive intellectual debate that went on in 
mainland China after the 1912 formation of the Republic of China founded by the 
Japan-educated Sun Yatsen (1866-1925), and also importantly the May 4th Movement of 
1919 commonly acknowledged as the intellectual blossoming period of modern China.   
The discussant also indicated that the Japanese intellectual-educators of future Chinese 
leaders including Sun Yatsen were hoping that Chinese modernization would model the 
Meiji Restoration of Japan including its modernized monarchy for the future governance of 
the new China.  The Republic of China, however, drew its inspiration more from the ideals 
of American democracy, such as that of Abraham Lincoln,32 to the great disappointment of 
Japanese leaders hoping for a pan-Asian grand alliance independent of Western influence.   
                                                
32 Sanminchui (the Three People’s Principles): the Political ideals of Republic of China (1912) in terms of nationalism, 
democracy and welfare as modelled on the Abraham Lincoln’s dictum ‘of the people, for the people, and by the people’. 
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JAH drew attention to the most prominent modernization leader of the Meiji era, namely, 
Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901).  He was educated both in Confucianism and ‘Dutch 
Learning.’33  Yet he took up the strategic position of the so-called ‘Leaving Asia’34 policy for 
the future of Japanese empire-building.  He called for the nation to rally around the 
‘overcoming of not only Confucianism but also Asian-ness altogether,’ until such time as 
the Japanese empire becomes the first among the equals of imperial powers then 
dominated by the West.   
This discussant also introduced a contrary example in the leadership of Yoshino Sakuzō 
(1878-1933)35 who was educated in the modern university in Japan, best known for his 
‘theory of political demo-centrism.’  He endeavoured to harmonize ‘progressive elements’ 
of the Confucian tradition with what he considered the successful modernization path of the 
Meiji Restoration so as to offer for the future of China and broader East-Asia an Asian 
model to emulate.   He tutored the family of Yüan Shikai (1859-1916), the then dominant 
Chinese political figure.  By engaging in the education of families with influence as well as 
in the Chinese public school system, Yoshino enthusiastically pushed for Chinese 
conversion to the Japanese path of modernization without success.  Chinese 
modernization leaders were split between those who preferred ‘the Chinese way of 
modernization with use of Western technology’36 and those who were more inclined to 
accepting modernization as Westernization.  No Chinese of either inclination promoted the 
outright undoing of Chinese tradition or Chinese-ness.  
One discussant (JTE) made an observation as regards the quintessential Japanese 
identity as eloquently exemplified by the Confucian scholar-turned philosopher Watsuji 
Tetsurō (1889-1960).  Watsuji is known to have made a very important contribution through 
his unique approach of ecological anthropology37 in his search for the roots of Japanese 
ethical thought. 38   Watsuji argued, according to the discussant, that an essential 
                                                
33 Rangaku (Dutch Learning): The Tokugawa shogunate allowed restricted access to Dutch visitors and their science, 
medicine and technology in the Nagasaki concession area during the period when the country was closed to foreigners 
(1641-1853). 
34 Datsu-A Ron (Leaving Asia)  
35 Yoshino Sakuzō (1878-1933): A Japanese author and political thinker in the Taishō era (1912-1926) of culturalism. He 
is best known for his theory of Minponshugi or ‘politics of demo-centrism.’ 
36 chung-ti hsi-yung (modernisation based on Chinese foundation with use of Western technology) : This is a summary of 
the Chinese political agenda during the ‘Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–1894)’ era that called for institutional 
reforms of the late Ching Dynasty following a series of military defeats and concessions to foreign powers. 
37 Watsuji, Tetsurō 1979a, Fūdo (Climate and Culture: an Anthropological Consideration), Iwanimishōten, Tokyo.  
38 ______ 1979b, Nippon rinrishisōshi (History of Japanese Ethical Thought), Iwanimishōten, Tokyo.  
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relationship exists between the climate and other environmental factors and the nature of 
human cultures.  Watsuji identified the three types of culture according to his ‘theory of 
climate and culture,’ namely, ‘pastoral culture type,’ ‘desert culture type’ and ‘monsoon 
culture type.’  Watsuji categorized Japan as the ‘monsoon culture’ type.  The discussant 
held the view that Watsuji was motivated to take his position of highlighting ‘spatiality’ as 
the integral element of philosophical anthropology as an appreciation and also as a 
criticism of the ‘being and time’39 paradigm of Heidegger with whom Watsuji studied in the 
same university in Germany during 1927 through 1928, and had opportunities for 
exchanging views.  While Watsuji was greatly influenced by Heidegger, Watsuji argued in 
his book titled ‘Climate and Culture’ that Heidegger under-emphasises spatiality and 
over-emphasises temporality.  Watsuji contended that, had Heidegger equally emphasised 
spatiality, he could have better represented the ‘life-world,’ to which we are inextricably 
connected.   Watsuji saw humanity in the ‘between-ness (aidagara),’40 fundamental to 
positive and intimate relationships forming the foundation of trust and social cohesion. 
Watsuji made a concerted effort to move the plateau of Japanese philosophy by 
encompassing and overcoming both the humanity of Confucianism and what he perhaps 
unfortunately perceived was the philosophy of the West represented by Heidegger.  
 
JHA offered a different qualification of Watsuji’s philosophical project.   Since Watsuji was 
engaged in an intense pursuit of the unique ‘Japaneseness,’ his philosophical project was 
vulnerable to arbitrary interpretation and even manipulation by those devoted to the then 
highly reinvigorated nationalism.  Indeed, his philosophical findings became important 
elements of the ultra-nationalists’ ideological support of territorial expansions and broader 
military adventures in Asia and in the Pacific.  After the war, Watsuji publicly accepted his 
responsibility for his pre-war pursuits, but this contrition did not diminish his intellectual 
influence to any great extent.  Through his employment of phenomenological and climatic 
methodology in defining the Japanese uniqueness of climate, culture and ‘life-world,’ the 
Neo-Confucian ‘school of mind and heart (shingaku)’ moved their ‘national learning 
(kokugaku)’ fervour to a new height of sophistication.    
 
The discussant (JAS) who researches post-Meiji social development introduced the 
important exceptions posed by those opponents to the strong currents of Japanese cultural 
                                                
39 Heidegger, Martin 1927, Sein und Zeit (being and time),  M. Niemeyer, Halle (Germany). 
40 Watsuji, Tetsurō 1990, ‘Chapter 2: Ningen sonzai no kūkandeki jikandeki kōsō (Spatial and Temporal Structure of 
Human Existence)’, in Rinrigaku (Ethics), Iwanami shōten, Tokyo.  
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and intellectual particularism.  Christian leadership was embodied by the leading Christian 
theologian Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930) 41  and his successor Yanaihara Tadao 
(1893-1961).42   Kanzō was born into a Confucian samurai family of the ‘Takazaki clan,’ 
and his secondary education took place at a Christian missionary school43 where Kanzō 
had already committed himself to a life in the Christian faith. He pursued the study of 
theology44 through the courtesies of Quakerism in Pennsylvania and came under the 
lifelong influence of the Quaker faith, non-church worship and pacifism.  Upon completion 
of his study and return to Japan, he founded  the Nonchurch Movement (Mukyōkai) of 
Christianity and became the foremost voice of Christianity in the Meiji period (1868-1912) 
and Taisho period (1912-1926) of Japan.  According to the discussant, Uchimura rejected 
neither Confucianism nor the ‘unique Japanese-ness’ in his cultural tradition.  His world of 
Christianity as the higher religion embraced diversity coming from national and cultural 
differences.   He, however, rejected the particularism and exclusiveness of the ideological 
path that the ultra-rightist government took.  Uchimura and Yanaihara persisted in their 
public condemnation of the invasion of Asian neighbours.  
 
When Japan waged war against China in summer 1937, Yanaihara wrote in the 
best-selling magazine titled ‘Ideal of the Nation’ and also lectured that the invasion 
represented ‘the day of the funeral of our beloved Japan, who lost her ideals in this world of 
hypocrisy.’   The discussant was convinced that the Confucian cultural ethos stayed with 
Uchimura and Yanaihara. He argued that, explicitly Christian yet implicitly Confucian in 
moral ideals, they endured with their efforts of recovering universal values of brotherly love 
and pacifism, in spite of and because of the violent tide of national narcissism. Narcissist 
                                                
41 Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930): the founder of the ‘Non-church Movement (Mukyōkai)’ of Christianity in Japan, 
influenced by his earlier study of Christianity at the Quakers seminary in Pendle Hill, Pennsylvania. 
42 Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961): Educated as an economist, he became one of the ‘seven disciples’ of Uchimura’s 
Non-church Movement in Japan and publicly voiced the strongest Christian opposition to the imperial policy of militarism.  
He suffered severe social ostracism and political persecution under the ultra-rightist imperial government in the pre-war 
period.  He was later honoured with the post-war presidency of the University of Tokyo.   
43 An American lay Christian missionary William S. Clark started a school in Sapporo where agricultural skills were taught 
mostly in the English language.   Uchimura was born with a linguistic talent.   He began his English language study in 
earnest at the age of eleven and then joined the school in 1877 to further his talent.  This missionary school called the 
Sapporo Agricultural College became the present-day Hokkaido University.  Clark with his extraordinary zeal for the 
mission committed his converted Bible class students to the lifelong study of the Bible and to live moral lives through 
signing the ‘Covenant of Believers in Jesus.’  
44 Uchimura studied Christian theology at Amherst College and Hartford Theological Seminary during 1884-1887.  The 
under-resourced Uchimura was able to continue his study through the encouragement of a Quaker couple Mr. and Mrs. 
Wister Morris the Quakers he befriended shortly after his arrival in Pennsylvania. The faith and pacifism of these Quakers 
made a lasting impression upon Uchimura.  Julius Hawley Seelye, the president of Amherst College, became and 
remained his spiritual mentor. 
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nationalism romanticised wars and national pride soared in the euphoric uniqueness of 
being Japanese and the nation’s particularism. The discussant held the view that, though 
small in number notwithstanding and being only the minority voice, the two Christians both 
born of Confucians did not diminish the importance of their role in the crucial moments of 
history in modern Japan. According to a prominent historian, Ienaga Saburō (1913-2002), 
they were ‘the conscience of the Japanese’ and ‘the light of salvation at the Dark Age of 
Japan.’   
 
3.2.8 From the Almighty Sacred to the Secular and Symbolic Tennōsei (emperorship) 
 
The first discussant (JHR) as a human rights policy researcher reflected on how the 
Confucian ethical ethos experienced peaks and troughs throughout the pre- and post-war 
eras of Japan through an intellectual soul-searching by the leading contemporary political 
scientist, Maruyama Masao (1914-1996).45  The youthful professor was conscripted by the 
Imperial Army and served as an infantryman in the South Pacific campaign.  With the war 
coming to its end, he came back to his professorship to write one of the most important 
philosophical reflections in the post-war era of Japan. Maruyama argued that Chu Hsi’s 
Neo-Confucian orthodoxy made only a limited intellectual contribution based on his 
dualism of the ‘principle (li) and material force (chi)’ theory.  This limitation was fortunately 
overcome by the indigenous scholars such as Ogyū Sorai (1666-1728) and others 
belonging to the Sorai school of Japanese Neo-Confucian learning, owing much to 
Yōmeigaku or the Japanese version of the Wang Yangming ‘school of mind and heart.’ 
 
On this note, another social policy specialist (JPR) touched on another view offered by the 
aforementioned Watsuji Tetsurō.  Watsuji was emphasizing the ‘deep-seated mind’ of 
Japan or the Japanese (Nihon no kokoro) in his two celebrated works, ‘Climate and 
Culture’46 and ‘The Pilgrimage to the Old Temples.’47  According to this discussant, this 
ethos raised by Watsuji is both religious and cultural.  Through ancestral veneration, 
Japanese religiosity sits comfortably with its cultural tradition and the unique climatic 
conditions that Japan experiences year by year.  Ancestral worship is imbued with the 
                                                
45 Maruyama, Masao 1963, ‘Introduction’, in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, Oxford University 
Press, London. 
46 Watsuji, Tetsurō 1979a, Op. Cit.  
47 ______ 1979c, Furudera junrei (The Pilgrimage to the Old Temples), Iwanimi shōten, Tokyo.  
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Confucian ethos and its rites as well as the rites of Shinto and Zen among other Buddhist 
sects.  
 
On this point, the human resource development expert (JPH) concurred and then offered a 
parallel view expressed by Émile Durkheim48 through his well known discussion on the 
‘sacred and secular’ and the ‘collective consciousness’ as the foundation of his sociology.  
This discussant argued that spiritual immanence of the sanctified and venerated ancestry 
is on the same religious continuum with that of the Heaven-endowed tennōsei 
(emperorship).  The Confucian ethos and its spiritual rites contributed to the depth of 
philosophical grounding and to the richness of veneration rites elevating the indigenous 
Shinto practices to a new plateau.   
 
The fourth discussant (JMC) as a writer in Japanese media agreed with the religious 
attribution of tennōsei (emperorship).  He also touched on the conflicting attributes of the 
‘emperor-centred state (tennōsei kokka).’  The discussant argued that the Japanese 
constitutional monarchy had both the attributes of a despotic monarchy and those of a 
constitutional polity.  The Confucian elements of tennōsei (emperorship) are often held 
responsible for having provided silent support to the despotic potential of the monarchy. 
The discussant mentioned that there has been a consistent antagonism between the 
incumbent government cabinets and the Privy Council of the emperor since the Meiji 
Restoration, in particular, during the 1920s and 1930s.  The discussant also mentioned the 
architect of the Meiji Constitution was a Confucian educated samurai Itō Hirobumi 
(1841-1909) who became the first prime minister of modern Japan.  Itō helped engineer the 
draft of the imperial constitution to bolster the tennōsei (emperorship).  According to this 
constitution adopted in 1889, ‘the divine Imperial Throne has the supreme power handed 
down from the ancestors,’ and also, ‘the empire of Japan shall be reigned over and 
governed by a line of emperors unbroken for ages eternal.’49  The discussant further 
argued that this constitution was a product of the collective intention held closely by the 
erstwhile Confucian scholar-samurai Itō and his colleagues to culminate in the ‘national 
moral conception’ rather than to produce a purely legal manifestation of the national polity.  
The ‘national moral conception’ encapsulated in the constitution was a brainchild of the 
                                                
48 Durkheim, Émile 1976, ‘Chapter V: Piacular Rites and the Ambiguity of the Notion of the Sacredness’, in the Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life, Swain, JW, trans., George Allen & Unwin, London, pp. 389-409.  
49 Isobe, Shirō 2003,  Dai-Nippon Teikoku Kenpō (the Great Imperial Japan Constitution), Shinzansha Publisher Co. Ltd., 
Tokyo. 
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‘National Learning (kokutai)’ that grew out of the Yōmeigaku school of Japanese 
Neo-Confucianism.  
 
This discussant and the policy specialist (JPR) also pointed out that tennōsei 
(emperorship) was not rescued by Japan itself in the process of post-war realignment.  
Rather, its rescue owed much to the cultural insight of the Secretary of War of the United 
States, Henry L. Stimson (1867-1950).  Stimson’s insistence on the post-war continuation 
of a ‘symbolic tennōsei (emperorship)’50 was the final decision overriding the widely divided 
views of the cabinet on the question of the emperor’s role in the war. In view of the  
semi-divinity status holding together the Japanese sense of ancestral continuity and 
semi-religious spiritual identity, the Occupation Forces decided to keep the symbolic tenno 
in the interest of the ‘unity of the people.’51  It was to be a nation like an extended Confucian 
family with the tennō as the head of the family. The decision was to honour such ‘collective 
consciousness’ and the ‘sacredness’ of what tennōsei (emperorship) represented, in order 
to create a friendly nation out of an old foe.     
 
JTE as an industry expert mentioned the recent resurgence of the right-wing ethos that 
romanticises chivalrous patriotism and selected Confucian virtues such as self-cultivation 
and unconditional loyalty. He quoted the extraordinary popularity of the historical sagas 
written by Shiba Ryōtarō (1923-1996).  Shiba’s hero ‘Sakamoto Ryōma’52 in his saga of 
‘Ryōma ga yuku (Here goes Ryōma)’ epitomises the patriotic samurai imbued with 
Confucian virtues and also equipped with enlightened worldviews, bringing about some 
significant achievements at the forefront of the Meiji Restoration process.  The discussant 
also noted that Maruyama warned of the rise of a veiled nationalism from the ashes.  
Maruyama believes that post-war the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (1952 and 1960) 
as a Cold War geopolitical strategy gave an expedient rationale for the veiled right-wing 
agenda.  
 
The next discussant (JAC) as a writer on the post-Meiji era of Japanese history quoted 
another observation by Maruyama to the effect that, unlike Germany that evoked the 
                                                
50 The current Constitution of Japan (1947) has its Article One stating clearly the symbolic nature of the emperorship: ‘The 
Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with 
whom resides sovereign power.’ 
51 Ibid. 
52 Shiba, Ryōtarō 1963-1966, Ryōma ga yuku (Here goes Ryōma), Bungei Shunjū, Tokyo. 
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universal sense of justice and rationality, Japan chose not to dismantle or uproot the 
intellectual depth achieved by those who may have contributed to the disastrous 
confrontations with the rest of the world.  The discussant also commented that Maruyama 
made a concerted effort to establish a universal spirit in Japan, focusing on ‘objectifying’ 
the ‘underlying rhythm’ of Japanese society, namely, a metaphor of attitudes and values 
supposedly rooted in the depth of the Japanese mind, which, in his view, was hampering 
the development of a universal spirit among the Japanese people.  Leading Neo-Confucian 
scholars grew uncomfortable with the universalist approach of Chu Hsi’s orthodoxy with its 
emphasis on the continuity of ‘humans to nature,’ whereas the leading Confucian scholars 
such as Itō Jinsai (1627-1705) and Ogyū Sorai (1666-1728) preferred the intellectual 
model of ‘design or invention (sakui).’53  Such an intellectual model of ‘design’ would free up 
Japanese creativity, whereas the model based on ‘nature (shizen)’ characteristic of the 
intellectual approach taken by Chu Hsi’s orthodoxy carries the risk of an intellectual 
dependency on the Sinic legitimation.   Hence the Confucian ethos and rites are implicit on 
the minds (kokoro) and ‘life-world’ but only with the unique Japanese qualifications.  
 
The above has been the summary of Japanese discussants’ responses to the question: 
‘Do Northeast Asians in Korea, Japan and the Republic of China (aka Taiwan) follow 
Confucianism as one of their major common philosophies and beliefs?’  The above 
summary has shown clearly that Japanese neo-Confucians had followed a unique path 
that was consistent with their ancient tradition and cultural sensitivities. The Confucian path 
of Japan was a clear departure from the Confucian history of her continental neighbour of 
Korea. The next section that follows below covers the responses to the identical question 
by the discussants of the Republic of China.  
 
3.2.9 On the Diverse and Deep-rooted Confucian Identity of the Republic of China (aka  
Taiwan) 
 
The political elites of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) brought the government of the 
Republic of China in 1949 to Taiwan under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek (1887-1975). The population under his direct leadership was only about one 
million two hundred thousand.  These mainlanders who tended to support the legitimacy of 
                                                
53 Maruyama, Masao Op. Cit., 1974, Part II, Chapter IV: the Historical Significance of the Transition from Nature to 
Invention, pp. 223-238. 
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Confucianism as the key Chinese philosophical foundation represent circa fourteen per 
cent of the current population of 22,900,000 persons.54 The same discussant also cited the 
somewhat misleading government statistics on religious affiliation55 - only 0.05 per cent is 
Confucian, whereas nearly ninety per cent of the population is known to acknowledge an 
‘informal’ affiliation with Confucianism without any ‘formal’ declaration. 
 
The next discussant (CPH) working in the management of a ‘science park’  held the view 
that the first transfer in 2000 of presidential power to the opposition mainly comprising 
non-Mainlander Taiwanese put an end to the political and intellectual dominance of the 
mainstream Nationalist Party (Kuomintang).  KMT policy of Confucian education as a 
semi-official national learning project with the responsibility coming directly under the 
Ministry of Education and honouring the birthday of Confucius as a national holiday was in 
tension with the non-mainland opposition such as the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP)56 who took over the presidency of the nation in 2000. The earlier Taiwanese 
migrants who came from southern China during the Ming and Ch’ing dynasties brought 
with them Confucian ethics. The indigenous constituency57 of Taiwan and the earlier 
Taiwanese migrants also came under the diverse foreign influences58  in history, and have 
been actively proselytized by other religions such as Catholicism and Protestantism. 
Taiwanese Presbyterian churches, in particular, are known to have contributed to the 
democratization process throughout the KMT government martial law era by staying on the 
side of the minorities that formed the oppositions. 
 
Another discussant (CAP) who researches in East-Asia philosophy suggested that a surge 
in the contemporary reinterpretation of Confucianism took place in mainstream 
philosophical circles.  Philosophical debates in the comparative context between the 
philosophies of the West and the East, represented by Confucianism, Buddhism and 
                                                
54 National Statistics (2006), the Republic of China (Taiwan), http://eng.stat.gov.tw, viewed 05 December 2006. 
55 This estimate is consistent with the data issued by the Government Information Office of Taiwan, and tabled in 
Appendix 6 (Religions of Taiwan).  The statistics covered religious affiliations in the order of percentiles of the population 
‘Taoism 33%, Buddhism 24%, Protestantism 2.6%, Catholicism 1.3%, Confucianism 0.05%’:  
<http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/p364.html>, viewed 05 December 2006. 
56 Minchintang (Democratic Progressive Party or DPP) 
57 Indigenous aborigines of diverse tribes mostly of Austro-Micronesian origins account for approximately 2 per cent of 
Taiwan population or circa 460,000 in number.  The ‘Council of Indigenous Peoples’ was promoted in 1996 to a 
ministry-level rank within the Executive Yuan, as a part of heightened awareness of indigenous constituency. 
<http://www.apc.gov.tw/english/>, viewed 05 December 2006. 
58 The Han migration during the Ming and Ch’ing dynasties occurred in 1600’s and Dutch and Spanish occupied provinces 
during ‘the European period (1623-1662)’.  
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Taoism among others.  He referred to the works of Liang Shuming (1893-1988) who is 
considered one of the pioneers in the contemporary Neo-Confucian movement.  For Liang, 
socialism foreboded destruction of the long cherished culture and intellectual foundation in 
favour of ‘material gains’ with ‘productive means’ of the proletariat-centric society. 
Market-driven capitalism devoid of moral pillars would deny the vast majority of the 
population a much needed chance of participation in the development of a new nation. 
Evidence of usurpations by foreign powers within China reinforced Liang’s concern.  The 
lack of competence and the corruption of KMT let him down.  As a response, he called for 
reinvigoration of the Chinese philosophical tradition with a fast-track learning of Western 
science and its institutions, so as to reinforce the Chinese intellectual institution that he 
believed better fitted the culture of the nation with its extraordinary long and rich history.  
Keen on mediation between the two camps of opposing political persuasions, Liang 
shuttled between them to promote the ‘Chinese middle path’ of modernization in the hope 
of dissipating the rising risk of a civil war.  He led an intellectual movement for the 
modernization of China through the rejuvenation of Confucianism.  Liang was alarmed 
about the onslaught of materialism coming from two directions.  One came from the 
‘dialectical materialism’ of the socialist revolutionary movement of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP).  Another came from the capitalism embraced by the Nationalists.  
 
Another discussant (CAE) as a research and development person concurred on the 
significance of Liang’s intellectual and social contributions.  The discussant referred as 
examples to the education institution, the ‘Encourage Benevolence Academy’59 that he 
founded and also to the political organization, the ‘China Democratic Alliance’60 that he had 
helped co-found. Both in Liang’s educational and socio-political engagement, Confucian 
rejuvenation was consistently his philosophical mainstay, and he left behind an important 
legacy for the next generation of leaders both in philosophy and politics.   
 
The discussant (CAH) as an educator for sustainable entrepreneurship offered a further 
contribution on the philosophical orientation of those belonging to the ‘Democratic 
Alliance.’  They were vigorously resisting the ‘school of Westernization’ such as espoused 
                                                
59 Mien jen shuyüan (Encourage Benevolence Academy): An academy of secondary level education established by Liang 
Shuming in 1940, and in 1946, an upgrade to tertiary level was also offered. 
60 Chungkuo minchu t’ungmeng (China Democratic Alliance): A mid-course political society formed in 1939 and went 
through reorganizations and realignments in 1941 and 1946. 
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by Hu Shih (1891-1962).61  Such a ‘look West’ school was in intellectual vogue during the 
period of the May 4th Movement (1919).  Those in favour of Westernization were fascinated 
by the teachings of the visiting scholars such as John Dewey (1859-1952)62 and Bertrand 
Russell (1872-1970).63  The ‘Alliance’ people, however, refused to accede to the thesis that 
Chinese culture, in particular Confucianism, is not a right fit for the modernization of China, 
hence its future may be doomed.  The discussant elaborated on the core argument of the 
‘Alliance’ cohorts primarily based on the teachings of Mencius.  They argued that there 
exist two bases of human behaviour, namely, ‘conscience’ (liangchih)64 and deliberation 
(ssulu).65   ‘Conscience’ belongs to the ‘heavenly principle’66 and is good.  ‘Deliberation’ 
belongs to ‘human desire’67 and is selfish.  As such, these two Confucian categories are not 
epistemological in nature, but represent moral values.  The ‘Alliance’ scholars were not 
convinced about the benefits of the materialist culture from the West with its insufficient 
philosophical mooring in moral values.   They placed the three major cultures of the world, 
namely, ‘Western, Chinese and Indian’ on an equal footing representing the unique 
strength of each culture.   
 
The discussant (CPE) as a policy person for the indigenous community contributed by 
expounding on how these Confucian modernizers sought to envisage a new ideal society 
and translate their belief into public policy priorities.  Their emphasis on economic policy 
was to spearhead the development of agriculture ahead of industry for peaceful and 
equitable transition of the vast masses to the ‘subsistence or minimal welfare’ level society 
(Hsiao-k’ang).68  For this reason, developmental resources should firstly be allocated to the 
peasantry and villages ahead of cities. Development should be human-centric, not 
material-centred.  Societal ethics should be the core of values central to the society, not 
ancillary. Through placing emphasis on Confucian ethics and self-cultivation, either selfish 
individualism or oppressive collectivism should be prevented.  They also warned against 
the primacy of the economy, as espoused by both socialism and capitalism. Instead, they 
wanted to see in an ideal society a ‘unity in harmony amongst economics, politics and 
                                                
61 Hu Shih (Hu Shi: 1891-1962): a leading writer and social movement leader, emphasizing fast modernization based on 
the Western philosophy and science, heavily influenced by the visiting scholar John Dewey.  
62 John Dewey (1859-1952):  Dewey taught in China during 1919-1921. 
63 Bertrand Russell (1872-1970): Russell taught in China during 1920-1921. 
64 liangchih (liangzhi: conscience) 
65 ssulu (silu: deliberation) 
66 t’ienli (tianli: heavenly principle) 
67 jenyü (renyu: human desire) 
68 hsiao-k’ang (xiaokang) a concept of subsistence or minimal welfare state, as quoted in the Classic of Rites. 
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education.’  In a nutshell, they sought for a society where social order would be the product 
of reason instead of might.69 
 
3.2.10 Contemporary Neo-Confucian ‘Transcendental Intuition’ and Mahayana Buddhism  
 
As part of the focus groups, CAC as a researcher of cross-strait cultural history brought up 
the importance of the interactions between Confucianism and Mahayana Buddhism.  He 
argued that the contemporary Confucian metaphysical thesis of the ‘transcendental 
intuition’70 had been greatly reinforced through its first encounter with the Mahayana 
teachings encapsulated in the works of ‘Kuei-chi’ (632~682) in his seminal work titled ‘The 
Formation of Consciousness-Only Doctrine.’71  The discussant further observed that this 
Buddhist ‘school of consciousness-only doctrine’72 greatly influenced the formation of the 
contemporary Neo-Confucian epistemology central to the thoughts of the leading 
Neo-Confucians of the twentieth century such as Hsiung Shihli (1885-1968) and Mou 
Tsungsan (1909-1995).  It relates to the fundamental structure of Confucian cognition in 
terms of ‘subject, object and inter-relationship between mind and environment.’73  Mou also 
attempted to build an intellectual parallel with the Kantian concepts of ‘reason’ and 
‘intuition.’   
 
Another discussant (CPS) added that a Buddhist-supported Confucian notion such as the 
distinction between the ‘original mind’ 74  and the ‘habitual mind’ 75  (or the ‘mind 
                                                
69 Liang, Shuming 1971 (first published in 1937), ‘Xiang cun jian she li lun, yi ming, Zhongguo min zu zhi qian tu (Theory 
of Building Village and Township: The Future of the Chinese Nation)’, Wenjing chuban-she, Taipei. : Liang listed the “Six 
Guiding Principles” of Chinese social development in what he believed was the ‘enlightened Confucian’ way. These 
principles became the de facto political agenda of the ‘China Democratic Alliance.’: (1) Economic development would 
occur, both in agriculture and in industry, but agriculture would be developed first. (2) The village was primary in 
importance; the city came second.  Between the city and the village there should be cooperation, not antagonism. (3) The 
subject of development would be people dominating the material world, not the other way around.  (4) It would be an 
ethical society, equally distant from the two negative extremes, namely selfish individualism and oppressive collectivism. 
(5) In the ideal society, politics, economics, and education would be unified, working harmoniously together. (6) Social 
order would be the product of reason instead of might.’ 
70 chih-te chih-chüeh (jide zhijue: transcendental intuition)  
71 Dharmapāla (Kuei-chi/kuiji) 1995 (First published in the seventh century), Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, (Chinese: Cheng wei 
shi lun/Xuanzang zuan yi. Cheng wei shi lun shu ji: Formation of Consciousness-only Doctrine), Shanghai gu ji chu ban 
she, Shanghai.   
72 Weishihlun (Weishilun: Consciousness-Only Doctrine)  
73 Mou, Tsungsan 1971, ‘Introduction’, in Zhi di zhi jue yu Zhongguo zhe xue (Transcendental Intuition and Chinese 
Philosophy),  Taiwan shang wu yin shu guan, Taipei. 
74 penhsin (benxin: original mind)  
75 hsihshin (xixin: habitual mind)  
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accumulating knowledge’) sits comfortably in the mental abodes of the Confucian 
adherents. Such a distinction was already common in the Buddhist tradition. 
 
A third discussant (CAH) related the notion of the ‘original mind’ familiar to Confucians to 
other concepts.  The Sinic dialectic of the ‘substance (t’i) and function (yung)’ has been at 
the centre of the philosophical debates why Sinic philosophical groundings should be the 
basis of the West-driven modernization. The discussant argued that, for those adherents to 
the dialectic notion of the ‘substance (t’i) and function (yung)’, the object of philosophy is 
‘substance’ and its ‘relationship with its manifestations’ or ‘functions’. Conversely, visible 
things are functions that are also manifestations of original substance. 
 
A fourth discussant (CAP) added the observation that some thinkers such as Hsiung Shili 
sought to unify the two.  At this point, the discussant introduced Hsiung’s view that 
‘substance and function are one, and they are not just indivisible, they are in a relationship 
of identity.’  For Hsiung, ‘the single thing is the Whole, and the Whole is present in the 
single thing, like the moon reflecting simultaneously on many different lakes’.  The ‘original 
mind’ is an absolutely independent ‘whole’.  At times it is called ‘heart,’ because it is the real 
core substance of the myriad things. Also it is at times called ‘intention’, because it 
develops in conformity with the incessant creativity of its own nature.  Also it is called 
‘conscience’, because it sees through all the creative processes.  The discussant noted 
that, to those adhering to the notion of the Buddhist-Confucian ‘consciouness-alone 
doctrine’, the true significance of the ‘original mind’ is right at the unity of ‘heart, intention 
and conscience.’76 
 
3.2.11 ‘Ascendant’ Confucian ‘Tao’ and Aesthetics 
 
Many of the Chinese discussants focussed on aesthetics and creativity.  CSS who is a 
social policy and welfare advocate argued that Confucian aesthetics and creativity are an 
underlying concept cherished by contemporary Chinese in the Republic.  He argued that 
‘Chinese Confucian-ness’ remains pervasive not just in the moral teachings, but also in all 
aspects of arts and literature produced and shared in the ‘Confucian life-world.’  He also 
referred to the comments made by Thomé Fang (1899-1977) to the effect that ‘aesthetic 
                                                
76 Hsiung, Hsihli 2001, Xin wei shi lun (New Consciousness-Only Doctrine), Hubei jiao yu chu ban she, Wuhan Shi 
(China). 
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intuition as the perception of the process of creativity visible anywhere in the universe is the 
start of any philosophical inquiry.’  Fang also views the knowing experience of humans as 
consisting of ‘three kinds of intuitions,’ namely, the ‘scientific, ethical, and aesthetic 
intuitions.’77 
 
CTI as an innovation advisor concurred on the importance of the aesthetic elements of 
Confucian tradition.  He added that the aesthetic experience expands the freedom and 
creativity of life, including in art, science and ethics.  According to him, Confucian teachings 
are encapsulated in the artistic language that helps free up the human spirit to perceive the 
rationality and freedom of cosmic creativity, and helps reach a vision of the cosmos and of 
human life as a whole immense harmony of feeling and rationality.  CAC also referred to 
this aspect of the Confucian ‘aesthetic impulse’ as the ‘ascendant attributes’ of 
Confucianism.  The discussant claimed that this aspect owes its origin to the Taoist 
teaching by Chuang Tzu.  The ‘ascendant Taoist Confucian worldview’ looks to 
transcending human life, bringing humankind to a new stage of existence, to a realm above 
practical daily reality.  He also argued that this aspect of ‘aesthetic Confucian-ness’ 
remains precious to the contemporary Chinese ethos.  
 
Concurring on the relevance of the aesthetic ethos, CHA as a human rights advocate 
argued that the aesthetic expressions in literature often became a powerful instrument for 
social reformers.  He referred to the examples often idolized heretofore of the celebrated 
poet cum social reformer Wang Anshih (1021-1086).78  According to the discussant, Wang 
wrote the so-called ‘social poems’ that combined poetry with an acute sense of the social 
injustices inflicted upon the commoners in the society run by the Confucian 
scholar-officialdom.  Wang was not only writing about the social ills and pains of the people, 
but he also offered policy alternatives in his voluminous output of critical poetry.  His poetic 
criticism covered the land rights of the peasantry, the distorted taxation system both from 
state and tax-payers’ points of view, the corruption of state bureaucracy, financial 
usurpations such as loan sharks, the ineffective state exam system and the dysfunctional 
legal system of the Sung dynasty (960-1279).  The reigning emperor Shen-tsung 
                                                
77 Shen, Qingsong, Li,  Du & Cai, Renhou,1999, Feng Youlan, Fang Dongmei, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, Taiwan shang 
wu yin shu guan, Taipei, p. 64 ff.   ‘The aesthetic perception is the most basic, the earliest form of knowledge, and it 
remains the foremost also in the end, as a coronation of all the knowing activity developed along human life.’ 
78 Oh, Heon-Pil 1988, ‘Wang Anshŭgui sahoe’si (On Social Poetry of Wang Anshih)’, Chungguk Ŏmun Nongch’ong 
(Journal of Chinese Language and Literature), vol. 1, pp. 121-159.  
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(1048-1085) sought Wang’s advice in his court.  Wang met vigorous opposition from the 
other prominent Confucian literary scholars such as Ou-yang Hsiu (1007-1072) and Su 
Tung P’o (1037-1101).  These opponents succeeded in driving Wang out of the court with 
the demise of the emperor, in spite of his contributions to the ‘sweeping reforms.’79  The 
discussant observed that moral calibres, aesthetic sensitivity and selfless devotion to 
societal justice remain the desirable attributes expected of the ‘superior Confucian 
person’80 still idolized by contemporary Chinese Confucian adherents.    
 
3.2.12 Confucianism and Western World Views: Understanding and Misunderstanding  
 
The discussant (CTE), a professional consultant on corporate governance/lay theologian 
touched upon the intellectual interchange between indigenous Confucian scholars and 
European thinkers.  He argued that such interchange starting in earnest from the 
missionary years of Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) provided the intellectual frame of reference 
for both Confucians and Europeans.  Many East-Asians educated in Confucianism toured 
or studied in Europe during the so-called ‘opening of nations’ and modernization drive 
period. CTE introduced, as an example, a major theological debate on the Confucian 
compatibility with Christian doctrine that Ricci’s reports triggered.  Three points dominated 
the debate.  The first point was whether the Confucian spiritual rites can be considered a 
cultural tradition of paying respect to the great teacher Confucius and a host of other great 
teachers, thus building an ethical foundation in the event of accepting the Christian faith, as 
Ricci tried to convince the Confucians of the superiority of Christianity.  The second point 
was whether the Confucian ancestral veneration is a cultural practice of a memorial service 
for their family ancestry, thereby not constituting idolatry in the Christian context.    The third 
point was whether the Confucian belief in Heaven (t’ien) was a complementary ethical step 
as a premonition to worshipping God in a Christian context, as Ricci claimed.81  The 
discussant argued that a similar debate had been occurring in China and Confucian 
East-Asia that was facing Christian missionary activity.  
                                                
79  His reforms encompassed correction of taxation system, recovery of state revenues through better budget 
management and control of inflation.  He helped initiate agricultural loans to relieve the farming peasants of the burden of 
interest extracted from them by moneylenders.  To break up the monopolies, he initiated a system of fixed commodity 
prices.  He appointed the governing boards to regulate wages and plan pensions for the aged and unemployed. Wang 
revamped the imperial examination system placing more emphasis on practical knowledge.  This process of what were 
perceived as drastic reforms drew ire from the Confucian official gentry and state bureaucracy on the grounds of running 
against the tradition of Confucian moral fundamentals. With the demise of Emperor Shen-tsung in 1085, Wang was 
permanently ousted from his official post. 
80chün tzu (junzi : superior Confucian person) 
81 Mungello, David E 1985, Curious Land: Jesuit Accommodation and the Origins of Sinology, Steiner, Stuttgart, p. 18. 
  126
 
The discussant (CSS) concurred on the reciprocity of the points of such debates, namely 
from Asian and European sides on Confucianism and Sinology, both of which were often 
referred to interchangeably in Europe.  He, however, brought up the more ominous sides of 
such debates. There persisted a perception about the inherent Confucian support for 
‘enlightened absolutism’ in reflecting upon the long Sinic history of absolute rule by 
Confucian-enlightened sovereigns.  Most vocal critiques of the alleged Confucian 
propensity of absolutist governance were the prominent Chinese writers Lu Hsün 
(1881-1936) 82  and Hu Shih (1891-1962).  They questioned the moral foundation of 
Confucianism in light of compelling historical evidence against their claim to ethical 
orthodoxy, and went on to claim that Confucianism stood in the way of modernization and 
democratization.83  One of their European points of reference was the argument proffered 
by Montesquieu (1689-1755).  Montesquieu reversed the then popular references to 
Confucianism as an ‘alternative political ideal of enlightened governance.’  He observed 
that ‘the basic intellectual mistake in the Chinese model is the legal rule of customs 
(moeurs) and rites (manières).’84  The reasons Montesquieu gave were that ‘customs 
govern the actions of human beings, while laws govern the actions of citizens.  Customs 
relate to inner human activity, whereas rites concern the outward conduct of people.  
Religion, customs, rites, and laws are distinct concepts, but they are conflated in the 
Chinese moral law and its prescriptions of rites.’  The discussant also noted that the 
anti-Confucian modernization leaders during the May Fourth Movement resonated with 
Montesquieu on the many grounds, in his view, why Confucianism and modernization 
cannot go together.85   
 
CPE agreed on the importance of cross-cultural debates both as an assault on 
Confucianism and also as an impetus to the resurgence of the contemporary 
Neo-Confucian movement.  He also observed that, contrary to Montesquieu, Leibniz 
(1646-1716) and Voltaire (1694-1778) found substantial philosophical richness in 
Confucianism as a state ideology.  Leibniz looked at the human world as a spectrum 
defined by two poles of civilization, Europe and China, whereby the characteristic of the 
                                                
82 Lu wrote in his vernacular Chinese (paihua) fiction ‘A Madman’s Diary (1918)’ to equate Confucian elites of Chinese 
ruling class to unrepentant cannibals. 
83 Chow, Tse-tsung 1960, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, CA,  pp. 305 -312. 
84 Montesquieu, C 1995, De l'Esprit des lois (2 vols), Versini, Laurent  ed, Gallimard, Paris, vol 1, p. 282. 
85 Chow, Tse-tsung 1960, Op. Cit., pp. 313-315. 
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poles is their striving for organizing ever more rational ways of life. Leibniz thought that 
joining the revealed religion of Europe to the ethics of China would allow for higher forms of 
knowledge.  Europe, Leibniz believed, had the superior Christian faith and logical 
philosophy, while China had the superior civil organization and practical philosophy.  CPE 
commented that such views are to be replicated two centuries later by the Neo-Confucians, 
mostly without reference to Leibniz.86 
 
The discussant (CEH) who researches in developmental economic models observed that 
such a positive view of Confucianism held by a certain European intellectual school was 
motivated by the then political conditions that Europe was under.  Contrary to Europe going 
through a series of wars, such as the ‘Thirty Years War (1618-1648)’, suffering from a 
post-Reformation lack of moral certainty and strong political centre, Confucian China 
seems to have possessed both attributes.  Reading from the reports mostly by Jesuits, 
such European intellectuals were led to believe that Confucian China and her Confucian 
cousins shared an invaluable intellectual asset.  And such an asset brought Confucian 
nations social peace and a well-organized social hierarchy.  
 
One discussant (CPR) as a policy person for a global innovation network introduced the 
view held by Voltaire (1694-1778) on Confucianism.  His views were not only a part of 
intellectual discourse in Europe, but also served as a point of reference for the 
Neo-Confucian leaders who led the modernization movement in the nineteenth century in 
Asia.  According to the discussant, Voltaire used the Confucian governance of emperorship 
in China as an enlightened rational form of government based on moral teachings with 
heavy emphasis on learning and scholarship at all levels, without imposing any religious 
fears as was prevalent in Europe.  The discussant surmised that Voltaire could have held 
such views as a means of emphasizing a need for European monarchs to reflect on 
themselves in a self-critical way.  According to Voltaire, Confucius just taught the wisdom to 
live a virtuous life, without advocating any particular religious doctrine.  The discussant 
suspected that Voltaire could have been motivated, as the ‘Enlightenment’ thinker, to 
advance the cause of religious tolerance that he thought was ideally realized in Confucian 
Asia. 
 
                                                
86 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 1994, Novissima Sinica (Writings on China), Cook, DJ &  Rosemont, H, ed. & trans., Open 
Court Pub., Chicago, pp. 45–49. 
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Another discussant (CAS) as a researcher of social cohesion of ‘tiger economies’ argued 
that a consummate metaphysical bridge-builder between the cross-cultural philosophies 
was Mou Tsungsan (1909-1995).  CAS held the view that Mou through his seminal works 
on Kantian philosophy succeeded in building a metaphysical bridge between the 
contemporary Neo-Confucianism and the system of Enlightenment thoughts of the most 
prominent philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).87   Mou equates the Confucian ‘moral 
minds’ to the Kantian ‘intellectual intuition’ in expounding upon how humans build their 
knowledge by producing concepts.88 
 
CMC as a media contributor agreed to Mou’s seminal contribution in bringing about a 
fundamental harmonization among the metaphysics of a major Western heritage, namely, 
Kantian philosophy vis-à-vis Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism.  CMC argued that such 
a metaphysical foundation was instrumental in exploring the intellectual answers to what 
was perceived as the two critical shortcomings of Confucian tradition, namely, science and 
democracy.  The discussant also argued that Mou made a milestone of metaphysical 
harmonization in his ‘Treatise on the Supreme Good.’89  Mou expanded on the concept of 
the ‘supreme good’ as taught by the T'ien T'ai90 school of Mahayana Buddhism.  In this 
ultimate form of goodness, Mou realized a harmonization of the moral ideas commonly 
pursued by Neo-Confucianism, the moral philosophy of Kant and Buddhism.  The 
discussant observed that the metaphysical bridge such as built by Mou reinforces the 
individual branch of human belief systems, as quoted in Mou’s own words.91  
 
The above has been the summary of discussions on the ‘Do Northeast Asians in Korea, 
Japan and the Republic of China (aka Taiwan) follow Confucianism as one of their major 
common philosophies and beliefs?’  
 
                                                
87 Mou, Tsungsan 1982, Kangde de dao de zhe xue (The Moral Philosophy of Kant), Taiwan xue sheng shu ju, Taipei. 
88 Ibid, according to Mou, “humans build up their knowledge by producing concepts, thanks to twelve categories in the 
mind.  While building an ontology of the world of phenomena, he states that phenomena are ‘phenomena’ for the knowing 
mind, but are ‘noumena’ for the ‘mind-in-itself.’  This free, unlimited mind or the ‘mind-in-itself,’ is common to and cannot be 
in conflict with, the three main Confucian doctrines, namely, the ‘innate moral knowledge or clear mind’, the ‘mind of the 
Buddha-to-come’ of Buddhism and the ‘heart of the Tao’ of Taoism.”  
89 Mou, Tsungsan 1985, Yuan shan lun (Treatise on the Supreme Good), Taipei Student Publishers, Taipei, p. 267. 
90T'ien T'ai (Tiantai) is one of Mahāyāna schools of Buddhism mostly adhered to in China and Japan, also called the Lotus 
School because of its emphasis on the Lotus in China. It was founded by Chih-I (Zhiyi: 538–597) during the Sui dynasty 
and was established at Tiantai Mountain in what is now Zhejiang province. 
91 Mou, Tsungsan 1985, Op. Cit., ‘any doctrine that can activate human rationality, that can push humans to employ their 
reason to realize morality, i.e., to realize inner liberation, i.e., to realize purification or sanctification of their lives, in order to 
reach the sphere of the highest ideals.’ 
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Korean discussants touched on the diverse Confucian attributes embedded ubiquitously in 
the people’s personal attributes irrespective of expressly declared religious affiliations.  No 
other aspect was more eminently a Confucian influence in Korea than education.  
Education essentially is a way of Confucian self-cultivation, but also a trusted path to social 
recognition and power.  Confucian institutions, albeit divested of the state orthodoxy, 
continue to exist in metropolitan and provincial areas as the important educational centres 
and preserver of the legacy.  
 
Japanese discussion on Confucian perception and influence also started with education. 
The education policy of the post-Meiji era was made evident in the editions of textbooks.  
Such textbooks carried rich attributes of Confucian ethics.  From the attributes of Confucian 
ethics, careful selection was made to ensure that such attributes are consistent with 
Japanese sensitivity and policy guidelines.  The Confucian ethos remains solidly ingrained 
in the family values and ethos that remain central to Japanese society.  Beneath the state 
umbrella, the common people’s ethical and aesthetic identity with Confucian values has 
been congenially expressed through the leading literary works.  The sacred almighty 
tennōsei (emperorship) from the Meiji era onwards has evolved to the contemporary 
secular and symbolic emperorship.  At the root of the tennōsei as the safeguard of the 
ultimate national symbol and also as the nucleus of ethical or ‘soft’ power, Confucian ethics, 
rites and ethos remain central and critical to its cohesiveness.   
 
Discussions on the Confucian legacy of the Republic of China started with the official 
recognition of Confucianism as the national learning agenda managed within the Ministry 
of Education.  The official recognition was to the extent of celebrating the birthday of 
Confucius as a national holiday called ‘Education Day.’  The Kuomintang government has 
maintained the near monopoly over politics until democratic changes started with the 
abolition of martial law and the opposition coming to power for the first time in the history of 
the Republic in 2000.  Confucianism free of political influence has advanced through the 
emergence of the contemporary Neo-Confucian scholarship and its social interactions 
domestically and regionally in Confucian East-Asia.  The island republic was the home for 
such a contemporary Neo-Confucian movement.  Contemporary Neo-Confucianism also 
interacted with Taoism and Chinese Buddhism as Classic Confucianism did in history.  
Buddhist and Taoist influence is apparent in terms of the transcendental and aesthetic 
intuitions of contemporary Confucianism.  Confucian thinkers have made a substantial 
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effort in building a metaphysical bridge between Confucian philosophy and that of the West. 
Confucian thinkers worked on a bridge as such to link the Western paradigms of modernity 
such as scientism and the institution of democracy with the historical reality that modern 
Confucianism inherited.  Discussants now moved to the next question on Confucian 
humanism. 
 
3.3 CONFUCIAN HUMANISM 
 
The discussants belonging to each national group were asked the question, ‘Is Confucian 
philosophical and belief tradition the bedrock of Confucian humanism?’  Confucianism 
since its inception from the Classical period led by Confucius and Mencius has been built 
on the cardinal value of ‘humanity.’  Humanism was the primary context of the Confucian 
belief system and scholarship from the very beginning of Sinic intellectual history.92  A 
leading contemporary Neo-Confucian scholar Wang-tsit Chan emphatically said ‘If one 
word could characterize the entire history of Chinese philosophy, that word would be 
humanism, not the humanism that denies or slights a Supreme Power, but one that 
professes the unity of man and Heaven.  In this sense, humanism has dominated Chinese 
thought from the dawn of its history.’ 93  The contemporary Neo-Confucian context of 
humanism also faces the question whether the so-called Confucian humanism can be 
consistent with the type of humanism in the Western context such as has flourished from 
the Renaissance.  Such humanism implies freeing humanity from the constraints of political 
and religious bondage and recovering the full potential of human capacity inherited from 
the individual humans and their inviolable values.94  Discussions on this question were 
focused on the Confucian context.  Discussants, however, maintained openness to the 
non-Confucian global context of contemporary humanism.   
 
3.3.1 Confucian Humanism in Contemporary Korea 
 
All Korean discussants highlighted in different ways the relevance and relationship of 
Confucian humanism to the evolution of the Korean nation, especially in contemporary 
times, and its impact upon social policy.  The first Korean discussant (KAS) as a sociologist 
                                                
92 Chan, Wing-tsit trans. 1963, ‘1) The Growth of Humanism & 2) The Humanism of Confucius’,  in A Source Book of 
Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, pp. 3-48.  
93 ibid. 
94 Lee, Bang Whan 1990, Humanismŭi sidaejŏk paegyŏnggwa sasang (The Thought and Background of Humanism), 
Nonmunjip (Chonbuk National University), vol. 20, pp. 1-17. 
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pointed out that the foremost Confucian reference to humanism can be traced in the 
teaching both of Confucius and Mencius about ‘human centrism or demo-centrism.’95  
Confucius laid a broad foundation for humanism through his teaching about humanity 
encapsulated in the Analects.  Mencius provided more specific ideas about Confucian 
humanism by emphasizing the importance of demo-centric concerns in his work bearing 
his name.96  In this work, Mencius wrote about sharing the Confucian Way of governance 
with the incumbent King Hui of Liang.  The discussant argued that this view of Mencius, in 
particular, became a milestone in the Confucian tradition of humanism, also known as 
Mencian human centrism or the Mencian doctrine of human dignity.97  The discussant 
added that the Mencian idea of Confucian humanism is not only related to morality, but also 
is concerned with the basis for keeping up human dignity such as a sovereign’s duty to 
provide for subsistence and to guarantee the mental space for freedom of thinking. 
 
The second discussant (KPS) who has a strong interest in social policy brought up the ideal 
of the mythical founding father of the nation, Tan’gun98 in relation to Confucian humanism. 
The ideal was called the ‘broadest possible benefits to humanity’99  and became embedded 
into Article Two of the ‘Basic Law of Education’100 of contemporary Korea, maintaining the 
same ideal proffered in the founding of the nation.  The concept of devotion to the welfare 
of humanity and humanitarianism predates the inception of Confucianism in Korea.  The 
three traditions of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism are known to have fused with this 
foundation ideal that goes back to the very founding of the Korean nation.  The discussant 
suggested that humanism remained central to the public perception of what should 
constitute the basis of social policy such as that of education.  Confucian humanism had 
contributed its share to this firmly established concept in contemporary Korean society.     
 
The following discussant (KPH) observed that the major challenge to Confucian humanism 
during the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) in Korea was exposed and debated about by the 
                                                
95 jenpen chui (renben zhuyi: human centrism or demo-centrism) 
96 Legge, James 1970, ‘Book on King Hui of Liang’, in the Chinese Classics of Mencius, Dover Publication, New York, pp. 
125-179. 
97 Lee, Sang-Soon 1996, ‘Yuga’ui indoju’uiwa yullisasang (Humanism and the Ethical Thought of Confucianism)’, Inmun 
Sahoe Kyoyuk Yŏn’gu (Journal of Humanities and Social Science Education), vol. 1, pp. 1-12. 
98 Tan'gun is a legendary founding father of Korea.  The history of Korea written during the Koryŏ dynasty (935-1392) 
records the foundation of Korea as having taken place in the year of 2333 B.C.E. 
99 Hong’ik In’gan (the broadest possible benefits to the humanity) 
100 Chapter One: Article Two of the Basic Law of Education, the Republic of Korea, as amended November 2005 
prescribes for ‘the Ideal of Hong’ik In’gan,’ namely, the ‘broadest possible benefits to the humanity.’ 
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Neo-Confucian branch of the so-called ‘Practical Learning (sirhak)’ school.  The motivation 
came from their humanitarian concern about those socially underprivileged.  The 
discussant referred to the example given by a prominent Practical Learning scholar cum 
writer Pak Chi-wŏn (1737~1805).  The writer Pak, in spite of his Confucian upbringing and 
his scholar-official social status, wrote the major ‘social novel’ titled the ‘Biographic Story of 
Lady Pak of the Hamyang Clan.’101  This story was a major moral awakening to the 
Confucian orthodoxy that dominated the society of that time and that allowed extreme 
gender injustices against womanhood, in particular, those widowed.  In spite of the 
overarching Confucian moral teachings for humanity, the Yi dynasty failed to abolish 
gender discrimination, honour of seniority, patriarchy and, most importantly, the slavery 
system. The discussant offered the view that Confucian humanism brought tangible social 
sympathy and support for those marginalized in the Confucian social hierarchy thanks to 
the efforts by the likes of the writer Pak of the Practical Learning School.  The other major 
‘social novels’ by Pak included ‘The Saga of Scholar Hŏ’ and ‘The Scolding Tiger.’102  Both 
works satirized the Confucian scholars failing miserably in delivering on their moral 
teaching about the acute needs of society, to the extent that the storyteller employs the 
‘critical tiger’ in scolding the scholar for having no real concerns about the social 
responsibility of looking after the poor and the underclass.  The discussant alluded that the 
writers of the Practical Learning School chose to use their literary skills of storytelling to 
arouse social awareness without directly jeopardizing the status of Confucian 
scholar-officialdom and factional allegiance.   
 
KCG as a policy advisor for corporate governance concurred with KPH on the contributions 
made by the School of Practical Learning in raising Confucian social awareness for the 
entire community beyond the self-interest of the scholar-officialdom.  This discussant 
argued that such a social campaign helped reorient Confucian thinking toward a more 
pragmatic social policy agenda.  This new agenda of Confucian societal humanism during 
the 17th and 18th centuries was commonly called the ‘pursuit of truth from facts or real 
events,’103  the ‘functional utility for popular welfare’ or the ‘salvation of the world and 
                                                
101 Kim, Il-Keun 1987, ‘Yŏlyŏ hamyang paksijŏn’gwa paksiŭi chŏng’yŏ kigyo (Honourable Life of Lady Pak in [Biographic  
Story of Lady Pak of Hamyang clan])’, Konkuk Ŏmunhak, vol. 11, no. 1. 
102 Pak, Yong-gu 1965, ’Hŏsaengjŏn’ and ‘Hojil’(‘The Saga of Scholar Hŏ’ and ‘The Scolding Tiger’), Ŭryu Munhwasa, 
Seoul. 
103 Kang, Man-gil et al, ed., 1998, ‘Introduction’, in Hangugŭi sirhak sasang (The Thought of Korean Practical Learning), 
Samsung Publishing, Seoul, pp. 7-34: ‘silsa kusi (pursuit of truth from facts or real events), iyong husaeng (functional utility 
for welfare), kuse chemin (salvation of the world and wellbeing of people).’ 
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wellbeing of people.’  The other leading figures in this campaign were Yu Hyŏng-wŏn 
(1622-1673), Yi Yik (1681-1763), Pak Che-ga (1750-ca 1804), and Jŏng Yag-yong 
(1762-1836).  These Confucian humanists have a large following to this day in Korea.   
 
The discussant (KPE) as an economic planner  pointed out that such a ‘social 
enlightenment’ drive by the School of Practical Learning had only a limited success, since 
the Confucian political mainstream in the officialdom remained untouched and unmoved by 
what was perceived as a non-official social agenda.  He brought up as an example a work 
by a major twentieth century Korean writer Yi, Kwang-su (1892-1950) who wrote ‘The 
Heartless (1917),’104 wherein the heroine from underprivileged social origins follows an 
extraordinary path through life due to her social standing.  Such gender or class-based 
social ills remained largely unchanged from those same injustices fought against in the 
seventeenth through to the early nineteenth century by those progressive Neo-Confucians 
of the Practical Learning School.  This work by Yi and others such as Sim Hun (1901-1936) 
who wrote ‘The Evergreen’105 mobilized a great social sympathy.  The Confucian ethic 
faced a challenge from this Confucian humanism with a new level of intensity. 
 
The social policy analyst (KPH) referred to more contemporary times.  He referred to the 
literary contributions made to humanism in Korea during and beyond the humanitarian 
crisis of the Korean War (1950-1953) and during the earlier Pacific War (1941-1945).  In 
the Pacific War, substantial Korean participation occurred in Japanese uniform as a part of 
the mobilization by imperial Japan.  Individuals and families with the Confucian habits of 
mind ran into these extreme conditions, and underwent situations of life and death. 
Confucian morals were in tatters and offered no respite to the angst, despair and absurdity 
of those going through the condition of war.  KPH argued that writers and critics such as 
Paek Ch’ŏl (1908-1985) helped create a melting pot of humanistic ideas that drew on 
diverse post-war literary sources, notably, that of existentialism.  The discussant added 
that Confucian minds met and fused with the other traditions in these extreme human 
conditions as confined and limited by the inhuman circumstances.  The discussant affirmed 
that such aesthetic and artistic awareness triggered by the pains of war liberated and 
                                                
104 Lee, Ann Sung-Hi trans. 2005, Yi Kwang-su and Modern Korean Literature Mujŏng (The Heartless), Cornell University, 
Ithaca, NY. 
105 Sim, Hun 1996, Sangnoksu (The Evergreen), with commentary by NH Cho, Seoul National University Press, Seoul. 
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boosted the spirit of humanism in the face of indescribable barbarity and human despair 
under the insurmountable conditions.106 
 
The discussant (KHR) as an advisor of Catholic human rights solidarity went even further 
and made an observation about the opposing views on the role of Confucianism and its 
humane concerns held by contemporary leading Asian political figures such as Kim Dae 
Jung and Lee Kuan Yew.  Sharp debates arose, prompted by Kim’s response in the 
Foreign Affairs article107 of 1994 to Lee on the concept of the so-called ‘Asian values.’   Lee 
popularized the notion of Asian values, basing himself on ‘Confucian humanism’ and its 
contribution to economic prosperity, while defending his ever-lengthening autocracy also 
on the grounds of Confucian social harmony guaranteed through political patriarchalism.  
The discussant argued that Lee’s view of Confucianism is that of minimalism, a view also 
propounded historically by the School of Legalism, most prominently by Han Fei (ca 
280-233 B.C.E.).  Lee chose to omit the key teachings of Mencius about the ‘moral 
responsibility of sovereigns’ to fairness and the ‘rights of the people to revolt’ as a last 
resort against unfit sovereigns.  Kim maintained his position in this response and 
throughout his presidency of Korea (1998-2003) argued that Confucianism provides a 
basis for humanism and for the adaptability to democratic principles elaborating on the long 
philosophical riches built around it.108  The discussant was persuaded that the so-called 
Asian value argument had lost much of its currency, since the Korean model of market 
economy has advanced together with what Kim claims to be Confucian democracy and has 
invalidated Lee’s argument. 
 
The discussant (KMC) as a mass media contributor observed that Kim made frequent 
references to the Mencian political reforms through moral and peaceful means, leaving the 
revolutionary option as a last resort.  Non-violent political resistance against the military 
government led by his political nemesis President Park Chung-Hee (1917-1979) in the 
tradition of Gandhi was heavily influenced by one of his mentors, Ham Sŏkhŏn (1901-1989). 
Ham was a Quaker leader and pacifist political activist, also known for his teaching of other 
                                                
106 Cho, Mi-suk 1997, ‘1950 nyŏndae humanism munhak (Literature of Humanism in Korea during the 1950s)’, in Konguk  
Ŏmunhak (Konkuk Language and Literature), vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 535-588. 
107 1) Zakaria, Fareed 1994, ‘Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,’ Foreign Affairs, vol.73, no. 2.  
2) Kim, Dae Jung 1994, ‘Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values: A response to Lee Kuan 
Yew,’  Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 6. 
108 Han, Sang-jin ed.1998a, ‘Kim Dae-jung’s speech’, in Tongyang’ui nunŭro segyerŭl  hyang’hayŏ (Towards the Globe 
through the Eyes of the East Asia), Nanam Publishing, Seoul, pp. 23-43. 
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Asian belief systems such as Taoism and Hinduism.   Kim is a practicing Catholic, but 
shared Ham’s view of progressive spirituality dwelling on the strength of belief traditions 
such as of Confucian pacifism and Taoist freedom.   
 
KTE as a corporate advisor for an economic justice forum referred to the common daily 
practices of Confucian ethics by contemporary Koreans as evidence of Confucian 
humanism in action.  According to him, fundamental principles and disciplines related to 
core human relations stand out representing the ‘intrinsic humanism’ and the ‘extrinsic 
humanism.’109  On the one hand, Confucian habits of heart in Korea relate to the intrinsic 
understanding of being desirable humans. On the other hand, such habits daily manifest 
extrinsic understanding of human relations from family, community, business and broader 
social association.  Conversely, the ideals of Confucian humanism present a daunting task 
to translate into practice to perfection.  Such ideals often encapsulated in crisp and pithy 
aphorisms find their way into common discourse as points of reference.  The discussant 
exemplified the most common quotations from the Great Learning, i.e., the Eight Virtues of 
the Way, namely, ‘investigation of things, in-depth knowledge, sincerity of thought, 
rectification of heart, self-cultivation, harmony of family, good governance of state and 
pacification of the world.’110  The discussant added that these virtues signify progression 
from ‘intrinsic humanism’ starting from the ‘investigation of things’ to ‘extrinsic humanism’ 
culminating in the ‘pacification of the world.’   
 
The next discussant (KSS) brought up another common Confucian axiom with similar 
currency, namely, the Three Fundamental Principles and the Five Moral Disciplines in 
human relations, as summarized by Tung Chung-shu (ca. 195-115 B.C.E.)111 The three 
principles are those of ‘loyalty between sovereign and subject, filial piety and respectful 
husband-wife relations’, while the five disciplines, originally of Mencian teachings, are the 
disciplines of ‘unwavering loyalty to sovereign or patriotism in the modern sense, filialness, 
marital integrity, respect of seniority and faithful friendship.’ 112  These principles and 
disciplines have long melted into the Korean vocabulary, and continue to serve as the 
moral building blocks of Confucian humanism with the stress on personal integrity.  
                                                
109 Cheng, Chung-ying 1991, Op. Cit., pp. 1 ff. 
110 Legge, James 1960/1970, the Chinese Classics (The Four Books of Confucianism), vol. 1, Hong Kong University 
Press, Hong Kong, pp. 356-381. 
111 Tung authored Ch’un ch’iu Fan-lu in which he re-formulated the teachings of Confucius into the aphorismic format of 
‘the Three Fundamental Principles and the Five Moral Disciplines.’ 
112 This comment is resonant with the points raised earlier in Chapter 2. 
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The discussant (KEH) as an economic historian noted some aspects of Korean social 
behaviour, commonly typified as ‘Confucian societal ties.’  He argued that this so-called ‘tie 
or bond culture’ is often stigmatized as symbolic of Confucian rigidity with the flair of 
pre-modern social behaviours.  The most prominent ties are those of ‘land, blood, 
schooling and at times which military services for the males, e.g., army, navy, air force or 
marines.’  These ties relate to which part of the country you are from, which family clan you 
belong to, which schools you attended and sometimes which branch of the armed services 
you served.  Awareness of such ties is maintained through associations related to province 
origin, family genealogy, school alumnus or school sports memberships and armed 
services’ veteran organizations.  Such tight-knit social networking based on the exclusive 
personal affiliations and closed memberships has been the target of social reforms. 
Notwithstanding that the bond-building habit may be universal in order to survive in any 
given society, Koreans tend to go to the extreme in the importance placed on such ties. 
Such behaviour earned itself the label of ‘Confucian habits’ of heart.  This also has a strong 
allusion to the history of intense Confucian factional struggles during the Yi dynasty 
(1392-1910) in Korea.  The discussant argued that this tie-building pattern of behaviour has 
ambivalence about it.  Its downside is that its exclusivity and closeness hamper social 
mobility and fairness of opportunity to all.  The upside, according to him, is that it reduces 
social transaction costs in building various productive organizations.  Organizations in both 
public sector and private sector place the primacy on efficiency.  Economic planning 
bureaucracy and globally competing business firms are good examples.  These 
organizations tend to elicit higher dedication and speedier results from their recruits 
because they come from such ‘tie’ origins, since they are expected to adapt and deliver to 
prove their worth as ‘faithful members’ of such organizations. 
 
KAC as a cultural theorist made an observation about the so-called post-Confucian 
democratization of Korea.  The military autocracy (1961-1987) frequently employed 
Confucian ethics as a means of reinforcing their conservative political agenda and 
containing the opposition.  Such a minimalist view of Confucianism was to be corrected 
with the arrival of democratically elected governments.  The discussant argued that such a 
transition from the restricted compliant Confucianism to that of more openness came to be 
termed the post-Confucian experiment with democracy.  Confucian humanism went 
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through a period of crisis and manipulation under the military governments, but outlasted 
them without any loss of moral integrity or philosophical legacy.113  
 
The above has been the summary of the Korean discussants’ views on the Confucian 
humanism of the nation. The discussions now move on to Japan and her Confucian 
humanism as seen through the eyes of contemporary Japanese discussants. 
 
3.3.2 Confucian Humanism in Contemporary Japan 
 
In looking at the place of Confucian humanism in contemporary Japan, JAS as a social 
development officer led off by suggesting that the Confucian intellectual and humanist 
influence over the principal Japanese history books of antiquity is significant as a frame of 
reference for the classic perception of humanism in Japan seen from the foundation 
philosophy of the nation. The ‘Records of Ancient Matters (620)’114 was edited as an 
anthology of the ancient stores about the mythical beginning of the nation. 115  The 
‘Chronicles of Japan (720)’116 is considered an official historical record of ancient Japan.117  
Both history books were written in the Chinese characters, since their releases predate the 
introduction of Japanese kana writing that is known to have come into use after the years 
when the celebrated poetic anthology of the ‘Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves’118  was 
released in 759 with the first use of Japanese kana.  As a nation with an intense interest in 
the continuity of its identity, these history books are more than histories told. Quotations 
from the books served as the reference to the legitimacy and sacredness of the imperial 
lineage and divine intervention in creation and rule of the nation for ‘generations eternal’.  
Apart from the obvious political implications of such deification of the national heritage, the 
sense of identity and the ethos of the people of Japan are equally important.  The 
discussant argued that such sharing of the same ancient family roots in a single 
genealogical link to the mythical beginning with the emperor as the ultimate head of the 
                                                
113 Kihl, Young-Whan 2004, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 
pp. 44-53. 
114 Kojiki or Furukotofumi (Records of Ancient Matters)  
115 Tōyama, Ichirō 2003, ‘Chapter Two: The Design of Kojiki, in Kojiki seiritsu no haikei to kōsō (Background to Formation 
and Structure of Kojiki), Kasama Shoin, Tokyo. 
116 Nihon Shoki (Chronicles of Japan) 
117 Kanemaru, Ken’ichi 2003, ‘Chapter One: The Era of Deities’, in Nihon shoki kōzōron (Discourse on the Structure of 
Nihon Shoki), Ōfū, Tokyo. 
118 man'yōshū (Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves): the oldest existing and most highly revered collection of Japanese 
poetry, composed during Nara and Heian (710-1185) era. 
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family is uniquely Japanese.  The Confucian texts were instrumental as the resource as 
well as an intellectual milestone in the task of nation-building and, perhaps more 
importantly, the building of the legitimacy. 
 
A second discussant (JAH) as an advisor of human development offered the view that one 
of the earliest historical writings about humanism in the Confucian context can be found in 
the works of Prince Shōtoku (574-622).119  The seminal work of the Prince was the very first 
constitution in the history of Japan, namely, the Seventeen-article Constitution.120  The 
discussant argued that this constitution manifested the Confucian humanism in 
governance enveloped in the indigenous Japanese ethos.  Such an ethos came from the 
tradition of ancient native belief.  The Prince is also known as the first courtly student of 
Confucianism and Chinese literature, after his mentor Wang-in of the Paekche dynasty 
(18-660 B.C.E.) in Korea introduced Confucianism for the first time to Japan.  Japanese 
court scholars also visited the T’ang dynasty (618-907) in China on diplomatic and 
scholarly missions.  Article Two emphasises the central state role of Buddhism.  Articles 
Three through Fourteen closely reflect Confucian ethics for sovereigns, officials and the 
common people based on Confucian moral principles.  
 
A further participant in the discussion (JAC) agreed, but added another angle to the 
significance of what the Prince’s work represents.  He argued that his work in all likelihood 
was the very first manifestation of ‘universal thought’ about humanity in the intellectual 
legacy of Japan, beyond the heretofore confinement of the uniqueness or particularity of 
the indigenous Japanese intellectual pattern.  He also argued that such Confucian 
ecumenism as implied in his work went through peaks and valleys in the subsequent 
history of Japanese thought. 
 
The discussant (JEH) as an economic historian referred to the dominance of the T’ang 
dynasty (618-907) that is also known as the golden era of Chinese civilization.  Its sphere of 
influence reached not only Japan but also the whole of Asia with China maintaining 
tributary relations with most of the smaller nations on its borders.  The T’ang dynasty 
received many courtly scholars who came to study.  Japanese visiting scholars were 
mostly Buddhist leaders associated with the court.  The discussant brought up Kūkai 
                                                
119 Shōtoku Taishi (Prince Shōtoku) 
120 Jūshichijō kenpō (the Seventeen-article Constitution) was introduced in 604 under the leadership of Prince Shōtoku. 
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(774-835) as an example of such Buddhist leaders.  On his return from a study tour of 
China, Kūkai established an esoteric Buddhist sect called the ‘True Words’121 in his effort to 
find a right fit for the wider community of his compatriots in their individual spiritual pursuits.  
It emphasised the ‘original awakening’122 by which any individual would have an inherent 
spiritual capacity to attain the great awakening.  This teaching contrasted to the then 
mainstream Mahayana practice.  Mahayana practice entailed substantial learning and 
lengthy spiritual cultivation, often beyond the reach of the majority of common people 
where Kūkai’s sympathy rested.  Kūkai managed to garner court support and succeeded in 
making available a number of his sect worship establishments nationwide.  The discussant 
also argued that such intellectual pursuits follow a certain pattern of the ‘tenacious 
undercurrent’123unique to Japanese culture.  This undercurrent directs the way of thinking 
towards reproducing the intellectual imports so as to attune them to the mental climate of 
native Japan.  The ecumenical attributes of Mahayana Buddhism and Classical 
Confucianism underwent alteration and adjustment to fit to such a principle of indigenous 
particularity. 
 
JPS as a welfare policy consultant highlighted a similar contribution made by the Buddhist 
leader Saichō (767-822) also known as the founder of the T’ient’ai branch124 as the leading 
Mahayana tradition in Japan.  The discussant argued that the Buddhist scholars also 
studied the principles and political applications of Confucianism on their study tours in the 
thriving dynasty of T’ang.  The Confucianism they witnessed in the T’ang dynasty had 
ecumenical inclinations as Mahayana Buddhism did.  Saichō and his disciples laid an 
important intellectual foundation for the Mahayana tradition through their founding of the 
Japanese T’ient’ai branch.  The discussant added that Confucian humanity remained 
implicit in the societal engagements of the T’ient’ai Buddhist leaders.   
 
The discussant (JAP) as a historian of Japanese thought shed light on the flourishing of a 
number of emergent Buddhist denominations during the Kamakura era (1185-1333) that 
grew into the major philosophical traditions that last to this day.  He highlighted the Pure 
Land and Zen Buddhism.  Pure Land flourished under the prominent leadership of Hōnen 
                                                
121 Shingon: the ‘True Words’ sect of Buddhism in Japan. 
122 hongaku: original awakening in Japanese 
123 tenacious undercurrent or basso ostinato in musical terms 
124 T’ient’ai, as mentioned earlier, is one of the many Buddhist branches in China and Japan.  It is also called the Lotus 
School because of its emphasis on the Lotus Sutra. It was founded in China by Chih-I (538-597). 
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(1133-1212) and Shinran (1173-1263) both of whom respectively established their own 
sub-denominations of Pure Land, namely, the ‘Pure Land School Proper’125 and the ‘True 
Pure Land School.’126  Zen Buddhism grew in strength under the leadership of Dōgen 
(1200-1253).  The major Buddhist denominations came to enjoy both sovereign and 
popular support nationwide under the so-called ‘common governance of sovereign law 
(ōbō) and Buddhist Law (buppō).’ The major Buddhist schools came to oversee the 
substantial financial and property wealth under their religious establishments.  Such 
worldly influence with its political implications was serious trouble in the making.  It came 
under the devastating attack by the warlords in the warring period leading to the 
emergence of the Tokugawa era (1600-1864).  JAP argued that the Confucian doctrine of 
governance was in continuous service to the Kamakura military governments of shoguns 
with the intellectual dominance of the prominent Buddhist leaders.  Buddhist leaders 
continued to utilize the sophisticated knowledge pool of Confucianism as long as it 
provided the required educational and intellectual resource but without giving it any political 
imprimatur. 
 
The discussant (JSS) as a social policy advisor spoke about the role of Neo-Confucian 
orthodoxy with the start of the Tokugawa era (1600-1864).  He pointed out that Confucian 
intellectual influence was obvious and substantial in that the first shogun inducted 
Neo-Confucian scholars such as Fujiwara Seika (1561-1619) and Hayashi Razan 
(1583-1657) as court retainers.  Fujiwara and Hayashi made a substantial contribution to 
the Japanese intellectual heritage beyond their courtly service.  The discussant also 
pointed out that the influence of Confucian humanism was conditional upon the premise 
that Confucian doctrines remain ‘contributory resources’ to the samurai government 
without challenging the political orthodoxy or legitimacy in opposition to the Confucian 
political dominance in the China or Korea of that time.  Confucianism in the court of 
Tokugawa played the role of political rites, not the politics itself.  The Confucian intellectual 
contribution was welcome, but remained a foreign import as separated from the native 
belief system rooted in the ancestral genealogy of the emperors.  
 
The discussant (JTI) as an enterprise advisor concurred with such a view that 
Neo-Confucianism had a paradoxical influence over the Tokugawa court for its profound 
                                                
125 Jōdoshū (Pure Land School Proper) 
126 Jōdo Shinshū (True Pure Land School) 
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intellectual role but its political role was restricted.   He argued that Tokugawa feudalism did 
not overcome the native tradition of ‘family clans (uji)’ and ‘tribal groups (be).’  The 
ascription of ancestral genealogy was critical to its political legitimacy.  The benefits of 
ecumenical beliefs such as Neo-Confucianism and Mahayana Buddhism have been 
obvious.  These benefits, however, remained ancillary to political legitimacy.  Shoguns and 
scholarly court retinues were familiar with what both intellectual traditions could offer, but 
were quite clear about where the limits were.  
 
JAP who researches in East-Asian philosophy brought attention to the influence of 
Confucian literature that came in contact with the native aesthetic ethos and helped 
produce sophisticated literary works.  The works were in the form of personal notes and 
poems of those serving at the court, the tales about the private lives of the ladies in court, 
and stories about the warriors in battle and their personal reflections, just to name a few.  
The writings carried the apparent influence of T’ang dynasty literature and the religious 
undercurrents of Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism.  The discussant also introduced 
some eminent examples.  The Pillow Book (1002)127 by Sei Shōnagon (ca 965-1010) 
carried personal notes and poems of those attached to the court.  The Tale of Genji128 by 
Murasaki Shikibu (ca 973-1014) was a collection of colourful stories and poetry about the 
ladies in the court.  The Tale of the Heike (1371)129 as a collection of stories written over a 
period by Yoshida Kenkō (ca 1283-1350) and other associated writers documented the 
saga of important battles and how warriors reflected on themselves as humans.  The 
discussant argued that the aesthetic and religious ethos expressed in such literary works 
and others attest how the people found their own mental space and autonomy in the 
hierarchical society with little tolerance for any deviance from the rule of power.  
Orderliness firmly remained in the artistic realm in terms of how the literary stanzas 
harmonize with the calligraphy, flower arrangement, tea ceremony and the movement of 
those in the artistically perceived common space of the shared lives.  The discussant 
claims that, despite this orderliness and submerged emotions, people found 
transcendence of spirit and freedom through their artistic and religious pursuits.  Aesthetics 
and religious ethos were often expressed in the unique Japanese perceptions such as 
‘heartfelt sorrow’130, ‘sympathy’131 and ‘mysterious longing.’132  The discussant offered the 
                                                
127 Makura no sōshi (The Pillow Book)  
128 Genji monogatari (The Tale of Genji) 
129 Heike Monogatari (The Tale of the Heike) 
130 awaré (heartfelt sorrow)  
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view that these perceptions common to various Japanese classical artistic forms including 
poetry, stories, paintings, music and masque drama provide the people of the various 
social strata with an artistic catharsis to free them from the effects of any social or political 
oppression. 
 
The discussant (JAH) concurred on Confucian humanism as expressed in the Japanese 
artistic ethos.  He offered a psychological parallel to it by introducing a significant popular 
movement of the ‘School of Learning of Mind’ firstly led by a Confucian scholar Ishida 
Baigan (1685-1744).  Also influenced by the indigenous Shinto and Zen Buddhist practice 
of quiet immersion into  self-reflection, Ishida tried to test the new intellectual frontier 
beyond the Yōmeigaku Neo-Confucian teaching of searching for the ‘original mind’133 as 
the ultimate moral awakening and enlightenment. 
 
Significance was added in that this teaching movement was available not only to the 
learned elites, but also to the general public who would otherwise have had very little 
access to the learning of such depth.  The discussant argued that this movement led by 
Ishida134 and his disciples broadened  intellectual opportunities to those less privileged 
commoners, also laying a foundation for the ‘people-centrism’135 of the so-called ‘Taishō 
democracy’ era (1912-1926) of ‘great righteousness.’ The discussant also added that this 
movement on the surface does not have any visible Confucian façade, but the Confucian 
context provided its content and scaffold without being too visible, thus concurrently 
addressing Japanese sensitivities.    
 
Another participant (JTS) as an industry strategist referred to the learning movement that 
arose amongst the urban ‘tradesmen’ 136  as another example of the intellectual 
opportunities.  The Tokugawa society was one with a clear hierarchy with four vertical tiers, 
namely, ‘scholar-officialdom, peasantry, craftsmen and mercantile class.’  The urban 
‘tradesmen’ advanced their relative social class thanks to their wealth and their vibrant 
participation in creative arts and broad based learning activities.  The discussant 
                                                                                                                                                
131 sabi (sympathy) 
132 yūgen (mysterious longing) 
133 penhsin (benxin: original mind) 
134 Sawada, J 1993, Confucian Values and Popular Zen, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, pp. 62-90. 
135 minponshugi: people-centrism or demo-centrism as an alternative name for democracy coined by Yoshino Sakuzo 
(1878-1933) , the leader of the ‘Taishō democracy’ era (1912-1926) of  ‘great righteousness.’ 
136 chōnin (tradesmen) 
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introduced a successful example.  The successful merchants of Osaka financed the 
establishment of the school for the commoners in 1724 under the name of the ‘Hall of 
Learning of Virtues’ or Kaitokudō, teaching diverse subjects of Confucian, Buddhist and 
Taoist traditions to those with little access to the elitist mainstream teaching institutions.  In 
1838, another school called Tekijuku came into being, specializing in the so-called ‘Dutch 
learning,’ e.g., science, medicine and European languages.  These schools for 
‘commoners’ were following in the intellectual leadership of the major Tokugawa 
Neo-Confucian scholars of ‘learning of mind’137 such as Hayashi Razan (1583-1657) and 
Ishida Baigan (1685-1744).  Both institutions became the foundation of the University of 
Osaka.  The discussant emphasized that Confucian learning was taken up for the broader 
community through the initiative by those tradesmen equivalent to the contemporary 
middle class.  The discussant also suggested that a sense of social cohesion rose up and 
survived thanks to this uncommon civic movement starting from below for moral 
enlightenment.   
 
The discussant (JSS) as a social policy advisor shed light on how the so-called ‘Meiji 
oligarchs’ educated in Confucianism in their youth led their lives as the leading figures at a 
time of great transition.  Their activities were partly in designing the change and also partly 
in political maneuvering for its delivery.  Itō Hirobumi (1841-1909) was the architect of the 
Meiji Constitution (1889).  Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838-1922) was the prime mover behind the 
introduction of the parliamentary government system for the first time in the history of 
Japan.  Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922) was behind the creation of the modern armed 
forces of Japan and introduction of military conscription.  The discussant argued that 
Confucian morals were embedded in their personal values such as devotion to learning, 
self-cultivation including literary skills such as poetry and unity of family with the greater 
family of the nation.  Their expression of Confucian humanism in the political processes 
was ambivalent.   Itō led a study group in law and government institutions, making study 
and fact-finding tours to the Western nations.  The discussant observed that, despite the 
modern structure of the Meiji Constitution, the group Itō led engineered a confidential 
process whereby no popular consent was sought.  The Meiji Constitution in fact fused the 
emperorship, the ‘national body (kokutai)’ and the identity of citizens as family members 
with the emperor at the head of the sacred lineage.  Without going through any ratification 
process, the Constitution came into being as a benevolent gift from the emperor.  The 
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discussant argued that, in the critical steps of this process, the speeches, announcements 
and wordings of the Constitution were redolent of Confucian humanism.  Ōkuma supported 
liberal education additional to the traditional Confucian teachings, hence founded Waseda 
University in 1882 as a higher learning institution with an international and open academic 
outlook.  Ōkuma’s role as constructive opposition continued to produce results in spite of 
frequent setbacks partly thanks to his engagement with the leading samurai clans that 
brought down the Tokugawa government.  Yamagata created the modern Japanese armed 
forces with soldiers and sailors equipped with modern arms, but mentally educated in 
Confucian ethics.  In the ‘Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors’138 of 1882 also known 
as the most important document in the history of the Japanese armed forces, the 
Confucian ethos permeated clauses such as articles one and four on loyalty and 
faithfulness.  
  
The discussant (JPE) as an economic planner added his views on the Meiji oligarchs.  
These oligarchs ultimately represented the political interests of the two leading military 
clans, namely, the Chōshū clan139 and the Satsuma clan.140  In the process of major 
political re-consolidation under the implicit leadership of the leading clans, they put to good 
use Confucian ethics, Buddhist sensitivity and Taoist artistry as necessary ingredients, but 
not as the compelling central theme of universal humanism.  These leaders were also the 
architects of an expansionist policy whereby they went on with the annexation or invasion 
of Confucian cousin nations and territories, i.e., Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria and heartland 
China.  The central theme of concentration and growth of power outstripped the personal 
ethos of Confucian humanism that these leaders cherished to the end of their lives.  
 
The discussant (JSS) introduced those who worked hard to overcome the ‘sacrosanct 
emperor’s sovereignty’ as espoused by such oligarchs as Yamagata. A prominent law 
scholar Minobe Tatsukichi (1873-1948) outlined his ‘organ theory of emperorship.’ 141  
Minobe was influenced by his teacher Georg Jellinek (1851-1911)142 during his study in 
Germany and theorized that the state comprises a set of legal organs and emperorship 
represents one of the key state organs rather than being a super-state organ.  With this 
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141 tenno kikansetsu (organ theory of emperorship) 
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theory, Minobe tried to advance the democratic institutionalization of the empire of Japan 
with some success.  The discussant argued that Minobe wanted to institutionalize checks 
and balances within the framework of emperor-centric sovereignty, and also conserve the 
moral ethos of society, including Confucian ethics and humanism.  The discussant also 
argued that such a consistent legal basis opened a way through which conservatives and 
liberals would conduct state matters side by side. Yoshino Sakuzō (1878-1933) led the 
liberal politics and Shidehara Kijūrō (1872-1951) led the liberal diplomacy of peaceful 
coexistence with Asian neighbours instead of imposing Japanese dominance.  
 
JPH as a human resource policy person added that Minobe and his likeminded colleagues 
could introduce the milestone legislation of the ‘Universal Manhood Suffrage Law.’143  
Liberal politics could not go far enough to embrace labour union rights, since the labour 
demands were feared too far left to warrant broad support.  Shidehara was instrumental in 
reaching the ‘armament control agreement of major powers (1921-1922)’ and return of the 
‘Shantung’ territory to China that the former imperial government of Japan took from 
Germany. Shidehara’s contribution to the democratization of Japan was later recognized, 
when he became the post-war prime minister in 1945-1946. The discussant argued that 
Shidehara was one of the Confucian and Western educated liberals who believed that 
constitutional monarchy can be legitimised and strengthened through reason and 
humanism, aided also by the embedded ethical traditions of Confucianism, Buddhism and 
Shinto.  
 
The discussant (JAC) as a cultural theorist of post-Meiji Japan made the observation on 
how the legacy of the so-called ‘mainstream neo-Confucian political ideologues’ of the 
post-Meiji era continued and grew in strength under the school of National Learning.  He 
argued that the mainstream neo-Confucian ideologues of particular significance to modern 
Japanese political ideology were Ogyū Sorai (1666-1728), Andō Shōeki (1703-1762) and 
Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801).  Sorai’s Neo-Confucian initiative is eminently recognized 
for having broken away from the Sinic Confucian orthodoxy to advance the Japanese 
people’s own sense of history.  Sorai trusted that it is both possible and necessary to create 
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the ‘intellectual design’144 of a new society.  Shōeki and Norinaga are recognized to have 
expanded on it and moved the Neo-Confucian intellectual platform of ‘National Learning’ to 
the ideological citadel of the ‘national body’145 of Meiji era Japan. Confucianism could 
survive as the backbone of the new Japanese polity in so far as its ‘philosophy and culture’ 
could help deliver the political ‘performance.’ 146   In the discourse of the new polity, 
Confucian-educated Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960) demanded that the ‘human existence’147 
of contemporary Japan be understood in the Japanese climatic context. Watsuji believed 
that humanism including that of Confucianism could grow only from the climatic soil of the 
nation’s unique ‘spatiality and temporality’.148  
 
JMC as a media contributor touched upon how those post-Meiji era citizens with their 
family-centric Confucian values and ethos lived through the new nation of diverse and 
conflicting social and political values.  Under vigorous modernization, post-Meiji era 
citizens experienced its pressures on their way of life and also in their minds. Some 
succeeded in internalising what the drastic changes brought.  Others did not.  Some 
argued that the true modernization of Japan lay in the ‘overcoming of modernity’ which was 
the phrase of the epochal social debate in 1942.  Others argued that, in order to ‘overcome 
modernity,’ Japan and the Japanese should ‘overcome democracy in politics, capitalism in 
economics, and liberalism in thought.’ 149   These external challenges brought on the 
substantial internal challenges to the ‘mental archetypes’150 of the hereto familiar ‘national 
myths’ and ‘life-world’ of the individuals surviving and living through their lives in the given 
societal conditions.  The prominent writers wrote about how people lived their marginal 
lives trapped between the crevices, leveraging their individual ethics of Confucian morals 
and family values vis-à-vis the relentless pace of materialism and power struggles.  
Natsume Sōseki (1867-1919) in his ‘Story of Child’ or Botchan (1906) wrote about the 
moral decay and tension seen from the outlook of a child.  Tanizaki Junichirō (1886-1965) 
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146 Foucault, Michel 1990, ‘Introduction’, in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: interviews and other writings, Routledge, New 
York.  
147 ningen sonzai (human existence) 
148 Watsuji, Tetsuro 1996, Watsuji Tetsuro's Rinrigaku: Ethics in Japan, Carter, E trans., SUNY Press, Albany, NY, pp. 
223-264. 
149 Hiromatsu, Wataru 2003, ‘Chapter 9: Historical Outlook of Kyoto School of Philosophy’, in Kŭndae chogŭngnon 
(Discourse on the Overcoming of Modernity), Kim, Hyang trans., Minumsa, Seoul. 
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plunged into the ‘aestheticism’ portraying the ‘lost souls’ searching for hedonistic moments 
of ‘unliveable lives’.  The contemporary Kenzaburō Ōe (born 1935) told the stories of those 
marginalised within their souls and without, such as his own autistic son.  The discussant 
argued that Confucian humanism rested within the mental scaffold of and its universal 
sympathy for humanity which survived despite the cataclysmic events of World War II. 
 
3.3.3 The Confucian Humanism in the Contemporary Republic of China (aka Taiwan) 
 
CSS as a social policy advocate observed that the current polity of the Republic of China, 
as encapsulated in its Constitution (1946),151 has taken its roots from the political ideals of 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen expressed in the ‘Three Principles of the People.’152  Sun’s legacy is 
clearly identified in the preamble to the Constitution.  The ‘three principles’ are, firstly, the 
‘principle of government of the people (min-tsu),’ secondly, the ‘principle of government by 
the people (min-ch'üan)’ and, thirdly, ‘the principle of government for the people, in 
particular, people's welfare (min-sheng).  The discussant argued that Sun’s political 
ideology of peaceful ‘social revolution’ came to be crystallized into the three principles in 
1897.  Sun studied government systems in the US, Europe and Japan. His interest in the 
social revolution of violence was aroused during his study in Russia.  The KMT government 
established the ‘Council for Chinese Culture Renaissance’ 153  in 1967 with the 
chairmanship assumed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) himself. The 
Council’s primary focus was on Confucianism and the national drive for revival of the 
Master’s teachings. 
 
The discussant (CPH) as a human resource policy person offered a comment on the 
Council’s important role for contemporary Confucianism in the Republic.  The Republic 
also nominated Confucius’ Birthday (September 28th) a national holiday celebrating it as 
‘Teacher’s Day.’  The discussant added that such a Confucian based cultural drive, 
including the inception of the Council for Chinese Culture Renaissance, also was a 
response to the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) of the rival government on the mainland 
with Confucianism earmarked as one of the key targets of heated criticism.  After the 
demise of Chiang Kai-shek, the Council that belonged directly to the Ministry of Education 
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was reorganized into the ‘Council for Cultural Affairs’154 in 1987.  Under this council, there 
are nationwide organizations that continue to look after the spread of Confucian Temples 
nationwide. 
  
The discussant (CMC) as an indigenous writer and social critic pointed out that the 
Republic of China since 1949 together with the territory of Hong Kong, has become the 
home of Neo-Confucian scholarship.  Inevitably contemporary Neo-Confucians in the 
non-socialist nations faced the challenge of maintaining the Confucian philosophical 
integrity in the full knowledge that the Mainland of China ideologically opposed 
Confucianism in its entirety.  The ‘Manifesto of Chinese Civilization to the World (1958)’155 
was a milestone for reinvigoration of Confucian studies in the context of universal 
humanism beyond Sinic territoriality or nationality.  The political mainstream in the Republic 
of China during 1949-1987 was held by the Kuomintang (KMT).  The KMT imposed martial 
law on the Republic to maintain its autocratic government throughout this period.  
Confucian ideologues maintained a certain distance from making any political intervention, 
since Confucian scholars and KMT elites shared a sense of painful loss from what has 
happened to both Confucian scholarship and KMT politics during their unsuccessful 
activities on the Mainland.  The discussant argued that only in the year of 1987 when the 
liberal minded President Chiang Ching-kuo (1910-1988) lifted martial law and brought in 
the era of democracy, did contemporary Neo-Confucian scholarship including its 
expressions of humanism blossom into its full potential.   
 
The discussant (CAS) as a sociologist concurred with the importance of the re-invigorated 
intellectual momentum of Neo-Confucian scholarship as led by the ‘Manifesto leaders,’ i.e., 
Carsun Chang (1887-1969), T’ang Junyi (1909-1978), Mou Tsungsan (1909-1995) and 
Hsü Fukuan (1903-1982).  He also pointed out the grassroots ‘new creed’ movements, 
posing as an example the ‘Unity Sect (I-Kuan Tao)’ with the acronym of IKT.  This sect is 
now an officially recognized religious organization since the government lifted bans on this 
sect and other ‘new religions’ in 1987.  This measure followed on Article 13 of the 
Constitution guaranteeing freedom of religion as a right of all people in the Republic. The 
discussant highlighted the point that, contrary to the tradition of orthodox Confucianism, 
this sect promises salvation. This syncretised Unity Sect based on Confucianism, Taoism 
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and Sinic Mahayana Buddhism with the rituals borrowed from diverse religious practices 
has risen to become the third largest religious group in the Republic.156  The discussant 
argued that the religious impetus grew towards more formal worship due to popular 
demand for the salvational edge beyond what is perceived as the passive moral-anchored 
humanism of Confucian orthodoxy.   
 
The above has been the summary of discussants’ views on the question, ‘Do these 
philosophical traditions and habitudes represent Confucian humanism as a foundation for 
societal cohesion and civility?’   While Confucianism and its cardinal value of ‘humanity’ 
were embraced in the history of Korea, Japan and the Republic of China, the emergence 
and evolution of humanism have been significantly divergent in terms of being inculturated 
into the cultural systems, national characters and political realities that each nation faced.  
From the discussion as above on Confucian humanism, the discussants moved to the next 
question of governance in the Confucian context and its practical implications of foremost 
importance i.e., human rights.  
 
3.4 CONFUCIAN GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The discussants’ views as they have been summarized up to this point have been focused 
on the theme of Confucian humanism.  From this part of the chapter, the discussions 
moved on to consider how such Confucian humanism translates into the pivotal human and 
social conduct of governance.  As indicated in the first chapter of the thesis, discussions on 
governance will be focused around one of the most important practices in governance in 
any given society, namely, human rights and their observance.  Discussants gave their 
views as summarized under the following headings, i.e., Confucian governance and its 
implications for human rights in Korea (3.4.1), in Japan (3.4.2), and also in the Republic of 
China (3.4.3). 
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3.4.1 Confucian Governance and Human Rights in Korea 
 
The government in Korea was under the control of the military autocracy from 1961 to 1987.  
In 1980, in the City of Gwangju, there arose a major civil revolt against the military 
government, resulting in a bloody crackdown with a great loss of life.  This incident led to 
the eventual downfall of the military government and ushered in an era of democratization 
in Korea.  During the presidency of the dissident-turned political leader Kim Dae-Jung (born 
1926), human rights was at the top of the political agenda of the nation.  In 2002, a national 
organization for the advocacy of human rights came into being for the first time in Korean 
history.  The organization funded by government is called the National Human Rights 
Commission of the Republic of Korea.157  This commission enjoys political neutrality free 
from any governmental intervention.  Whereas this commission stands exclusively for 
human rights matters, the protection of civil rights is broadly prescribed for in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Korea.158  Under the heading of Chapter II, Rights and 
Duties of Citizens, starting from Article 10 through 37, human rights covering the political, 
social, economic and cultural areas receive constitutional protection.  As to whether 
Confucian humanism played a role in the political and cultural process towards the 
formulation of the current constitution that has taken on a very liberal democratic stance, 
the discussants provided their thoughts in terms of the various historical backgrounds both 
of the intellectual struggles and grassroots momentum that have proven critical to 
achieving the current level of both ideological and institutional democratization of 
contemporary Korea. 
 
The first discussant (KPS) with his intense interest and expertise in the history of Korean 
social policy took the lead in his discussion group and pointed out that the Gwangju 
episode, now honoured as the ‘Gwangju Democratization Movement’, was a ‘struggle for 
recognition.’159  People struggled to be recognized for their sovereignty as citizens, their 
political entitlements particularly to freedom of speech and of the press and to fair 
economic and social rights.  He argued that, while this struggle for human rights was 
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triggered by Korean circumstances, the nature and aim of the struggle were universal in 
terms of fundamental rights stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
and its key covenants such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).  
 
The second discussant (KMC), a regular contributor to the press, concurred on the 
universal nature of the Gwangju struggle.  He pointed to the absence of human rights in 
terms of the denial of civil rights to uphold peaceful political protests, freedom of speech 
and press, fair access to economic opportunities that Gwangju citizens felt denied to them, 
and the discriminatory social and cultural conventions.  He also emphasized that Gwangju 
and its environs were the home for grassroots movements such as the ‘Peasant Revolt of 
the Eastern Learning’160 in 1894 and the ‘Gwangju Student Movement’ in 1929.  The 
Peasant Revolt was an act of political and social resistance against the incumbent political 
forces of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) and the subjugation of state sovereignty to the 
interests of the growing influence of imperial Japan in Korean politics at that time.  The 
Student Movement was part of an ongoing anti-imperial Japan independence movement 
that continued throughout the Japanese annexation of Korea (1910-1945).  The Korean 
population within the imperial Japanese society occupied the position of secondary citizens 
subservient to main islanders of Japan with severely restricted claims to human rights.161 
 
The third discussant (KPH) who advises on human resource policy made an observation 
on the evolution of Korean bureaucracy since gaining its independence from Japanese 
annexation in 1945.  The ‘temporary military government (1945-1948)’ imposed by the US 
authorities on the southern part of the Korean peninsula faced a lack of experienced 
bureaucrats who could help run the Korean government in the vacuum that the now 
defeated Japanese imperial governor-general left behind.  Both the US military 
government and the newly installed Korean government of Dr. Syngman Rhee (president 
1948-1960) had no choice but to inherit the Japanese trained Korean bureaucracy and the 
officialdom culture embedded in it.  The discussant argued that the Korean elites who 
survived such a change continued to exert substantial influence over the political 
institutions in the process of Korean nation-building.  As an example, the discussant quoted 
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the drafting process of the ‘first constitution of the Republic of Korea (1948).’  The drafting 
work involved Korean elites whose intellectual underpinnings were in the Japanese 
imperial heritage.  Dr. Yu Chin-O (1906-1987) was one of them.  Yu led the team of legal 
scholarship for the draft constitution.  This draft constitution, that ultimately became the first 
constitution of the nation, inevitably ended up incorporating many key clauses that were 
dear to the ‘Meiji oligarchs’ when they politically manoeuvred their preferences into the 
Meiji constitution (1890).   
 
The sociologist discussant (KAS) commented on the national leaders of modernization of 
Korea spanning the 19th through to the 20th century and how the Confucian education they 
received in their youth and the modern Western education in their adulthood influenced the 
roles they played in the process of forming the constitutional mainframes.  As discussed 
earlier, Itō Hirobumi (1841-1909), a leading Meiji oligarch, was a samurai scholar-official 
well versed in Confucian scholarship and literature.  Ito’s Confucian ethical ethos was 
infused into the modern legal framework of the Meiji constitution. Syngman Rhee, born 
from a Confucian scholar-official family with his adulthood Princeton education, helped 
introduce the first draft constitution of Korea prepared by his law professor-turned 
supporter Yu Chin-O. Rhee found the draft constitution by Yu congenial to his aspiration for 
a patriarchal Confucian government.   Yu looked at the Meiji constitution and that of the 
Weimar Republic (1919-1933) as his primary points of reference. The discussant argued 
that the important proviso both the Meiji and Korean constitutions carried was making the 
civil liberties of citizens conditional upon what the nation’s heads believed was in the best 
national interest.  Such best interest of the nation in the case of Japan was what the 
emperor and ‘national body (kokutai) would envisage.  In the case of Korea, it was what the 
president of Korea would see fit in the interest of ‘national security.’ The Korean 
Constitution (1948) carried such qualifications through Article 28 of the second chapter 
(‘Rights and Duties’) in relation to restricting civic freedoms.   The discussant argued that 
such qualifications162 opened a way for the autocracy of Syngman Rhee’s presidency and 
arguably for those following in his footsteps. Confucian humanism clad in a well-meant 
form of Confucian ‘family-state’ patriarchal tradition made an ambivalent contribution at 
best to the project of building the modern Korean democracy. 
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Parallel to Rhee’s political regime and his constitution framework, the next discussant 
(KSS) who was working for a non-government economic justice advocacy organization 
offered a comment on the similar approach chosen by the government of President Park 
Chung-Hee (presidency 1961-1979).  Park introduced the so-called ‘Restoration 
Constitution (Yusin Constitution)’ in 1972, with which he could technically perpetuate his 
presidency. Through such a draconic law, Park introduced a rubber stamp parliament 
called the National Conference of Unification163 that was empowered to authorise the 
extension of his presidency as he wished. In spite of the prospering Korean economy, such 
dictatorial governance triggered widespread resistance.  Park’s government was 
emboldened enough to issue a decree on 13 May 1975 to ban all criticism of the 
government and of the ‘Restoration (Yusin) Constitution.’  The discussant argued that a 
polity under what was officially termed ‘Korean democracy’164 by the Park government was 
partly inspired by the autocratic Indonesian president Sukarno (presidency 1945-1967) and 
his policy of ‘guided democracy’ as an ideological shield against his autocracy. The 
discussant also argued that this concept of ‘guiding the people’ instead of representing the 
people’s political sovereignty was a form of Confucian ‘sagely kingship’ in the eyes of Park 
and also an expression of Confucian humanism reflecting his sense of history in making a 
clear break with the previous poverty of the nation.‘165    
 
On this point of the alleged Korean perception of Confucian ‘sagely kingship,’ the next 
discussant (KEH) as an economic historian offered another perspective in the context of 
political economy.  He believes that there has been a ‘patriarchal culture’-based leadership 
offering the trade-off of rapid economic development and its tangible benefits to the people 
in return for their Confucian consent to the form of benevolent autocracy in the interests of 
the greater good of the nation over the long term.  The discussant emphasized the role of 
an efficient bureaucracy of economic technocrats congenial to such patriarchal leadership.  
Governments subscribing to such Confucian style of patriarchal leadership have been 
supported by a civil bureaucracy that gave an open-ended allegiance to the patriarchal 
leadership without expectation of reciprocated rights or privileges, except for the outcome 
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of national development and communal wellbeing.  The discussant further argued that 
Confucianism provided implicit support to such leadership that sought to rule by law but 
only to the extent of using law to enforce the wishes of the ruling group without subscribing 
fully to the notion of a rule of law. 
  
Contrary to such a politicized view of Confucian compliance, there have been diverse 
social and religious groups that considered this view as an offensive distortion of Confucian 
humanism.  The discussant (KSS) as a researcher with an interest in social history, 
expounded upon which groups in Korean society under the autocratic governments from 
1961 to 1987 organized their systematic and persistent opposition and struggles.   Firstly, 
there were the religious groups comprising Catholic, Protestant and Buddhist adherents.   
Secondly, there were social groups consisting of students, workers and the ‘grassroots.’166  
They rejected such patrimonial ownership of the greater good for the society. In fact they 
emphasized the Confucian tacit acceptance of liberal values of tolerance and plural notions 
of the good as Mencius and Chu Hsi had taught.  Support for democracy and human rights 
in the 1970s through to the 1990s have come from a variety of groups held together by a 
liberal consensus within the opposition camp.  Korea’s ‘economic miracle’ was engineered 
by the authoritarian regime.   In turn, the regime could sustain its political control with all the 
means at its disposal.  It was too strong for the divided opposition, and was able to be in 
power for nearly three decades.  The discussant argued that the opposition endured, 
evolved and finally triumphed in spite of the social engineering by the autocratic state.  The 
opposition prevailed eventually as the course of resistance was equal to the project of 
democratising Korean society in ways which were appropriate to the priorities of each 
participating group.  The discussant also argued that this process of social evolution not 
only brought economic achievement unimpeded, but also helped rediscover and 
strengthen the intrinsic beliefs of those opposing religious groups including that of 
Confucianism and its concern for humanity.     
 
As regards the Confucian ethos of an elite technocracy, the discussant (KPE) with an 
economic planning background observed that Confucian ethics permeated the characters 
and attitudes of those elite bureaucrats in their sense of duty to themselves and to the 
                                                
166 chae’ya (grassroots): Korea witnessed a surge of social leaders at the grassroots opposing the military autocracy 
(1961-1987). Chae literally means ‘exist’, ya means ‘in the openness of grass’ or ‘opposition.’ 
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people as the Confucian ‘superior persons’ or ‘gentlemen.’167  He argued that positive traits 
of the Confucian character did emerge, as did the commonly known weaknesses of 
Confucians. Strengths would be   ‘encouragement of learning of the superior person’, 
‘respect for ethics and morality’ and ‘respect for probity, loyalty, and righteousness.’  
Weaknesses as commonly referred to are 168  ‘veneration of China’, ‘factionalism,’ 
‘family-ism or clan-ism,’ ‘class notions,’ ‘bookish impracticality,’ ‘weak commercial or 
industrial capacity,’ ‘reverence for titles’ and ‘reverence for the past.’   
 
Regarding the Confucian ethos imbued into the mindset of the administrative elite in the 
Korean bureaucracy, the next discussant (KAC) who studies cultural theories offered 
further background.  He believes that in spite of the modern institutions and legal system, a 
parallel can be drawn between the Confucian statecraft of the Yi dynasty and that of the 
Republic of Korea in philosophical and behavioural aspects.  Confucianism remains a body 
of ethical and moral principles that the head of the state and elite ‘scholar-officials’ must 
learn to apply.  The Confucian concepts of governance are encapsulated in the three words, 
i.e., ‘kyŏngse (the management of the world or the economy), che’min (the sustenance of 
the people), and ch’iguk (the rule of the nation).’  The first two are from the writings of 
Chuang-tzu (ca 4th century B.C.E.) and the third from the Great Learning.  The point made 
by this discussant (KAC) was supported by another social scientist (KAS) who summarised 
to the effect that Confucian/Taoist political ideology was and remains a conservative 
doctrine based on the notion of promoting moral-ethical principles and social institutions for 
maintaining peaceful political order and social harmony.  Such ideology goes hand in hand 
with a hierarchical society in which those in the positions of authority bestow benevolence 
downwards and those below reciprocate with loyalty and compliance to the state.  Human 
rights and duties are vertically integrated as the pillar of stable social and moral propriety. 
 
Regarding such Confucian mutuality of benevolence of the above and compliance of the 
below, the discussant (KHA) who counsels on human rights offered his outlook.  He 
believes that such fusion of morality and politics, if it were to work out fine, calls for a major 
                                                
167 kunja (Korean equivalent to chüntzu in Chinese: Confucian ‘superior persons’ or ‘gentlemen’) 
168 Hyon, Sang-yun (1893-1950), a prominent Confucian scholar and the first chancellor of the Korea University, is known 
to have classified the strengths and weaknesses of Confucian characters in his work, Chosŏn yuhaksa (The history of 
Confucianism in the Yi dynasty).   The strengths are: kunjahak (encouragement of learning of the superior person), yulli 
dodŏk kwan (respect for ethics and morality) and ch’ŏngnyŏm chŏrŭi (respect for probity, loyalty, and righteousness).  The 
weaknesses are: mohwa sasang (veneration of China), tangjaeng (factionalism), kajok chuŭi (family-ism or clanism), 
kegŭp sasang (class notions), munyak (bookish impracticality), sanggong yŭnyak (weak commercial or industrial capacity), 
sangmyŏng chuŭi (reverence for titles) and pokko sasang (reverence for the past). 
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assumption.  The assumption is that successful harmony should be kept up within the 
Confucian doctrine of self-cultivation, family regulation, social harmony and political rule. 
Mencian teaching directs that Confucian scholar-official elites bear the burden of 
maintaining the basis of moral and political leadership in the state.  The discussant also 
referred to the Mencian admonition against the complacency based on the emphasis on 
stability and predictability alone. Should the system of governance and sovereignty decay, 
risking people’s rights to life and subsistence, Mencius asks that those scholar-official 
elites live up to their moral integrity of Confucian humanism and bring about the necessary 
change even at the cost of self-sacrifice. The discussant argued that, in the history of 
Confucian governance, passive resistance was common, whereas open resistance 
remained a rarity.  
 
Regarding Confucian governance and statecraft in the modern democratic context, the 
discussant (KPS), a social policy researcher, referred to the seminal work, the ‘Doctrines of 
Governance and Statecraft’169 by the prominent ‘Practical Learning’ school doyen Chŏng 
Yagyong (1762-1836).  He argued that Chŏng envisaged successful statecraft based on 
Confucian humanism is achievable in the dynamic interplay of the ‘essential trio’, i.e., 
‘benevolent teachings, self-cultivation and enlightenment,’ ‘just and working institutions’ 
and ‘people’s trust in the moral identity of the selves with the sovereigns as family.’170    
 
On this point of the state and its statecraft equalling the personification of family, the 
discussant (KAP) who researches Asian history of thought concurred that Confucian family 
values and value orientations are central and essential ingredients of Confucian 
contributions to the democratisation processes in Korea and, likewise, progress in human 
rights. In the context of contemporary Korean democracy, the essential trio would still 
remain the same, i.e., the first being the ‘Confucian ideals of humanism as mainstay 
thought’, the second, ‘modern functioning institutions,’ and, the third, the ‘self-identity with 
one’s family’ qualifying the success of leading a fruitful life seen in the eyes of the family 
outlook on life and world.  He argued that this trio creates not just a democratic polity as a 
vindication of justice, but also fortifies the warmth and trust of the family, recovers the 
aesthetic self-identity in unity with the family of the first relation through to the ultimate 
                                                
169 Kyŏngse yup’yo (the Doctrines of Governance and Statecraft) authored by Chŏng Yagyong (1762-1836) during ca 
1817.  
170 Yi, Iksŏng 1990-1993, Chŏng Yagyong and Authorship of Kyŏngse yup’yo (the Doctrines of Governance and 
Statecraft), Minjok Munhwa Ch’ujinhoe, Seoul, vol. 4. 
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relation reaching the greater family, namely, society.  He further argued that Confucianism, 
as a science and art of statecraft, contributed to the re-establishment of the intellectual and 
psychological equilibrium 171  of selves, family and the state through the Confucian 
personification of family compassion, and humanism adding resilience in every meaningful 
step of the relationship.  
 
On the Confucian ideal of society as a harmonious extended family, the next discussant 
(KMC), a media person, suggested a substantial qualification on such an optimistic 
scenario.  He referred to the status of Korean human rights standing in relation to the key 
international human rights covenants.  Korea became the signatory nation to key 
international human rights covenants, including those of the United Nations, particularly the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) among others.  He indicated 
that the government authorities concerned were passive parties at best for the 
enforcement of such covenants. The first governmental report to the UN Human Rights 
Committee under the ICCPR was submitted in 1991.  The non-governmental human rights 
advocacy groups did not agree with the 1991 report made by the Ministry of Justice and 
submitted their ‘counter-report’ in 1992 to the same UN Human Rights Committee.  This 
counter-report was one of many to come and was jointly drafted by the civil society 
advocacy groups headed by the ‘Korean Lawyers for a Democratic Society (Minbyun)’ and 
the ‘National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK).’  This disagreement with the 
government claims, spelled out in this counter-report, covers the integral points such as 
‘remedies against rights violations being not readily available’ and ‘investigative agencies 
shying away from those cases involving high-ranking officials.’  The discussant 
emphasized that the ongoing scrutiny, both domestic and international, by such civil and 
advocacy groups, societies and advocacies on the official practices of human rights policy 
by governmental agencies has become an important pillar of human rights observance in 
Korea. 
 
On the importance of non-governmental civil society groups, the discussant (KHA) as an 
advocate of human rights noted that there has been an intensive effort to coordinate the 
diverse civil organizations under one umbrella.  The Korea Human Rights Network 
                                                
171 Piaget, Jean 1985, ‘Introduction’, in Equilibration of Cognitive Structures: The Central Problem of Intellectual 
Development by Jean Piaget, Terrance Brown, and Kishore Julian Thampy , University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
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(KOHRNET) was formed in 1994 as an umbrella for the non-governmental human rights 
groups working in Korea.  This organization and its member groups work regionally with the 
nations in the Asia Pacific as well as with the UN and other organizations such as Amnesty 
International among others.  The discussant brought attention to the fact that civil human 
rights groups have become a significant source of political influence since the presidency 
of Kim Dae-Jung.  President Roh Mu-hyun (presidency 2003-2007) was a former member 
of the ‘Korean Lawyers for a Democratic Society (Minbyun)’ and his close aides who joined 
his government came from the leading civil groups such as the ‘People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD)’ formed in 1994.  The discussant also argued that the 
most significant exception to the human rights regime in Korea remains the ‘National 
Security Law (NSL)’ that came into existence during the Korean War (1950-1954) against 
Communist North Korean counter-espionage. Both President Kim Dae-Jung and President 
Roh Mu-hyun despite their former careers as human rights champions could not deliver on 
their election pledge on the abolition of this draconic law.  This law has a half century record 
of abuses, having been mobilized in many political witch-hunts. Yet, despite its ignobility, 
both presidents found its cancellation political suicide in view of the inter-Korea tensions 
and popular sentiment against destabilization of any kind involving national security 
matters.  The discussant observed that Korean division and the contemporary terrorism 
threats have placed substantial limitations on any further progress in the human rights 
observance in this republic. 
  
3.4.2 Confucian Governance and Human Rights Observance in Japan 
 
Contemporary Japan is indisputably a liberal democratic nation in terms of its polity. Its 
governance; however, it has undergone a series of momentous changes.  To quote only 
some of those, the ancient age of ‘clan (uji)’ and ‘tribe (be)’ societies, followed by importing 
and localizing the major belief systems such as Buddhism and Confucianism together with 
their governance ethics, Confucian-enlightened shogunate, post-Meiji modernity and the 
Occupation-imposed and now embedded liberal democracy.  Discussants’ views were 
diverse on Japanese governance, the Confucian influence on it and the concept of human 
rights.  Human rights as a part of the Japanese vocabulary emerged as a transliterated 
legal term in the late nineteenth century when European legal literature and institutions 
were studied and adopted in earnest.  An intellectual struggle is still underway to reconcile 
Japanese humanism and its implications for citizens’ rights.  This struggle also responds to 
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the Japanese aspiration to find a right balance between her tradition and the universal 
human rights regimes, in particular those coming under the United Nations, where she 
hopes to play a much bigger role.  The views as summarized below reflect these ongoing 
efforts and challenges.  
 
The first discussant (JHR) who researches human rights policies observed that there is a 
strong argument or near consensus that human rights as a legal framework should be 
accommodated to each nation’s history, culture and ‘climate’ of civilization.  As much as the 
universal human rights regime is a great human achievement in history, it is by no means 
one that provides a fit-all remedy to a specific nation’s human and social circumstances.  
The discussant referred to it as ‘inter-civilization human rights’ or ‘culture and 
climate-contextualized human rights’ regime.172  
 
The next discussant (JPH), an advisor on human resource development, added his 
remarks in drawing a parallel to the afore-mentioned ‘climate-contextualization‘173 of both 
human rights and duties in the Japanese context.  The Japanese word for human being is 
ningen.  It is a combined word of nin (or hito) for ‘man’ or ‘person’ and gen (or aida) for 
‘between‘, ‘interval’ or ’space.’   Hence, the Japanese understanding of ‘human being 
(ningen)’ or ‘being human’ carries the connotation of association, interrelation or 
‘between-ness’ (aidagara) between human beings.  The space or between-ness between 
people refers to the social world, in particular, the community that people live in.  This 
‘between-ness’ is also conditioned by temporality and spatiality that form the culture of the 
community.  JPH argues that Japanese ‘climate-contextualized human rights’ imply the 
reciprocity of ‘between-ness.’  
 
On ‘human between-ness’ as the determinant of the Japanese context of human rights, 
another discussant (JAP) noted the importance of the contribution Nishida Kitarō 
(1870-1945) made through his concepts of the ‘absolute contradiction’ and ‘nothing-ness.’   
Nishida pursued the ‘true self’ which is in no conflict with the ‘others.’ His epistemological 
departure point for attaining the true self was the ‘dialectic of self-negation and 
                                                
172 Ōnuma, Yasuaki 1998, ‘Introduction’ in Jinken, kokka, bunmei (Human Rights, Nation and Civilization), Chikuma 
Shobō, Tokyo.  
173 Watsuji, Tetsurō 1996, Watsuji Tetsurō’s Rinrigaku (Ethics), trans. Yamamoto & Carter,  State University of New York 
Press, Albany, NY, pp. 223-234. 
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self-affirmation.’174  His thought was inspired by the teachings of Mahayana and Zen 
Buddhism.  JAP argued that true human rights or duties, according to the Kyoto school led 
by Nishida, emerge from such ‘absolute contradiction’ of human fullness in nothingness 
and the dialectical process of self-negation and self-affirmation.   
 
As regards how Confucian governance relates to human rights, given such dialectic of 
self-negation and affirmation, the next discussant (JAE), a consultant for social service 
development, brought up the societal tension arising from pre-modern paternalism, 
modern democratic legal institutions and post-modern cultural liberalism.  The first source 
of tension is that the symbolic emperorship is more than symbolic and commands a cultural 
and quasi-Confucian moral authority effectively maintaining the ultra-legal status of 
pre-modern paternalism and ‘family state head’ in the tradition of Confucian sovereigns.   
This runs counter to the modern democratic legal framework that contemporary Japan has 
in place, which clearly stresses that no one is above the law. JAE quoted the theory of a 
prominent law scholar Minobe Tatsukichi (1873-1948) who foresaw such a fundamental 
dichotomy between emperorship and the democratization of Japan, including universal 
and equal human rights, and proposed in 1912 the ‘organ theory of emperorship’175 as a 
part of the modern government institution, igniting a political firestorm at that time.  JAE 
also believes that the third element of the tension is the youthful generation with no war 
memory but with a post-modern cultural liberalism.  This generation feels alien to both the 
tradition of symbolic emperorship and the imposed modernity of contemporary governance 
and institutions that they find inadequate and sometimes irrelevant.  JAE added that such 
divisions have left the sense of spiritual impoverishment among many who have become 
materially better off now but are feeling spiritually poorer despite the positive value of 
modern democratic institutions.   
 
The next discussant (JTE) who advises on corporate ethics concurred with the sense of 
dichotomy that JAE had described.  JTE made his contribution by expounding upon the 
‘law of social existence’ that buttresses the Japanese sense of human relationship and 
mutuality of respect for human rights.  In terms of the Japanese communitarian ethos, 
                                                
174 Dilworth, Viglielmo & Zavala, trans. & eds 1998, ‘The World as Identity of Absolute Contradiction’, in Sourcebook for 
Modern Japanese Philosophy: Selected Documents, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT., pp. 54-72. 
175 Ienaga, Saburō 1964, Minobe Tatsukichi no shisōshiteki kenkyū (the Study on the History of Minobe Tatsukichi’s 
Thoughts), Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, pp. 191-238. 
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comments were made earlier on in this chapter.  JTE’s ‘law of social existence’ advances a 
deterministic view.   
 
While the individual is essential to the definition of human reality and crucial to ethics, 
because of individual consciousness and freedom, there is no ontological priority of the 
individual over the collective.  They always exist jointly.  From the standpoint of subjectivity, 
communities are based on the subjective preoccupation of human beings with one another, 
since communities are also subjects in themselves.176  JTE argues that the existence of 
communities is from the outset a basic fact of human existence in the Japanese context 
and very much so with its understanding of rightful human rights and duties.  
 
As regards the tension between Confucian communitarian ethos and individual integrity 
that affects human rights observance, the next discussant (JAC) who researches 
Japanese cultural history served a reminder to the effect that the pre-Meiji era samurai 
class upheld the Confucian concept of justified resistance based on Mencius’ theory of 
Heaven-ordained revolution.  The samurai class perceived their ultimate human rights 
observance rested in upholding their strong sense of honour.   In the event of an unjust 
order handed down from the superiors and that compromised their honour,   their cultivated 
moral courage could refuse any self-degrading servility even at the cost of their lives, 
namely, self-immolation as a last resort to preserving their right to honour and taking 
responsibility for their actions.  JAC argued that such ethos of masculine chivalrousness 
with rights and duties continues to have its appeal in contemporary Japan.  
 
The discussant (JPS) who advised on social policy development argued that there exists 
no fundamental conflict between Confucian communitarian consciousness and an 
individual one.  He sees both playing complementary roles in serving democratic ends.  In 
any given society, there arises an inherent potential for conflicts amongst individuals. 
Confucian communitarian awareness can evolve the resolution of conflicts beyond litigious 
processes towards more reciprocal processes whereby both individual and common good 
are contemplated.  JPS informed his discussion group that the society of Japan certainly is 
less litigious by a considerable margin than most OECD nations.177  
                                                
176 Watsuji, Tetsurō 1996, Op. Cit., p. 18 ff. 
177 The National Assembly of Korea has a statistical record (1995) that shows the US has 31 lawyers per 10,000 
population units whereas Japan has only 1 lawyer: search.assembly.go.kr/bill/lawinfo/000000105L1.HWP.PDF, viewed 
07 February, 2007. 
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He argued that a healthy democracy requires intermediary communities to cultivate civic 
and cooperative virtues.   Communal identification with a larger society and its social 
capital can be invigorated by our experience of democratic participation.   On the other 
hand, the democratic veto power of clearly defined individual rights limits collective 
coercion imposed upon individuals so that there is a logical balance between individual 
rights and consensus.   The consensus tends to disguise virtual coercion in the name of 
consensus since there exists an unequal distribution of socioeconomic power.  The 
discussant emphasized that the judicial balancing of individual rights versus 
communitarian interest protects individuals against such coercion by ensuring that 
individual rights are honoured with fairness. 
 
The next discussant (JHR) who advises on human rights policy commented on the origin of 
a major human rights law issue related to aliens or foreigners with residence in Japan.  He 
referred to the process of introducing the new constitution in 1947 by the Occupation 
authorities.  Despite the overall framework provided by the legal team of the Occupation 
authorities, the process involved an intensive and exhaustive consultation with their 
Japanese counterparts.  This Japanese involvement was considered a matter of the 
utmost importance by the Occupation authorities, since they wanted to avoid the situation 
whereby the new constitution without due Japanese involvement would be subject to 
abrogation, when the occupation came to the end.  The discussant highlighted the point 
that Japanese political and conservative culture intervened and impacted upon what legal 
status is conferred upon aliens and foreign born population in Japan who were brought in 
as a part of the war effort.  According to the original draft by the Occupation legal team, 
human rights clauses of the proposed new constitution fully subscribed to the entire human 
rights of all the ‘people in Japan.’   Conservative politicians foresaw a political risk in 
defining human rights as inclusive of all those foreign born yet living in Japan, since the 
overwhelming majority of them were Korean.  The ‘people in Japan’ through such political 
intervention changed over to the ‘people of Japan (kokumin),’ whereby the aliens or 
foreigners including their offspring born in Japan are legally considered aliens living 
temporarily in Japan before they eventually return to their countries of origin. The Japanese 
sense of humanism Confucian or otherwise provided the basis of human rights observance 
in so far as such basis remains compatible with the integrity of the Japanese identity within 
a homogeneous nation. 
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The next discussant (JHA) who works in human rights advocacy commented that such a 
conservative policy about the human rights of foreigners was challenged by the social 
critics during the constitutional legislative process in 1947 and up to now.  JHA argued that 
these critics sought a firm commitment to democratic values and the protection and 
promotion of human rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. 
JHA also noted that the Supreme Commander of the Occupation forces, General Douglas 
MacArthur (1880-1964), made an effort to institutionalize liberal democracy and universal 
human rights in particular, and invited the founding chairperson Roger Baldwin 
(1884-1981) of the American Civil Liberties Union178 to offer help in this process.  His visit 
triggered the birth of the Japan Civil Liberties Union (JCLU) 179  that came to exert 
substantial influence over the development of a human rights regime to this day. 
Notwithstanding, MacArthur and his legal team chose not to override the Japanese 
modification on the rights of aliens. It was considered in the interest of both the Occupation 
and the enemy-turned future friend of Japan to honour the tradition, including the Shinto, 
Confucian and Zen Buddhist ethos of Japanese nationhood.  
 
On the legacy of the civil liberties movement in Japan, the next discussant (JEH) who 
researches the history of developmental economies offered the view that in the modern 
history of human rights movement of minorities such as Koreans and Ainus and the 
underclass such as ‘village folks (Burakumin),’ the role played by the socialist party and 
their activists stood out. The first director, Unno Shinshiki of the Japan Civil Liberties Union 
(JCLU) installed in 1947, was a democratic socialist.  JEH highlighted that all advocacies 
irrespective of political persuasion including socialists and communists who were 
persecuted during the imperial Japanese reign were free to participate in the human rights 
movement.  JEH also noted that both the largest civil liberties organization in Japan, 
namely, the Japan Civil Liberties Union and the largest lawyers’ federation in Japan, i.e., 
the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA)180 subscribe to protection and promotion 
of human rights of all peoples in Japan including aliens and foreigners.  These declarations 
are incorporated in the ‘Statute of Japanese Civil Liberties Union’ of 1995181 and the 
                                                
178 American Civil Liberties Union: <www.aclu.org>, viewed 07 February 2007. 
179 Japanese Civil Liberties Union: <www.jclu.org>, viewed 07 February 2007. 
180 The Japan Federation of Bar Associations, < http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en>, viewed 07 February 2007. 
181 The Statute of Japanese Civil Liberties Union (1995): <http://www.jclu.org/ippan_jouhou/JCLU%20STATUTE.pdf>, 
viewed 07 February 2007. 
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‘Practising Attorney Law’ of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations.182  JEH argued that, 
while the conservative Confucian ethics helped introduce the restrictive human rights, 
Confucian scholar-official ethics remained strong with the major advocacy organizations 
opposing discriminations of any form levelled at the non-mainstream populations.    
   
The next discussant (JPS) who consults on social welfare policy introduced the notion of a 
‘public service-private human rights solidarity’ based on the nationwide participation of 
volunteers that he believes is a manifestation of Confucian humanism in action. He noted 
that Japan has kept up the Confucian sense and tradition of the ‘scholar-official’ honour 
attached to public service.  Public services or officials are called kan and people or citizens 
are called min. Since 1948, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has had a human rights protection 
organization called the Civil Liberties Bureau (CLB).183 This Civil Liberties Bureau works 
with the nationwide network of human rights advocates called the ‘Civil Liberties 
Commissioners (CLC),’ offering guidance in nearly all parts of Japan regarding human 
rights and offers assistance when necessary.  This ‘public-private (kan-min)’ partnership 
has grown substantially since its inception in 1948, engaging in some 20,000 human rights 
case according to the Ministry’s 2004 census.184  JPS argued that the social nexus of the 
public-private partnership has grounding in the Confucian ethics of looking after the 
‘broader family’ of the society from the position where each family member can serve, 
heeding the call for duties and rights in approximately the right balance.  
 
The next discussant (JAE) who advises on occupational skill development concurred with 
the Confucian ethical grounding of the community volunteerism in human rights. He added 
that such community volunteerism has existed since earlier on in the 1920’s to care for the 
poverty-stricken population. These volunteers were called the ‘community commissioners’ 
(hōmen-iin) or the ‘disciples of benevolence (toku-shi),’ comprised of those middle class 
persons with the   Confucian sense of duty and service, and at times those harbouring an 
ambition to enter national politics. JAE pointed out that, despite the substantial services 
rendered through this volunteerism, such volunteerism seldom confronted the sensitive 
sectors of national policy such as the law on aliens and foreigners.  
 
                                                
182 The ‘Practising attorney Law’ of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations: 
<http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/pdf/practicing_attorney_law.pdf>, viewed 07 February, 2007. 
183 Jinken Yōkōkyoku (Civil Liberties Bureau): <http://www.moj.go.jp/index.html>, viewed 8 February 2007. 
184 ibid. 
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The discussant (JHA) who also volunteers for human rights advocacy commented on the 
limitations of volunteerism.  He emphasized that it had become more apparent when Japan 
faced its obligations to comply with the international human rights conventions such as of 
the UN.  According to the ‘Paris Principles’185 of the UN conventions on human rights, 
member states are obligated to submit reports regularly on the progress of human rights 
observance in each nation.  The largest lawyers’ confederation, i.e. the Japan Federation 
of Bar Associations (JFBA) contradicted the government of Japan report to the UN in 2003, 
and offered an ‘alternative report’ to the same UN organization, namely, the United 
Nations’ High Commissioner for Human Rights.186  In this alternative report, JFBA made 
the criticism that the volunteer human rights advocacy, in particular, the Civil Liberty 
Commissioners, are not entirely independent of governmental influence to the extent that 
they shy away from confronting extant governmental policies.  JHA argued that the ‘justice, 
discipline and institutions’ should progress beyond the plausible Confucian ethical 
interventions in human rights matters.   
 
The discussant (JTI) who works on social innovation and microfinance brought up the 
human rights challenges of the traditional social underclass, i.e., the ‘untouchables'’ 
(buraku-min). The hierarchy of the Tokugawa era (1600-1864) of Japan allowed the 
creation of this underclass who were engaged in what was perceived as unsavoury work 
such as butchery, leather and shoe- making.  It alienated the community of this underclass 
from the social mainstream until it was abolished by law during the Meiji Restoration. In the 
1920’s, socialists and communists took advantage of the so-called ‘Taishō era democracy’ 
of the 1920s and 1930s and launched the class struggle in earnest for the ‘village folks’ by 
organizing the ‘Society of Equality (Shuiheisha).’187  However, the social integration of this 
underclass has not materialized to this date. The discussant informed his group that the 
government of Japan since the 1960s chose to close the economic gap of this class by 
subsidizing their micro-businesses, skill training, housing, health, education and other 
social and welfare services rather than talking about their situation as an infringement on 
civil and political rights. This priority on economic wellbeing was the agenda the 
                                                
185 The ‘Paris Principles” refer to the national institutions’ obligations agreed on through the United Nations General 
Assembly convention in Paris 1993 for the promotion and protection of human rights, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm>, viewed 8 February 2007. 
186 Japan Federation of Bar Associations: viewed 8 February 2007. 
187 Shuiheisha (the Society of Equality): <http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~mg5s-hsgw/siryou/kiso/suiheisya_sengen.html>, 
viewed 8 February 2007. 
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government followed, whereas the Buraku Liberation League (BLL)188 since its formation in 
1955 had pursued equal social and political rights along with economic and cultural rights. 
Apart form the human rights issue of Korean residents in Japan, the question of Japanese 
‘human rights’ has become nearly synonymous with this Buraku discrimination. Tokugawa 
period discrimination allegedly was a way of life.  Confucians are accused of their silent 
consent to the so-called ‘four main classes’, i.e., ‘samurai, peasant, artisan, and merchant’ 
and this underclass did not even belong to the class nomenclature.  JTI noted that the 
anti-Confucian sentiment was particularly highlighted due to the ‘class struggle‘ elements 
that Japanese Socialists and Communists brought to the League movement as founding 
members as well as the current key participants.  While the Ministry of Justice reports189 
that the economic parity of this underclass had reached circa 80 per cent of the average 
Japanese by 2006, the discussant argued that the civic, political, social and cultural rights 
are far from being met to satisfactory levels yet.  
 
The discussant (JHR), a social policy person, introduced the human rights issues as 
related to the indigenous peoples mostly living in Northern Japan such as Hokkaido, the 
Kuril Islands and the southern Kamchatka Island.  They are called the Ainu, meaning the 
‘peoples.’ When the Meiji government annexed the island of Hokkaido, this population 
became a segregated minority subject to various discriminations.  The government of 
Japan decided to award a special cultural status to the Ainu indigenous population of circa 
150,000 persons.190  JTI advised that in 1997 the government of Japan enacted the ‘Ainu 
Culture Promotion Law,’ 191  whereby their cultural rights have been partly restored, 
silencing any hope of independence the Ainus and the ‘utaris (comrades in Ainu)’ wanted.  
The provincial government of Hokkaido and the central government are actively supporting 
their economic welfare by promoting lucrative tourism to the Ainu cultural sites.  
 
 The next discussant (JCG), working on corporate governance in Japan and its 
neighbouring countries with Japanese joint-stock enterprises, offered his view on the 
status of the Koreans in Japan as the single biggest alien population in Japan.192  At the 
end of the Pacific War there were 2.3 million Koreans in Japan of whom 700,000 had been 
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190 The Foundation of Research and Foundation of Ainu Culture, <http://www.frpac.or.jp/>, viewed 8 February 2007. 
191 ibid. 
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brought to Japan since 1939 as a conscript labour force or as military conscripts.  Many 
returned home, but others stayed on in Japan.  Under the new Constitution of Japan 
enacted in 1947, these Koreans have remained aliens, now including the third and fourth 
generations of their descendents.  This status means restriction upon the civic entitlement 
to full human rights held by Japanese citizens.  JCG argued that the Korean question had 
become a topic of major diplomatic manoeuvres.  Firstly, the broader global role that Japan 
wants to play including possible membership of the UN Security Council needs Korean 
government support that has consistently demanded the egalitarian status of the long-term 
Korean residents in Japan, with the special reminder to Japan that the majority of this 
population are in fact the victims of the imperial Japanese war effort.193  Fundamentally 
Koreans in Japan are excluded from officialdom and the political process.  Jobs in public 
schools are not open to Korean teachers. Koreans can run for only mid-level provincial 
government office, with the central government office denied to them as aliens. JCG said 
that since 1990, Korean human rights advocacies such as the ‘Lawyers for Democratic 
Society (Minbyun)’ and the ‘Human Rights Homes (Inkwon Sarangbang)’ had collaborated 
with the ‘Koreans-in-Japan Human Rights Group (Zainichi Kankokujin Minshu Jinken 
Kyōka) in Japan in order to increase their effectiveness of lobbying both levels of 
governments.  
 
The discussant (JHR) who researches human rights policy added that the international 
sensitivity of the Korean issues remains critical for Japan. While the conservative 
government and the mainstream want to elevate the profile of Japan as the leading nation 
of the world, the Korean dilemma remains at the forefront of the major challenges ahead of 
her global advancement.  The UN Human Rights Commission continually receives 
reminders and reports concerning the status of Korean human rights in Japan, whereas the 
Republic of Korea made a substantial headway since the downfall in 1987 of the military 
government and the ensuing shift to democratization.   
 
The next discussant (JPR) who researches socio-economic policy development 
commented that a dichotomy remains evident between the progressive group and the 
conservative one.  JPR argued that the most important measure the progressive camp 
achieved during the conservative government of Jun’ichirō Koizumi (prime ministry 
2001-2006) was to introduce in 2002 the ‘Law on the Promotion of Human Rights 
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Education and Human Rights Awareness Raising.’194  Under this law, government finances 
the nationwide education on human rights in schools, enterprises, public offices and all 
areas of human rights, and produces the Annual Reports on Measures for Human Rights 
Education and Human Rights Encouragement.’195  JPR argued that this process despite its 
political intent of warding off domestic and global scrutiny entices the general public of 
conservative political persuasions to acclimatize themselves towards the eventual 
internationalization of Japan human rights regimes.  He held the view that this Confucian 
approach also is a process of consensus-building that is compatible with the Japanese 
sensitivity.  
 
On the education program on human rights, the discussant (JSS), a social policy advisor, 
added that this program was indeed triggered by the conservative government of Koizumi 
in full realization that the overcoming of the deep-seated sense of Asian or Japanese 
cultural ‘particularity’ would require a long term approach and a consistent overseeing by 
the national leadership.  In response to the UN resolution on the ‘human rights education 
decade,’196 the Prime Minister Koizumi agreed to create a high-profile committee in his 
office to oversee the UN Decade of Human Rights Education with the participation of senior 
ministers and deputy vice ministers from all the related ministries.  JSS held the view that 
this initiative is a further development from the position of the Japanese government held 
during the World Conference on Human Rights in Bangkok, 1993197 when Japan was still 
sympathetic with the Asian cultural contextualization of the international human rights 
conventions.  JSS also noted that key non-government organizations had also formed a 
platform of coordination since 1997, with the participation of Buraku, Ainu and Korean 
human rights advocacy groups,  and international ones such as Amnesty International, the 
group being called the ‘Human Rights Forum 21 (Jinken Forum 21).’198 This group regularly 
offers their own assessment on the progress of human rights observance in Japan 
nationally and internationally, independent of governmental reports to the UN human rights 
organizations.  JSS held the view that Confucian governance of liberal tradition such as 
known from Mencian teachings in fact sits very well with such an open coordination, not 
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only on the ‘public-private (kan-min) basis, but also on the inter-ethnic and 
domestic-international levels. 
 
3.4.3 Confucian Governance and Human Rights in the Republic of China 
  
The system of governance as we see it today in the Republic of China is a historical 
outcome of the Hsinhai Revolution (1911).  This revolution meant the demise of the Ch’ing 
dynasty (1644-1911) and the birth of the Republic of China under the leadership of Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen (1866-1925).  His political doctrine of the ‘Three Principles of the People,’ as 
introduced earlier in this chapter, has become embedded in the current constitution and 
political framework of the Republic after its move to the island of Taiwan in 1949.  
Governance and its foremost challenge of human rights have been central issues in the 
ongoing political and social discourses of Dr. Sun and his successors including 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975).  Some leaders such as Sun and Chiang 
focused on nation-building and acknowledged human rights as one of the ‘necessary 
conditions’ of democracy, in so far as the nation-building project can accommodate a 
‘balance of civic duties and rights.’  Other leaders offered widely diverse views i.e., a 
modified Confucian human centrism at the one end of the spectrum to a very liberal model 
of full-fledged human rights observance at the other end. The attribution to Confucian 
humanism is evident in some views, while it remains only implicit in other views.  These and 
other ideas on human rights were commented on by our discussants as summarized 
below. 
   
The first discussant (CHA), who works in the area of human rights advocacy, brought 
attention to the fact that Sun Yat-sen’s prescription for the Chinese observance of human 
rights was an eclectic one.  Dr. Sun gave a lecture in 1924 titled the ‘Principle of People’s 
Power.’199  The discussant argued that, in this lecture, Dr. Sun gave two sides to the 
subject of human rights or ‘people’s rights.’  On the one hand, Sun supported the ‘people’s 
rights’ as the ‘political force of people’s power’ 200  as the quintessence of modern 
democracy.  On the other hand, Sun was concerned about the potential lack of social 
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solidarity, which he called ‘a fistful of loose sand’ analogous to anarchy that in part 
characterized the state of affairs surrounding Dr. Sun’s nation-building project.201  The 
discussant further argued that Sun’s ambivalence as such was picked up by the Chiang 
Kai-shek government and then politically remastered during the Mainland era continuing to 
that of Taiwan in their justification of political repression and curtailment of human rights.  
Sun believed that a maximal freedom should be in the responsible hands of the nation, 
while people ‘must all sacrifice our [individual] freedom’ until such time as the nation 
becomes a ‘strong and prosperous one.’ 
 
The next discussant (CPS), a social policy specialist, introduced the significant and very 
public challenge levelled at the government of the Republic of China that came as the 
‘Manifestos of the China League for the Protection of Civil Rights’202 released in 1932 and 
also in 1933.  These manifestos were jointly drafted by the prominent figures in the political 
and social inner circles that formed the ‘China League for the Protection of Civil Rights.’  
These persons included, among others, Madame Soong Ching-Ling (1893-1981), the 
bereaved wife of Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the prominent writer Hu Shih (1891-1962), 
the highly regarded educator and the former chancellor of Beijing University, Ts'ai 
Yüan-p'ei (1868-1940) and the well-known essayist Lin Yu-tang (1895-1974).  The 
discussant noted that these manifestos were equal to a political response to the 
widespread abuses of human rights perpetrated by the government of the Republic.  Such 
a response was staged by the social elites, not as a grassroots response, nor by a civic 
advocacy group.  The manifestos called for the release of political prisoners and legal 
protection for those in custody due to political dissidence.203  
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Distancing himself from this open confrontational discourse on human rights, an example 
of a more conciliatory approach was introduced by the discussant (CPH) with his 
professional interest in human development policy.  The discussant argued that, quoting 
from an essay on human rights in 1929 titled ‘On Human Rights,’204 human rights is 
perceived as fundamental as ‘to be a person or to become human’205 According to the 
essay writer, the fundamental ingredients of ‘being a person’ lie in nurturing and honouring 
‘individual natures and their personalities.’206  Unless such ‘individual natures and their 
personalities’ are given the chance to develop to the full, the Confucian moral thesis that ‘all 
can become sages’ remains an empty promise.  The real meaning of human rights rests in 
the critical and necessary functions, namely, ‘preservation of life, development of individual 
nature and personality, and attaining of the greatest well-being for the greatest number of 
people.’ 207   The discussant noted that such a view accommodated the democratic 
principles moderated by the dire societal circumstances the nation was under.  
 
Moving away from the political scientist’s view on human rights from the above, now to the 
philosophical notion of the Neo-Confucian School of Yangming,208 a discussant (CAP) with 
his interest in the history of ideas expounded upon what was the view on human rights and 
duties according to the School of Yangming.  The Yangming School advanced the Mencian 
idea of the ‘doctrine of good-knowing or intuitional knowledge.’209  Through this ‘good and 
intuitional knowledge,’ Neo-Confucians approach what is right or wrong and also what 
constitutes public interest or self-centric interest.  Neo-Confucians also refer to the 
concomitance of ‘humaneness and righteousness’210 in their pursuit of genuine Confucian 
humanity.  The discussant offered the view that such Neo-Confucian views embraced by 
the School of Yangming have impacted upon the philosophical underpinnings of the 
East-Asian concept of human rights.  Conversely the Neo-Confucian perception of human 
rights rests on the continuum of ‘humaneness and righteousness,’ applying the ‘good and 
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intuitional knowledge,’ while maintaining the delicate balance between public interest and 
individual interests. 
 
On the matter of the balance of Confucian governance between public interests and 
individual ones, CSS who advises on social welfare policy suggested that realistically it has 
to be reflected in terms of political power-sharing, since human rights equals empowerment 
of people and power-sharing normally occurs amongst equals.  He referred to the concept 
of the ‘revolutionaries and human rights’211 that was shared by the power elites of the 
historical Hsinhai Revolution (1911) that led to the birth of the Republic of China.  CSS 
argued that those revolutionary power elites irrespective of whether they were rightwing or 
leftwing rejected the ‘Heaven-endowed’ or natural human rights. They approved of the 
‘revolutionary people’s rights (koming min-ch’üan),’ whereby ‘only those who participated in 
the revolution are entitled to enjoy revolutionary people’s rights, which are not granted to 
counterrevolutionaries.’212  This sense of revolutionary privileges remained with them when 
they moved the central government in 1949 to the island of Taiwan.  CSS noted that this 
concept of ‘revolutionary people’s rights’ often became a basis of imposing oppressive 
measures over those indigenous Taiwan peoples who are considered at best free-riders on 
the revolution or sympathizers with the enemy, namely, the Japanese imperial government 
of Formosa (1895-1945).     
 
Such ‘revolutionary people’s rights’ and the heavy-handed policies associated with them 
ran into a major conflict with the indigenous population, according to the next discussant 
(CHR) who advises on multi-ethnic human rights.  When the Japanese occupation came to 
an end in 1945, the Governor General and Garrison Commander Ch’en I (1883-1950) took 
control of Taiwan for the Republic of China.  While the so-called ‘Kuomintang 
revolutionaries’ considered the indigenous population as sympathizers with the former 
enemy of Japanese occupation government, the indigenous felt otherwise.  Taiwan under 
Japanese occupation already had an established economic infrastructure of transportation 
and communication, advancement in education and social welfare services such as 
medical services, with the exception of the political rights arena where Japan did not allow 
equality between Japanese and Taiwanese.  CHR held the view that the native Taiwanese 
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considered the invading mainlanders as incompetent, corrupt, immoral, and unrefined. The 
indigenous anger against their authoritarian rule brought about major civil unrest and a 
street protest on 28 February 1947 and in the weeks that followed.  The brutal crackdown 
incurred the casualties of 20,000 people killed or disappeared, including many considered 
the members of the indigenous elite groups.  This incident for the next several decades 
became the cornerstone of the indigenous human rights movement and also for the 
independence of Taiwan that remains the central political issue of the contemporary 
Republic of China until today.  
 
This revolt was also caused by the cultural and religious discontent of the indigenous 
against the military government, according to the next discussant (CAC) who studies 
cross-strait cultures.  When the withdrawal of the mainland government to Taiwan took 
place in December 1949, two million mainlanders joined the indigenous population of 
seven million.  The majority of indigenous Chinese spoke Hokkien (Min-nan dialect) and 
Hakka, whereas the newly arrived mainland government imposed the exclusive official use 
of Mandarin for schools and all social and cultural expressions to the great discontent of the 
indigenous population.  CAC argued that these linguistic and cultural rights have been 
restored with the relaxation of autocratic governance in 1980s.  In 1997, the first 
non-Mandarin broadcasting station began service from the port city of Kaohsiung,213 with 
more non-Mandarin radio broadcasters offering the diverse cultural and political views 
representing the indigenous population and their cultural human rights. 
 
Further to cultural rights, the next discussant (CPE), a public policy-person for an 
indigenous community, commented on civil and political rights  during the ‘martial law era 
(1949-1987)’ enforced on them under the strict justice regime of a military court.  CPE 
observed that the number of court cases involving the indigenous population dealt with 
under such a military justice system came to an approximate total of 10,000 cases.214  He 
argued that a political impetus for indigenous human rights came from the momentous 
episode of the ‘Kaohsiung Incident (1979).’  This incident was triggered by the 
heavy-handed KMT suppression of the anti-KMT political monopoly movement staged by 
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the indigenous elites.  CPE emphasized that this incident was a turning point for the 
democratization of the Republic.  During the incident, arrests of those dissidents were in 
excess of sixty including eight Presbyterian ministers.  One of the defence attorneys for 
those arrested was Ch’en Shui-pien (born 1950) who in 2000 was elected President of the 
Republic and another among the accused and convicted was Annette Lu (born 1944) who 
became Vice President.  As supporters of universal political and cultural human rights, both 
Chun and Lu support the tradition of the Confucian governance ethics and its underlying 
humanism, but place more emphasis on the institutional framework of human rights that 
was lacking under the KMT government.  CPE noted that the international support of the 
indigenous human rights movement was significantly aided by the Presbyterian churches 
of Taiwan.215  The Presbyterian churches had a strong following in the central and southern 
part of the Republic and offered open support for the indigenous movement.  During 1977 
and 1979, Presbyterian churches helped with the opposition’s public reminder of the 
principles of the UN human rights conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) in a direct link with and an open support for the leaders of the ‘Kaohsiung 
Incident’ of 1979.   He argued that the Presbyterian religious position had little conflict with 
the Confucian ethos and humanism as Confucianism was considered a part of the Chinese 
indigenous culture rather than a proselytizing religion.  
 
Such human rights activism during the 1970s through the 1980’s received significant 
support from the ‘women’s right movement,’ such as advanced by the ‘Awakening 
Foundation,’216 according to the next discussant (CPS), a policy-person for alien workers.  
Their activities encompassed women’s health, the revision of family law for gender equality 
and fair election and more public offices open for woman candidates.  Vice President 
Annette Lu also made a contribution by authoring the ‘New Feminism’ in 1989.  CPS noted 
that women rights activism now has a nationwide network and political support from both 
the incumbent and KMT, as they represent a significant electoral constituency. 
 
Further to the civil human rights activism, the community of lawyers came to play an 
important role for human rights, the discussant (CHA) commented, an advocate for human 
rights solidarity.  One of the leading organizations is the ‘Taipei Bar Association.’217  This 
association was formed in 1947 and weathered severe political oppression owing to its role 
                                                
215 Hsiao, Winston 1995, Op. Cit., p. 125 ff. 
216 Annette Lu: <http://www.president.gov.tw/1_vice_president/subject-04ab3.html>, viewed 12 February 2007. 
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  175
in the legal defence of dissidents following the ‘February 28th Incident of 1947.’   With 
martial law coming to an end in 1987, the association assumed a much greater role in 
human rights-related legal services and came to establish in 1990 the ‘Human Rights 
Committee’ under its umbrella.  CHA noted that the Taipei Bar Association is a national 
organization, not just for the Taipei area in spite of its name.  This association and other 
lawyers’ groups launched the ‘Judicial Reform Foundation.’218  CHA informed his group 
that one of the important current projects on the judicial reform movement agenda is the 
abolition of capital punishment in the Republic.  Suggestions about judicial reforms are 
regularly made for the ‘Legislative Yuan’ as the law-making body of the Republic.  He 
argued that such suggestions are particularly well heeded by the incumbent government of 
President Ch’en Shui-pien, since many association members are former colleagues of the 
anti-KMT movement.  CHA also argued that Confucian human concern underlies the legal 
reforms undertaken by such legal elites and organizations.  Through such reforms, it is 
anticipated that human dignity for the indigenous population advances.  
Another discussant (CSS) who advises on social welfare policy observed that, parallel to 
the lawyers’ groups, human rights organizations also emerged in the Republic.   One of the 
leading ones is the ‘Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR).’ 219   The TAHR 
campaigns on the repeal or revision of undemocratic laws and regulations such as the 
National Security Law, the Parade and Assembly Law, the Civic Organizations Law, and 
restrictions on radio broadcasting, all of which continued to arbitrarily deprive people of 
basic civil rights.220  CSS highlighted the interest in the human rights policy shown by the 
government of Ch’en Shui-pien.  After his inauguration in 2000, Ch’en proffered his human 
rights ideal which he termed ‘nation-building through human rights (jen ch’üan likuo).’  One 
of the follow-on actions taken by Ch’en was to organize a legislative study committee with 
the task of drafting the law for eventual establishment of a ‘national human rights 
commission.’  This commission, once installed, would become the permanent central 
organization for the advocacy of human rights in the Republic, commensurate with the 
international human rights conventions.  Since the Republic of China lost its UN 
membership to the People’s Republic of China in 1971, the Republic is under no obligation 
to make governmental reports to the UN human rights organizations.  However, the 
‘Chinese Association for Human Rights (CAHR)’ formed in 1979 in Taiwan produces its 
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annual reports titled the ‘Human Rights Index in Taiwan, the Republic of China.’  It covers 
integral areas of international human rights conventions, i.e., civil and political rights, 
economic and social rights, judicial rights, educational and cultural rights, and women’s 
and children’s rights.221  
 
As regards the Confucian ethical significance of these human rights struggles and current 
developments underway in the Republic, the next discussant (CAS) who studies the social 
cohesion of emerging economies gave an observation.  He referred to the freedom of 
speech as the foremost human right, since this freedom as now enjoyed in Taiwan enables 
people to freely discuss what they perceive are truly human rights and how such rights 
reflect their values including the Confucian ethos and humanism they cherish.  He also 
quoted the words of Hu Ping (born 1947) an international human rights advocate: 
‘Freedom of speech is the foremost form of human rights.’  CAS observed that the current 
activism around the institution-building underway with some success is exactly what the 
leading neo-Confucian scholars wanted to see happen to the Confucian heritage of 
humanism.  He also argued that freedom of speech advances the Confucian governance 
ideal of the ‘sages within, kings without (neisheng wei wang).’  Freedom of speech as the 
hallmark of democracy and development of science were those key ingredients that the 
Neo-Confucian scholars on Confucian governance such as Mou Tungsan (1909-1995)222 
felt as the most necessary amelioration upon the legacy of Confucian humanism and 
governance.  CAS noted that the democratic advances in the Republic also proved the 
‘Asian value argument’ wrong that favoured any benevolent Confucian autocracy.  
Economic and social rights can not substitute for civil and political rights as both are 
integral parts of human rights seen also from the context of Confucian governance, as CAS 
quoted the words of a neo-Confucian doyen on governance Carsun Chang (1887-1969)223 
who also played an eminent role in the drafting of the current Constitution of the Republic in 
1947. 
 
Sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 as above have summarised the discussants’ views on the 
question, ‘Does Confucian humanism advance governance such as the observance of 
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human rights?’ Confucian humanism faced severe challenges in Korea, where Confucian 
governance has been politicised by the sovereigns and Confucian political elites in history, 
facing near total rejection during the modernization processes.  The current liberal political 
process of the very young contemporary Korean democracy prompted fresh looks at their 
own philosophical underpinnings moored around the legacy of Confucianism.  This interest 
also brings up questions as to whether Confucian governance is compatible with the 
modern democratic institutions such as the human rights regimes.  Japan of the Tokugawa 
era saw its shogun’s court embrace orthodox Confucianism as the political support for and 
moral legitimacy of their rule.  A host of prominent Neo-Confucian scholars favoured the 
more egalitarian school of the Neo-Confucian tradition. Japanese Neo-Confucians 
advanced the Japanese proper Neo-Confucian tradition of Yōmeigaku. Their emphasis 
was placed upon the learning about the ‘mind and heart (shingaku)’ in step with the 
evolution of Zen Buddhism and Shinto-ism among others.  Meiji era modernization and 
post-WWII liberal democratic institutions have not completed the project of modern human 
rights observance on par with the international conventions on human rights.  Since the late 
1990s, the civic community and government of Japan embarked upon the decade-long 
nationwide education program for human rights in step with the UN agenda.  The Republic 
of China on the other hand has upheld Confucian learning as part of the national learning 
agenda since 1949 consistent with the political agenda of KMT.  KMT imposed martial law 
during 1948-1986 leaving the human rights discourse tightly under the control of the 
autocratic government.  With the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the historic switch of 
power in 2000 to the opposition representing indigenous Taiwanese elites, human rights 
advancement was given a new momentum.  Human rights advocate-turned Ch’en 
Shui-pien as the head of the state, the Republic is on the path to a more mature democratic 
nation. This advance in democratic institutions and the concurrent development in science 
that translates into economic prosperity also represent what the Neo-Confucian scholars 
previously advocated as the way Confucian humanism and governance should be 
heading.   
 
Having summarized the discussants’ views as above on Confucian governance and its 
implications on human rights, this chapter now moves on to the next question as to whether 
Confucian humanism fosters economic ethics.  Economic ethics will be seen on the 
continuum of human rights in the context of Confucian humanism.  Economics ethics is not 
about ethical conduct or otherwise in the competitive profit-driven market economy.  
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Economic ethics to be discussed will be about the Confucian ethics in the economic 
landscapes. 
 
3.5 CONFUCIAN HUMANISM AND ECONOMIC ETHICS 
 
Further to the discussants’ views on Confucian humanism, governance and human rights, 
the next summary of discussants’ views relates to economic ethics.  Each national group 
was asked to respond to the question, ‘Does Confucian humanism foster economic 
ethics?’  
 
In the discussion of economic ethics, focus was placed neither on the micro-behavioural 
economic ethics such as corporate governance, nor on ethical in-market conduct in the 
competitive profit-driven market economy.  Economic ethics in this chapter will be on the 
continuum of human rights in the context of Confucian humanism.  Discussants’ views on 
economic ethics summarized hereunder are about how Confucian humanism plays out in 
the economic domains as expressions of human rights.  In relating to economic ethics 
about Korea, Japan and the Republic of China, discussants paid special attention to the 
acute global dilemma of ecology and environment.  While the three nations play significant 
roles as global economic players, they are also perceived as potential contributors to the 
cost to nature or conversely those who can contribute towards prevention of such cost 
incurred on nature due to their economic activity.  In the context of Confucian humanism, 
the discussants’ views on economic ethics remained broadly on the same continuum of 
human rights.   
 
The first discussant (KPE) working as an economic development planner offered the 
view that contemporary Korea should reconsider the economic ethical paradigm 
based on the so-called ‘homo-centrism.’  According to him, the end is nearing fast to 
the ethical thesis that man is superior to nature and economic development is the 
productive endeavour by the superior beings subjecting nature to the process of 
‘creative destruction.’224  Nature is finite, whereas the appetite for economic growth 
remains insatiable.  He believes that the Confucian ethical tradition and its 
humanism based on the ‘human-to-nature unity’ should play a role in restoring the 
                                                
224 Schumpeter, J. A. 1991, ‘Introduction’, in The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism, Swedberg, R ed., Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
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balance to the already endangered lack of equilibrium between nature as the abode 
of all life forms including humans, and humans themselves. 
 
On the ‘homo-centric’ economic ethic orientation, the next discussant (KSS) who 
advises a citizens' coalition for economic justice referred to it as the fundamental traits of 
the Enlightenment and its ongoing impacts on the processes of modernization.  He argued 
that, in contrast to the Judeo-Christian perception of nature as the resource for humans, 
Confucians, Buddhists and Taoists would consider nature as the very source where the 
humans come from.  He also argued that Confucian East-Asia faces the dilemma between 
the quests for economic development under the influence of the Enlightenment ideals and 
the Confucian ethical grounding in the unity of human and nature.  Confucian humanism is 
profoundly committed to seeing humans flourish.  Such flourishing, however, is 
conditioned upon the ethical and intellectual maturing process of self-cultivation, the 
embracing of our broader selves in the social community and nation, and finally finding 
the unity with the Heaven and the earth.  He held the view that the rediscovery of such 
Confucian nexus of the inclusive humanism beyond humans alone would be the first 
step in the direction of righting the ecological and environmental ills that economic 
centrism had wrought on nature.  
 
As regards the tension between the economic centrism and the Confucian cosmology 
with nature as the source of all living forms including humans, the third discussant 
(KAC) who researches in cultural history referred to the thought of the leading 
Neo-Confucian scholar Yi Yulgok (1536-1584) of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) in Korea.  
Yi’s cosmology built around the ‘united theory of material force’225 continues to have an 
influence upon the Confucian intellectual community of contemporary Korea.  He is 
known for having brought the ‘material force’ as the connective cosmological link 
between all beings.  KAC argued that such ‘material force,’ according to Yi, constitutes 
a foundation for all ecosystems, allowing for a place for both humanity and all other 
entities.226  This view of Yi’s was shared by Kaibara Ekken (1630–1714) of the Tokugawa 
era (1600-1864) in Japan.  The Confucian theory of the ‘united material force’ owes its 
intellectual indebtedness to the teachings of Chou Tun-yi (1017-1073) of the Northern 
Sung dynasty (960-1127) in China.  KAC also argued that Chou’s idea helped develop the 
                                                
225 ch’i (ki in Korean: material force, ether or force) 
226 Ro, Young-chan 1989, The Korean Neo-Confucianism of Yi Yulgok, SUNY Press, Albany, pp. 15-36. 
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Neo-Confucian social principle of ‘man and nature,’ offering a path for a new 
economic ethics and a fresh paradigm on ecology fitting the modern context.  
     
As regards a fresh ethical outlook on economy and ecology, the fourth discussant 
(JCG) who advises on the corporate governance of Japanese enterprises brought up 
the teachings by Ishida Baigan (1685-1744). 227   Baigan was a renowned 
Neo-Confucian leader who started the Sekimon School of Learning of the Mind 
(Sekimon Shingaku).  Baigan was active as an educator of the ‘townsmen (chōnin)’ 
who played the central economic role as trade persons in commerce and industry of 
the Tokugawa era in Japan.  His economic principle was enshrined in a simple 
dictum: ‘Conduct the trade with the Confucian Analects in one hand and the abacus 
in another.’  JCG argued that, according to Baigan, the success of Confucian 
economic conduct lies not in the blind pursuit of profits, but in the Confucian 
self-realization through exercise of Confucian economic ethics that Baigan equated 
to the seeking of the Way.      
 
Further to Confucian ethics in relation to economic engagement, particularly impacting 
upon nature, another discussant (JPE) who advises on policy for sustainable economic 
development argued that the Confucian outlook on the ‘things in nature’ goes beyond the 
‘shallow engagement’ in pursuit of self-interest for wellbeing or affluence.   The Great 
Learning, an integral Confucian canon, teaches that investigation into ‘things’ in nature 
would lead to the extension of knowledge and wisdom.228  As such from the Son of Heaven 
down to the mass of the people, all students of Confucian teachings must consider the 
cultivation of the person through such a wisdom-building investigation.  The Taoist canon, 
the ‘Way to True Morality (Tao Te Ching),’229 also refers to Tao or the Way lying in the 
understanding that ‘all things and selves belong to the same Mother of the universe, 
with differences remaining merely in names.’  JPE argued that this philosophy of nature 
supports the so-called ‘deep ecology.’230  The ‘deep ecology’ differs from the ‘shallow 
ecology’ that caters to the short-term remedy for the damages that have already 
occurred to the ecology.  JPE further argued that the ‘deep ecology’ starts from the 
                                                
227 Tsuchiya, Takao 2002, Nihon keiei rinenshi (The History of Japanese Management Thoughts), Reitaku University 
Publishers, Kashiwa City, pp. 139-169.   
228 Legge, James 1970, Op. Cit., vol. 1(the Great Learning), pp. 356-360. 
229 Lao Tzu 2001, Tao Te Ching (the Way of True Morality): the definitive edition, Star, Jonathan, trans., Jeremy P. 
Tarcher/Putnam, New York, pp. 14-15. 
230 Foundation for Deep Ecology, <http://www.deepecology.org/directory.html>, viewed 17 February 2007. 
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understanding that every human, all life forms and every ‘thing in nature’ share the 
same motherhood.  The ‘deep ecology’ is about re-anchoring the economic ethics of 
nature for the long term or putting no limit to the time requirement.  
 
Further to the moral grounding about the ethical outlook on nature, one discussant (JAE) 
who researches in sustainable capitalism of the new millennia brought up the aspect of 
Confucian and Taoist aesthetics about nature.  From the outlook of Confucian and Taoist 
aesthetics, the harmony of beauty inherent in nature is the ultimate purpose in itself.231  It 
contrasts with the view that nature can be taken advantage of for human satisfaction and 
self-interest.  He referred to the Japanese practice of gardening as a practical example of 
aesthetic appreciation and an abiding ethos of being in oneness with nature.  Confucianism 
and Buddhism influenced the Japanese native concept of nature that bore a distinct 
attribute of animist naturalism.  According to the ancient belief in Japan, the nature has its 
own life and is inhabited with kami’s (gods).  The aesthetic and quasi-religious zeal in the 
creation of aesthetically superior gardens and realization of a small heaven on earth 
distinguishes the Japanese sense of honoring nature and its beauty.  The most prominent 
garden in Japan Kōrakuen was an outcome of such a sentiment by Tokugawa Mitsukuni 
(1628-1701), a Confucian scholar son of the then reigning shōgun.  The garden that set the 
model for gardening henceforth for posterity also included in it a rice paddy in order to 
remind the sovereigns of the hardship that the farmers undergo.  Such a Confucian ethical 
reminder to the sovereigns of the people’s pain in the midst of aesthetic pleasure is 
consistent with the teachings of Mencius.  A Confucian scholar-official, Fan Chungyen 
(989-1052) of the Northern Sung dynasty, is known to have given a similar admonition to 
those in the governing position.   Fan’s words of compassion were cherished by Tokugawa 
Mitsukuni when he created his garden.  The admonition was: ‘Feel worried before the 
nation (t’ienhsia) starts to worry, and feel happy after the nation (t’ienhsia) is happy.’232  
JAE argued that Confucian economic governance implies living and flourishing with nature 
in terms of empathetic ethos, ethics and aesthetics at heart as well beyond the physical 
world. 
 
                                                
231 Lao Tzu 2001, Op. Cit., pp. 19-22. 
232 Fan Chungyen (989-1052) made the statement that was quoted in his work, Yüeh-yang Lou Chi.  This work of his is 
quoted at the ‘Shengyan Xuetang (the Study Resources of Sacred Classic Texts)’, 
http://www.fainfo.com/puton/lang/lang13/lang131.asp, viewed 18 February 2007. 
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 On the alarming destruction of the ecology, the next discussant (JTS) who advises on 
industry strategy commented that the community of industries had also responded and 
expressed their commitment to arresting the speedy downturn in the global environment.  
One noteworthy course of action came through their proclamation of the ‘Caux Round 
Table Principles for Business.’233  The Caux Round Table is an outgrowth from the concept 
of kyōsei (symbiotic coexistence),234 - industry, society and nature should coexist within a 
symbiotic harmony.  The Round Table Principles released in 1994 as one of the global 
ethical benchmarks for sustainable industry has the so-called ‘Principle 6. Respect for the 
Environment’: ‘A business should protect and, where possible, improve the environment, 
promote sustainable development, and prevent the wasteful use of natural resources.’  JTS 
argued that, while industry has a long way to go to be fully committed to the preservation of 
nature and ecology as their highest priority, industry leaders of non-socialist Confucian 
East Asia acknowledged the severity of the global ecological crisis and the role of industry 
and its economic ethics.  Unlike some leading industrial nations that continue to oppose the 
Kyoto Protocol frequently under pressure from local industry, Korea and Japan joined the 
protocol.  He also argued that, in rallying international support for this convention, namely, 
the Kyoto Protocol, Japan played a leading role with the implicit support of and no overt 
resistance by local industry.  
 
As regards the support for the Kyoto Protocol coming from the economic sector, the 
following discussant (JPR) who advises on the new millennia innovation policy expounded 
on the critical role played in this regard by the Federation of Economic Organization 
(Keidanren).235  He argued that this federation is imbued with the Confucian economic 
ethics of conducting the business or other economic affairs not only in the self-interest, but 
also in the broader interest of the extended family, i.e., the nation, hence nicknamed the 
‘Japan Inc.’  The Federation offered its official support for the ‘United Nation Framework 
Convention on Climate Change’236 that sponsors the Kyoto Protocol.  The Federation 
made public their support through its declaration in 2005 titled the ‘Need to Develop a New 
International Framework to Prevent Climate Change.’ 237   JPR also argued that the 
                                                
233 Steiner, GA & Steiner, JF 2006, Business, government, and Society, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, New York, p. 133. 
234 Frederick, RE ed. 2002, A Companion to Business Ethics, Blackwell Publishing, London, pp. 234, 374, 379. 
235 Keidanren (The Nippon Federation of Economic Organizations or the Japanese Business Federation), 
<http://www.keidanren.or.jp>, viewed 21 February 2007.  
236The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), <http://unfccc.int/2860.php>, viewed 21 
February 2007.  
237 Keidanren (The Nippon Federation of Economic Organizations or the Japanese Business Federation), Op. Cit. 
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Confucian ethical ethos was implicit in the undercurrent of this major step forward from 
their traditional conservative position about installing a new regulatory framework that 
could potentially regulate their own economic activities worldwide.  He also observed that, 
while the Confucian ethical practices in the close-knit government-business relationship 
often chose loyalty or national interest over universal Confucian humanism or benevolence, 
this decision both by the government of Japan hand in hand with their key economic 
organization sets a new record as an important reversal.  
 
As regards the enlightened view on the ecology held by those in the industrial sector, 
another discussant (CPR) who is a policy-person for a global innovation network offered a 
view on the sustainability of nature as the principal capital.  He argued that Confucian 
economic ethics calls for a new paradigm, based on the Confucian teachings about the 
unity of Confucian cosmology, philosophy and ethics and ecology.  The new paradigm 
would be that the environment and natural assets are capital rather than expendable 
resources.   Since nature is the principle and the base capital for the survival of all lives, 
Confucian economic ethics, according to this new paradigm, would serve as a reminder 
that the capital is to be preserved for good, and humans are to live on its interest only.  CPR 
also argued that economic interests should not dictate over nature any process of 
unstoppable declines or irreversible destruction.  He added that Confucian teachings on 
leading the thrifty and simpler life help maintain non-agonistic relationship with nature.     
 
In terms of humans’ perception and relationship with nature, the next discussant (CAP) 
who researches in Asian philosophies observed that the Confucian views were 
substantially influenced by Taoism, Buddhism and ancient Vedic belief tradition.  He 
touched on the Buddhist view on the close relationship between the ‘changeability of 
nature (aniccā)’238 and human morality.  Buddhism views changeability as the perennial 
principle of nature.’  CAP referred to a commentary on the Buddhist canon 
Cakkavattisīihanāda Sutta that reads:  
 
‘When humankind is demoralized through greed, famine is the natural outcome. When 
moral degeneration is due to ignorance, epidemic is the inevitable result. When hatred 
is the demoralizing force, wide-spread violence is the ultimate outcome.  If and when 
mankind realizes that large scale devastation has taken place as a result of moral 
                                                
238 aniccā: Pali term for ‘changeability of the nature. 
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degeneration, a change of heart takes place among the few surviving human 
beings.’239   
 
CAP argued that such interweaving of cosmology, ethics and ecology in terms of relational 
and processive values is shared by Chan or Zen Buddhists and also by Taoists.  
 
Parallel to the non-agonistic religious view on nature and economic ethics, one discussant 
(CHR), as a policy-person for multi-ethnic human rights, advanced a ‘non-violence’ pacifist 
view on nature.  CHR referred to the thought of the prominent Neo-Confucian scholar Mou 
Tsung-san (1909-1995) and his discourse on the ‘fundamental trait of 
concern-consciousness.’240  Mou expanded on the teachings of the Doctrine of the Mean 
(Chung yung) to elucidate upon the Confucian consciousness of and sympathy with the 
intrinsic value of nature.  According to Mou, this Confucian ‘concern-consciousness’ 
upholds the fundamental human trait and intent to preserve and enhance nature towards 
human flourishing.  Mou also asserted that the Confucian inclusive ‘concern-conscious’ 
humanism has been significantly influenced by the relational patterns shown in the 
Classics of Changes (I Ching).  CHR argued that such Confucian spiritual conformance 
also resonates with the principles of ‘non-violence (ahimsa)’ and the ‘persistent quest for 
truth (satyagraha)’ that permeated and encouraged the peaceful resistance movement of 
the indigenous people of the Republic of China during Japanese imperial rule (1895-1945) 
and that of KMT government (1945-1990).  CHR also argued that such Confucian 
‘concern-consciousness’ is evident in the exercise of Confucian rites, and, through such 
rites, the ‘concern-consciousness’ translates into compassionate social economic 
practices and also gentle and sustainable interactions with nature.  He added that the 
intrinsic value of nature as upheld by the Confucian teachings should replace the 
instrumental value of nature held by those economic centrists in order to reverse the 
dangerous decline in global ecology.  
 
As a further support for the rediscovery of Confucian intrinsic value in nature, another 
discussant (CTS) who advises on advancement of the research and development referred 
to the public dialogue that had taken place in 1999 between the leading two prominent 
                                                
239 The Journal of Buddhist Ethics, <http://www.buddhistethics.org/10/deegalle-sri-lanka-conf.html>, viewed 21 February 
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Confucian scholars of China and Japan, i.e., Chang Tanien (1909-2004) and Okada 
Takehiko (born 1908).  The conversations proceeded under the title ‘Simplicity and 
Harmony at the Doorstep of the New Millennia, moving from Confrontation to the Great 
Commonwealth.’241  As the title suggests, both scholars strongly felt it necessary to 
rediscover and reinforce Confucian dignity through leading simple lives, ridding of modern 
materialism and economic centrism, returning to the intrinsic values repositioning humans 
in harmony with nature.  CTS argued that this call to return to the fundamental Confucian 
ethics and ‘respond (ying)’ to both ‘natural order (t'ien-li)’ and ‘moral order (tao-li).’   He 
further argued that the Confucian ideal of the Great Commonwealth (ta-t’ung) does not lie 
in building another empire at the expense of the human and natural capitals, but lies in 
realization of the harmony and unity amongst the humans with nature, i.e., the ‘Heaven and 
the Earth (t’ien-hsia).’  
 
Regarding the balance between human and natural capital, the following discussant (CPS) 
who serves as a social policy-person for multi-ethnic work forces extended the view that 
realization of the harmony between humans and nature is in fact a universal ideal shared 
by the so-called ‘conservationists or the preservationists’, irrespective of religious or 
philosophical persuasions or national origins.  Azuma Ryōzo (1879-1980) who led the 
induction of the national parks program in Japan to preserve pristine natural condition was 
in fact inspired to do so by his mentor John Muir (1838-1914). The two dedicated 
preservationist friends supported each other in ecological philosophy and moral support 
from their own origins of tradition. Azuma loved to quote Muir, when he said:  
‘Why should man value himself as more than a small part of the one great unit of 
creation? And what creature of all that the Lord has taken the pains to make is not 
essential to the completeness of that unit - the cosmos? The universe would be 
incomplete without man; but it would also be incomplete without the smallest 
trans-microscopic creature that dwells beyond our conceited eyes and knowledge.’ 242   
CPS argued that the economic ethics expressed in the global ecological crises is on the 
same plane as the human rights struggle.  As the drafting process of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights engaged the East-Asian participation, the climate change 
protocols under the ‘UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’ including the ‘Kyoto 
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Protocol’ have engaged the East-Asia partners such as Japan and Korea.  He maintained 
that, for love of nature, there is no boundary of any kind.  
 
The above summary under the heading of 3.5 reflects the discussants’ views on the 
Confucian humanism and its relation to economic ethics.  Discussions were triggered by 
the question ‘Does Confucian humanism foster economic ethics?’  Economic ethics has 
been looked at as a nature-bound extension of Confucian humanism as opposed to the 
human rights as human bound extension of Confucian humanism.  Discussants’ views 
about the Confucian governance and ethics in economic conduct devoted substantial 
attention to the global ecological crisis and what Confucian economic ethics and worldview 
could offer in contrast to the Enlightenment values that faced the criticism of being 
instrumentally oriented in terms of its economic centrism.  Confucianism or its humanism 
was and is human centred with broadly defined non-agonistic moral emphasis on the unity 
and harmony of human to nature as a part of Confucian cosmogony and cosmology.  
Confucians, however, are awakened to their moral realization facing the destruction of the 
nature as the abode of humans and all life.  Confucian East-Asia countries as economic 
actors as well as major influencers on the well-being of the global ecology are at the 
crossroad whether to restore and live the teachings of Confucian humanism inclusive of the 
‘concern-consciousness’ for nature or otherwise.  A Korean discussant was critical of the 
contemporary market economy-driven ‘homo-centrism’ and its dangerous ecological 
implications.  He referred to the teaching of the Korean Neo-Confucian doyen Yi Yulgok on 
the ‘material force’ being the connective cosmological link between all beings.  A 
Japanese discussant referred to the Tokugawa era of Japan in its pragmatic reference 
to ethical economic conduct with ‘daily co-use of the Analects and abacus.’  Merchants 
were taught to equate their trading acts to seeking of the Way.  Re-anchoring economic 
ethics in nature is said to necessitate a long-term deeper moral commitment, namely, 
‘deep ecology.’  An aesthetic outlook on nature focussed on the love of nature was 
also advanced.  Industry response to the global challenges in terms of economic 
ethics came through their global ‘Roundtable’ that included the clause for ecological 
concerns.  Industry in Japan collectively offered their ‘conditional support’ for the UN 
climate change conventions.  A discussant from the Republic of China advanced the 
notion of nature being the principal capital to be preserved for good, not for living off 
it.  The pacifist view of non-violence interaction with nature was also advanced. Such 
pacifists viewed the natural order and the moral order on the same continuum as 
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advocated in the Buddhist, Taoist and Confucian traditions.  Another discussant 
pointed out the universality of the ethical concern and love of nature, irrespective of 
the national boundaries or cultural background by quoting an episode of friendship 
between leading Japanese and American conservationists.  
   
In discussion of economic ethics so far, focus has been placed on how economic ethics as 
a part of Confucian governance plays out in the economic domains, in particular, facing the 
global ethical challenge of the ecological crisis.  Economic ethics was an ethical expression 
of Confucian humanism as was the human rights.  Having summarized the three nations’ 
perception of economic ethics and their ethical roles as global economic players, 
discussions moved to the next and last segment of the chapter on the question of whether 
Confucian humanism including human rights and economic ethics are compatible with the 
globalizing civil society.  
 
3.6 GLOBAL CONFUCIAN HUMANISM  
 
The above segment of the chapter has been about how discussants view Confucian 
humanism and its ideals and concerns about economic ethics in relation to the three 
contemporary East-Asian nations.  Some discussants already had expressed unequivocal 
views about what and how Confucian humanism can do and should do to address the 
ethical challenges such as the global environmental crisis.  In this segment, a summary has 
been made below of the responses to the next question on the global context of Confucian 
humanism.  Responses are to the specific question: ‘Is Confucian humanism compatible 
with the ideals and concerns of globalizing civil society, especially in terms of human rights 
and economic ethics such as over the global ecological crisis? ’ 
 
Civil society as the society of Confucian civility is of direct concern to Confucian humanism. 
Its interest and concerns rest with whether such civil society represents the integral values 
of Confucian humanism such as humanity, civility, interconnectedness, reciprocity, 
communitarian interest at heart, and responsible cultivated ‘ideal persons.’ 243   The 
globalization of civil society poses a fresh question to Confucian humanism if the new 
global nexus accompanies new sources of strengths that Confucians sought after, such as 
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democratic institutions and advancement of science.  Discussions have been centred on 
what is perceived the three fundamental ingredients of civil society in the global context, 
namely, democratic polity, civil capitalism and the rule of law.    
 
The first discussant (KTI) who consults enterprises about innovation cited the 1990s 
transition of Korea as an example of Confucian humanism making a shift through the 
dynamics of democratization and globalization of civil institutions.  Politically, Korea shifted 
from military autocracy to a freely elected democratic government in 1992.  Economically, 
Korea ranked as the 11th largest economy in the world by 1996 and joined the so-called 
‘rich country club’ of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
in the same year.  But the euphoria about the newly gained democracy and prosperity was 
short-lived, since in the very next year of 1997, Korean was plunged into the so-called 
‘Asian Financial Crisis’ that was perceived as the most serious national crisis since the 
Korean War (1950-1953).  Confucianism came under fresh attack.  Confucian governance 
was accused of being at the backdrop of Korean status quo and standards, no longer 
compatible with the global norms that Korea has newly subjected herself to.  KTI, however, 
argued that the ‘Asian Crisis’ was in fact a blessing in disguise.  Korea not only burst her 
‘bubbles,’ but also had a chance to consolidate her ‘bubble-like’ institutions that have 
remain impervious to the calcified rigidity with market, education, media, bureaucracy and 
all forms of social and institutional exchanges that require accountability.  He further 
argued that a sustainable civil society emerged in Korea, ironically through this major 
all-compassing crisis, whereas, on the surface, it was seen as a crisis of finance. 
 
On the institutional rigidity as the culprit of the Korean scenario of the Asian Crisis, the next 
discussant (KTS) as a political economist and industrial strategist quoted other critical 
impediments unique to Korea on her path to a global civil society.  The first impediment is 
the division of the peninsula and the continued Cold War legacy of ideological tension 
between the South and the North of Korea.  In South Korea, there is another major political 
impediment of ‘regionalism.’  Korean regionalism originated from the factional struggles in 
history between the Eastern and the Western parts of South Korea.  The Eastern part, i.e., 
Kyŏngsang province, produced the largest number of Confucian scholar-officials during 
Koryŏ dynasty (935-1392) and Yi dynasty (1392-1910), and dominated Korean politics.  
This dominance from the standpoint of the Western part, i.e., Chŏlla province, was 
considered an exclusion of the Western part from fair opportunities of participation in 
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national politics that also equaled to unfair access to power and wealth.  KTS emphasized 
the severity of such regional division which was imbued with inflammatory emotions.  It 
took a half century since the Republic of Korea came into being in 1948 to allow the free 
election of the first non-Eastern national leader from this disadvantaged Western part.  The 
Western born Kim Dae-Jung (presidency 1998-2002) was the symbolic figure finally 
vindicating the long held bitterness of the West.   KTS observed that the North-South and 
the East-West splits continue to exert substantial negative influence on the development of 
a global civil society, since any policy agenda advanced by one part is usually seen with 
suspicion by another part.  
 
As regards any possible remedy to the regional division, the third discussant (KAE) who 
advises on the development of the next generation digital system commented on the role of 
the ‘networked citizenship.’  He expounded upon the emergence of the networked 
citizenship known as the ‘Netizens,’ i.e., networked citizens, as a significant political and 
social platform closely related to the globalization of civic participation and empowerment 
of hitherto apolitical citizens, particularly of youth.  KAE argued that the Korean experiment 
of network democracy has major political implications.  Networked citizens operate their 
own electronic mass media with participation of a large number of e-reporters, e-advocates 
and e-civic service volunteers such as ‘Oh My News.’ 244   Such media topped the 
conventional media majors in the last presidential election campaign and brought the last 
upset victory to the underdog candidate Roh Muhyŏn (incumbent president 2002-2007 
terms).  KAE also noted that such interconnectedness of high-speed internet available to 
Korean citizens at affordable cost helps bring closer those areas with ‘distances of hearts.’   
 
On the contribution of the networked citizenry to a globalizing civil society, another 
discussant (KMC) who works as a civic volunteer for participatory democracy expressed 
substantial reservations.  He agreed to the value of immediacy and transparency of the 
e-media, but he also believed that the e-media also helped deepen the paradox of the 
so-called ‘identity politics’245 and reinforced the old division.  Since Korean e-media is 
almost immediately translated online into  multi-lingual options, most popular ones being 
Chinese, Japanese and  English, contents often inflame nationalist or xenophobic 
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sentiments among neighboring countries and also from those with different identities such 
as ‘Chinese Koreans’ from Northern China working in Korea as guest workers or refugees 
from North Korea.  KMC argued that networked citizens are deeply divided over the 
defense alliance with the US and its influence on humanitarian support for North Korea. 
Such matters closely relate to Korean identity politics.  Nationalist sentiment resents the 
so-called ‘end-ism’ represented by the ‘triumph of liberal democracy,’ where Americanism 
looms large.246  Conversely, most nationalistic Koreans believe that the US, despite its role 
in introducing liberal democracy to Korea, is singularly responsible for division of the 
Korean peninsula.  On the other hand, liberal market-loving Koreans tend to credit the US 
for security and access for market and capital that helped create the Korean economic 
success.  KMC noted that, in terms of Confucian humanity and civility, this 
interconnectedness and instant reciprocity of community communication helped in 
highlighting the communitarian interest, but seldom succeeded in warming the hearts, 
much less creditable for help in grooming the Confucian ‘responsible cultivated ideal 
persons.’ 
 
Further to the ‘networked-ness’ of contemporary Korea, the following discussant (KPE) 
who works as an economic policy planner highlighted the global dependency of the Korean 
economy.  He quoted the external trade of Korea as the percentile of Gross National 
Product averages 70 per cent for the last decade.247  In a nutshell, the Korean economy 
survives through buying and selling with the rest of the world.  Hence, globalization of 
Korea inevitably occurred with her economy first. Globalization of civil society did not 
happen automatically thereafter, since the autocratic military government also heavily 
depended on their economical credential for the legitimacy of their forceful perpetuation of 
their rule.  KPE argued that Kim Dae-Jung government as a civilian government had no 
choice but to uphold ‘market economy and democracy’ for their so-called ‘participatory 
democracy.248 Kim’s recipe for globalizing Korean civil society was ‘bourgeois democracy’ 
basing its political centre-weight upon the prosperous middle class and liberal democratic 
model compatible with the global mainstream.249  KPE also argued that Kim’s globalization 
was intended not on the weakening of the nation state of Korea, but instead on its 
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strengthening through marrying the strength of Confucian and other traditions with the 
institutional advantages.  
 
On the question of the Kim Dae-Jung model of democracy, the next discussant (KTS) who 
works as an advisor for industrial policy strategy highlighted the ‘porosity’ of the globalizing 
Korean politics and its susceptibility to geopolitics.  Kim’s so-called ‘Sun-Shine Policy’ of 
warming up to the Stalinist North Korea with economic and humanitarian aid was severely 
criticized by the right-wing. KTS argued that domestic conservatives and global 
Neo-conservatives succeeded in the substantially downgrading of Kim’s political legitimacy 
despite recognition by the Nobel Prize Committee with the Peace Prize of 2000.  Ironically, 
his presidency was recognized for the economic turn-around of Korea by successfully and 
speedily surmounting the Financial Crisis of 1997-2000 working side by side with the heavy 
handed International Monetary Fund, whereas his long cherished political ambition was to 
overcome the Cold War status quo of the North-South division.  KTS also argued that his 
momentous contribution to installing the National Human Rights   Commission for the first 
time in the history of Korea was compromised by the global events such as the Cold 
War-like confrontation between the US and North Korea on the nuclear issues.  He 
observed that the context and conditions of Korean civil society is both globally and locally 
determined, as her economy is.  KTS believed that the Korean global civil society project is 
experiencing severe ‘hong’yǒk (measles)’ in its transition from the Confucian society 
towards a global civil society.   process undergoes the pressure of globalization through 
emergence of multiple identities heretofore insignificant, now vying for fresh legitimacy.  
The challenges riding on the global wind call for gender equality, religious openness, 
cultural and ethnic diversity, and contra-regionalism.250 
 
On the Korean ‘democratization measles,’ the discussant (KAS) as a sociologist held the 
view that the Korean democratization process of 1987-2006 has been a change in ‘political 
identity’ only to liberal democracy, but with ‘no qualitative shift in content.’   KAS indicated 
that the Korean Confucian ethos has been resistant to the complete separation of power 
amongst the three branches of government that became separate and independent 
according to the democratic principle of ‘checks and balances,’ but became all too 
combative to the Korean Confucian ethos.  He noted that democratically elected presidents, 
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such as Kim Youngsam (presidency 1993-1998), Kim Dae-Jung (presidency 1998-2002) 
and Roh Mu-hyun (presidency 2003-current) after the first year of the so-called 
‘honeymoon period’ consistently suffered low popularity, and often under-rated less than 
autocratic military presidents.251  KAS assumed that institutional change in terms of political 
identity took place in 1987-2006 periods, but mass politics and their ethos may require a 
generation to digest the qualitative change.  
 
On the generational shift of democratization, the next discussant (KHA) who volunteers for 
human rights advocacy offered a view at a substantial distance from the former discussant.   
He took up the example of civic movements by non-government voluntary organizations 
that became the backbone of the fast-track democratization of Korea.  KHA argued that the 
democratization of Korea from 1987 onward is not an abrupt one or accident.  It is a result 
of a long persistent fight for democracy by civic organizations throughout 1961-1987 when 
military governments had had dominance over Korean politics.   He also argued that the 
social legitimacy of the democratic civic movements combined with the rising standard of 
living and education engendering higher expectation from what people perceived as the 
civil and civilized society became the main driver for the democracy beyond the already 
global economy of Korea. He indicated that the major drawbacks on Korean political 
progress are, firstly, the ‘boss-centered dysfunctional party politics’ that has not change 
much since the autocratic era, and secondly, the ‘regional politics’ and hierarchical rigidity 
often blamed on the Confucian tradition.  
 
On the Confucian challenge of social rigidity, another discussant (KPH) who advises on the 
policy of human resource development indicated that the issue of gender equality in Korea 
remains the foremost challenge facing Korea on its path to a global civil or civilized society.  
He advised that the Korean civic movement works hand in hand with the global 
organizations of gender equality advocacy.  The Korean government and society have 
been repeatedly reminded of the slow progress Korea has made in its ‘gender 
empowerment measure.’252  KPH emphasized that Korean democratization pattern of 
‘learning by doing’ could very well speed up the remedying of gender disparity by quoting 
the emergence of top woman political figures such as Han Myŏng-suk and Park Geun-hye. 
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Han Myŏng-suk (born 1944) has been the incumbent prime minister of Korea since 2006 
and Park Geun-hye born in 1952 as the daughter of ex-president Park Chung-hee 
(presidency 1961-1979) is the leader of the conservative political party and a top contender 
for 2008 presidential election.  He argued that, once Korean ethos accepts womanhood as 
compatible with national leadership, gender inequality, consistently accused of as the last 
negative vestige of Confucian legacy, may even disappear.  KPH also argued that Korean 
politics came increasingly under the influence of global politics, and major female 
politicians in friendly countries such as Margaret Thatcher (prime minister of the UK 
1979-1990), Angela Dorothea Merkel (incumbent chancellor of Germany) and the current 
US presidential candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton (born 1947) are exerting an indirect 
influence on the gender politics of Korea.  He observed that Confucian humanism would 
not diminish due to the emergence of woman empowerment.  Instead, correction of gender 
inequality would be a major success of the contemporary Neo-Confucian project of 
transforming itself as compatible with the globalizing civil society. 
 
As regards whether such political and institutional democratization in Korea remains 
related to Confucian humanism, the next discussant (KAH) who researches and teaches 
social theory offered a view.  He observed that the Korean Confucian ethos is very 
comfortable with the three basic ingredients of the civilized global civil society, namely, 
democracy, rule of law and market economy. Rule of law is considered the minimal 
requirement for a stable and fair society in support of human flourishing.  Market capitalism 
has brought economic prosperity that has been the state ideal of the Confucian Yi dynasty 
(1392-1910) throughout its history of struggle.  He further argued that Confucian humanism 
subsisting in the Korean Confucian ethos helped overcome the otherwise combative 
political transitions without loss of affective human relations amongst the opponents.  KAH 
indicated that this affective Confucian humanism remains an important element of Korean 
social capital.  He noted that the Korean reconciliation of Confucian ideas with globalization 
occurred in terms of market economy dynamism, empowerment of people, and continued 
experiments with her young still evolving democratic institutions.253   
 
As regards the globalization of Japan and her development into a global civil society, the 
discussant (JAS) who researches in the post-WWII social development touched on the 
evolution of Confucian ethics of the political elites.  JAS argued that the political elites who 
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led the post-WWII economy of Japan to the forefront of the global economy formed the 
triumvirate matrix, i.e., the dominant conservative political party of the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP),254 the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI: 1949-2000) now 
superseded by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI: 2001-current),255 and the 
Japanese Business Confederation (Keidanren). 256   The Confucian sense of the 
‘responsible model persons’257  permeated those dedicated public and private sector elite 
groups.  They also formed informal study groups and met regularly to study together, 
brainstorm and advance the most desirable policies for the nation and also to ensure that 
such policies, once conceived, fall into the common interest and genial to sensitivities of 
the tripartite values.  Such informal affiliations developed into the ‘policy-tribe members 
(zoku iin)’ amongst LDP parliamentarians whose roles would be linked between the ‘major 
party factions (habatsu)’ and ‘political figure support societies (kōenkai).’  Such factions 
would form horizontal network as well as the traditional top-down chain of command based 
on loyalty.  Major factions and support groups of LDP and their shadow supports from MITI 
and the business confederation have succeeded in arranging the uninterrupted runs of 
premiership of Japan exclusively from LDP during 1950s-1990s.  JAS also argued that this 
Confucian network of values and ethos serving the higher goals of the individual and 
societal or ‘bigger family’ values remain an important part of Japanese Confucian 
humanism in the Japanese context despite pressures of globalization.  
 
As regards modern Japanese Confucian ethos, another discussant (JTE) who represents 
industries for corporate governance offered the view on the other side of the 
politico-economic mainstream in Japan.  JTE argued that labour unions in Japan, whether 
at company level or the level of national federations, are keeping very close relationships 
with their counterparts, namely, employers and employers’ organizations.  The annual 
labour offensives typically staged in the early part of each year called ‘the Spring Offensive 
(shuntō) are conducted in a measured way, with the ritualized show of force through 
slogans, head-gear and choreography, but always a certain level of mutual respect 
amongst the stakeholders.  He also argued that this behavioral pattern is based on the 
Confucian psychology that embraces the parties concerned in the social nexus of the 
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industry relations such as through the medium of the ‘Japanese Trade Union 
Confederation (rengō).’258 Excessive disruption of work is considered by all parties of 
industry-labour relations as anti-social conduct.  Since Japanese companies branch out 
globally, they maintain a Japanese Confucian model of labour relations adjusted to host 
nations’ rules.  JTE noted that the Japanese Socialist Party and Japanese Communist 
Party that supported more aggressive labour offensives have not succeeded in changing 
the overall pattern of labour movement, since they were seen acceptable to the sensitivities 
of the Japanese public.  Instead, such opposition political parties contributed to the 
institutional enhancement of the labour movement.  Despite economic globalization of 
Japan, the Japanese ethos remains unchanged and moored to the tradition of human 
relationships based on Confucian civility.   
 
As regards Japanese ethos vis-à-vis the globalizing of Japan, the following discussant 
(JSS) who researches in and advises on social policy highlighted the dialectical duality of 
Japanese ethos about the two major theses, i.e., the globalization known in Japan as the 
‘internationalization (kokusaika)’ and the ‘discourse on Japanese identity (nihonjinron)’ that 
has emerged as the central intellectual discourse of Japanese society during 1980s-1990s.  
Internationalization meant both threat and opportunity.  According to the leading social 
psychologist, the ‘comfortable endearment relationship (amae)’ 259  has had persisted 
between individual citizens and the political mainstream who represented them.  Continuity 
and stability of this close and endearing civic-public officialdom co-existence have been 
enduring and successful in restoring the prestige and confidence of Japan by bringing 
about the economic prosperity and the unprecedented half a century of peace.  JSS argued 
that internationalization and its implicit change of rules means a threat to this relationship or 
those who remain attached to such ethos.  He also argued that Japan has developed and 
internalized the ‘closed-nation (sakoku)’ disposition a number of times in history, due to her 
geographical separation from the continent and insulation from its political changes.  Her 
mainstream political leadership felt secure in enforcing the ‘closed-nation policy’ such as 
during the Tokugawa era (1600-1864) and also earlier vis-à-vis China for a considerable 
period during T’ang dynasty (618-907) era in China. 
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On the point of the ‘closed nation’ syndrome, the next discussant (JMC) who regularly 
writes as a social critique in the media asserted that this ‘closed nation’ aspect has become 
natural by the earlier history of the ‘closed island nation’ syndrome repeating itself, but also 
it has been further reinforced in recent history by the policies of the Meiji oligarchs and their 
likeminded leaders of posterity including the post-WWII premier Shigeru (premiership 
1948-1954).  Yoshida is also known as a protagonist of the ‘so-called 1955 rightwing 
heritage.’   JMC argued that the conservative political elites forming the centre of Japanese 
politics have been bound to their own psychological framework and tend to see the reality 
of the world through their own ‘prism.’260  Seen through such a prism, internationalization 
reeks of dangers and risks to the tradition and their hold on power.  He also argued that 
new openness due to internationalization can potentially expose that their own leaders did 
perceive and made policy decisions in the comfortable ‘endeared’ harmony with the 
sensitivity of its people as if within the closed society.  But at the same time, their own 
leaders failed to recognize and offer the people valuable opportunities to pursue the long 
term interest as a nation on timely basis in step with the dynamic changes occurring under 
globalization.  
 
On the matter of openness to globalization, one discussant (JAE) who researches in the 
policy for excellence in the new millennia made an observation on Japanese globalization 
and challenges to her becoming a global civil and civilized society.  According to JAE,  the 
issues related to how Japan overcomes her ‘closed-ness’ on her policies toward foreigners 
in Japan and her abrasive relations with her Asian neighbouring countries are the most 
pronounced challenges facing Japan in her globalization or internationalization.  Japanese 
migration law would dictate that children born to the 3rd or 4th generation residents of 
foreign ancestry are still classified as aliens, constituting an ongoing internal friction in 
Japan and with the governments of the ancestral nations.  Japan’s Asian neighbours still 
demand of the unwilling Japanese authorities a proper protocol of ‘historical atonement’ for 
the past colonialism of the imperial era.  The passive response to such issues on the part of 
the government of Japan contrasts with the positive foreign policy related to Japan’s 
current pursuit for the seat of permanent membership of the UN Security Council and 
expansion of a global role for the Self-Defence Forces of Japan such as with the UN 
Peace-keeping Forces.  JAE argued that this antinomy represents the tension between the 
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tradition of the ‘comfortable endeared (amare)’ ethos and what is perceived risky 
counter-Japanese culture and tradition implicit in globalization.  The government of Japan, 
with the broad support of the Japanese public,261 continues to apply its strict policy of 
exclusive Japanese ethnicity to selection process related to public service, academic 
positions, public school teaching jobs, and the legal professions.  The private sector such 
as media reporting jobs also comply with such ethnic policy.  He also argued that this 
ethnicity-centric societal conducts must come to an end, since such domestic issues are 
concurrently matters of international concern and remain the central issue for Japan as she 
aspires to a global civil society and playing a leading role in and with it. 
 
As regards the vision of Japan in the new millennia, another discussant (JAP) who 
researches in the history of Japanese thought referred to the challenge as the overcoming 
of ‘economy-centrism.’   He referred to the ‘White Paper’ released in 2000 by the Cabinet 
Office called the ‘Vision of Japan in the 21st Century’262 and another released in 2001 by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs titled ‘Japan's Foreign Policy toward the 21st Century’.263   JAP 
asserted that the long-term vision of Japan remains economy-centric and defence-centric 
amongst the officialdom.  He observed that, while Japanese elites remain enslaved to the 
‘memory politics’ with her neighbors such as on the question of ‘history textbooks,’ the 
project of a global civil society in Japan through her internationalization (kokusaika) 
remains deterred by the ‘closed nation (sakoku)’ disposition.  JAP held the view that the 
‘new kaikoku (opening of the nation)’ may have to happen with the ‘opening of mind.’  JAP 
argued that, through the new kaikoku or opening of the ‘heart and nation’, the ‘spatiality and 
temporality of Japan’264 may have to be reinforced with the ‘meeting of minds’ or the 
‘spirituality’ of Japan ‘beyond the realism of economy and defence.  He believed that there 
has been a strong tradition of ‘spiritualization of social and economic reality’265 in the 
intellectual history of Japan.  He referred to the Neo-Confucian school of Yōmeigaku and 
the School of Mind and Heart Learning that sought through the meeting of minds a 
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permanent paradigm of peace in the Confucian unity of the ‘cultivated personhood, broader 
family including community of neighbors and the Heaven.’   
 
As regards the globalizing context of Confucian humanism in the Republic of China, the 
discussant (CPH) who works as a policy-person for an indigenous community observed 
that the young democracy of the Republic is undergoing the next stage of democratization.  
Since Ch’en Sui-pien (presidency 2000-current) brought the end to the half a century 
political monopoly of the Nationalist Party, the democratic constitutionalism has been fully 
restored.  Great progress has been made with the human rights observance including in 
regard to the indigenous population.  Also freedom of speech, free press and 
independence of other branches of government such as the role of judicial system were 
applied into full practice.  CPH argued that, together with the shift in the exercise of political 
freedom, there has been another shift in the approach to the ‘democratic constitutionalism.’  
As one of the first drafters of the Constitution, Chang Chün-mai (1887-1969) opposed the 
idea of the so-called ‘revolutionary human rights’ qualifying those participating in the 
Revolution of the National Party to the ‘privileges of human rights.’  Such qualified human 
rights have been the basis of political legitimacy for the selective application of human 
rights and other democratic principles to the disadvantages of the indigenous population or 
those not in full supports of the National Party government during 1949-1990.  CPH quoted 
the words of Chang on the universality of human rights:  
 
Because people have personality (jenko), understand rites (li) and justice (i), and have 
a sense of honour, they naturally comprise the backbone of the country.  Respecting 
people is thus a means to protect the dignity (tsunyen) of the government.  If a country 
wants human rights to be protected, it must first treat people as human beings and not 
as slaves.266   
 
As regards the progress of the young democracy of the Republic, the next discussant 
(CAS), who researches in the social cohesion of the emerging economies touched upon 
the dilemma posed by the unique international isolation of the Republic and its tense 
coexistence with China.  CAS argued that this isolation and geo-political implications 
adversely affect the progress of the democratic maturation of the Republic.  Ch’en Sui-pien 
                                                
266  Chang, Chün-mai 1946, ‘Human Rights Are the Basis of Constitutionalism’, in Ten Lectures on Democratic 
Constitutionalism, Carsun Chang Association, <www.carsunchang.org.tw>, viewed 6 March 2007. 
  199
(presidency 2000-current) mobilized the support behind him through his policy of Taiwan 
independence that inflamed the political leadership of China who openly threatens invasion 
on this account.  Ch’en’s policy complicated the positions not only of China, but also of the 
US who maintains the treaty obligation of mutual defence under the ‘Taiwan Relations Act’ 
since 1979 when the US established diplomatic relationship with the Peoples’ Republic of 
China.267  Since the National Party now headed by Ma Ying-chiu (the party chairperson 
2005-2007) engages in the political fight-back to return to power in the 2008 elections, the 
two rival political camps of Ch’en and Ma are engaged in a zero-sum struggle.  CAS 
observed that both camps overlooked the consequences of such struggles with no regard 
to the rule of law and democratic civility.  The peoples of the Republic irrespective of which 
party they support have been disillusioned about the outcome of the democratization.  CAS 
argued that the project of democracy in Taiwan remains a work in progress, including the 
return of Confucian civility to governance. 
 
On the current democratic progress and the difficulties it faced, the following discussant 
(CHA), who works as an advocate for human rights solidarity, observed that, despite the 
numerous setbacks encountered in the democratic progress-making, the Republic has a 
strong heritage of sustained struggles for democracy that have been underway since the 
Japanese occupation era (1895-1945) and the Nationalist government (1945-2000).  CHA 
argued that the symbolic significance of the Republic’s democracy has become a powerful 
message for the rest of the global Chinese communities, certainly including the Peoples 
Republic.   He believed that the democratic struggles and sacrifices made such as during 
the ‘February 28 Incident’ of 1947 and the ‘Kaohsiung Incident’ of 1979 will continue to play 
the important role as the guiding principles in the ongoing pursuit and advancement of 
democracy.  While both political camps oppose the ‘one China policy of ‘the Peoples 
Republic,’ the Nationalist party leader and leading contender for the next presidency of the 
Republic in 2008, Ma Ying-jeou suggested a conciliatory policy course as he would seek to 
promote better ties with the mainland, leaving the ‘question of Taiwan's ultimate status to 
an indeterminate future’268 when China will have developed further and perhaps liberalized 
its authoritarian political system.   CHA highlighted that democratization of the Republic has 
involved wide support and the engagement of the concerned global community of solidarity 
groups such as the North American Presbyterian Church that stayed with the Taiwan 
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indigenous rights movement during the Japanese and KMT era as well as the 
contemporary Neo-Confucian movement where the Republic remains an important hub of 
the global efforts.  He argued that, notwithstanding the geopolitical context and the ongoing 
tension in cross-strait relations, the Republic has embarked upon its important first steps 
towards becoming a globalizing civil society.  
 
The above section 3.6 of the chapter has been about how discussants view the globalizing 
process of Confucian humanism and its ideals and implications on the civil society.  The 
summary has been of the responses to the question: ‘Is Confucian humanism compatible 
with the ideals and concerns of globalizing civil society, especially in terms of human rights 
and economic ethics such as over the global ecological crisis?’  Three nations have had 
their own distinct paths to the global civil society or growth towards it, facing or still trying to 
overcome the obstacles of endogenous or external natures.  Economic successes shared 
by these three nations have been an obvious impetus to globalizing dynamics, and vice 
versa.  Economic prosperity alone did not eventuate acceptance and internalization of 
democratic principles and practices.  Forces of globalization, however, made the process 
of democratization a project of not only of the nations, but also of the international 
engagements and interactions among the states and non-state actors.  The Korean 
democratic shift suffered an ongoing internal schism of inter-Korea and inter-regional 
frictions.  Popular opinion even reversed their approval ratings of the long dreaded 
autocratic military governments and freely elected democratic governments.  Highly 
networked citizens’ democratic groups proved to be no panacea, as people start to be 
reminded that communication actually rests in the exchange of ‘open minds’ rather than the 
fast exchange of voluminous information.  Koreas still goes through the ‘measles of 
democratization,’ as a discussant mentioned.  The Korean democratic process certainly 
has significant implications over the future of the Northern part of the peninsula.  Japan has 
global economic status and rides on its success complying with the global standards of 
economic conduct.  Japan, however, is yet to sort out its long history of swings between the 
‘open and closed nation’ heritage.  The Japanese philosophical heritage including 
Confucianism and system of governance share much with the traditions of China and 
Korea, yet the irritants such as the interpretation of recent history continue to separate her 
from being the whole-heartedly welcome neighbor nation despite her leading role in the 
industrialization of the East Asia.  Japan is keen to maintain her ‘endearing ethos’ among 
the social constituents including the bureaucracy in her pursuit of internationalization, 
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concurrently aspiring for a bigger role in world affairs beyond economy alone.  The 
Republic of China has a watershed switch to a new democracy with implosion of the 
Nationalist Party after half a century of dominance in politics.  But its young democracy is 
still in the formative process with the inter-strait and geopolitical matters adding to the 
severity of its challenges.  
 
3.7 CONCLUSION  
 
The above six parts of this chapter, i.e., sections 3.1 through 3.6, have summarized the 
discussant views from the three nations.  Their views were freely expressed as 
conversations were conducted around the trigger questions.  The questions were focussed 
on:  ‘3.1 Confucianism as major common philosophies,’ ‘3.2 Confucian beliefs as the 
bedrock of Confucian humanism,’ ‘3.3 Confucian humanism, and its impact upon 
governance such as human rights,’ ‘3.4 the Confucian humanism in relation to economic 
ethics,’ and, finally, ‘3.5 Confucian humanism and its compatibility with a globalizing civil 
society.’   
 
Koreans identified their Confucian heritage with the Confucian influence on education in 
terms of philosophical orientation as well as the highest priority education is accorded in 
the Korean society.  Confucian institutions survived albeit reduced in scale or official 
legitimacy.  Korean Confucianism embedded in the followers of other religions has been 
noted as a significant attribute of contemporary Korean Confucianism.  
 
Japan also had a long and enduring tradition of Neo-Confucianism since the official 
induction of Confucianism as the state ideology of the Tokugawa era (1600-1864).  Meiji 
Restoration leaders selectively used the Confucian ethos and principles through the 
constitutional emperorship laws, school textbooks and military regimentation.  The 
Aspiration of modern Japan met the setback in her defeat in WWII and ensued 
soul-searching for the identity debate called Nihonjinron. Discussants described 
contemporary Japan within the process of globalization and localization according to the 
sensitivities of Japan and the role befitting the economic power house of the world.  
Japanese intellectuals have undertaken a pervasive range of cross-civilization studies in 
philosophy, social sciences and certainly in political systems and governance.  If necessary, 
their aspiration was to ‘overcome modernity’ as the project started in the West by 
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Enlightenment thinking.  In every aspect of the national ethos and identity, the emperor or 
tenno remains of critical importance.   
 
The Republic of China that was started on the mainland by Sun Yat-tsen in the aftermath of 
the successful republican revolution of 1911 to the demise of the imperial tradition inherited 
the philosophical and governance tradition of China.  While the People’s Republic rejected 
Confucianism as the symbol of feudalism and the ills of China that needed to be overcome, 
Confucian scholarly tradition continued outside the mainland, and the Republic of China 
adopted Confucianism as the national learning framework after nationalist government 
moved to Taiwan in 1949.  Its political recognition was a mixed blessing as its politicisation 
remained aloof from the peoples in their struggles for modern democracy. Confucian 
scholarship blossomed in the Republic, but the Confucian contribution remains within the 
domains of family and human relations ethics.  
 
All three nations have seen three Confucian traditions actively interacting with the other 
major philosophical and cultural ethos of Mahayana Buddhism and Taoism.  As much as 
philosophy and ethics remain central to the Confucian tradition, the aesthetic aspects of 
such traditions are found occupying the important parts of peoples’ minds and the 
life-world.  
 
Enduring attributes of humanism have been discussed through diverse angles and views of 
the discussion participants from the point of identifying what Confucianism means to 
contemporary East-Asians in terms of belief system, its implications on the critical 
governance issues such as human rights and economic ethics and as the important launch 
points towards the globalizing civil society each nation is aspiring to.  
 
With the above narrative data and its documentation corroboration on the theme of 
Confucian humanism summed up in the third chapter, discussion of the thesis now moves 
to Chapter Four, in which the data and documentation corroborations would be analysed 
and interpreted in conjunction with the corresponding points of the scholarly literature 
review of Chapter Two in the thematic order of the discussions. 
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Chapter Four:  Analysis and Interpretation  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This fourth chapter proceeds with the analysis and interpretation of the discussion data 
together with documentation corroborations that constituted Chapter Three.  This ‘analysis 
and interpretation’ concurrently relates to the corresponding themes, points and content 
that emerged in the literature review of Chapter Two.  Starting with the foundation of 
Confucianism as the common philosophy of East-Asia, this process of analysis and 
interpretation moves its focus to Confucian humanism.  Next, the process continues to the 
governance domain of human rights and economic ethics.   It finalizes with the analysis and 
interpretation of the outlook on global Confucian humanism.  
 
A good part of the theoretical framework that this ‘analysis and interpretation’ employs 
owes much to the literature review of the thesis.  This chapter will go beyond it where 
deemed necessary in its undertaking to expound upon the complex interplay of the diverse 
factors or multiple levels of the cultural and philosophical layers that often become the 
building blocks of Confucian humanism.   
   
4.2 CONFUCIANISM AS THE COMMON PHILOSOPHY  
 
As regards the commonality of Confucian tradition in the three nations, all three nations’ 
interlocutors agreed to some levels of embedding of Confucian attributes in their lives and 
in family and social institutions.  Koreans tend to maintain their Confucian decorum despite 
their affiliation with the missionizing religions such as Christianity. Japanese employ 
Confucian thinking and conventions to reinforce the national identity and integrity of 
Japanese culture and tradition. The Republic of China has followed their official policy of 
honouring Confucianism as the understanding of national learning for all post-WWII 
governments.   
 
4.2.1 Multi-layers of Cultures and Consciousness embedded as Confucianism 
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In the discussions as well as the literature review, Confucianism has emerged not only as a 
moral philosophy and a lifelong intellectual pursuit, but also as the core system of learning 
about ‘minds and hearts.’  
 
Both the discussions and the literature alike point to the ‘minds and hearts’ aspects of 
Confucian humanism.  A leading Korean Confucian leader such as T’oegye (1501-1570) 
edited his textbook for crown princes around the theme of taming ‘minds and hearts’ as the 
bedrock of the princely virtues. Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714) of Japan expanded his 
teachings of the ‘mind and heart’ from the shogun and samurai officials to a broader 
community including the ‘trades-persons (chōnin)’ who became the foundation of the 
modern Japanese market economy. The enduring dynamism of the Yangming school 
legacy of Neo-Confucians within the Sinic spheres was and is also about the study or 
school of ‘mind and heart learning.’  
 
The study of the ‘mind and heart’ engaged all levels of society.  The study also engaged 
intellectual and moral enquiries and aesthetics.  The ‘hearts and minds’ were to be 
cultivated and educated to ‘investigate things’ beyond the banality of superficial daily 
matters or below the surface of pretensions.  T’oegye taught about the ‘immersion’1 into the 
depths of the mind and heart to gain ‘enlightened knowledge.’  A Japanese discussant 
referred to the ‘endeared relations of mind and heart (amae)’ as the innermost immersion 
quest for spiritual comfort with one’s close neighbours or co-navigators in life.  The 
Japanese also pointed to the ‘sorrow at evanescence (mono o aware)’ as the penetrating 
sensitivity into the meaning and hidden sorrows of all lives and things.  Wang Yangming 
(1472-1529) as the leader of the Chinese school of ‘mind and heart’ learning suggested 
that the ‘mind’ and the ‘principle (li)’ are the same and ‘to understand the universe, one 
needs to seek within one’s own mind first.’  
 
While the discussants’ views were not totally in agreement on the centrality of the ’mind 
and heart,’ its significance is undeniable for the characterization of Confucian influence on 
the philosophical and psychological orientation of the various Confucian minds of 
East-Asia.  The culture that such minds form is dense and multi-levelled from the deepest 
level of personal resonance with one’s ‘mind and heart,’ the next level of Confucian 
awareness of ‘being’ is ‘being in one’ with one’s next neighbours in life, i.e., family, although 
                                                
1 hamch’im (immersion in Korean) 
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physically separated ones.  The next level of Confucian consciousness would be that of the 
social self that aspires to think and act in accordance with the Confucian teachings for 
‘superior persons.’2  
 
This formation of multi-level Confucian consciousness of individual and social identities 
calls for the ‘thick description’3 of its cultural character in order to properly describe and 
understand its entirety.  In terms of Confucian consciousness, the ‘mind and heart’ exists 
as the ‘symbol’4 and the ‘principle (li)’ of the cosmos.  This Confucian consciousness 
implies the epistemological departure point for the Confucian outlook on life and 
worldviews.  The levels of ‘cultivated and learned’ Confucian consciousness in turn form 
the ‘topography of mind’5 and the spiritual and cultural ‘archetypes’6 that belong to each 
level of consciousness.  The vertical structure of consciousness comes into play with the 
multi-layers of human horizons as of individuals and as of human-to-human social beings.   
This structure of Confucian consciousness implies the ontological departure point for the 
Confucian ‘life-worlds.’  
 
Confucian attributes continue to dwell within the minds and hearts and behaviours of 
Korean Christian and Buddhist adherents, despite their declared belonging to their 
religions.  Japanese samurai official-scholars were both Confucian and Shinto adherents 
dependent upon what levels of their consciousness are in interaction with their environs.  
Likewise, Chinese republican revolutionaries were both lovers of Confucian decorum as 
the part of the Chinese tradition as well as the reformers of the Confucian political status 
quo.  This external multiplicity is not perceived as an inner inconsistency.  It is rather the 
visible level of the ‘iceberg’7 that shows the conscious level of awareness in contrast to 
another part of the self or even the greater part of self remaining at the sub-conscious level 
or the sub-water level.  Discussants and literature articles consistently highlight the fact that 
cognition of the conscious or subconscious levels of Confucian life and world only refers to 
                                                
2 chün tzu (Confucian superior persons) 
3 Geertz, Clifford 1973, ‘The Thick Description of Culture: Chapter 1 ‘Toward and Interpretive Theory of Culture’, in The 
Interpretation of Culture, Basic Books, New York.  
4 ibid 
5 Morris, Brian 1994, ‘Chapter 5: Taoism, Confucianism and the Chinese Self’, in Anthropology of the Self: the Individual in 
Cultural Perspective, Pluto Press, London.  
6 Mental, spiritual and cultural ‘archetypes’: C. G. Jung Research Institute of Korea, <http://www.jung.re.kr/index1.htm>, 
viewed 12 March 2007. 
7  Centre for Applied Psychology, ‘Freud's Iceberg Model for Unconscious, Pre-conscious, & Conscious’: 
<http://wilderdom.com/personality/L8-3TopographyMindIceberg.html>, Canberra, viewed 12 March 2007. 
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their visibility.  It does not relate directly to the substance and existential reality.  
Emergence and submersion of faiths and religious traditions continued and were repeated, 
not one replacing another.  Those undergoing these dynamic and cyclical processes were 
the faith traditions of Confucian orthodoxy, Neo-Confucian reformulation, Buddhist and 
Taoist syncretism, Shinto evolution, and Christian coexistence within Confucianism among 
others.   
 
4.2.2 Confucian Collective Consciousness and Intentionality  
 
Discussions pointed to the enduring tendency shown by Confucians in collective 
consciousness and comparable accommodation of the ‘collective intentionality’ that 
Confucian social ideology implies. The interest was not about the collectivization of 
individual intentions subservient to social wills, but about how individual intentions would 
evolve into the communal interest under the influence of self-realization, common ethics 
and shared social goals.  Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) is said to have inherited the moral and 
intellectual tradition of the Chou Dynasty (ca 1122-256 B.C.E.).  Discussion and literature 
data pointed to the probable motivation of Confucius and his disciples to expand upon the 
moral tradition. This project would be aimed at morally educating sovereigns and ministers 
of warring nations together with peoples under their rule undergoing unbearable hardships.  
The collective intentionality would be conceived to elevate the communal moral plateau to 
realize the ideals of individual self-cultivation and harmonious governance and putting an 
end to the chaos and moral vacuum that the Sage witnessed.  
 
The Korean Neo-Confucian teacher T’oegye in his teaching of the crown princes is said to 
have adopted the same principle of communal consciousness and collective intentionality 
of realizing the same moral horizons across the social standings from sovereigns, 
scholar-officials and commoners.  When Hayashi Razan (1583-1657) was serving as the 
shogun’s mentor, Razan is said to have adopted the similar principle of realizing the same 
moral horizons across the social standings from shoguns, and the four sub-classes of 
ruling samurais, farmers, artisans and merchants.  Wang Yangming (1472-1529) is said to 
have stayed close to the teachings of Mencius and the ‘Great Learning (Ta-hsüeh).’   Wang 
insisted upon the nurturing and maintaining of the ‘original mind (penhsin)’ of peoples of all 
levels and also upon realizing of the moral potential of all.  
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Both the discussions and the literature pointed to the immanence of Confucian moral 
awareness and its religiosity of transcendence.  The Confucian ‘construction of social 
reality’ coexists with Confucian religiosity.  Immanent Confucian moral awareness on the 
continuum with the Confucian social morals and cosmology settles in the sense of the 
‘sacredness’8 of identifying with and striving to live the eternal purpose through the daily 
observance of Confucian decorum embodied in rites.  Confucian religiosity is congruent to 
other major proselytizing religions such as Christianity in Korea and the Republic of China, 
whereas in Japan it is less certain.  Such Confucian openness is conducive to political 
collective intentionality.9  The thesis of ‘collective intentionality’ discussed in the literature 
review that  it leads to a positive social dynamic working for the collective interest based on 
common human dignity, rights and duties, received positive indications from the focus 
group discussions.  Discussions broadly affirmed that ‘the ideas common to its humanism 
and its holistic collective interest would influence individual and collective will, and they 
would also determine the roles of actors and how they would interact with the 
circumstances of the time.’   
 
Confucian ‘self-cultivation and education’ produces the learning outcome of Confucian 
‘social psychology.’  This social psychology is closely aligned with Confucian state ideology, 
since such state ideology fosters the way of surviving under the Confucian social hierarchy 
that Confucian knowledge and power-building brought into being.  Korean Confucians are 
said to be sensitive to the collective image of self.  Korean Confucian self (na) and 
self-identity (cha’ki) are preserved in the ‘referential self identity’ and uses the facility of 
Confucian ‘ritualized behaviour (üiroeysŏng).’10  Japanese Confucian decorum displays the 
‘professed intention (tate-mae)’, but submerges ‘real intention (hon-ne).’11  On the patterns 
of Confucian social practices, namely, what is often perceived as the ‘Confucian collective 
or communitarian social behaviours,’ comparative notes on the ‘collectivism versus 
individualism’ 12  and behavioural patterns have become useful for practitioners of 
cross-cultural social affairs.13   
                                                
8 Durkheim, Emile 1976, Op. Cit., pp. 403-414, 416-417.  
9 Searle 1995: Op. Cit. 
10 Choi, SC & Kim, KB 2003, ‘A Conceptual Exploration of Korean Self in Comparison with the Western Self’, in Progress 
in Asian Social Psychology: Conceptual and Empirical Contributions, eds. KS Yang,  Paul Pedersen & Ikuo Daibo, 
Praeger, London. 
11 Doi, Takeo 1986, the Anatomy of Self, Kodansha, Tokyo, pp. 35-47. 
12 Hofstede, Geert 1997, Op. Cit., pp. 49-78. 
13 Trompenaars, F & Hampden-Turner, C 2000, Op. Cit.,  pp. 50-68. 
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4.2.3 Education and its Centrality to Confucianism 
 
The data highlighted the central importance of education for the Confucian tradition not 
only as the means of self-cultivation and rearing the next generation, but also as a practical 
path to political, economic and public service career opportunities.  Korean Confucian 
education was centred on the fostering of the scholar-officials.  Japanese educators 
belonging to the ‘practical learning’ schools (jitsugaku) in a broad application of ‘practical 
learning’ undertook the affordable education of the commoners.  The effects of such an 
undertaking by Confucian educators, later supported by well-resourced ‘tradespersons 
(chōnin),’ were evident since the educated commoners became the driving forces for the 
fast-track modernization triggered by the Meiji Restoration since 1868.  
 
The literature also informs us that the Yüan dynasty (1279-1368) of China with its adoption 
of the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy of Chu Hsi as the state ideology advanced learning 
through Confucian education as the central endeavour of the state with focus on producing 
the nation’s next generation of elites.   
 
All three nations shared Confucian state examination system started by the Confucian 
courtly scholars of the T’ang dynasty (618-907) of China.   The state examinations had 
Confucian philosophy as the central themes.  The state examination system still exists 
within the modern liberal democratic institutions, although the examination content has 
changed to modern governance discipline. The Confucian tradition endures with this 
continuation of state exam system in the belief that those who have attained the high level 
of scholarship through the self-discipline and character-building of hard study deserve high 
public office. 
 
Discussions pointed to the pattern that ideological changes started with the alteration to the 
content and direction of education, and saw its consummation in the education policy such 
as witnessed in the emergence of the ‘National Learning (kokugaku)’ as a transmutation of 
Confucianism, and the ‘Education Edict’ of Meiji era, as a de facto ideological declaration of 
post-Meiji Japan.   
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4.3 CONFUCIAN HUMANISM 
 
Confucian teachings of humanity and furthering self-cultivation with the communitarian 
interest at heart, i.e., ‘public mindedness’ have characterised the two millennia of 
Confucian tradition.  The Confucian cardinal virtues of ‘humanity, justice, rites and 
wisdom’14 became the foundation of Confucian humanism, and they continued to nurture 
the Confucian way of humanism through self-cultivation as individuals and also by serving 
the community as Confucian social beings with the integrity expected of self-cultivated 
‘Confucian superior persons.’15   
 
The discussions brought a broad agreement to the veracity of Confucian humanism as an 
embedded set of values within the tradition of Confucianism.  Discussions and the literature 
also noted that nations’ history and political circumstances left diverse footprints in the past 
and present attributes of Confucian humanism.  Confucians followed in the education and 
self-cultivation processes a structural path of ‘cognitive and affective development’16 within 
the over-riding theme and framework of Confucian humanism.  They pointed to the aspect 
that a structural path of ‘cognitive and affective development’ was empirically evident with 
the three nations.  Such path determined the systems of knowledge and its progress in 
both intellectually and emotionally rewarding ways, and broadly agreed to in having reaped 
the ‘positive affects and effects’ in their shared intellectual and cultural history.   
 
4.3.1 The Confucian ‘Structure’ of Consciousness 
 
The discussions and reviewed literature both point to the emergence of a certain 
identifiable mental and spiritual structure and orientation that the peoples of Confucian faith 
exhibit individually and collectively in their consciousness of self as a Confucian being and 
also as a social being within the Confucian context of the ‘extended family’ that determine 
their broader societal domain of human engagement.  
 
The Confucian consciousness of ‘self’ transforms itself from the relational framework of 
‘self-to-world’ of subject-to-object contrast to a new relational plateau of ‘self-to-another 
self’ within the paradigm of Confucian humanism.  Conversely, under this new relational 
                                                
14 jen, I, li, chih (humanity, justice, rites and wisdom) 
15 chün tzu (superior moral person) 
16 Wadsworth  2004, Op. Cit. 
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framework, Confucian humanism represents an outcome of a shift to the epistemological 
paradigm in terms of who we are and how we relate to one another.17  Confucian rationality 
based on this understanding of the self and life-world would go on with the building of their 
relationships and what they would perceive as the ‘liveable life-world.’  
 
Further to Confucian understanding as such, the discussions and the literature referred to 
the psychological structure of ‘self’ and ‘super-self’ consciousness.  The thesis was that, 
within the Confucian ontological structure of self-identity and the ‘super-self’ as the social 
Confucian selves, Confucians inherit and maintain their ‘self-portraits of the minds and 
hearts’ or the ‘archetypes of anima.’18  The Micro-cosmos of Confucian selves resides 
within the perceived perfect unity with the macro-cosmos of the Confucian universe. 
Individual awareness and that of the community of Confucians also stay on the different 
planes on their ‘topography of minds’ forming the ‘iceberg’ 19  of the conscious, 
pre-conscious and subconscious levels of the Confucian self-awareness.  
 
The discussions and the literature review also referred to the Korean Confucian doyen 
T’ogye (1501-1570) and his seminal metaphysical and cosmological work of the ‘Ten 
Diagram of Sagely Learning.’  His work was underpinned by such structural self-awareness 
within the moral universe.  Such epistemological and ontological frameworks are 
consistent with Chang Tsai (1020-1077) being one of the three great rejuvenators of the 
Neo-Confucianism during the Northern Sung dynasty (960-1126) era in China.  Fujiwara 
Seika (1561-1619) as the first Confucian courtly scholar for the Tokugawa shogunate 
embraced the same principle and helped determine the path of Japanese 
neo-Confucianism.  The discussions referred to Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960) who 
reinforced such ethical self-awareness with his unique Japanese contextualization of 
‘temporality and spatiality’ in his ‘Book of Japanese Ethics (rinrigaku).’  
 
The discussions also pointed to other unique patterns or ‘structures’ of Confucian 
approaches that respective national cultures of Confucianism evolved into, and continue to 
share and differ to this day.  Koreans embraced the symbols and signs of ‘I Ching’ as the 
                                                
17 Chung, Chung-Ying 2001, ‘Confucian Methodology and Understanding the Human Reasons’, in Phenomenology of 
Life in a Dialogue Between Chinese and Occidental Philosophy, Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 31-46. 
18 Jung, C.G. 1971, The Archetypes and Collective Unconsciousness, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, pp. 3-74, 
figure 1.  
19 Centre for Applied Psychology: Op. Cit., ‘The Topography of Human Mind by Sigmund Freud’  
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national emblems and continue to mobilize dedication and aesthetic endearments around 
such semiotic entities with little alteration and resistance as they keep trusting in the 
universality and timelessness of their values.  The Japanese on the other hand had 
consistently insisted upon the regurgitation of foreign ideas and reproduction into 
Japanese versions fitting the sensitivities and tradition.  Confucian ‘mind and hearts’ wear 
the mantle of the ‘socialized structures’ that such Confucian symbols created through 
symbols and signs that abound in ‘I Ching,’ and, more importantly, the ‘ideograms’ that 
grew from the symbols and signs of nature, that the three nations have shared over the last 
two millennia.  The collective socialization of Confucian symbols is pronounced with the 
nations’ ‘foundation myths’ such as Tan’gun of Korea and the ‘Sun Goddess (amaterasu)’ 
that later Confucians mobilized Confucian decorum to add legitimacy and to embellish 
sacredness.  The national myths20 about the culture’s foundation and genealogies tracing 
back to the divinity remain powerful, and they consistently received nourishment from the 
riches of Confucian resources. These external ‘structures’ of Confucian origin in turn can 
pose as an independent social reality with little or no bearing on the Confucian ‘minds and 
hearts.’  Discussions pointed to the ‘dialectical relationship’ between Confucian ideals and 
the structural reality of Confucian societies that they helped create. Confucian 
scholar-officials often found themselves fighting their own shadows such as through the 
protracted factional struggles in the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) of Korea.    
 
Such Confucian societal evolution also refers to a pattern emerging as a structural dilemma. 
The Confucian structure of intellect and ethos produces a set of knowledge and reality as a 
new construction.  The literature argument21  about ‘Piaget’s theories of principles of 
constructivism’ relates to the Confucian domains of education, intellectual autonomy or 
lack thereof, and, also, on fostering moral reasoning and moral behaviour.  Literature 
pointed out to the effect with the implicit support of discussions that Neo-Confucian 
countries formed a new epistemological and ontological structure both in scholarship and 
governance, and both in the ways of humanism and secularism.  
 
4.3.2 Confucian Transcendental Intuition and Interactions with Taoism and Buddhism  
 
                                                
20 Lévi-Strauss, Claude 1992, Op. Cit., Chapter 11: Mythical Possibility to Social Existence.  
21 Wadsworth  2004, Op. Cit., Piaget’s theories of ‘principles of constructivism’.  
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Both discussions and the literature pointed to the significance of the Confucian capacity of 
transcendental intuition and imagination that had been reinforced down through the ages of 
interactions with Taoism and Mahayana Buddhism. Confucian metaphysics as such 
relating to the ‘transcendental intuition’ continue to influence twentieth century 
Neo-Confucians such as Hsiung Shihli (1885-1968) and Mou Tsungsan (1909-1995).  
Metaphysical balance between ‘intuition’ and ‘reason’ implied the balance between the 
‘substance (t’i) and function (yung)’ within the unity of ‘heart, intention and conscience.’ 
Hsiung for example, sought to overcome the divide of ‘intuition’ and ‘reason,’ since he 
believed that ‘they are not just indivisible, they are in a relationship of identity.’   
 
4.3.3 Confucian Aesthetics and Signification 
 
Confucian self-cultivation fosters literary and other aesthetic pursuits as the foundational 
qualities essential to becoming the ‘superior Confucian person (chün tzu)’ as well as being 
a courteous form of communication.  It also facilitates the passing of the state examination 
that is essentially a test of poetic rendition of Confucian wisdom written around the question 
on Confucian humanism in public policy.  The Confucian aesthetic imagination had been 
greatly influenced by Taoist and Buddhist traditions.  Through aesthetic pursuits, 
Confucian minds found peace and unity with nature that represented the perfection of 
beauty.  The Japanese stand out in terms of valuing the artistic attainment, even placing it 
on an equal footing as the moral accomplishment in self-cultivation and advanced 
scholarship.  Discussions pointed to such artistic and aesthetic ascription as being the 
basis of ‘fundamentally being Japanese.’  The Tale of Genji’22 is the first and oldest 
Japanese novel filled with romantic encounters, some of which can make even modern 
readers blush.  Due to its aesthetic sensitivity and refined description of ‘sorrowful 
emotions (aware),’ it superbly represents the Japanese innermost perception of beauty.  
The major Neo-Confucian reformer in the Tokugawa era (1600-1864) Motoori Norinaga 
(1730-1801) equated the importance of this aesthetic work of the ‘Tale of Genji’ to the 
Confucian Analects in terms of importance to Japanese national identity. Likewise, a 
classical anthology of poetry called the ‘Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves (Man'yōshū)’23  
is extolled as the epicenter of the Japanese kana writing system as well as carrying the 
Japanese sense of identity par excellence.  
                                                
22 Genji Monogatari (The Tale of Genji) by Murasaki Shikibu (ca 979-1014) 
23 Man'yōshū (Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves) by Ōtomo no Yakamochi (ca 718-785) 
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Discussions pointed to the importance of Japanese identity embedded in aesthetics as the 
central ‘signification’ as the collective symbols within the ‘social lives‘24 of being Japanese 
and being Japanese Confucian humanists.  Discussions pointed to the effect that the 
ancient symbols and significations carry and the indigenous essence of the aesthetic 
tradition has become the central theme of contemporary Japanese discourse on the 
‘Japanese identity (Nihonjinron)’ or ‘overcoming of modernity’ through the rejuvenation of 
the ancient identity of Japanese integrity.  The leading contemporary writer Natsume 
Sōseki (1867-1916) and his powerful interpreter Watsuji remain at the centre of the 
national discourse.  The focus groups emphasized the context to the effect that such 
leadership would call upon the nation to rediscover its Japanese identity in the aesthetics25 
of the Japanese classics, with the support of the moral contribution of the Confucian 
intellectual traditions, not the other way round.  In place of the so-called ‘Confucian four 
cardinal virtues’ of ‘humanity, righteousness, rite or decorum and wisdom (jen, i, li and chih), 
Japanese identity and sensitivities would sit more comfortable with the alterated version of 
Confucian humanism in the ‘truthfulness, goodness and beauty (shin, zen and bi)’ as the 
integral values in life and as the foundation of their worldview.  
 
Data from the discussions and the literature are in broad agreement over the fact that 
aesthetics lies as the bedrock of Confucian humanism, in particular with the 
under-represented social class of commoners.  Through aesthetic outlets, they had the 
chance of self-expression and self-realization through artistic and literary pursuits.  In the 
non-official domains of the Yi dynasty of Korea, the literary works of Hŏ Gyun26 and Kim 
Man-jung 27  portrayed the life under Neo-Confucian dominance, and offered rival 
worldviews.  The commoner class of the ‘townsmen’ of the Tokugawa era of Japan not only 
brought economic vibrancy, but also fostered the urbane culture, such as rakugo28 satire 
literature and ukiyoe29 ‘impressionist’ fine arts.30  The Socially under-represented ladies of 
China were portrayed through the major Chinese classical saga of Hong Lou Meng (Dream 
                                                
24 de Saussure, F 1990, Op. Cit., pp. 15, 18, 65, 71-78, 106-109. 
25 Doi 2001, Op. Cit., pp. 22-37. 
26 Hŏ Gyun (1569-1618): a major literary writer of Yi dynasty Korea. 
27 Kim Man-jung (1637-1692): a major literary figure and official-scholar of the Yi dynasty Korea.    
28 Rakugo (literally "fallen words") is a Japanese entertainment form based on comical monologues. It was originally 
known as karukuchi (jokes).  
29 ukiyo-e (pictures of the floating world), is a genre of woodblock prints and paintings produced between the 17th and the 
20th century.  
30 MacPhail 2001, Op. Cit. 
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of the Red Chamber),’31 in which they discuss together in a lively fashion and live their 
‘non-royal’ day to day lives with their own private sets of ‘Confucian mind and heart’ despite 
the state machinery of Neo-Confucianism they were under.  
 
4.4 CONFUCIAN GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The two data sources suggest that Confucian governance initially grew from the classical 
Confucian ‘ideal of governance’ in nurturing and installing the humane flourishing of the 
‘sovereign as a sage.’  The dictum of the ‘Sage within and King without’32 refers to this ideal.  
Confucian philosophy of governance in the ‘ching-shih (ordering of the world)’ has become 
the cornerstone of what Confucian humanism could bring about in the real world.  
Discussions and literature agreed to the deals of compassionate governance proffered by 
Mencius.  It has been also agreed to that Mencius was and is the centre-figure for the 
Confucian sympathy, ethos and concerns for the underprivileged commoners.  Also 
emphasized was his insistence on the ultimate goal of governance resting with how to care 
for the commoners in securing subsistence and providing chances of self-cultivation and 
leading meaningful lives despite the social standings.   
 
4.4.1 The Governance Ideal within the ‘Great Learning’ Framework  
 
Both the discussions and the literature commonly highlighted the ‘Great Learning’33 as the 
orthodox Neo-Confucian canon on governance, while it is also the one of the four main 
Confucian canons.  Beyond the symbolic dictum of the ‘sage within, king without,’ the 
‘Great Learning’ spelled out other governance terms such as the so-called ‘three headings 
and eight particulars’ 34 as the ‘policy implements’ that have remained the mainstay of 
Confucian governance.  Mencius offered the egalitarian teachings and practices, and 
continued to remain as the central figure of Confucian governance ideals with concerns for 
the under-privileged peoples.  
 
                                                
31 One of the masterpieces of Chinese fiction and also considered one of the greatest novels, with its authorship attributed 
to Cao Zhan (circa 1715-1753). 
32 neisheng wei wang (Sage within and Kingliness without) 
33 taehak (Korean), ta-hsüeh (Chinese) 
34 samgang; Korean, san-kang; Chinese (the Three Heads), palchomok; Korean, pat’iamu; Chinese (the Eight 
Particulars)  
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The discussions pointed to, and the literature corroborated, the decline in terms of 
Confucian governance and its processes through its aging, abuses of power, and its 
calcification of governance institutions, rendering it incapable of responding to the 
challenges of modernization forced upon the East-Asia.  The data highlighted the 
institutional deficits of Confucian governance and its lack of flexibility and adaptability in 
meeting the external and internal challenges.  Warring periods both in Korea and China 
often incapacitated the Confucian hierarchy in their caring for the commoners’ lives. 
 
While the strength of the moral and intellectual integrity of Confucian humanism remained 
unchanged, the Confucian governance as the system of serving the people had to go 
through a reformation such as through the ‘Practical Learning’ school of thought in Korea 
and Japan.  In this process, Chu Hsi’s orthodoxy was severely challenged by those more 
inclined to act upon the possible practical steps for the benefit of the broader community of 
commoners.  The ‘Yangming school’ both in China and Japan virtually became another 
major strand of Neo-Confucianism, as they appealed to the commoners with less interest in 
moral and philosophical discourse than in survival and subsistence.  Social stratification 
occurred, and structural rigidity undermined Confucianism and its legitimacy.  Most 
eloquent expressions of such popular discontent with Confucian governance and hierarchy 
came from the major popular uprisings such as the ‘T’aiping Rebellion (1851-1864)’ in 
China and the ‘Tonghak (East Learning) Rebellion (1894-1897) in Korea.  These revolts 
were the direct outcome of Confucian governance failure.  Confucian governance as the 
social morality underwent a major shift from orthodoxy to decay and incompetence, facing 
the challenge of having to choose between major restructure or meet demise. Equilibrium 
was broken and the society was getting eager for a new era.  The rejuvenation of the 
classical strength of Confucian ideals was attempted, but did not materialize soon enough.  
The Korean shift against Confucian governance occurred with the annexation of Korea in 
1910 to the empire of Japan who imposed the Meiji system of Japanese-Western 
governance. Japan employed the Confucian ethos within the structure of the Meiji 
constitution, but structurally, their governance system shifted almost entirely to that of the 
West.  The Republic of China in 1911 adopted a Western constitution, while Dr. Sun 
incorporated Confucian moderation within the constitution such as the ‘qualified human 
rights within the context of the republic revolutionary agenda.’   
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Strong references were made through discussions and literature to the Confucian societal 
evolution in conjunction with the structural dilemma of Confucian governance.  The new 
reality imposed upon the Confucian structure of intellect and ethos a compelling call for a 
fresh set of knowledge and necessary social reforms.  Both scholarship and system of 
governance inched closer to the demands of secular needs by engaging with the market 
forces and the power of science mostly coming from the West.  Both the Neo-Confucian 
doyen Mou Tsung-san (1909-1995) and political leader Kim Dae-Jung (b. 1925) held that 
the Confucian accommodation to modernity and the rejuvenation of the spirit of Confucian 
governance is both possible and necessary, only when contemporary Confucianism is in 
step with the market economy whereby people participates as the basic creative forces of 
the society and the full benefit of the advances in science are enjoyed.  Conversely, the 
demand made earlier in Yi dynasty by those of the ‘School of Practical Learning’ could be 
met only through the violent changes wrought by the external forces upon the unwilling 
Confucian hierarchy.  Human rights observance as the integral elements of the governance 
could be re-ignited in earnest, when the institutions of human rights accompanied the 
change that came over the Confucian societies.  
 
4.4.2 Evolution of Confucian Governance and Human Rights  
Confucian orthodoxy as the state ideology had societal cohesion and civility as its minimal 
practical aim.  Within the framework of Confucian humanism permeating all walks of lives, 
the sovereigns were expected to refrain from the excessive use of power since their 
mandate came from heaven, namely the ultimate accountability to the service of people.  
Mencius was forthright in warning against incorrigible sovereigns as they become subject 
to their removal after all peaceful means have been exhausted to correct their ill political 
behaviours in alienation of the people’s rights to living.  
The discussion groups referred to this critical finality, including the modern debate over the 
‘Asian democracy’ between the ‘liberal democracy’-minded Kim Dae-Jung and Lee Kwan 
Yew who upholds the inevitability of ‘Asian autocracy’ based on the East-Asian Confucian 
culture.   
The discussants referred to the historical episodes of people’s struggle for recognition of 
their rights, most prominently, the Gwangju (Kwangju) Democratization Movement also 
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known as the Gwangju Uprising in Korea during 1980, which triggered a democratic shift in 
Korean politics.  Both military governments of 1961-1987 and the dissidents shared 
Confucian values, but differed in the terms of how to advance the nation in their pursuit of 
national goals, namely prosperity and democracy.  
They also pointed out that the people’s spirit in pursuit of demo-centric values was an 
inherent part of Confucian teachings, if not legally spelled out as plainly as in the modern 
constitutional framework.  
It also pointed out that this constitution has dropped, during the process of Japanese 
moderation, a clause for human rights protection within Japan that broke away from the 
ethnicity-citizenship nexus.  Foreign born residents and their descendents remain as 
permanent aliens under the current constitution; thereby those foreign born residents 
brought to Japan during wartime now in their third or fourth generations still remain 
alienated from the mainstream society, with restrictions on their participation in the public 
services.   
Japanese civil societies and legal advocates have been actively pursuing changes to more 
transparent regimes of human rights, but changes have been slow to come.  Discussions 
indicated that the government-led education campaign called the ‘decade of the nation’s 
learning of human rights,’ underway since 2002, is an indication of how difficult and 
painstakingly slow the internalization of human rights regime is within the Japanese ethos.  
Japanese sensitivities would consider it an impingement upon their perceived ethnic purity 
and unique ‘Japaneseness’ to let in the challenges coming from outside.   
The Japanese discussants also indicated that consensus has been reached in Japan that 
Japan aspires to become a globally respected player befitting its economic might, including 
a seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and expanding the role of the 
Japanese Self-Defence Forces as the UN Peace-keeping forces.  Both require the broader 
support of other nations, including unwilling and suspicious neighbouring nations such as 
Korea and China, whose residents constitute the majority of the aliens in Japan.  These 
so-called aliens clamour for equality in human rights within Japan.  The ‘internationalization 
(kokusaika)’ as the Japanese term of globalization has become a direct driver of possible 
changes with the human rights regimes.  Since 2000, Japan no longer supports the 
  218
so-called ‘Asian value’ thesis in the human rights conventions annually convened by UN 
Human Rights Council.     
 
The Republic of China since its birth in 1911 had had the human rights discourse and 
observance as the central issue of the new republic’s political legitimacy.  Sun Yatsen’s 
‘Three People Principles (san-min chu-i)’ had democracy as one of the three principles.  
His idea of human rights was moderated in an ambiguous word by his study of the Western 
models, in particular that of the US and Abraham Lincoln’s that he admired, to what he 
thought was a right fit to the historical reality of the China of his time.  
 
Discussants referred to the concept of the ‘human rights for the revolutionaries,’ whereby 
those actively participating in the republic’s revolution would be the first and foremost to 
become the legitimate beneficiaries of human rights as they had fought for them.  This 
exclusivist approach remained as part of the political ideals of the National Party (KMT) 
even after the 1949 transition of its government to the island of Taiwan.  It became the 
basis of discrimination against the indigenous population and earlier migrants from the 
mainland during the Ch’ing dynasty.  
 
The KMT government throughout its 1949-2000 rule accommodated Confucianism as the 
‘national learning’ and administered it directly under the Ministry of Education.  The 
opposition that defeated KMT in the historic election in 2000 led by Ch'en Shui-pien 
(presidency 2000-current), a former human rights lawyer, who has not dismantled the 
ministerial overseeing system of Confucian national learning.  The leading contemporary 
Neo-Confucian scholars of the Republic who started and led the contemporary 
Neo-Confucian movement made their own contribution in the reinforcement of the 
Confucian tradition in the political and economic transformation of the Republic.  
 
Discussants pointed to the significance of the Republic’s active participation during the 
drafting of the UN charter on human rights, namely, the ‘Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’ through the vice chairmanship of P. C. Chang (1892-1957).  Chang, Confucian 
educated in youth, was invited to contribute to the drafting process and indeed succeeded 
in infusing a certain sense of Confucian humanism to the draft within the framework of 
‘respect for and universality of human dignity.’   
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Discussions highlighted the importance of the people’s struggles for their rights. 
Significance was particularly attached to the so-called Feb. 28th incident of 1947 and the 
Kaohsiung Incident of 1979.  The latter produced many dissident leaders and advocates for 
human rights composed of ‘those outside the KMT political sphere (t’ang-wei),’ including 
the current president Ch’en and vice president Annette Lu (vice presidency 2000-current). 
Discussions also indicated that the liberal democratic model of democracy is undergoing a 
period of severe growth pains, since the newly earned political freedom has allowed a 
flare-up of an incessant series of the ‘zero sum’ political struggles between the incumbent 
and the KMT opposition in their endeavour return to the power that they held for over a half 
century.  The Ch’en government policy of Taiwan independence antagonizes the mainland 
in terms of the ‘one China policy.’  The Republic’s human rights regime crosses to other 
faith communities.  Christian support of the indigenous rights has been significant.  The 
Presbyterian Churches of North America maintained their support of indigenous rights 
throughout the Japanese occupation of 1895-1945 and the KMT governments of 
1949-2000), suffering substantial sacrifices in human terms.  
 
4.4.3 Evolution of Human Rights and Confucian Gender Equality as an Unfinished Project 
 
The three nations are liberal democracies in terms of democratic constitutionalism and the 
rule of law they institutionalized. Korea and Japan are the signatories to the UN 
conventions of international human rights regimes such as International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) among others.  The Republic of China though stripped of UN 
membership since 1979, publicly declared their compliance with the key conventions of the 
UN. When the governments send their reports as signatory nations such as the UN Human 
Rights Commission, the society advocates or lawyers organizations also offer their views 
to the public sometimes sending contrary reports.  This aspect of checks and balances is of 
significant importance to reconciling the national human rights agenda and perceptions 
and priorities with those of international community.  The ‘Minbyun (Korean Lawyers for a 
Democratic Society)’ and the ‘National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK)’ play this role 
regularly.  The Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) offered an ‘alternative report’ 
to the UN human rights organization.  The ‘Chinese Association for Human Rights’ played 
a similar role in the international forums on the status of human rights in the Republic of 
China.  
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Despite economic prosperity and democratization of the three nations, there remains a 
serious level of gender inequality in all three nations.  Women enjoy the same education 
and welfare opportunities.  Notwithstanding, women are grossly under-represented in 
many areas of social participation, despite their individual capacities.  Discussions included 
comments about the Korean female prime minister and presidential candidate, but these 
examples remain rarities.  Confucianism is the first to be blamed for the patriarchal 
hierarchy and traditional attachment of primogeniture that perpetuated womanhood to the 
secondary roles at home or in society.  Confucianism can not avoid such criticism, in view 
of the long history of Confucian orthodoxy as state ideology of Korea and China, and also in 
Japan to a certain extent.  Discussions and literature pointed to the numerous social 
disparities and outright injustices condoned under Confucian governance, and the literary 
works that portrayed the hardship of the under-represented members of the societies such 
as womanhood.  Women found their private intellectual and aesthetic space in pursuit of 
the arts and literature often under the influence of Taoist and Buddhist transcendentalism. 
It is noteworthy that behind the great Confucian scholars, there have been great mothers 
who helped form the character of the great person in youth.  The Korean Confucian doyen 
Yi Yulgok (1536-1584) had the prominent calligrapher and artist mother Sin Saimdang 
(1504-1551).  The three nations abound in the number of anecdotes about the ‘great 
mothers for great persons.’  It remains to be seen whether time may arrive when Confucian 
families talk of the ‘great mothers for the great daughters.’ 
 
4.4.4 Confucian Governance and the Challenges of Reform: Human Rights in the New  
Millennia 
 
The discussions and literature data pointed to the aspect that the intentionality of 
Confucian humanism was translated into the formulation and institutionalization of 
Confucian governance.  It was a bold prescription for moral grounding to overcome the 
process of struggles and to realize an ideal society.  It was far from being a recipe for 
self-perpetuating peace.  Confucius and his disciples were born into warring states, and his 
teachings were not entirely embraced by those sovereigns then governing.  His teaching of 
humanity became a basis of political mandate for those willing and capable of attaining the 
level of moral character that encompasses self-cultivation, concern for community and the 
unity with Heaven as the source of the eventual mandate.  Classical teachings of the 
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Confucius school origin, however, faced severe challenges on the grounds of the various 
alleged weaknesses and vulnerability.  The discussants pointed to the institutional frictions 
with the legalists who insisted upon more firmly and clearly spelled out ‘rule by law’ terms 
rather than relying entirely upon universal goodwill.  Mohists criticised the Confucian lack of 
egalitarian concerns for those who can not afford access to potentially elitist learning of 
Confucian schools.  The era of active philosophical and political debates with the 
participation of the so-called ‘Hundred Schools of Thought (770-222 B.C.E.) was also the 
same era in which the Confucian governance ideology had to weather the storms of 
criticism.  
 
Discussions and literature referred to the point that Confucian governance as the 
‘governmentality’ 35  of Confucian humanism was adopted as a state ideology by the 
Emperor Wu of Han (156-87 B.C.E.) thanks to the extraordinary contribution made by the 
leading Confucian scholar-official of the era Tung Chung-shu (195-115 B.C.E.).36  The 
governance system then was institutionalized through the court-sponsored learning 
institutions and state exam system based on the five Confucian canons which lasted for an 
extraordinary period of longevity of 18 centuries and also was shared by the Confucian 
neighbors of Korea and Vietnam among others.  Discussions and literature also pointed to 
the notion that sustainability of Confucian governance was possible due to the series of 
major reforms by a host of later Confucian leaders.  Discussions and literature referred to 
the importance of the contribution made by the leading Neo-Confucian thinker Chang Tsai 
(1020-1077) and his overriding call for return to Confucian humanism, laying a new 
foundation for the major reforms.  Another major call for reform came from the prominent 
Confucian leader Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-1695), 37  whose demand included the 
‘constitutions’ and the rule of law with ‘human rights’ protection of the under-represented 
social class at the forefront of such reforms.  Huang did not see his ideals realized in his life 
time, but continued to inspire the reform leaders in the 19th century in all Confucian nations 
of East-Asia.  The School of Practical Learning played an important role in bringing 
scholarly and philosophical concerns of Confucian humanism much closer to the tangible 
needs of the broader community of commoners, not only in the matters of subsistence, but 
also in social justice such as the balance of human duties and rights.  Such Confucian 
                                                
35 Foucault 1990, Op. Cit. 
36 Queen, Sarah A. 1996, ‘Chapter 7: The Wider Circle of Han Jurisprudence’, in From Chronicle to Canon: The 
Hermeneutics of the Spring and Autumn, according to Tung Chung-shu, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
37 Huang Tsung-hsi 1993, Op. Cit. 
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reforms not only helped sustain the sustainability of Confucianism as a philosophical 
tradition, but also nurtured a sympathetic ethos for civic justice.  Discussions and literature 
made allusion to the notion that adoption of and unimpeded transition to the liberal 
democratic institutions including human rights observance was attributable to a long 
nurtured Confucian tolerance.   
 
In terms of the maturity of modern democratic institutions of the three nations, inclusive of 
human rights regimes, discussants agreed that the three nations are still very young 
democracies, and are very much in the process of self-reflection and adjustment to the new 
condition of their fast globalizing societies.  While Confucian humanism per se is not 
challenged, Confucian governance faces the major challenges of diverse reforms in the 
new millennia as it did numerous times in the past.    
 
4.5 CONFUCIAN HUMANISM AND ECONOMIC ETHICS 
 
Economic ethics was viewed during the discussions as an ethical extension of Confucian 
humanism and governance on the same continuum with human rights.  Discussions and 
literature pointed to the ethical crisis that has been emerging under the forces of the market 
economy, where Confucian East-Asians play an active role as economic actors within the 
global economy.  In contrast to the rich economic dividends that East-Asia benefited from, 
Confucian East-Asians are becoming more aware of their negligence of the economic 
ethics.  Discussions led to the point that such an ethical lapse about the economy is most 
pronounced in the destruction of global ecology.  In an insatiable pursuit of economic and 
industrial progress, the so-called ‘developmental economies’ of East-Asia have been in a 
rush, and  often turned blind eyes to the concerns about sustaining the nature that 
Confucian teachings refer to as the ‘source of their beings.’   
 
Discussions and literature led to the point that Confucians are newly awakened to the vital 
challenge to Confucian humanism in itself.  The challenge is whether the Confucian belief 
in itself remains valid, facing such a critical ethical crisis, in light of the Confucian belief in 
the ‘human continuity of being,’38 whereby humans are in a nexus with both earth and 
Heaven.   
 
                                                
38 Tu, Weiming 1998, Op. Cit.  
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On the most fundamental level of the perception as to why such a crisis is allowed to 
happen, discussions and literature alluded to the thought that current global crises arose 
due to the dominance of a homo-centric social philosophy.  In other words, homo-centric 
individualism rode on ‘technological thinking’ as a brainchild of the ‘Enlightenment’ stream 
of thoughts.  Such thinking has humans at the centre of the universe and assumes that 
humanity is endowed with the exclusive rights to dominion over the nature.  Discussions 
and literature also pointed out that Confucian humanism has to recover its social principle 
of the unity between humans and nature.  Conversely, it has to return and live up to the 
inextricable nexus of relationships both between human and human, and between human 
and nature. 
 
Discussions also led to the point that the philosophical anthropology of Confucianism 
consistent with that of Taoism and Buddhism considers nature as the source of all living 
forms including humans, in contrast to the Judeo-Christian thesis that nature is the 
endowed resources for the humanity to conquer and utilize.   Neo-Confucian scholar Yi 
Yulgok (1536-1584) of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) in Korea held the cosmology built 
around the ‘united theory of material force.’39  Yi built his cosmology around ‘material 
force’ as the connective cosmological link between all beings, as he believed that such 
‘material force constitutes a foundation for all ecosystems, allowing for a place for both 
humanity and all other entities.40  This view was shared by Kaibara Ekken (1630–1714) 
of the Tokugawa era (1600-1864) in Japan and owes its intellectual birth to the teachings 
of Chou Tun-yi (1017-1073) of the Northern Sung dynasty (960-1127) in China.   
 
Discussions and literature highlighted the contradictory thesis of the market economy.  The 
economic dynamism of a market system brought to Confucian East-Asia unprecedented 
prosperity.  On the other hand, the market principle of competitive pursuit of profit which the 
Confucian East-Asia partake of in earnest undermined the very abode of all lives including 
humanity.  In other words, Confucian East-Asia followed upon the ‘enlightened worldview’ 
rooted in scientific rationality, materialism and social utilitarianism in the interest of 
‘progress.’  Discussions highlighted a need to be reminded of Lao Tzu’s teachings of ‘unity 
with nature’ as a viable solution.  In so doing, Confucian East-Asia can recover its freedom 
                                                
39 ch’i (ki in Korean: material force, ether or force) 
40 Ro, Young-chan 1989, Op. Cit. 
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from artificiality and arbitrariness of the homocentric way of thinking that separates 
humankind from nature. 
 
Discussions and literature pointed to the efforts made by those concerned in the industry 
who supported the initiative of the principle of ‘co-habitation or symbiotic coexistence 
(kyosei)’ of industry within a sustainable nature.  Originating in Japan, this initiative is 
known to be widely shared by the industrial community in Europe and the US.  This 
principle is also consistent with the dialectic dualism of ‘principle’ and ‘material force’ 
enunciated Chu Hsi.41   
 
The most eloquent reminder of the central Confucian concept of a ‘earth-human-cosmos 
continuum’ is the dictum by the  Neo-Confucian doyens such as Chang Tsai (1020-1077) 
who said: ‘Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as 
I find an intimate place in their midst.’  The twentieth century Confucian scholar Mou 
Tsung-san (1909-1995) called out to the East-Asian minds to the ‘life-world philosophy’ as 
the central idea of modern contemporary Confucian teachings.  Discussions and literature 
referred to his assertion that the modern Confucian challenges are firstly to ‘subjectively 
overcome the contradiction between life and reason’ through a renewed Confucian 
‘philosophy of life,’ and secondly to ‘objectively overcome a contradiction between life and 
reason’ through respect for the creativity of the nature that sustains all forms of lives and 
the environment that embraces them.  
 
Ethics within the market mechanism is certainly important enough to keep up the 
transparency and health of an economic system based on the just management of the 
market system.  The bigger challenge facing the economic ethics lies in whether and how 
Confucian East-Asians can refresh its ‘philosophy of life’ in order to responsibly live up to 
the principles and worldview born of Confucian humanity.  Confucian humanism rooted in 
the ‘human–to-nature nexus’ compels that the common concerns of the global community 
are listened to and economic ethics such as concerning the global ecology are properly 
attended upon, as the circumstances can only worsen with the passage of time.  
 
                                                
41 ch’i (qi : force, material force or ether) 
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Discussions and literature pointed to the notion that economic interests should no longer 
impose on the nature any process of unstoppable declines or ‘creative destruction.’42  The 
Confucian teachings on leading the thrifty and simpler lives serve as a plain reminder as to 
how to live a life in a non-agonistic relationship with the nature.  A discussant called this 
ethical economic approach to the ecology the ‘deep ecology.’43  The ‘deep ecology’ 
implied the re-anchoring the economic ethics of nature as the long term commitment 
without imposing limit on the time requirement.  Discussions also supported the view 
that Confucian economic ethics as an extension of Confucian humanism should see 
to it that a new global regime of environment and ecology should be deployed in 
conjunction with peace, human rights and equitable social and economic development.  
 
4.6 CONFUCIAN HUMANISM AND GLOBALIZING CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
The economic ethics discussed so far has concerned itself with how Confucian humanism 
plays out in the economic domains, in particular, facing the global ethical challenge of the 
ecological crisis.  It was about the three nations’ role in economic ethics, not only as global 
economic actors, but also as responsible members of the global civil society.  
 
Discussions pointed out that the globalization of East Asia occurred primarily in the 
economic domains.  Then one could ask, given the economic globalization of East-Asia, if 
Confucian humanism in itself is global or even universal.  Taken in the global context, the 
question can continue if it is ‘compatible with the ideals and concerns of globalizing civil 
society.’  Discussions gave divergent views, but one consistency with responses was that 
the three nations are still very much in the process of adjusting to and inculturating of what 
is perceived as the global civil and civilized society.   
 
Discussions asserted that Korea underwent a dramatic political shift from the military 
government era (1961-1987) and became probably one of the most liberal democratic 
societies in Asia. Discussions also pointed out that the intuitional change has not 
internalized into the ‘qualitative change’ within the system and with the ‘perceptions of the 
constituents’ of this young democracy.  Pains of change and growth are evident, and 
termed as undergoing the ‘measles of democratization.’  Confucianism was embraced by 
                                                
42 Schumpeter 1991, Op. Cit. 
43 Foundation for Deep Ecology, <http://www.deepecology.org/directory.html>, viewed 17 February 2007. 
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both military governments and the oppositions in mobilizing their own political legitimacy 
through the display of their own versions of Confucianism either as a means of securing the 
political status quo citing ‘social stability’ or as the moral ground for change of 
governments.  
 
Japan undertook the national agenda of ‘internationalization (kokusaika)’ as commonly 
referred to in Japan as an equivalent to globalization.  It has been reinvigorated since the 
start of the new millennium.  The ‘internationalization is very much the contemporary 
catch-word and an action plan of the government and the citizenry of Japan.  It was 
preceded by an intensive national ‘soul-searching’ called the ‘national identity discourse 
(nihonjinron)’ in the 1980s and early 1990s.  Discussions informed that it faced the internal 
challenges of having to overcome the time-honoured ‘closed nation (sakoku)’ syndrome.  It 
also faced the external challenges of unwilling and suspicious Asian neighbours with whom 
Japan still has the task of overcoming the pains rooted in recent history.  The Confucian 
ethos permeated nearly all aspects of life in Japan, but only in so far as it serves the 
purpose of reinforcing what is already uniquely Japanese.  Despite hurdles on the way, 
Japan as a nation tries to ‘re-open its nation (kaikoku)’ to becoming a more responsible 
player on the global stage including the immediate goal of becoming a permanent member 
in the UN Security Council and more active peace-keeping roles under the UN banner. 
 
The political shift in the Republic of China arose with the downfall in 2000 of the nationalist 
Party (KMT) from its half a century of political monopoly.  Political shifts did not affect the 
status of Confucianism as the ‘national learning,’ in so far as the Confucians do not take 
sides.  The memory is fresh in the Republic about the intense ideological contest during 
and after May 4th Movement (1919) between those in support of fast-track Westernization’ 
such by Hu Shih (1891-1962) and those against it.  The latter such as Liang Shuming 
(1893-1988) would like to see the Confucian tradition reinforced through the ‘Western 
science-based instrumentalist modernization’ while maintaining the core of Confucian 
philosophical strength.  Mou Tsung-san perceived the project of the Republic of China 
becoming a global civil and civilized society lying in the building of the society, fortified by 
the new sources of strengths that modernity brings, such as democratic institutions and 
advancement of science that Confucian governance sorely missed in its history.  
Discussions also referred to the thoughts of Mou and his colleague Carsun Chang to the 
effect that Confucian humanism could contribute to building of the global community of civil 
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societies through sharing of  the integral values of Confucian humanism such as humanity, 
civility, interconnectedness, reciprocity and communitarian interest at heart through 
self-cultivation to become responsible  ‘ideal persons.’44   
 
Discussions alluded to the notion that, if the three fundamental ingredients of civil society in 
the global context were ‘democratic polity, civil capitalism and the rule of law,’ Confucian 
humanism would share such economic, legal and political ideals.  The three nations are on 
their own paths to ‘democratization, sustainable market economy, and liberal democratic 
constitutionalism’ in a way fitting their own circumstances and the sensitivities of their 
indigenous cultural traditions.  The three nations have seen the rise of civic participation of 
legal and human rights advocacies that have risen above the narrow interpretations of 
national interests and acted in their own way to represent the view of the peoples of the 
nations in the various international domains.  Discussions also indicated that the biggest 
dilemma Korea is facing is the division of the peninsula between the North and the South. 
Japan’s dilemma sees more of internal attachment to the long cherished ‘native ethos’ that 
finds the opening of the ‘nation’ equal to compromising the integrity of the nation.  The 
young democracy of the Republic of China hinges its project of becoming a globalizing civil 
society upon its cross-strait relation as it directly engages the internal progress of politics 
and security of the divisive society that it has become since the Opposition came to power 
in 2000.   The three nations no longer entertain the so-called ‘Asian thesis’ of democracy 
with the use of Confucianism as a pretext of political moderation.  Discussions indicated 
that in all three nations, the breath and depth of civic participation in the political process 
have already reached a substantial level and they are aspiring to new heights.   
Discussions also alluded to the notion that the project of globalizing civil society in the three 
nations may have already been launched, and are well underway.  In all likelihood, 
Confucian humanism would benefit such a process thanks to the shared core values, but 
how it works remains to be seen. 
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The above has been the analysis and interpretation of the discussion data and 
documentation corroborations of Chapter Three aided by the corresponding themes, points 
and content of the literature review outlined in Chapter Two.  The progression of analysis 
                                                
44 chün tzu (ideal person) 
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and interpretation followed broadly on the themes of the foundation of Confucianism as the 
common philosophy, Confucian humanism and its governance such as impacting upon 
human rights and economic ethics, and the global context of Confucian humanism.  The 
complex interplay of the diverse factors and multi-levels of the cultural and philosophical 
layers emerged.  Some indeed became the building blocks of Confucian humanism in the 
three nations.  Others grew to become the deterrents to it. 
 
The legacy of Confucian scholarship and practices around the ‘mind and heart’ school of 
learning emerged as an enduring aspect of Confucian humanism.  It represented not only 
Confucian religiosity, but also became a wellspring for the sympathetic Confucian ethos for 
those caring for the greater community of commoners in making education affordable and 
accessible as in the Tokugawa era Japan and Yi dynasty of Korea through volunteers’ offer 
of free education through their private academies in the provinces beyond the fiscal means 
of the central governments.  
 
‘Collective intentionality’ as related to Confucian governmentality has remained in the 
social consciousness of the Confucian tradition since the Classical Age of Confucius, and 
remained within the social psychology of Confucian societies, not as a means of 
subjugating individual wills, but as the harmonizing medium for the different levels of the 
societal hierarchy.   
 
Korean Confucianism had placed a very high priority on education, as it is not only a 
medium of self-cultivation, but a direct path to power and wealth such as through the state 
examination system. Japanese neo-Confucians had promoted a more egalitarian 
education additional to the elitist one, grooming a much larger literate populace ready to 
adjust to a new society that Meiji Reformation helped bring about.  The Modern Republic of 
China adopted both Western education and that of Confucianism as the essential teaching 
of the nation.  
 
Government institutions of contemporary Korea, Japan and the Republic of China shed the 
traces of Confucian governance in terms of institutions, but maintain the strong Confucian 
ethos in its legal and institutional framework.  Neo-Confucian scholars long felt the need to 
improve upon the institutions of democracy and the advancement in science, whereby the 
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three nations enthused in the embracing of both.  It also meant bridging an important gap 
between Confucian East-Asia and the West that brought the impetus to such change.  
 
Confucianism, an embedded way of life, exhibited an extraordinary level of tolerance 
towards other missionizing religions such as Christianity.  In the highly Christianized 
country of Korea, nearly all Christians are Confucians as well.  Confucianism in Japan 
remains more implicit as a source of intellectual and ritual resources in support of the 
indigenous system of thought and sensitivity.  Confucianism in the Republic of China is 
whole-heartedly embraced as a tradition of Chinese life, knowing no internal political 
boundaries, except for mainland China.  
 
The thesis of Confucian humanism as a viable central philosophical, political and social 
theme is broadly affirmed in the case of Korea and the Republic of China, whereas for 
Japan, it does require a number of qualifications, firstly, by determining if it is attuned to the 
integrity of the indigenous Japanese culture, psychological and, lastly, but not in the least, 
aesthetic sensitivity.  The subtle difference between the traditional worldview of indigenous 
Japanese and that of Confucianism as a foreign religion is in fact what the earlier 
neo-Confucians of the Tokugawa era in Japan such as Itō Jinsai (1627-1705) struggled 
with.  In a sense the struggle is still underway, as Japan has a long history of looking up to 
the intellectual and intuitional innovations of China, while watching out against the 
dominance of Sino-centralism both politically and intellectually.  
 
Confucianism grew in depth and fortitude by closely reacting with and against the 
pervasive influences of Taoism and Buddhism.  Confucian aesthetics owes much to the 
Taoist tradition, and its ‘transcendental immanence’ of life and world outlook to Buddhism. 
Both the competitive and affective relationship that has characterised the coexistence of 
the three religions in East-Asia significantly altered each other in character, engendering 
diverse denominations, and pathways of cyclic growth and decline in the three nations.  
   
As regards the global compatibility of Confucian humanism, discussions placed more 
weight on the commonality than on the divergence between Confucian human values and 
what is perceived as the global civil society ideals.  Economic ethic discussions pointed out 
the gravity of Confucian concerns about the severe global challenge of ecology, and 
Confucian role in undoing some of its critical disservice in its economic drive wrought to the 
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ecological health of the world, and to play a fair share in arresting the dangerous downward 
path of the environment. 
 
With this selection of comments on the analysis and interpretation that cross-checked the 
views, points and themes in interplay of discussion data, the documentary support and 
literature review covered in chapters two and three, the discussion now progresses to the 
next and final chapter.  In Chapter Five, the research findings will be reviewed and 
summarized in order to answer the main research question that this study started with, and 
also to ascertain how closely these research findings relate to the three main points of 
postulation the study also started with in Chapter One. 
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Chapter 5: Synthesis and Conclusions 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
With the analysis and interpretation presented in Chapter Four, this fifth and final chapter 
proceeds to a ‘synthesis’ of such analysis and interpretations within the entirety of the 
framework of this thesis in order to reach the ‘research findings.’  
 
Such ‘synthesis’ and ‘findings’ in turn will be examined in relation to how they answer the 
‘main research question’ raised in Chapter One, namely: 
 
‘How has Confucian humanism emerged from the tradition of the commonly shared 
Confucian philosophy in the industrial non-socialist East Asia of Korea, Japan and the 
Republic of China, and how does it relate to Confucian governance in regard to human 
rights and economic ethics on their individual paths towards globalizing civil societies?’  
 
Once examination of the research findings has been completed in relation to the main 
research question backed by the three-point postulation, the discussion moves to drawing 
out the conclusions of the thesis.   
 
This process will be covered under the headings of ‘5.1 Introduction’, ‘5.2 Synthesis and 
Research Findings’, and, finally, ‘5.3 Conclusions.’  
 
Through the process of the analysis and interpretations of the data from the focus group 
discussions, documentation corroborations and literature reviews, the main themes of 
Confucian humanism and its governance system especially in regards to human rights 
and economic ethics have been dealt with.  These themes also covered the foundation 
and evolution of Confucianism as the common philosophy of the three countries, the 
emergence of Confucian humanism, and, in turn, the governance implications of 
Confucian humanism such as upon human rights and economic ethics, and, lastly, but not 
in the least, the global context of Confucian humanism.  
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The complex interplay of the diverse factors and multi-levels of the cultural and 
philosophical layers emerged.  The ‘mind and heart’ have remained the crucial central 
theme as the mainstay of scholarship and practices.  The religious tolerance of 
Confucianism stood out.  The ‘aesthetic affect’ sensitivities were found to place 
momentous importance on Confucian inter-cultural interactions with the indigenous 
tradition of Japan.  These and other themes and points as the outcome of the analysis and 
interpretations conducted thus far will be synthesized hereunder to serve as the ‘research 
findings.’ 
 
5.2 SYNTHESIS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
Confucianism as a philosophical tradition emerged as an outcome of a long evolutionary 
process.  This process has had its major turning points.  The first one was Confucius and 
his crucial foundational work of building an enduring metaphysics and learning system 
around the core concept of ‘humanity’ giving the impetus to the moulding of Confucian 
humanism.  The second one came as the major reformation period called the ‘era of 
Neo-Confucianism’ and the emergence of a new orthodoxy.  The Neo-Confucian era 
followed the intervening millennia of Confucian interactions with their critics such as the 
legalists and the egalitarianism of the Mohists and, most importantly, the alternative 
traditions of Taoism and Buddhism.  During the 16th through 19th centuries, the Korean and 
Japanese Confucians moved the philosophical and social discourse of Neo-Confucianism 
to a new wave called ‘Practical Learning’ to link the Confucian ideals to the practical needs 
of the under-privileged commoners.  The ‘Practical Learning’ era led up to modernity, with 
its different ramifications in diverse denominations and interactions with the indigenous 
traditions.  
 
The following thematic summary provides as the research findings what Confucianism 
and Confucian humanism meant to those in the East-Asian nations of Korea, Japan and 
the Republic of China, in terms of metaphysics, cosmology, religion, humanism, education, 
governance, social psychology, aesthetics and worldview including the outlook on the 
globalizing ‘life-world.’  Each aspect is of a consequence on its own, and is closely related 
to each another.    
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5.2.1 Research Findings on Confucianism as the Common Philosophy of the Three  
Nations  
 
All the participants in the focus group discussions from the three nations agreed to the 
significant level of Confucian influence they could easily recognize in all aspects of their 
lives.  It has been and still remains for them the ‘way’ of life and a trusted and admirable 
path to ‘become human.’  Confucian learning and spirituality are adhered to as a way to 
realize creative transformation of one’s character through the life-long process of 
‘self-cultivation.’  Confucians had attained their height of intellectual, moral and aesthetic 
ideals through the system of learning, philosophizing, and practicing in the tradition of 
‘humanity’ that Confucius and his disciples successfully formulated in the Classical age.  
 
The Confucian concerns are not only demo-centric, but also its teachings call for the unity 
within the ‘human to nature’ nexus.  The harmony sought after within the society of 
Confucians desires for ‘togetherness’ in human development and also seeks to share the 
human flourishing amongst the ‘all in the community’ without exclusion of anyone due to 
social standing or birth right.  This aspect of ‘collective intentionality’ has served Confucian 
governance, and remained the important attribute of Confucian humanism.  
 
The Republic of China as individuals, community and society remains committed to ‘living 
the tradition’ of China, that means, ‘living the way of Confucianism’ as the natural Chinese 
way, considering the Chinese and Confucian ways as interchangeable.  Koreans 
maintained their Confucian ‘souls and decorum’ despite the rise of the missionizing 
religions such as Christianity.  The Japanese employ Confucian thinking and conventions 
to reinforce the national identity only insofar as Confucianism or any ideology of foreign 
origin does not compromise the integrity of Japanese tradition and sensitivity. For 
Japanese, Confucianism remains the philosophy of China despite its universal and 
enduring values.  
 
Confucianism as a living tradition is not monolithic.  Confucius built the foundation of 
Confucianism through his teaching about ‘humanity’ in his Analects as the cornerstone of 
Confucian humanism.  Mencius on the other hand wrote extensively, taught and engaged 
tirelessly about egalitarian social conduct, in particular to guard against the abuse of 
power of sovereigns.  Others contributed more to cosmology such as Chou Tun-i 
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(1017-1073).  Confucianism as a religion is tolerant and willing to benefit from the other 
great traditions such as from Taoism for the ‘unity with nature and appreciation of its 
beauty as is’ and from Buddhism for the depth of spiritual enlightenment.  It was and still is 
quite common in Confucian East Asia that a person is Taoist and Buddhist and, quite 
comfortably and concurrently, remains a Confucian.  This co-existence of the three great 
philosophical traditions competitively yet complementarily signifies a lasting peace among 
the religions that seems more and more a rarity in the rest of the world.  
 
Confucianism is the most secular among the three religions and remained the orthodox 
state ideology for nearly two millennia in Korea and China.  Its governance employed the 
institutions of ‘rites’ that included the symbols, signs and lingual ideographs that came 
from the observation of nature and humanity.  The Confucian contribution to the 
governance of Korea and China during the last two millennia of the dynastic period is 
indisputably central to the governments of both nations.  Confucian participation in the 
official court of Tokugawa era (1600-1864) in Japan was conditional upon the 
complementing of the military governments, not as the one in the driver’s seat.  The great 
neo-Confucians of Japan all served as court advisors, but not as the supreme leaders.  
Such positions were symbolically or realistically reserved for the hereditary emperors or 
the military suzerains called shoguns.    
 
For Confucians, learning meant much more than education.  It meant a semi-religious act 
of self-cultivation to realize the status of the ‘superior person.’  It equated to realizing the 
ideals of Heaven within the micro-cosmos of the Confucian ‘self’ within the community of 
the likeminded Confucian seekers of other ‘selves.’  Confucian scholarship was not an 
option.  It was the way.  It was also the path to public office for which all aspirants for the 
high offices of public service must pass annual exams in Confucian canons and writing 
poetry in calligraphic style.  This wholesome system of character building was the system 
of Confucian learning asked of sovereigns down to a person of any social level  desirous to 
‘become human’ in the true context of Confucian propriety. 
 
The system of learning, the perception of moral links in every relationship, the 
human-to-Heaven nexus in cosmology and the social conduct through Confucian rites 
that survived not just for centuries, but for two millennia, have left a number of enduring 
attributes of the Confucian way of life in terms of the interrelationships between 
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individuals, person-to-person, community and society as a whole.  One of the most 
important aspects is to look upon the family as the most important social institution where 
the strength of character starts and ends as the final test of its validity.  The Confucian 
family is hierarchical, but reciprocity of ‘humanity’ that goes bidirectional leaves everyone 
under the obligation to do the utmost as a member of the micro-cosmic family of their 
natural birth, and also as a member of the macro-cosmic family of Heaven that equates to 
the social domain where ultimately the Confucian ‘superior person’ is accountable to.    
 
As to the broad theme of whether Confucianism remains the common philosophy of the 
three nations, the research findings can be summarized as follows:  
 
5.2.1 (a) Confucian Metaphysics of Humanity 
The Confucian ‘self’ is founded on the anthropological phenomenology of ‘self-to-other 
selves’1 that perceives the ‘self’ in ‘relation’ to the ‘family.’  The Confucian family has a 
wide spectrum, starting with the birth-related family, community and to the largest family 
meaning the society or the Mother Nature with Heaven as its head.  The relation 
determined by ‘being in or of family’ implies a relationship of trust, not of competitive 
struggles for the survival of the fittest.  This metaphysical departure point is what has 
made Confucianism and Confucian humanism enduring as the belief system, surviving 
two millennia through cross-breeding with the other major traditions of Taoism and 
Buddhism.  Confucian humanity based on such a ‘relation’ of ‘self-to other-selves’ 
provided a self at peace with other selves in society, living the ‘promise’ of self-cultivation 
to the level of the ‘superior personhood’ in the elevation of ‘selves’ of the ‘families’ large or 
small for mutual human flourishing.  
 
5.2.1 (b) Confucian ‘Human-to-Heaven’ Nexus Cosmology  
Confucian cosmology is an integral part of the philosophy, since the Confucian 
epistemology of cosmos starts with the perceived ‘micro-cosmos’ existing within the ‘self 
and selves.’  The nexus between the micro-cosmos and cosmos determines the 
Confucian ontology that the cosmos is indeed an abode of all lives, including human 
‘selves,’ with no exclusion of others or other things.  The ‘meaningful’ cosmological nexus 
has been perceived as existing and undergoing the constant changes within the ongoing 
dynamics of the ‘principle (li)’ and the ‘material forces (ch’i).’  Such cosmology has a direct 
                                                
1 Jung & Jung 1994, Op. Cit. 
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bearing upon the religiosity of Confucianism and its attributes of tolerance, enabling the 
crossing of the boundaries between secularism and religious sacredness.   
 
5.2.1 (c) Confucian Religiosity 
Confucianism remains a major religion of the world. Confucianism as a religion does not 
provide a direct personal ‘self-to-God’ relationship for salvation.  Its religious path lies in 
leading lives on the secular path through the semi-religious practices of self-cultivation to 
‘become human.’  Confucian humanness is based on the awareness of ‘immanent 
transcendence’ within the micro-cosmos that has a moral nexus to the highest being in the 
universe.  Confucian religiosity is about the seeking of the ‘way’ in order to find and live the 
‘order and peace’ of the universe within the Confucian ‘self’ and with the selves.  It is 
tolerant about other religions sharing the same or similar values with different paths to 
achieve them.  It also learns and changes from learning from the superior thoughts and 
practices.  
 
5.2.2 Research Findings on Confucian Humanism 
 
Confucian ‘humanity’ became the foundation of Confucian humanism, and came to be 
further reinforced by the teachings of the ‘Confucian four cardinal virtues’ that include not 
only ‘humanity,’ but also ‘righteousness or justice, rites and wisdom.’2  Neo-Confucian 
doyens such as Chu Hsi emphasized the role of human emotions, namely the ‘seven 
emotions,’ i.e., ‘sympathy or love, joy, anger, fear or sorrow, dislike and desire.’3  The four 
cardinal virtues were also called the ‘four beginnings.’  Such ‘human’ and humane four 
beginnings are to be mobilized in order to promote human potential further and also to 
overcome limitations manifested in the ‘seven emotions.’  Confucius’ teachings of 
humanity received egalitarian support later from Mencius who consolidated for the 
commoners the concerns of Confucian humanism and focussed its attention upon them.  
 
On the theme of Confucian humanism, the following summary is given on the research 
findings of diverse Confucian perceptions and attributes of how Confucians perceive their 
humanism. 
 
                                                
2 jen, I, li, chih (humanity, justice, rites and wisdom) 
3 Chan, Wing-tsit 1989, Chu Hsi: New Studies, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, pp. 249 ff.  
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5.2.2 (a) Confucian Education and Self-cultivation towards the ‘Superior Personhood’ 
The Confucian perception of education was that education constitutes a vital path of 
realizing the creative transformation of self rather than acquiring knowledge for jobs and 
being more informed about managing individual lives.  It was more of a path for the 
‘seekers of the way ‘and is a life-long enterprise for all.  It certainly served the practical 
purpose of gaining access to political, economic and public service career opportunities. 
The centrality of education in the Confucian way of leading desirable lives is clearly 
spelled out in the Analects as the ‘greatest pleasure’ of meaningful life.  Despite this 
Confucian emphasis on education, Korean Confucian education was centred on the 
fostering of the scholar-officials.  In China, since the Yüan dynasty (1279-1368) adoption 
of the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy of Chu Hsi as the state ideology, Confucian education 
placed focus on producing the nation’s next generation of state elites.  Japanese 
educators belonging to the ‘practical learning’ schools (jitsugaku) undertook the affordable 
education of the commoners, laying an intellectual groundwork for the fast-track 
modernization that was in waiting to be triggered by the Meiji Restoration (1864).  
Confucian education was not just about learning about Confucian philosophy or an Asian 
intellectual tradition.  The Confucian habit of heart with self-cultivation and life-long 
learning let Confucian East-Asians gain more self-knowledge and knowledge about others 
including those of the West.  Confucian East-Asians have become most ardent learners of 
the Western science and democratic institutions for the last century and half, investing 
their human and financial resources with a highest personal and family priority of 
investment.  Education also became the most important foundation of Confucian 
humanism, as it created a common platform of knowledge, human understanding and 
mutual development.  
 
5.2.2 (b) Confucian ‘Mind and Heart’ Learning and Social Psychology 
Neo-Confucian scholarship has produced a school of ‘mind and heart’ learning as a 
dynamic process of understanding self and the beyond. The Neo-Confucian Wang 
Yangming School of ‘mind and heart’ learning emphasized the role of ‘intuition’ together 
with reason as the integral human capacity to understand truth.  Also Confucian ‘self’ and 
‘super-self’ in the community of ‘selves’ form and maintain the ‘self-portraits of the minds 
and hearts’ in their ‘archetypes of anima.’4   
 
                                                
4 Jung, CG 1971, Op. Cit. 
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These self portraits of minds become the basis of Confucian social psychology.  Korean 
examples were that Korean Confucian self (na) and self-identity (cha’ki) are preserved in 
the ‘referential and ritualized self identity.’  Japanese Confucian decorum would allow 
display only of the ‘professed intention (tate-mae)’, but submerges the ‘real intention 
(hon-ne).’5  The Japanese delight in the penetrating sensitivity and meaning hidden within 
the sorrows of all lives and things, called the ‘sorrow at evanescence (mono o aware).’  
Wang Yangming (1472-1529) went further and suggested that the ‘mind’ and the ‘principle 
(li)’ are the same and ‘to understand the universe, one needs to seek within one’s own 
mind first.’  
 
Such multi-layers of Confucian mind and heart form a structure of intellect and ethos, and 
proceed to engendering the set of knowledge and reality as a new construction, and 
continue to impact upon Confucian scholarship and governance.   
 
5.2.2 (c) Confucian Governance 
The ideals of Confucian governance or the ‘ching-shih (ordering of the world)’ have been 
encapsulated in one of the four Neo-Confucian canons, i.e., the ‘Great Learning.’  It is the 
cornerstone of what Confucian humanism could bring to Confucian society.  Confucianism 
as an orthodox state ideology had its basis tenets of governance in so-called ‘sage within, 
king without.’  Also from the ‘Great Learning’ are the ‘means of governance’ under 
so-called ‘three headings and eight particulars’6 that have remained the mainstay of 
Confucian governance. Confucian governance was based on the institutions of moral 
virtues, on the assumption of ‘grooming and installing of the ‘sovereign as a Confucian 
sage.’  It also meant concentration of knowledge and power within the privileged group of 
scholar-officials who performed governance on behalf of sovereigns.  Mencius and other 
Confucian sages continuously warned against the abuse of power by the privileged class. 
Mencian ideals were about compassionate governance, prescribing for the Confucian 
sympathy, ethos and concerns for the underprivileged commoners, in securing 
subsistence and providing chances of self-cultivation and leading meaningful lives despite 
their social standing.   
 
                                                
5 Doi, Takeo 1986, Op. Cit., pp. 35-47. 
6 samgang; Korean, san-kang; Chinese (the Three Heads), palchomok; Korean, pat’iamu; Chinese (the Eight 
Particulars)  
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Reformers of the Neo-Confucian era called for an institutional overhaul such as the 
introduction of constitutionalism advocated by Huang Tsung-hsi.  Japan takes a particular 
pride in having instituted her first constitution as early as in the era of Prince Shōtoku 
(Shōtoku Taishi: 574-622).  It was only with the influence of the West that fully 
institutionalized constitutions came into being in all three nations for which Confucians 
reformers had clamoured for centuries.   
 
Rule of law is the modern acquisition of Confucian East-Asia since Confucian governance 
was that of the ‘rule by law’ based on the Confucian virtues and social harmony.  In terms 
of the maturity of democratic institutions, Confucian governance of the three nations is 
very much in the process of formation and maturing as the ‘young democracies.’   
 
5.2.2 (d) Confucian Human Rights  
The Confucian philosophy of governance in the ‘ching-shih (ordering of the world)’ has 
prescribed a balance of human duties and rights.  There has been an aversion against the 
litigious practices for the protection of human rights by individuals, since it is considered 
socially counter-productive for the preservation of social stability and cohesion.  ‘Human 
rights’ as a vocabulary is an import.  Legal institution for the human rights of the three 
nations occurred at the same time when each nation’s modern constitutional governments 
were introduced.   
 
Mencian egalitarianism is an enduring reference for the Confucian advocacy of human 
dignity, in particular for the rights to subsistence as an equivalent to the modern covenants 
for economic and social rights, not full civic and political covenants.  Confucian 
governance has long been vulnerable as an institution to the abusive power of the 
sovereigns who used the Confucian system of governance as a vehicle for hierarchical 
autocracy.  This concentration of knowledge and power constituted a system of Confucian 
‘governmentality’7 that was at odds with the protection of the commoners’ rights. 
 
Korean success so far with democratization wherefrom they secured the liberal system of 
human rights is an outcome of a long struggle by the peoples for their rights such as 
through the Gwangju Incident.  The first constitution of Korea in 1948 has a framework of 
liberal democracy, but the government of Syngman Rhee (1875-1965) manipulated the 
                                                
7 Foucault 1990, Op. Cit. 
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constitution to suit their autocracy.  Confucian humanism would not object to the people’s 
rights as long as social harmony is preserved.  But this conditionality was sufficient ground 
for political manipulation of people’s rights.  Only with the downfall of the military 
governments in 1987did Korea see a functioning system of human rights observance.  
 
The Republic of China since its birth in 1911 instituted the modern constitution under the 
Three Peoples Principles, but the human rights terms were moderated and reserved only 
for those actively participating in the revolutionary struggles, hence constituting their 
preferential system of human rights until KMT moved their government to Taiwan.  The 
KMT-centric regime of human rights continued until their fall from power in 2000.  Japan 
has had a liberal democratic constitution since 1947 under the tutelage of the Occupation 
forces, but the Cabinet of Japan has been staging the ‘decade of human rights education 
for the nation’ since 2002.  Japan has a particular dilemma on human rights of those aliens 
in Japan who stayed behind after the close of WWII.   
 
Confucian ‘demo-centric’ philosophy is at the centre of Confucian humanism and 
governance. Neo-Confucians, in particular, a number of Confucian reformers of the 
‘Practical Learning‘ school in Korea and China, underscored a need  for institutional 
strengthening and reform of Confucian governance, in particular with the focus on the 
commoners’ rights to economic, social and political rights.  It is only in the twentieth 
century under the influence of the West-originated modernization that the three nations 
began to embark on the system of human rights observance.  It became apparent in this 
research that democratic institutions around the human rights regime is a process 
underway, and far from being established in system awareness or the practices in these 
three young democracies.  One milestone in the human rights discourse in East-Asia is 
that none of the three nations any longer subscribes to the notion of the ‘Confucian Asian 
democracy’ whereby certain human rights could be curtailed in the interest of national 
development as advocated by the Senior Minister Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore.  Three 
nations accept the compatibility of Confucian humanism, human rights and market 
economy, as advocated by the Neo-Confucian doyen Mou Tsung-san (1909-1995) and 
political leader Kim Dae-Jung (b. 1925) of Korea.  
 
It was prophetic that the first drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
insisted on the active participation by the large population and ‘high context culture’ 
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nations such as China and India in the process of creating a new convention for the whole 
of humanity, since human rights conventions subject to moderation by ‘cultural 
particularism’ would be largely dysfunctional in the end.  Participation by P. C. Chang 
(1892-1957) and his Chinese colleagues in the drafting committee with inputs of the 
Confucian concept of ‘humanity’ was a meaningful milestone in the East-Asian history of 
human rights development.  Civil groups of the three nations make a significant 
contribution in reconciling the national system of human rights to the conventions of 
international human rights by offering their annual human rights reports independently of 
their own governments.  
 
5.2.2 (e) Confucian Aesthetics 
Confucian learning places high importance on the personal capacity for literary 
composition in particular, that of poetry, calligraphy and classical painting as the essential 
ingredients of study as the foundational qualities essential to becoming the ‘superior 
Confucian person (chün tzu)’.  Poetic writing is a form of tests given in the state exams for 
the high public offices.  Confucian aesthetics owe a lot to Taoism for freedom of thought 
and closeness to nature as is and its untouched beauty.  Through aesthetic pursuits, 
Confucian minds found the peace and unity with nature that represented the perfection of 
beauty. Aesthetic imagination also gave the commoners the space of freedom under the 
rigid hierarchal society that Confucian governance often created despite their wishes.    
Aesthetics did not replace the centrality of Confucian teachings, since it enriches 
Confucian learning.   
 
In the case of Japan, it is disputable whether aesthetics or Confucian moral teachings 
come first.  Aesthetics has been at the very centre of being ‘fundamentally Japanese.’  
Aesthetic sensitivity and refined description such as the ‘sorrowful emotions (aware)’ is 
known to superbly represent the Japanese innermost perception of beauty.  Motoori 
Norinaga (1730-1801) went further and equated the importance of this aesthetic work of 
the ‘Tale of Genji’ to the Confucian Analects in terms of importance to Japanese national 
identity.  The importance of aesthetics as the ‘signification’ of the collective social and 
national symbols is significant. The contemporary Japanese discourse on the ‘Japanese 
identity (Nihonjinron)’ re-affirmed the Japanese consensus on the ancient Japanese 
identity reflected in the aesthetics.  Japanese would like to see the Japanese identity in the 
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aesthetics8 of the Japanese classics recovered with the support of the moral contribution 
of the Confucian intellectual traditions, not the other way round.  Hence the Japanese 
ideals of a perfect Confucian humanism is closer to the ‘truthfulness, goodness and 
beauty (shin, zen and bi)’ rather than so-called ‘Confucian four cardinal virtues’ of 
‘humanity, righteousness, rite or decorum and wisdom (jen, i, li and chih).’ 
 
5.2.3 Research Findings on Global Confucian Humanism and Civil Society 
 
The three nations prescribe to the international covenants of human rights, and their civil 
groups are actively engaged in the international conventions of human rights both as 
national members and international participants in the upholding of the global human 
rights regime.  Apart from participation in the global market as economic actors, the three 
East-Asian nations confronted the moral challenges in the economic ethics in particular in 
the crisis of global ecology.  While the three nations do partake of the due efforts in the 
micro-aspects of economic ethics, this research paid attention to the macro side of 
economic ethics with special focus on the ecology, where the three nations are part of the 
problem and yet potentially a major contributor in diffusing the crisis. 
 
5.2.3 (a) Confucian Economic Ethics and Global Ecology  
Economic ethics was viewed as an ethical extension of Confucian humanism on the same 
continuum with human rights.  An ethical crisis arose with the market economy, where 
Confucian East-Asians play an active role, due to the moral hazards of economic-centrism, 
including Confucian East-Asians who relentlessly pursued economic progress with an 
undeniable cost to nature and the global ecology.  The East-Asians have been the 
so-called ‘developmental economies’ and have rushed their development with no regard 
to sustaining the nature that Confucian teachings refer to as the ‘source of their beings.’  
The moral challenge is deep seated in that Confucian belief in the ‘human continuity of 
being’9 in a nexus with both earth and Heaven.   
 
On the most fundamental level of the perception as to why such a crisis is allowed to 
happen, discussions and the literature alluded to the thought that current global crises 
arose due to the dominance of a homo-centric social philosophy.  In other words, 
                                                
8 Doi 2001, Op. Cit., pp. 22-37. 
9 Tu, Weiming 1998, Op. Cit.  
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homo-centric individualism rode on ‘technological thinking’ as a brainchild of the 
‘Enlightenment’ stream of thoughts.  Such thinking has humans at the centre of the 
universe and assumes that humanity is endowed with the exclusive rights to dominion 
over nature.  Discussions and the literature also pointed out that Confucian humanism has 
to recover its cosmological principle of the unity between humans and nature.  Conversely, 
it has to return and live up to the inextricable nexus of relationships both between human 
and human, and between human and nature.  The Confucian East-Asia moral dictate is 
how to recover its philosophical anthropology whereby nature is the source of all lives 
including humans, not the resources to conquer and use up.   In a nutshell, Confucian 
East-Asia had a wake-up call, having long followed upon the ‘Enlightened worldview’ 
rooted in scientific rationality, materialism and social utilitarianism in the interest of 
‘progress.’  Confucians are reminded of Lao Tzu’s teachings of ‘unity with nature’ as a 
viable solution and hope they are not too late to play their due roles as a responsible party 
in the global community.  Those concerned in industry are working on the ‘principle of 
symbiotic coexistence (kyosei)’ of industry within a sustainable nature together with 
Europe and the US.   
 
Ethics within the market mechanism is certainly important enough to keep up the 
transparency and health of an economic system based on the just management of the 
market system.  The bigger challenge facing economic ethics lies in whether and how 
Confucian East-Asians can refresh its ‘philosophy of life’ in order to responsibly live up to 
the principles and worldview born of Confucian humanity.  Confucian humanism rooted in 
the ‘human–to-nature nexus’ compels that the common concerns of the global community 
are listened to and economic ethics such as concerning the global ecology are properly 
attended to, as the circumstances can only worsen with the passage of time.  The 
Confucian call for the ‘deep ecology’ implies re-anchoring the economic ethics around 
the preservation of nature as a long term and in-depth engagement. 
 
5.2.3 (b) Global Confucian Civil Society 
The globalization of East Asia is occurring at a fierce pace in the economic domains.  The 
project of a Confucian global civil society used to be the ideal that the East-Asian 
reformers of nineteenth century Korea and China painfully cherished in being 
eyewitnesses to the decay of Confucian governance and its relevance.  The three 
industrial East-Asian nations have overcome the economic hurdles in terms of providing 
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the ‘commoners’ with the economic wellbeing that has been denied them for so long.  
Liberal democracy is still in the process of settling down in the soils of the nations.  Korea 
is undergoing the maturation process of ‘qualitative democratization’ and is colloquially 
described as suffering from the ‘measles of democratization’ where citizens not only enjoy 
the fruits of democracy, but also are asked to partake in the process.  Japan is in the 
process of ‘internationalization (kokusaika)’ as the way Japan handles the challenges of 
her globalization.  This had a precursor called the ‘national identity discourse (nihonjinron)’ 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  She tries to overcome the ‘closed nation (sakoku)’ syndrome and 
forego the burdens of history that provides the sore points with her closest neighbours.  
Japan tries to ‘re-open its nation (kaikoku),’ as she did try to during the Meiji Restoration, 
so that she assumes the global role fitting her stature as the second largest economy of 
the world and certainly the economic locomotive of the Asia-Pacific. 
 
While the three nations aspire for a bigger global role, they also share an internal burden 
of not having overcome gender inequality, often accused of being a part of the Confucian 
male-centric legacy. 
 
The Republic of China, according to Liang Shuming (1893-1988), would like to see the 
Confucian tradition reinforced despite globalization.  Mou Tsung-san perceived the project 
of the Republic of China becoming a global civil and civilized society as the fundamental 
path to the building of the livable society, reinforced by democracy and science within the 
global market economy.  Chang Chun-mai (1887-1969) saw the potential of Confucian 
humanism making an important contribution to building of the global community of civil 
societies through sharing of  the integral Confucian values such as ‘humanity, civility, and 
reciprocity.’  
 
The project of the global civil society is much underway within the three nations.  This 
assessment is based on the substantial progress the three nations had already made and 
also in the dynamic transition underway with what are commonly referred to as the ‘three 
key tenets of civil society,’ i.e., ‘democratic polity, civil capitalism and the rule of law.’  The 
rise in civic participation by legal and human rights advocacies in the international 
domains is another important indicator of the maturing process and surmounting the 
narrow boundaries of national interests.  
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5.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter now turns to draw the conclusion of the thesis, and also undertakes to 
answer the ‘main research question, on which this study embarked in Chapter One, i.e.,  
 
‘How has Confucian humanism emerged from the tradition of the commonly shared 
Confucian philosophy in the industrial non-socialist East Asia of Korea, Japan and the 
Republic of China, and how does it relate to Confucian governance in regard to human 
rights and economic ethics on their individual paths towards globalizing civil societies?’  
 
As the study seeks the clues to the answer, the following overview covers the themes of 
this trans-temporal, cross-cultural and inter-disciplinary discourse held so far, as 
presented within the discussions, documentary corroborations and literatures that 
preceded the current chapter. 
  
Humanism was the foundation of the Confucianism as the learning and belief system. 
Confucian humanism was encapsulated in the teachings of Confucius with ‘humanity’10 at 
the centre of his teachings.  The epicentre of this humanity was traceable, according to the 
words of Confucius himself, in the earlier part of the Chou dynasty era (circa 1122-256 
B.C.E.) that preceded the era of Confucius by centuries. Confucius (551 – 479 B.C.E.) and 
his disciples created the irreversible currents of what is now known as Confucianism and 
its tradition of humanism.   
 
It was a tradition for life-long ‘learning,’ not ‘teaching’ in terms of ‘handing down’ of the 
golden rules from above. The learning for self-cultivation was also based on the attitude of 
extraordinary humility, as Confucius declared in his Analects that there is learning to be 
had when three persons of any calibre meet.  The Confucian tradition went through major 
challenges of alternative groups of thoughts such as the ‘Hundred Schools.’ Most 
significant and fundamental challenges came from the egalitarian Mohists who delighted 
in mocking the Confucians as the foolhardy intellectual servants of sovereigns.  Legalists 
accepted the admirable teachings of Confucians, but criticised the Confucian lack of 
enforceable system of governance, highlighting the fallibility of human nature.   
 
                                                
10 jen: humanity or human-ness 
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Confucianism succeeded in weathering such a stormy period, and had a great chance of 
having it reinforced through the epochal contribution by the prominent Confucian 
scholar-official Tung Chung-shu (ca 195-115 B.C.E.). Tung also succeeded in having 
Confucianism adopted as the state ideology by the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.).   The 
currents of Confucianism and its humanism came to form the ‘river’ by this era, as its 
influence and practices as the belief system, a way of life and the learning system widened 
and deepened in the public and private domains over the Chinese mainland and began 
influencing its neighbours.  The Classical Confucianism that characterized this period of 
the Confucian evolution has survived as the central philosophical influence on the three 
East-Asian nations in terms of the peoples’ way of thinking, learning, family and societal 
relations and the ‘life-world, until their respective polities underwent fundamental changes, 
i.e., Japan through Meiji imperial government (1868-1912), and Korea in 1910 through 
annexation to Japan, and the birth of the Republic of China in 1911. 
 
During the intervening millennium from the era of Tung Chung-shu and the Confucianized 
Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.), Confucianism met many challenges in the interactions 
with alternative belief systems, most importantly, that of Buddhism which, since its 
introduction to the three nations, emerged as the superior intellectual tradition with its 
metaphysics of transcendence that contrasted with the limitations found in Confucian 
worldliness and secularity. The Neo-Confucian reformation that took place during the 
Sung dynasty (960-1279) arrested the downturn of Classical Confucianism, and 
reformulated the greater part of Confucianism and advanced articulation on its humanism 
as we witness today, adjusting significantly its spiritual erudition such as ‘cosmological 
immanence’ of  human spirituality as a major influence of Buddhism. The dwindling 
currents of the tradition of the first millennium re-emerged as the river running through 
East-Asian civilization.  
 
The Neo-Confucian tradition saw the emergence of its most significant branch in the 
school of ‘Practical Learning’ in the 16th through 19th century notably in Korea and Japan. 
Confucian scholar-officials were directing their attention to improving the living conditions 
of the commoners who remained underprivileged in the Confucian hierarchal societies. 
The Neo-Confucian leaders of Japan made a significant contribution in widening the 
educational opportunity to non-elitist groups, ‘tradesmen’ and other commoners who 
otherwise had no access to education and social mobility.  The educated and prosperous 
  247
tradesmen formed the middle class and became one of the mainstreams in the 
modernization and industrialization of Japan that started in earnest with the Meiji 
Restoration.  Korean neo-Confucians and their Chinese counterparts made their own 
effort, but the benefits of wider education remain with rearing the next generation of 
Confucian scholar-officials.  
 
The egalitarian spirit and respect for ‘practical’ and tangible help for those in need, namely, 
commoners, also were prompted by the arrival of the ‘Western learning’ that was 
Confucian name for Catholicism.  The ‘practical learning’ challenged Confucian orthodoxy 
ideals, but also strengthened the tradition through their reformation. The central theme of 
Confucian humanism centred upon the ‘humanity’ of Confucius was never challenged 
despite the tides of reformation that the periods of challenges made necessary.  This 
egalitarian spirit of the ‘practical learning’ school became an important intellectual 
precursor to the forth-coming democratization of Korea and Republic of China.  
 
Confucian governance was both practical undertakings and an extension of the Confucian 
ideal of humanism.  It was expressed in the ‘sage within and king without’ axiom, whereby 
the sovereigns and ministers would take up the governance tasks on the same continuum 
with Confucian self-cultivation to become the ‘superior personhood’ according to the 
Confucian ideals.  Mencius went further with the conditional support of such ideals in so far 
as the sovereigns do not commit the ultimate fallacy of becoming the ‘incorrigible’ ones, in 
which case the rights of the commoners to revolution or to ousting them should be 
preserved.  Another major Confucian reformist Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-1695) called for 
proper constitutionalism to put an end to the widespread abuse of power that alienated 
Confucian ideals from the reality of hardship that the commoners had to live through.  The 
Confucian reformers’ quest for demo-centric governance, fair and functioning institutions 
and the scientific advancement to turn around the peoples’ standard of living has not 
materialized within the framework of Confucian ideals, and certainly not during the 
Confucian dynastic period.    
 
Whereas human rights as a legal term is an import, the Confucian demo-centrism of 
placing the ‘harmonic balance between human rights and human duties’ was the political 
ideology of Confucians, most prominently of Mencius. In reality, the ‘rights part’ of 
Confucian governance was struggling with keeping up the people’s natural rights to 
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subsistence.  In terms of the modern conventions of human rights, Confucian governance 
only partially answered to the ‘covenants of economic and social rights.’  The Confucian 
call for maintaining the admirable harmonic social balance between the Confucian duties 
and rights more often than not became the political instrument of the ‘benevolent 
autocracy.’    
 
Confucian reformers’ works were stopped short, when the revolutionary momentum took 
over with the sudden emergence of the Western imperial powers in the East-Asian political 
scene in the mid-to-late 19th century.  The birth of the Republic of China in 1911 meant the 
demise of millennia old dynastic governance of China, introducing modern constitutional 
governance.  The modernizing Japan of the Meiji era annexed Korea in 1910 and imposed 
Meiji constitutional governance.  New constitutions of Japan and Republic of China had 
many implicit ingredients of the Confucian ethos in the constitutions and education-related 
edicts, but fundamentally those were based on the Western prototypes. Under this 
predominantly West-emulating modernization drive, the currents of Confucianism went 
below the surface of political structure.  The main currents of the Confucian river that ran 
through the East-Asian civilization now became the undercurrents.  Confucian attributes 
are no longer on the spectrum of official governance, but remained in the habits of minds, 
in family and human relationship, and culture and aesthetics.   
 
The economy-centric modernization of the three nations brought Confucian humanism the 
long coveted economic wellbeing of the commoners.  But it also brought a set of new 
dilemmas.  Instrumental interpretation of Confucianism came to be called ‘Asian values’ 
and served the interest of the political autocracy.  The unbridled pursuit of development 
played havoc on nature and the ecology running counter to the Confucian belief in the 
unity with nature.  In the 1980s, Korean Confucian ethos of demo-centrism erupted in a 
major show-down with the thirty year military autocracy whose disdain for the peoples’ 
rights became no longer acceptable.  The undercurrent of Confucian humanism and its 
quest for human dignity resurfaced as the main current when the democratization 
movement became widespread and proceeded in full force.  In the words of Confucian 
educated Bishop Tji Hak-soon (1921-1993),11 the ‘river of justice’ still ran and carried the 
momentum of what the Confucian reformers long cherished as the ‘dreams of 
                                                
11 Tji, Hak-soon (Daniel) 1984, ‘Introduction’, in Chŏng’ŭi ka kangmul ch’ŏrŏm (Let the River of Justice Run Still), 
Hyŏngsŏngsa, Seoul. 
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democratization and democratic institution’ consistent with the ideals of Confucian 
humanism. The ideals of Confucian humanism looked beyond the newly achieved 
material wellbeing of the nations.  Those contemporary Neo-Confucians led reforms in the 
persons of Buddhists, Catholics and Anglicans in Korea, and in the Republic of China, in 
the persons of Protestants.  
 
While the projects of Confucian reforms on democratic institution and advancement in 
science may not be uniquely attributable to the three East Asian nations, the way they 
pursue these projects may have global implications. Confucian humanism is 
uncomfortable with sheer market principles and forces despite the economic prosperity it 
engenders. It is concerned about the destruction of human relations, especially that of 
family as the basic social institution.  It abhors the destruction of nature as it is where the 
humans are from.  It is concerned about the push in education as the key to success in the 
market, whereas Confucian education means life-long learning through self-cultivation for 
mutual flourishing, not winning over others as competitors in the marketplace of 
opportunities. Confucian humanism aspires to overcome such challenges and 
dichotomies, consistent with the resources of ‘humanity’ and its intellectual history of 
having faced similar challenges. For the last century and a half, Confucian East-Asians 
have not only diligently studied Western science and democratic institutions, but also met 
many minds and hearts of the West of alternative belief systems and traditions, yet sharing 
the same concerns about the state of affairs of humanity and where global humanism is 
heading.  The river of Korean, Japanese and Chinese minds met that of North America in 
the Pacific and made the Pacific a greater ocean.  The minds of Europe and East-Asia are 
no longer separated in the pursuit of the common humanism.  The currents of Confucian 
humanism made of universal and ecumenical hearts and minds will not only continue to 
carry on with its tradition of humanity, but will also blend with other traditions and form a 
new and larger current.  
 
The study has come to relate to the ‘main research question’ and also the postulation in 
the three parts.  
 
It became apparent through this study that Confucian humanism was and is the integral 
part of Confucianism from the outset of its birth.  It was embedded in Confucianism as the 
tradition of belief system and the commonly shared philosophy of ‘humanity.’  
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Confucian humanism has been applied to governance implicitly during the West-propelled 
modernization process as the undercurrent within the institutions of governance and 
constitutionalism of the industrial non-socialist East Asia of Korea, Japan and the Republic 
of China. 
 
Confucian humanism with its ‘demo-centric’ ethos certainly provided fertile ground for the 
development of human rights, but the functioning regime of human rights observance has 
been the outcome of the democratic institutions and constitutionalism emanating from the 
West. Despite the long history of the three nations, all three are called ‘young 
democracies,’ since the process of institutionalizing democracy within the ethos of 
Confucian mind and hearts still is underway and remains a project very much in the 
making.   
 
Confucian humanism has a direct bearing on the economic ethics as related to the global 
challenge of ecology.  Confucian belief in human unity with nature needs to be revisited in 
local and global context, remaining a fresh challenge.  
 
Confucian humanism by nature is ecumenical and universal, and will blend and will work 
with other traditions of the world on their individual paths towards globalizing civil societies. 
While Confucian humanism remains shared by the three nations, exception would be with 
their political paths that are conditioned upon how each nation manages its reality rooted 
in the recent history chequered by both cooperation and struggles.  
 
In response to the postulation, firstly, Confucianism as one of the common philosophies 
and beliefs of contemporary Korea, Japan and Republic of China (aka Taiwan) indeed had 
its Confucian humanism from the very inception of Confucianism as the philosophical 
tradition.  
 
Secondly, Confucian humanism did advance governance as expressed in the observance 
of human rights by providing the fertile ground of demo-centric Confucian ethos, but the 
functioning regime of human rights is the outcome of interactions with and help of the 
democratic institutions and constitutionalism coming from the West.  Economic ethics 
based on Confucian belief in the unity of human to nature would be essential in jointly 
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meeting the global challenges of the ecological crisis where Confucian East-Asia must 
shoulder fair share of responsibility on account of its damaging role played in the process 
of industrialization.  
 
Thirdly, Confucian humanism and its ideals would broadly accord with the humanism and 
ideals of a globalizing civil society.  Not only globally shared values of civil society are 
compatible with those of Confucian humanism, but also it is a high likelihood that there 
would be a lot to complement each other with.  
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Appendix 2: Glossary 
 
This glossary covers those vocabulary items referred to in the text of the thesis, and also some appear as 
those in common use and found useful for discussions on Confucianism.  Trilingual equivalents are given only 
if in current use. The meanings of many words are often more than one. Hence the most common ones are 
given. Most Chinese characters are commonly recognized by the three nations, but exceptions exist. Some 
writings of uniquely Japanese practices are quoted in parentheses with denotations of [Kanji]. 
 
 
*Romanization Conventions 
For Korean, the McCune-Reischauer system1 has been used. Exceptions are made for those cases where the 
use of alternative conventions is clearly established. In the quotation of other works, the conventions used by 
original sources have been maintained, unless changes were considered imperative. 
For Japanese, the Hepburn system2 has been used together with its modification made by Kenkyusha’s new 
Japanese-English Dictionary, 3rd edition. Exceptions are made for those cases where the use of alternative 
conventions is clearly established. In the quotation of other works, the conventions used by the original 
sources have been honoured, unless changes were considered necessary to maintain integrity of the texts. 
For Chinese, the Wade-Giles system3  has been used and pinyin equivalents are shown where deemed 
necessary. It has taken up the current practices at UCLA titled Wade-Giles to Pinyin Conversion Table. It is 
also identical with the system adopted by the Library of Congress.   In the quotation of other works, the 
conventions used by original sources have been used, unless changes were considered desirable. 
 
 
Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer 
Hepburn/ 
Kenkyusha 
  
    be [部(族)] tribal group 
    buppō [佛法] Buddhist Law 
   burakumin [部落民] village folks (untouchables) 
   bushido [武士道] way of  the warr ior  
ch’an zhan sōn zen 禪 meditat ion 
chen zhen chin shin 眞[真] t ruth 
cheng zheng chōng  政 sociopol i t ical  order 
                                                     
1 McCune-Reischauer system: http://mccune-reischauer.org, examined 20 August 2006. 
2 Hepburn system: http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/japanese.pdf, examined 20 August 2006.  
3 Wade-Giles system, http://www.loc.gov/catdir/pinyin/romcover.html, examined 20 August 2006. 
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Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer 
Hepburn/ 
Kenkyusha   
cheng zheng chōng  正 order ly 
chengming zhengming chōngmyŏng  正銘 proper use of  terms 
ch’eng cheng sōng  誠 integr i ty,  at tent iveness 
ch’eng-chi chengji sōnggi  成己 sel f-real izat ion 
ch’eng-i chengyi sōng’ŭi  誠意 sincere wi l l  or  intent ion 
ch’eng-jen chengren sōng’in  成人 mature person 
chi ji ki  己 ego, sel f  
ch’i qi ki  氣 force, mater ia l  force, 
ether 
ch’i-ch’ing qiqing ch’ilchōng  七情 seven emot ions 
chi-ku jigu chilgo  疾固 detested inf lexibi l i ty  
chiao jiao kyo  敎 to teach 
chih zhi chi chi 知 knowledge 
chih hsing ho i zhixing 
heyi 
chihaeng habil  知行合一 The unity of knowledge and 
action 
chih zhi ch’i  致 administer  
chih zhi chi l   質  raw stuff 
chih zhi ch’i  治 to regulate, to direct, 
well-governed, in good order 
chih zhi chi  智 wisdom 
ch’ih chi ch’i  恥 shame 
chih ch'eng zhicheng chisōng  至誠 highest integrity 
chih kuo zhiguo ch’ikuk  治國 political administration 
chin jin kŭn  謹  spare one's words 
Chin-ssu-lu  Jinsi lu jinsirok  近思錄 Reflections on Things at Hand 
ching jing kyŏng  經 canon, book 
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Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer    
ching jing kyŏng  敬 reverence, mindfulness, 
earnestness 
ching-tsou jingzou chŏngjwa  靜坐 quiet sitting 
ch'ing qing ch’ŏng  淸 clear 
ch'ing qing chŏng jyō 情 emotion 
   chōnin [町人] tradesman/townsman 
   chōshūhan [長州藩] Chōshū clan of Tokugawa era 
chouli zhōuli churye  周禮 The Rites of Zhou 
chu-tzu 
pai-chia 
zhuzi 
baijia 
cheja paekka  諸子百家 The Hundred Schools of 
Thought 
 
ch’üan-li 
 
quan-li  
 
gen-ri  
 
權利[権利] 
 
right(s) 
ch’un ch’iu  chunqiu ch’unch’u  春秋 Spring and Autumn Annals 
chün tzu junzi kunja  君子 superior persons 
chung zhong ch’ung  忠 doing one's best 
chung zhong chung  衆 the multitude 
chung-yung zhongyong chungyong  中庸 the mean 
fa-chia fajia pŏpka  法家 legalism 
hao hsüeh haoxue hohak  好學 love of learning 
ho he hwa wa 和 harmony 
ho-erh- 
pu-t’ung 
he-er  
bu-tong 
hwa’i pudong  和而不同  harmony without conformity 
   hongaku [本覚] original awakening 
  hong’ik In’gan  弘益人間 the broadest benevolence for 
humanity 
hsi-ming ximing sŏmyŏng  西銘 Western Inscriptions 
hsiang xiang sang  像 image 
hsiang xiang sang  相 phenomenon, mutual 
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Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer    
hsiao jen xiaoren soin  小人 retarded individual 
hsiao-k’ang xiaokang   小康 minimal well-being 
hsien jen xianren hyŏnin  賢人 person of superior quality 
hsin xin sin  信 living up to one's word 
hsin xin sim shin 心 heart and mind 
Hsin-hsüeh Xinxue Simhak shingaku 心學[ 心学] Learning of Mind and Heart 
hsing xing sŏng  性 Character/nature 
hsing xing hyŏng  刑 punishment 
hsing-li xingli sŏngni  性理 nature 
hsűeh xue hak  學 learn 
hui hui hye  惠 magnanimity 
huo huo hok  惑 dispelling doubt 
   husen hōan  [普選法案] universal manhood suffrage law 
i yi ye  藝 art 
i yi ŭi  義 righteousness 
i yi ŭi i 意 meaning, intention, thoughts 
i yi ŭi  宜 appropriateness 
i-ching yijing yŏkkyŏng  易經 Book of Changes 
jen ren in  仁 humanity 
jen ren in  人 person 
jenyü renyu   人慾 human desire 
jen tao rendao indo  仁道 the way of the human being 
jou rou yu  柔 soft 
   Kaitokudō 懐徳堂 Merchant Academy 
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Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer    
kang gang kang  强 hard 
ke-chi geji kŭkki  克己 to discipline oneself 
ko-wu gewu kyŏngmul  格物 investigation of things 
   kogaku [古学] ancient learning 
   kokugaku [国学] national learning 
   kokutai [国体] National Body or Entity 
k’un kun kon  坤 earth 
kuo guo kuk  國 nation 
   kyôiku 
chokugo 
[教育勅語] Imperial Rescript on 
Education 
   kyōsei  共生 symbiotic coexistence 
  kwŏnsŏnjing’ak kanzen chōaku 勸善懲惡 
[ 勧善懲悪] 
encouraging good and 
castigating evil 
li li ye  禮 ritual action 
li li i  理 principle, rationality 
li li p’ung  豊 ritual vase 
li li i  履 to tread a path 
li li i  利 ego-advantages 
  iyong husaeng  利用厚生 functional utility for welfare 
Li-chi Liji yegi  禮記 Book of Rites 
Li-hsüeh Li-xue   理學 School of Principle 
lian lian yŏm  廉 integrity 
liang-chih liangzhi yangji  良知 good knowing or  intuitional knowledge 
liu-i liuyi yukch’e  六禮 six arts 
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Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer    
mang mang maeng  盲 blind 
mei mei mi bi 美 beauty 
min min min  民  the masses 
   minpō [民法] Civil Code 
min te minde mindŏk  民德 te of the masses 
ming ming myŏng  冥 dark, closed eyes 
mu-min 
 
mu min 
 
mongmin mokmin 牧民 shepherding for the people, a 
term used for ‘civic service’ in 
the modern context 
neisheng 
weiwang 
neisheng 
weiwang 
naesŏng 
waewang 
 內聖外王 sage within, king without 
   Nihonjinron [日本人論] Discourse on Japaneseness 
   ningen sonzai [人間存在] human existence 
    ōbō [御法] sovereign law 
  paedo  覇道 ruled by force 
pao bao p’ok  暴 overbearing 
pai hsing baixing paeksŏng  百姓 the hundred surnames, 
populace 
pen-hsin benxin bonsim honshin 本心 original mind 
p'ien pian p’yŏn  偏 one-sided 
po bo pak  薄 thin 
   ritsu ryō [律令] laws and regulations 
ruhsüeh ruxue yuhak jugaku 儒學 Confucianism 
   sabi [寂] sympathy 
san-kang 
pat’iamu 
sangang 
batiamu 
samgang 
paljumok  三綱 八條目 three headings and eight particulars 
sanminchui sanmin zhuyi samminjuŭi  三民主義 
Political ideals of Republic of 
China (nationalism, democracy 
and welfare) 
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Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer   
 
   Satsumahan [薩摩藩] Satsuma clan of Tokugawa era 
  sŏnghak seigaku 聖學[聖学] holy learning or  learning of monarch 
  sŏnghaksipto  聖學十圖 Ten Diagrams to become a sagely sovereign 
shan shan sŏn zen 善 goodness 
shan jen shanren sŏnin  善人 good/adept person  
shengming 
ruhsüeh 
shengming 
ruxue 
saengmyŏng 
yuhak 
 生命儒學 Life Confucianism or 
Confucianism of vitality 
sheng jen shengren sŏng’in  聖人 sage 
shih shi sa  士 scholar-official 
shih chi shiji sagi  史記 Grand Scribe’s Records 
Shih-ching shijing sigyŏng  詩經 Book of Poetry 
shih min shimin samin  使民 proper employment 
shih jen shiren sain  使人 employment of jen 
   shingon [真言] True Words 
   shinto [神道] "the Way of the Gods" 
  silsa kusi  實事求是 seek truth from facts (or real 
events) 
  sirhak jitsugaku 實學[実学] Practical or Real Learning 
shu  shu su   數  calculations 
shu shu sŏ  恕 placing oneself in another's 
place 
shu shu sŏ  書 writing 
Shu-ching Shujing  sŏgyŏng  書經 Book of Documents 
   shūchū kiyaku  [船中規約] Code in the Boat 
shu jen shuren sŏ’in  庶人 the many 
ssu si sa  思 think, reflecting 
  XXI
Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer    
ssu si sa  私 self 
ssulu silu saryŏ shiryo 思慮 deliberation  
ssu-tuan siduan sadan  四端 four feelings(beginnings) 
ta da tae  大 great 
ta da tal  達 convey, reach 
ta jen daren tae’in  大人 great person 
ta-hsüeh daxue taehak  大學 Great Learning 
ta-t’ung datong taedong  大同 Great Commonwealth 
t’ai-chi taiji t’ae  太極 the Supreme Ultimate 
t’ai-ho taihe t’aehwa  太和 the great harmony 
t’ai-hsü taixu t’aehŏ  太虛 the Great Void 
tao dao to  道 Way/noble way 
te de tŏk  德 virtue 
   tennōsei  [天皇制] emperorship 
t’i ti ch’e  體 body 
t’i-yung tiyong ch’eyong  體用 substance and function 
t’ien tian ch’ŏn  天 heaven 
t’ien-fu tianfu: ch’ŏnbu  天賦 heaven's endowment 
t’ien-ming tianming ch’ŏnmyŏng  天命 heaven's imperative 
t’ien-hsia tianxia ch’ŏnha  天下 Heaven and Earth 
t’ien-hsing tianxing ch’ŏnsŏng  天性 heavenly nature 
ts’ai cai che  宰 oversee 
tsao-wu chu zaowuzhu chomulchu  造物主 creator 
  XXII
Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer    
tsojen zuoren   做人 to be a person or  to become human 
tsowei zuowei chagwi sakui 作爲[作為] intention or design 
tsui zui choe  罪 guilt 
tsun zun chon  尊 of high rank 
t'ung tong tong  同 agreement 
tzu-jen ziren chayŏn shizen 自然 nature 
tzu-shih zishi chasil  自失 self-negligence 
tzu-te zide chadŭk  自得 attaining it in oneself 
    uji [氏(族)] family clans 
   ukiyoe [浮世絵] pictures of the floating world 
  wangdo  王道 rule by virtue 
wei-i weiyi yuil  唯一 unique 
wen wen mun  文 cultural tradition(human 
culture) 
wentzu wenzi munja  文字 letter 
wu-wei wuwei muwi  無爲 non-action 
   yakusa no 
kabane 
[八色の姓] eight honorary cognomens  
  yangmyŏnghak yōmeigaku [陽明学] Study of Wang Yang-ming 
  yŏmin tongnak  與民同樂 bliss of sharing happiness  with populace 
   yūgen [幽玄] mysterious longing 
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This glossary covers those vocabulary items referred to in the text of the thesis, and also some appear as 
those in common use and found useful for discussions on Confucianism.  Trilingual equivalents are given only 
if in current use. The meanings of many words are often more than one. Hence the most common ones are 
given. Most Chinese characters are commonly recognized by the three nations, but exceptions exist. Some 
writings of uniquely Japanese practices are quoted in parentheses with denotations of [Kanji]. 
 
 
*Romanization Conventions 
For Korean, the McCune-Reischauer system1 has been used. Exceptions are made for those cases where the 
use of alternative conventions is clearly established. In the quotation of other works, the conventions used by 
original sources have been maintained, unless changes were considered imperative. 
For Japanese, the Hepburn system2 has been used together with its modification made by Kenkyusha’s new 
Japanese-English Dictionary, 3rd edition. Exceptions are made for those cases where the use of alternative 
conventions is clearly established. In the quotation of other works, the conventions used by the original 
sources have been honoured, unless changes were considered necessary to maintain integrity of the texts. 
For Chinese, the Wade-Giles system3  has been used and pinyin equivalents are shown where deemed 
necessary. It has taken up the current practices at UCLA titled Wade-Giles to Pinyin Conversion Table. It is 
also identical with the system adopted by the Library of Congress.   In the quotation of other works, the 
conventions used by original sources have been used, unless changes were considered desirable. 
 
 
Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer 
Hepburn/ 
Kenkyusha 
  
    be [部(族)] tribal group 
    buppō [佛法] Buddhist Law 
   burakumin [部落民] village folks (untouchables) 
   bushido [武士道] way of  the warr ior  
ch’an zhan sōn zen 禪 meditat ion 
chen zhen chin shin 眞[真] t ruth 
cheng zheng chōng  政 sociopol i t ical  order 
                                                     
1 McCune-Reischauer system: http://mccune-reischauer.org, examined 20 August 2006. 
2 Hepburn system: http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/japanese.pdf, examined 20 August 2006.  
3 Wade-Giles system, http://www.loc.gov/catdir/pinyin/romcover.html, examined 20 August 2006. 
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Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer 
Hepburn/ 
Kenkyusha   
cheng zheng chōng  正 order ly 
chengming zhengming chōngmyŏng  正銘 proper use of  terms 
ch’eng cheng sōng  誠 integr i ty,  at tent iveness 
ch’eng-chi chengji sōnggi  成己 sel f-real izat ion 
ch’eng-i chengyi sōng’ŭi  誠意 sincere wi l l  or  intent ion 
ch’eng-jen chengren sōng’in  成人 mature person 
chi ji ki  己 ego, sel f  
ch’i qi ki  氣 force, mater ia l  force, 
ether 
ch’i-ch’ing qiqing ch’ilchōng  七情 seven emot ions 
chi-ku jigu chilgo  疾固 detested inf lexibi l i ty  
chiao jiao kyo  敎 to teach 
chih zhi chi chi 知 knowledge 
chih hsing ho i zhixing 
heyi 
chihaeng habil  知行合一 The unity of knowledge and 
action 
chih zhi ch’i  致 administer  
chih zhi chi l   質  raw stuff 
chih zhi ch’i  治 to regulate, to direct, 
well-governed, in good order 
chih zhi chi  智 wisdom 
ch’ih chi ch’i  恥 shame 
chih ch'eng zhicheng chisōng  至誠 highest integrity 
chih kuo zhiguo ch’ikuk  治國 political administration 
chin jin kŭn  謹  spare one's words 
Chin-ssu-lu  Jinsi lu jinsirok  近思錄 Reflections on Things at Hand 
ching jing kyŏng  經 canon, book 
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Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer    
ching jing kyŏng  敬 reverence, mindfulness, 
earnestness 
ching-tsou jingzou chŏngjwa  靜坐 quiet sitting 
ch'ing qing ch’ŏng  淸 clear 
ch'ing qing chŏng jyō 情 emotion 
   chōnin [町人] tradesman/townsman 
   chōshūhan [長州藩] Chōshū clan of Tokugawa era 
chouli zhōuli churye  周禮 The Rites of Zhou 
chu-tzu 
pai-chia 
zhuzi 
baijia 
cheja paekka  諸子百家 The Hundred Schools of 
Thought 
 
ch’üan-li 
 
quan-li  
 
gen-ri  
 
權利[権利] 
 
right(s) 
ch’un ch’iu  chunqiu ch’unch’u  春秋 Spring and Autumn Annals 
chün tzu junzi kunja  君子 superior persons 
chung zhong ch’ung  忠 doing one's best 
chung zhong chung  衆 the multitude 
chung-yung zhongyong chungyong  中庸 the mean 
fa-chia fajia pŏpka  法家 legalism 
hao hsüeh haoxue hohak  好學 love of learning 
ho he hwa wa 和 harmony 
ho-erh- 
pu-t’ung 
he-er  
bu-tong 
hwa’i pudong  和而不同  harmony without conformity 
   hongaku [本覚] original awakening 
  hong’ik In’gan  弘益人間 the broadest benevolence for 
humanity 
hsi-ming ximing sŏmyŏng  西銘 Western Inscriptions 
hsiang xiang sang  像 image 
hsiang xiang sang  相 phenomenon, mutual 
      
  XVII
Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer    
hsiao jen xiaoren soin  小人 retarded individual 
hsiao-k’ang xiaokang   小康 minimal well-being 
hsien jen xianren hyŏnin  賢人 person of superior quality 
hsin xin sin  信 living up to one's word 
hsin xin sim shin 心 heart and mind 
Hsin-hsüeh Xinxue Simhak shingaku 心學[ 心学] Learning of Mind and Heart 
hsing xing sŏng  性 Character/nature 
hsing xing hyŏng  刑 punishment 
hsing-li xingli sŏngni  性理 nature 
hsűeh xue hak  學 learn 
hui hui hye  惠 magnanimity 
huo huo hok  惑 dispelling doubt 
   husen hōan  [普選法案] universal manhood suffrage law 
i yi ye  藝 art 
i yi ŭi  義 righteousness 
i yi ŭi i 意 meaning, intention, thoughts 
i yi ŭi  宜 appropriateness 
i-ching yijing yŏkkyŏng  易經 Book of Changes 
jen ren in  仁 humanity 
jen ren in  人 person 
jenyü renyu   人慾 human desire 
jen tao rendao indo  仁道 the way of the human being 
jou rou yu  柔 soft 
   Kaitokudō 懐徳堂 Merchant Academy 
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Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer    
kang gang kang  强 hard 
ke-chi geji kŭkki  克己 to discipline oneself 
ko-wu gewu kyŏngmul  格物 investigation of things 
   kogaku [古学] ancient learning 
   kokugaku [国学] national learning 
   kokutai [国体] National Body or Entity 
k’un kun kon  坤 earth 
kuo guo kuk  國 nation 
   kyôiku 
chokugo 
[教育勅語] Imperial Rescript on 
Education 
   kyōsei  共生 symbiotic coexistence 
  kwŏnsŏnjing’ak kanzen chōaku 勸善懲惡 
[ 勧善懲悪] 
encouraging good and 
castigating evil 
li li ye  禮 ritual action 
li li i  理 principle, rationality 
li li p’ung  豊 ritual vase 
li li i  履 to tread a path 
li li i  利 ego-advantages 
  iyong husaeng  利用厚生 functional utility for welfare 
Li-chi Liji yegi  禮記 Book of Rites 
Li-hsüeh Li-xue   理學 School of Principle 
lian lian yŏm  廉 integrity 
liang-chih liangzhi yangji  良知 good knowing or  intuitional knowledge 
liu-i liuyi yukch’e  六禮 six arts 
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Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer    
mang mang maeng  盲 blind 
mei mei mi bi 美 beauty 
min min min  民  the masses 
   minpō [民法] Civil Code 
min te minde mindŏk  民德 te of the masses 
ming ming myŏng  冥 dark, closed eyes 
mu-min 
 
mu min 
 
mongmin mokmin 牧民 shepherding for the people, a 
term used for ‘civic service’ in 
the modern context 
neisheng 
weiwang 
neisheng 
weiwang 
naesŏng 
waewang 
 內聖外王 sage within, king without 
   Nihonjinron [日本人論] Discourse on Japaneseness 
   ningen sonzai [人間存在] human existence 
    ōbō [御法] sovereign law 
  paedo  覇道 ruled by force 
pao bao p’ok  暴 overbearing 
pai hsing baixing paeksŏng  百姓 the hundred surnames, 
populace 
pen-hsin benxin bonsim honshin 本心 original mind 
p'ien pian p’yŏn  偏 one-sided 
po bo pak  薄 thin 
   ritsu ryō [律令] laws and regulations 
ruhsüeh ruxue yuhak jugaku 儒學 Confucianism 
   sabi [寂] sympathy 
san-kang 
pat’iamu 
sangang 
batiamu 
samgang 
paljumok  三綱 八條目 three headings and eight particulars 
sanminchui sanmin zhuyi samminjuŭi  三民主義 
Political ideals of Republic of 
China (nationalism, democracy 
and welfare) 
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Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer   
 
   Satsumahan [薩摩藩] Satsuma clan of Tokugawa era 
  sŏnghak seigaku 聖學[聖学] holy learning or  learning of monarch 
  sŏnghaksipto  聖學十圖 Ten Diagrams to become a sagely sovereign 
shan shan sŏn zen 善 goodness 
shan jen shanren sŏnin  善人 good/adept person  
shengming 
ruhsüeh 
shengming 
ruxue 
saengmyŏng 
yuhak 
 生命儒學 Life Confucianism or 
Confucianism of vitality 
sheng jen shengren sŏng’in  聖人 sage 
shih shi sa  士 scholar-official 
shih chi shiji sagi  史記 Grand Scribe’s Records 
Shih-ching shijing sigyŏng  詩經 Book of Poetry 
shih min shimin samin  使民 proper employment 
shih jen shiren sain  使人 employment of jen 
   shingon [真言] True Words 
   shinto [神道] "the Way of the Gods" 
  silsa kusi  實事求是 seek truth from facts (or real 
events) 
  sirhak jitsugaku 實學[実学] Practical or Real Learning 
shu  shu su   數  calculations 
shu shu sŏ  恕 placing oneself in another's 
place 
shu shu sŏ  書 writing 
Shu-ching Shujing  sŏgyŏng  書經 Book of Documents 
   shūchū kiyaku  [船中規約] Code in the Boat 
shu jen shuren sŏ’in  庶人 the many 
ssu si sa  思 think, reflecting 
  XXI
Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer    
ssu si sa  私 self 
ssulu silu saryŏ shiryo 思慮 deliberation  
ssu-tuan siduan sadan  四端 four feelings(beginnings) 
ta da tae  大 great 
ta da tal  達 convey, reach 
ta jen daren tae’in  大人 great person 
ta-hsüeh daxue taehak  大學 Great Learning 
ta-t’ung datong taedong  大同 Great Commonwealth 
t’ai-chi taiji t’ae  太極 the Supreme Ultimate 
t’ai-ho taihe t’aehwa  太和 the great harmony 
t’ai-hsü taixu t’aehŏ  太虛 the Great Void 
tao dao to  道 Way/noble way 
te de tŏk  德 virtue 
   tennōsei  [天皇制] emperorship 
t’i ti ch’e  體 body 
t’i-yung tiyong ch’eyong  體用 substance and function 
t’ien tian ch’ŏn  天 heaven 
t’ien-fu tianfu: ch’ŏnbu  天賦 heaven's endowment 
t’ien-ming tianming ch’ŏnmyŏng  天命 heaven's imperative 
t’ien-hsia tianxia ch’ŏnha  天下 Heaven and Earth 
t’ien-hsing tianxing ch’ŏnsŏng  天性 heavenly nature 
ts’ai cai che  宰 oversee 
tsao-wu chu zaowuzhu chomulchu  造物主 creator 
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Chinese Chinese Korean Japanese Character 
[Kanji] 
Meaning 
Wade-Giles Pinyin McCune- 
Reischauer    
tsojen zuoren   做人 to be a person or  to become human 
tsowei zuowei chagwi sakui 作爲[作為] intention or design 
tsui zui choe  罪 guilt 
tsun zun chon  尊 of high rank 
t'ung tong tong  同 agreement 
tzu-jen ziren chayŏn shizen 自然 nature 
tzu-shih zishi chasil  自失 self-negligence 
tzu-te zide chadŭk  自得 attaining it in oneself 
    uji [氏(族)] family clans 
   ukiyoe [浮世絵] pictures of the floating world 
  wangdo  王道 rule by virtue 
wei-i weiyi yuil  唯一 unique 
wen wen mun  文 cultural tradition(human 
culture) 
wentzu wenzi munja  文字 letter 
wu-wei wuwei muwi  無爲 non-action 
   yakusa no 
kabane 
[八色の姓] eight honorary cognomens  
  yangmyŏnghak yōmeigaku [陽明学] Study of Wang Yang-ming 
  yŏmin tongnak  與民同樂 bliss of sharing happiness  with populace 
   yūgen [幽玄] mysterious longing 
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Appendix 3: Biographic Digest  
(* Key figures mentioned in the thesis or closely related thereto) 
 
*Romanization Conventions for Names 
For Koreans, the McCune-Reischauer system1 has been used. Exceptions are made for those names where 
the use of alternative conventions is clearly established and in current use.  
For Japanese, the Hepburn system2 has been used together with its modification made by Kenkyusha’s new 
Japanese-English Dictionary, 3rd edition. Exceptions are made, as with Korean names, for those names where 
the use of alternative conventions is clearly established and in current use.  
For Chinese, the Wade-Giles system3  has been used and pinyin equivalents are shown where deemed 
necessary. It has taken up the current practices at UCLA titled Wade-Giles to Pinyin Conversion Table. It is 
also identical with the Library of Congress.   Exceptions are made, as with Korean and Japanese names, for 
those names where the use of alternative conventions is clearly established and in current use.  
Chang, Carsun: see Chang, Chün-mai  
Chang, Chün-mai (Zhang Junmai or Carsun Chang,張君勱: 1887-1969).  A leading Neo-Confucian philosopher and  
political leader who founded and led the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party  
 
Chang, Peng-chun (Zhang, Pengjun, 張彭春: 1892-1957).  A Chinese professor, philosopher and playwright.  He served  
as as vice-chairman and Chinese delegate to the UN Commission on Human Rights (1948) in charge of drafting the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  His philosophy is known to be based on Confucianism.   
 
Chang, Tsai (Zhang, Zai, 張載: 1020-1077). One of the most renowned Neo-Confucians in the Northern Sung dynasty  
(960-1126)  
 
Ch'eng, Hao (程顥:1032-1083).  Ch'eng Hao and his younger brother Cheng Yi (1033-1108) were the most noteworthy  
scholarly legends of early Chinese Neo-Confucianism of Sung dynasty (960–1279) in China with Chang Tsai.  
 
Ch'eng, I (程頤: 1033-1108)  see Ch’eng Hao 
 
Ch’eng-Chu  (程朱).  A combined name of Ch’eng brothers and Chu Hsi given as a school of thought  
 
Chŏng, Tojŏn (鄭道傳: 1342-1398).  A leading Neo-Confucian scholar and statesman during the late Koryŏ dynasty and  
the early Yi dynasty in Korea  
 
Chŏng, Yag-yong (also Tasan, 丁若鏞: 1762-1836).  A leading Korean philosopher during the Yi Dynasty who was  
regarded as the greatest of the Sirhak (Practical Learning) thinkers 
 
Chou I (see Chou-i) 
 
Chou, Fo-hai (Zhou Fohai, 周佛海:1897-1948), A politician and second in command of Wang Jingwei’s government or  
Nanjing regime (1940-1945) in China 
                                                     
1 McCune-Reischauer system: http://mccune-reischauer.org, examined 20/08/2006 
2 Hepburn system: http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/japanese.pdf,  examined 20/08/2006 
3 Wade-Giles system, http://www.loc.gov/catdir/pinyin/romcover.html, examined 20/08/2006 
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Chou, Tun-i  (周敦頤: 1017-1073).  One of the most noteworthy scholarly legends of early Chinese Neo-Confucianism  
and cosmologist.  While he was influenced by Buddhism and Taoism, he followed the most ancient tradition of 
Chinese metaphysics as consigned in the Book of Changes (I Ching).  
 
Chu, Hsi (Zhu, Xi, 朱熹: 1130–1200).  A Sung Dynasty (960-1279) Confucian scholar who became one of the most  
significant Neo-Confucians in China.   Chu Hsi was also influential in Japan, where his followers were called the  
Shushigaku (朱子学) school.       
 
Chuang, Tzu (Zhuangzi: 莊子).  A leading Taoist philosopher during the Warring States Period in ancient China (ca the  
4th century B.C.E.)  
           . 
Confucius (孔夫子: 551–479 B.C.E.).  A famous Chinese thinker and social philosopher.  His teachings and philosophy  
have deeply influenced East Asian life and thought which emphasised personal and governmental morality, 
correctness of social relationships, justice and sincerity.  
 
Dōgen (道元, or Dōgen Zenji, 道元禅師: 1200-1253). A Japanese Zen Buddhist teacher and the founder of the Sōtō  
school of Zen in Japan.  
 
Fan, Chungyen (Fan, Zhongyan 范仲淹: 989–1052).  A prominent politician and literary figure in Sung dynasty  
(960-1279) in China.   He was also a strategist and educator.  His most famous work was Yueyang Lou Ji. 
 
Fujiwara, Seika (藤原 惺窩: 1561-1619).  A Japanese Confucian scholar of the early Tokugawa period.  He is  
regarded as the founder of Tokugawa neo-Confucianism.  
 
Fukuzawa, Yukichi (福澤 論吉: 1835-1901)  A leading Meiji Restroration figure, author, writer, teacher, entrepreneur and  
political theorist who founded the Keio University.  
 
Ham, Sŏk-Hŏn (咸錫憲: 1901-1989).  One of Asia's most important voices for democracy and non-violence during the  
20th Century.  Though formally a Quaker, he concluded that all religions are one.  
 
Han, Fei Tzu (Han Feizi, 韓非子: ca. 280-233 B.C.E.).  A philosopher of the Han dynasty in China who, along with Li Ssu,  
developed Hsün Tzu’s philosophy into the doctrine embodied by the School of Law or Legalism.  
 
Hang, Liwu (杭立武: 1903-1991). A Chinese educator, politician, diplomat and social activist.  
 
Hayashi, Razan (林羅山: 1583-1657).   A Japanese Neo-Confucianist philosopher, serving as an advisor to the first  
three shoguns of the Tokugawa bakufu.  He was greatly influenced by the work of Chinese Neo-Confucianist Chu 
Hsi.  
 
Hōnen (法然, also Hōnen Bo Genku: 1133-1212).  A Japanese born Buddhist and the founder of the first independent  
branch of Jōdo Shū (Pure Land Buddhism)  
 
Hsün Tzu  (Xun Zi,  荀子: 310-237 B.C.E.).  A major Chinese philosopher during the Warring States Period.   He wrote a  
book known as the Hsün Tzu. 
 
Huang Ti (Huangdi, the Yellow Emperor or Huang Di 黃帝).  A legendary Chinese sovereign and cultural hero who is  
said to be the ancestor of all Han Chinese.  He is known for the introduction and invention of Chinese medicine, 
compass and sexagenary cycle Chinese lunar calendar.  
 
Huang, Tsung-hsi (Huang Zongxi, 黄宗羲: 1610-1695).  A Chinese political theorist, philosopher, and soldier during the  
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latter part of the Ming dynasty into the early part of the Ch’ing dynasty.    
 
Huineng (HuiNeng, 慧能 or 惠能: 638-713).   A Chinese Chan (Chinese Zen) monastic who is one of the most important  
figures in the entire tradition.   Huineng is the Sixth Patriarch of Chinese Chan Buddhism, as well as the last official 
patriarch.  
 
Ishida, Baigan (1685-1744).  A scholar of the merchant (chōnin) class in the mid-Edo period, founder of Sekimon  
Shingaku, the school of ‘Heart-Mind Learning’.    
 
Itō, Hirobumi (伊藤 博文: 1841-1909).  A Japanese politician and the country’s first Prime Minister (and the 5th, 7th, and  
10th).  He supervised the drafting of the Meiji Constitution of 1889.  
 
Itō, Jinsai (1627-1705).  A Japanese sinologist, philosopher, and educator of Tokugawa period, who founded the  
Kogigaku (“Study of Ancient Meaning”) school of thought, which subsequently became part of the larger Kogaku 
(“Ancient Learning”) school.     
 
Kaibara, Ekken (also known as Atsunobu [篤信],貝原 益軒: 1630-1714).  A Japanese Neo-Confucianist philosopher  
and botanist during the Edo Period of the 16th century of Japan 
 
K’ang, Yü-wei (K’ang Yu-wei, 康有為: 1858-1927).  A Chinese philosopher and reform movement leader.  He was a  
leading philosopher of the new text school of Confucianism, which regarded Confucius as a utopian political 
reformer. 
 
Kukai (空海: or Kōbō-Daishi 弘法大師: 774-835). A Japanese monk, scholar, poet, and artist.  He was thd founder of the  
Shingon (True Word) school of Buddhism.    
 
Ku, Yen-wu (Gu Yanwu, 顧炎武: 1613-1682).  One of the most eminent scholars of the early Ch’ing dynasty.  
 
Kuan Tzu (Guanzi, 管子 or Kuan Chung (管仲): d. 645 B.C.E.). He was prime minister of the state of Ch'I and he is  
regarded as one of the three patriarchs of Tao.  
 
Kuei-chi (竅基, Kuei-chi: 632~682).  One of the disciples of Hsuan-tsang (玄奘: 596-682) and the developer of the  
Wei-shih (Consciousness Only) School which is one of the Chinese Mahayana schools in China.    
 
Lao Tzu (Laozi, 老子).  A major Taoist figure in Chinese philosophy.  According to Chinese tradition, he lived in the 6th  
century B.C.E., however, many historians placed his life in the 4th century B.C.E., which was the period of the 
‘Hundred Schools of Thought’ and Warring States Period.  He was recognised as the founder of Taoism.  
 
Liang, Ch’i-ch’ao (Liang, Qichao 梁啟超: 1873-1929).  An essayist, historian, reformer and one of the most influential  
intellectuals in China in the first half of the twentieth century.   
 
Liang, Shuming (梁漱溟: 1893-1988).  A Neo-Confucian philosopher and writer who attempted to demonstrate the  
relevance of Confucianism to China's problems in the twentieth century.   
 
 Liu, Shih-p’ei (Liu Shipei or Shen Shu,劉師培: 1884-1919).   A Chinese classical scholar who created the Society for the  
Study of Socialism in 1907 during his study in Tokyo.  
 
Lo Ch’in-shun (Luo Qin-shun, 羅欽順: 1465-1547). A philosopher and Neo-Confucian in the Ming dynasty of China.  
 
Lu, Hsiang-shan (Lu, Jiuyuan, 陸象山: 1139-1193).  A Chinese Neo-Confucian philosopher, government official and a  
teacher of the Southern Sung dynasty.  He was the rival of the great Neo-Confucian rationalist Chu Hsi.  
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Lu-Wang (陸王).   A combined name of Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming given as a school of thought. 
 
Maruyama, Masao (丸山眞男, 1914-1996). A leading Japanese political scientist with expertise in the history of  
Japanese political thought and a renowned writer in contemporary political journalism. 
 
Matsuo, Bashō (松尾 芭蕉,  1644-1694).  The most famous poet of the Edo period in Japan. During his lifetime, Bashō  
was renowned for his works in the collaborative haikai no renga form; today, he is recognized as a master of brief 
and clear haiku. 
 
Mencius (Meng Zi: ca. 372–289 B.C.E.).  A Chinese philosopher and follower of Confucianism who argued that humans  
are naturally moral beings but are corrupted by society. 
 
Motoda, Nagazane (元田永孚:1818-1891). A Japanese Confucian scholar-official born in Kumamoto as the son of a  
samurai of the Kumamoto Clan. He engaged in the drafting of "Kyogaku taishi" and drafted the Imperial Rescript on 
Education. 
 
Motoori, Norinaga (本居宣長: 1730-1801).  A leading Japanese scholar of Kokugaku (Ancient Studies) during the Edo  
period.  
 
Mo-Tzu (Mozi, ca. 470-390 B.C.E.).  A philosopher who lived in China during the flowering of the ‘Hundred Schools of  
Thought’ during the early Warring States period.  He founded the School of Mohism and argued strongly against 
Confucianism and Taoism.  
 
Mou, Tsungsan (牟宗三, Mou Zongsan: 1909-1995).  Mou is a leading contemporary Neo-Confucian philosopher.  He  
made a major comparative metaphysical study between Chinese philosophy and Immanuel Kant. 
 
Natsume, Sōseki (夏目 漱石, 1867-1916).  One of the best-known Japanese authors of the 20th century.  His works of  
fiction, as well as his essays, haiku, and kanshi (poetry composed in Chinese) were tremendously influential and are 
popular even today.  
 
Nishida, Kitarō (西田 幾多郎: 1870–1945). A prominent Japanese philosopher, founder of what has been called the  
Kyoto School of philosophy.  
 
Ogyū, Sorai (荻生 徂徠: 1666-1728).  A Japanese Confucian philosopher known by the pen name Butsu Sorai.  He has  
been described as the most influential scholar of the Tokugawa period.  
 
Ōkuma, Shigenobu (大隈 重信: 1838-1922).  A Japanese politician and the 8th (1898) and 17th (1914) prime  
minister of Japan.  Ōkuma was also an early advocate of Western science and culture in Japan, and founder of 
Waseda University. 
 
Park, Che-ga (朴齊家: 1750-1805). An advanced shirak scholar of the late Yi dynasty Korea and one of disciples of Park  
Chi-wŏn.  
 
Park, Chi-wŏn (朴趾源; 1737-1805).  A Shirak thinker and writer during the late Yi dynasty.  He believed that Heaven  
bestowed unique talents on all men.  His major work was ‘Tale of the Yangban’.  
 
Ricci, Matteo (1552-1610).  Born in Macerata, Papal States (now Italy).  An Italian Jesuit missionary who introduced  
Christian teaching to the Chinese empire in the 16th century.  He founded the Catholic missions of China.  
 
Saichō (最澄, 767-822). A Japanese Buddhist monk credited with founding the Tendai school in Japan, based around  
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the Chinese Tiantai tradition.  
 
Shinran (親鸞: 1173-1263). A  Japanese Buddhist monk.  He was a pupil of Hōnen (1133-1212) and the founder of the  
Jōdo Shinshū (or True Pure Land) sect in Japan.  
 
Shōtoku, Taishi (聖徳太子, Prince Shōtoku: 574-622).  A regent and a politician of the Imperial Court in Japan.  He was  
tutored by Wang-in (Wani) of the Paekche dynasty (18 B.C.E.- 660 C.E.) of Korea who introduced to the Japanese 
court Confucianism and other courtly scholarship.  He is also known to have introduced the first constitution of Japan 
(the ‘Seventeen Article Constitution’). 
 
Ssuma, Ch'ien (Sima Qian,司馬遷: ca. 145-90 B.C.E.).  A perfect of the Grand Scribes (太史令) of the Han dynasty.  He  
is regarded as the father of Chinese historiography because of his highly praised work, Shiji (史記, ‘History 
Record’).   
 
Sun, Yatsen (孫逸仙: 1866-1925).  A Chinese revolutionary and political leader who is often referred to as the "father of  
modern China".  He was the first provisional president when the Republic of China was founded in 1912. He later 
co-founded the National Party or Kuomintang (KMT) where he served as its first leader. 
 
Tai, Chen (戴震: 1723-1777).  A notable scholar of the Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1911) in China, making great contributions  
to mathematics, geography, phonology and particularly philosophy   
 
Tanizaki, Junichiro  (谷崎 潤一郎: 1886-1965).  One of the major writers of modern Japanese literature.  He is regarded  
as the most popular Japanese novelist after Natsume Soseki (1867-1916). 
 
T'oegye  (also Yi Hwang, 李滉: 1501-1570).  One of the most honored thinkers of the Korean Neo-Confucian tradition.   
He interpreted and synthesized in Korea the Neo-Confucian reformulation completed by Chu Hsi during the Sung 
dynasty in China.  
  
Tokugawa, Ieyasu (徳川家康: 1543-1616).  A Japanese warrior-leader who founded the Tokugawa shogunate   
 
Toyotomi, Hideyoshi (豊臣秀吉: 1537-1598).  A Sengoku daimyo (feudal lord in the Warring States period) who unified  
Japan. He is noted for a number of cultural legacies.  The period of his rule is often called the Momoyama period. 
 
Tung, Chung-shu  (董仲舒, Dong Zhongshu: ca. 195-115).  A Han dynasty Confucian scholar.  His thought integrated yin  
yang cosmology into a Confucian ethical framework.  
 
Uchimura, Kanzō (内村鑑三: 1861-1930).  A Japanese author, Christian evangelist, and the founder of the Non-church  
Movement (Mukyōkai) of Christianity in the Meiji and Taisho periods in Japan.  
 
Wang, Anshih (王安石, Wang An-shi: 1021-1086).  A Chinese economist, statesman, chancellor and poet of the Song  
dynasty who attempted some controversial, major socioeconomic reforms.   
 
Wang, Yang-ming (王陽明, Japanese Ō Yōmei: 1472-1529).  A Chinese idealist Neo-Confucian scholar-official in the  
Ming dynasty.  After Chu Hsi, he is commonly considered the most important Neo-Confucian thinker.  His school of 
thought (Ōyōmei-gaku in Japanese) also greatly influenced the samurai ethic of that time in Japan. 
 
Watsuji, Tetsurō (和辻哲郎: 1889–1960).  A Japanese moral philosopher, cultural historian and intellectual historian 
 
Yamaga, Sokō (山鹿素行:1622-1685).  A Japanese philosopher and strategist during the Tokugawa shogunate.  He  
was a Confucian, and applied Confucius's idea of the "superior man" to the samurai Samurai class of Japan.  
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Yamagata, Aritomo (Prince, 山縣 有朋: 1838-1922).  A field marshal in the imperial Japanese Army and twice Prime  
Minister of Japan.  He was the first prime minister of Japan after the opening of the imperial Diet under the Meiji 
Constitution (1889-1891).    
 
Yanaihara, Tadao (矢内原忠雄: 1893-1961).  Educated as an economist, he became one of the ‘seven disciples’ of  
Uchimura’s Non-church Movement in Japan.  He served as the president of Tokyo University in post-WWII era. 
 
Yasuda, Yojūrō (保田与重郎: 1910-1981). A literary critic known as the leader of the school of romanticism in the  
Post-war era of Japanese literature  
 
Yi, Ik (also Sŏngho, 李瀷: 1681-1763).  An early sirhak (Practical Learning) philosopher and social critic in the Yi dynasty  
of Korea.  
 
Yi, Yulgok (李栗谷, also Yi I, 李珥: 1536-1584).  A noted Korean sage in the Yi dynasty.  He is one of the two most  
famous Korean Confucian Scholars with T'oegye.  
 
Yoshino, Sakuzō (吉野 作造: 1878-1933).  A Japanese author and political thinker in the Taishō era (1912-1926) of  
culturalism.  He is best known for his formulation of the theory of Minponshugi or politics of demo-centrism. 
 
Yu, Hyŏng-wŏn (柳馨遠: 1622-1673). A leading Sirak (the Practical Learning) scholar in the late Yi dynasty Korea 
 
Yun, Sŏndo (孤山 尹善道: 1587-1671). A noted Korean poet of the Yi dynasty.  He is considered the greatest master in  
the history of Korean literature. His most famous work is The Fisherman's Calendar, a cycle of forty seasonal sijo.  
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Appendix 4: Chronology 
 
Period/ 
Year 
Korea Japan China 
(Rep. of) 
Notes and Remarks 
1000 
B.C.E. 
 Jōmon culture 
   Chou Dynasty (ca 1122-256 B.C.E.) 
800    
600   Kuan Tzu  Kuan Chung (d. 645 B.C.E.) 
   Confucius 孔夫子 (Kong Fuzi or K'ung-fu-tzu) (551 – 479 B.C.E.) 
400   Divided China 
* Refer to the details of division 1in the footnote. 
   Mencius 孟子  (most accepted dates: 372–289 B.C.E.) 
   Chuang Tzu  Zhuang Zi (ca 369-286 B.C.E.) 
  Kofun period (Ca. 300-710) 
   Hsün Tzu   荀子 or Xún Zǐ (310–237 B.C.E.) 
 
   Han Fei  (ca 280-233 B.C.E.) 
   Tung Chung-shu (ca 195-115 B.C.E.) 
200   Ch'in dynasty (221-206B.C.E. ) 
   Former Han (206 B.C.E.-8 C.E. ) 
   Ssuma Ch'ien  Sima Qian (ca. 145-90 B.C.E.)  
0   Later Han (25-220) 
 Three Kingdoms Period (57-668) 
Koguryŏ (37 B.C.E.- 668 C.E.) 
Paeche (18 B.C.E. – 660 C.E.) 
Silla (57  B.C.E.- 935 C.E.) 
     
200 C.E.   Ts'ao wei (Wèi 魏 or Cáo Wèi) (220-265) 
     
400     
  introduction of 
Buddhism  
 552 
600   T’ang dynasty (618-907) 
   Kuei-chi  (632-682) 
  Taika Reform  (645) 
 Unified Silla dynasty (668–935) 
  Nara period (710-1185)  
  Saichō   (767-822) 
   Kūkai  (774-835) 
800  Heian period (794-1185) 
  Sei Shōnagon   (ca 965-1010) 
  Murasaki Shikibu   (ca 973-1014) 
900 Koryŏ dynasty (935-1392) 
Earlier Neo-Confucians 
   Sung dynasty: Northern Sung (960-1126), Southern Sung (1126-1279) 
1000   Fan Chungyen Fan Zhongyan (范仲淹: 989–1052) 
   Ou-yang Hsiu  (1007-1072) 
   Chou Tun- i Zhou Dunyi, 周敦頤(1017-1073) 
                                                
1 Ch’u (722-223), Sung (770-286), Lu (770-249), Ch’ing (770?-206), Chou (722?-256), Wei (403?-230), Han (376?-225), 
Chao (376?-222), Yen (770?-222), Ch’i (770?-221), ‘Spring and Autumn Period’ (ca 722-481), ‘Period of Warring States’ 
(403-221) 
 2
   Chang Tsai Zhang Zai (1020-1077) 
   Wang Anshih  (1021-1086) 
   Ch'eng Hao 程顥 (1032-1083) 
   Ch'eng I 程頤 (1033-1108) 
   Su Tung P’o  (1037-1101) 
   Chu Hsi Zhu Xi, 朱熹  (1130–1200) 
   Lu Xiang-shan  (1139-1193) 
1200  Kamakura period (1185-1333) 
  Hōnen   (1133-1212) 
  Shinran   (1173-1263) 
  Dōgen   (1200-1253) 
  Iryeon    (1206-1289) 
  Yoshida Kenkō   (ca 1283-1350) 
   Yüan dynasty (1279-1368) 
   Song Lian Sung Lien (1310-1381) 
 Yi Saek   (1328-1396) 
  Muromachi period (1333-1568) 
   Tai Zu (Hongwu 
Emperor) 
personal name Zhu Yuanzhang (1328 –1398) 
 Chŏng Tojŏn    (1342-1398) 
   Ming dynasty (1368-1644) 
   Wang 
Yang-ming  
(1472-1529) 
   Lo Ch’in-shun  (1465-1547) 
1400 Yi dynasty (Chosŏn dynasty: 1392-1910) 
Later Neo-Confucians 
1500 Yi Hwang   T'oegye (1501-1570) 
 Yi Yulgok    (1536-1584) 
   Lü Kun  呂坤 (1536-1618) 
  Tokugawa Ieyasu   (1543–1616) 
  Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi  
 豊臣秀吉 (1537-1598) 
  Azuchi-Momoyama period (1568-1600) 
  Fujiwara Seika   (1561-1619) 
  Hayashi Razan   林羅山 (1583-1657) 
 Hŏ Gyun    (1569-1618) 
1600  Tokugawa Japan (Edo period: 1600-1868) 
 Kim Man-jung    (1637-1692) 
  Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1911) 
   Huang, 
Tsung-hsi  
Huang Zongxi (1610-1695) 
   Ku Yen-wu  Gu Yanwu (1613-1682) 
   Thirty-Year War  (1618-1648) 
   Wang Fuzhi  (1619-1692) 
 Yu Hyŏng-wŏn    (1622-1673) 
  Yamaga Sokō   山鹿素行 (1622 - 1685) 
   Lü Liuliang  呂留良 (1629-1683) 
  Ito Jinsai   (1627-1705) 
  Kaibara Ekken   貝原 益軒 or 篤信 (1630-1714) 
   Han Tan  (1637-1704) 
  Ogyu Sorai   荻生 徂徠 (1666-1728) 
  Ishida Baigan   (1685-1744) 
  Andō Shōeki   (1703-1762) 
 3
 Yi Yik    (1681-1763) 
1700   Dai Zhen  (1723-1777) 
  Teshima Toan   (1718-1786) 
  Motoori Norinaga  (1730-1801) 
 Pak Chi-wŏn    (1737~1805) 
 Pak Che-ga    (1750-ca 1804) 
 Jŏng Yag-yong    (1762-1836) 
   Lin Zexu  (1785-1850) 
   Wei Yuan  (1794-1856) 
1800  Motoda Nagazane  (1818-1891) 
   Li  Hongzhang  (1823-1901) 
  Fukuzawa Yukichi   (1835-1901) 
  Katō Hiroyuki   (1836-1916) 
   Zhang Zhidong  (1837-1909) 
   Opium War  (1839-1842) 
  Itō Hirobumi    (1841-1909) 
   Hu Liyuan  (1847-1916) 
   K’ang Youwei  (1858-1927) 
   He Qi  (1859-1914) 
 Taewŏn’gun   (reign 1863-1886) 
  Uchimura Kanzō   (1861-1930) 
  Tokutomi Sohō   (1863-1957) 
   Tan Sitong  (1865-1898) 
   Sun Yatsen  (1866-1925) 
  Meiji  Period (1868-1912) 
  Natsume Sōseki   (1867-1919) 
  Nishida Kitaro  (1870-1945) 
  Minobe Tatsukichi   (1873-1948) 
   Liang Qichao  (1873-1929) 
  Yoshino Sakuzō   (1878-1933) 
   Chen Duxiu  (1879-1942) 
   Lu Hsün  (1881-1936) 
   Liu Shipei (Shen 
Shu)  
(1884-1919) 
   Gao Yihan  (1884-1968) 
   Hsiung Shihli  (1885-1968) 
  Tanizaki Junichirō   (1886-1965) 
   Chiang Kai-shek  (1887-1975) 
   Carsun Chang  (1887-1969) 
  Watsuji Tetsuro  (1889-1960) 
   Hu Shi (Hu Shih) (1891-1962) 
   Chang, 
Peng-chun  
(1892-1957) 
 Yi, Kwang-su    (1892-1950) 
  Yanaihara Tadao   (1893-1961) 
   Liang Shuming  (1893-1988) 
   Luo Longji  (1896-1965) 
1900   Republic of China (1912-  ), People’s Republic of China (1949-  ) 
 Sim Hun    (1901-1936) 
 Ham Sok-Hon    (1901-1989) 
   Hsü Fukuan  (1903-1982) 
   T’ang Chunyi  唐君毅 (1909-1978) 
   Mou Tsungsan  (1909-1995) 
   Chang Tanien  (1909-2004) 
 4
  Taishō period (1912-1926) 
  Ōhira Masayoshi   (1910–1980) 
  Yasuda Yojūrō   (1910-1981) 
  Maruyama Masao   (1914-1996) 
  Okada Takehiko   (1908-) 
 Park 
Chung-Hee  
  (1917-1979) 
  Showa period (1926-1989) 
   Li Buyun (1933- ) 
   Liu Huaqiu  (1939- ) 
  the Pacific War (1941-1945) 
 Republic of Korea (1945- ) 
 the Korean War (1950-1953) 
   Wei Jingsheng  (魏京生：1950-) 
   Zhang Wenxian (1951-) 
   Xia Yong (1961-) 
 Military autocracy (1961-1987) 
  Heisei period (1989-     ) 
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Appendix 5-1: Letter of Invitation to Focus Group Discussions 
with the Terms of Confidentiality   
Date, 2005 
<Title> 
<Name> 
<Position> 
<Name of Organization > 
<Address> 
Invitation to ‘Small Group Discussion’ on: 
Confucian Humanism 
as the Foundation of Human Rights and Economic Ethics: 
A Study of Korea, Japan and the Republic of China 
Doctorate of Philosophy Research 
Dear      , 
This letter is to invite you to a ‘Small Group Discussion’ on the Confucian Humanism as the Foundation of Human 
Rights and Economic Ethics’. Discussions are taking place as a part of my Doctorate of Philosophy Research 
project at RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia, under the supervision of Professor Desmond Cahill.  
You may kindly note that my interest is in finding the ‘Confucian Humanism as the Foundation of Human Rights 
and Economic Ethics.’ The research is based on an overall enquiry that can be broken into the three postulates: 
Postulate 1:  
Confucianism as one of the common philosophies and beliefs of contemporary Korea, Japan and Republic 
of China (aka Taiwan) evolved into Confucian humanism.   
Postulate 2:  
Confucian humanism advances governance as expressed in the observance of human rights and the 
evolution of economic ethics. 
Postulate 3:  
Confucian humanism and its ideals accord with the humanism and ideals of a globalizing civil society.  
The discussion group will meet at a location that is convenient for those who agree to take part in this research. 
The discussion is estimated to take about two hours in a quiet and comfortable place in a convenient location. 
Informal unstructured discussions will focus on the questions given in the attached ’Focus Group Discussion Guide’. 
The under-signed researcher will make the written notes as the transcript of the small group discussions.  
The researcher will maintain the confidentiality about the discussions and the identities of the participants, and will 
make sure to remove any possible personal or organizational identifiers from the written transcripts.  
Please also be advised that the themes of the discussion will be aggregated and no names of research participants 
or their companies will be used in the thesis to ensure anonymity is preserved.  
On completion of the research, the ‘executive summary’ of any research findings will be provided to you. 
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary. If you agree to participate you may withdraw at any time. 
If you have any questions please feel free to contact me at: 
Email: calvin.lee@rmit.edu.au 
Phone +61(3)  Fax +61(3) 
Thank you for your kind consideration, and I look forward to keeping in touch with you again through phone or 
email to fix the date and venue of your convenience. 
XVIII
Yours sincerely,  
Calvin Chong Kun Lee 
Candidate,  
Doctor of Philosophy  
School of International Studies (GSSSP)  
RMIT University  
Email: calvin.lee@rmit.edu.au, Phone +61(3) , Fax +61(3) 
Level 5,  
Building 37, RMIT University 
411 Swanston Street,  
Melbourne, VIC 3000, Australia 
Enclosed: 
Questions for the ‘Unstructured Small Group Discussions’: 
Q1 Do Northeast Asians follow Confucianism as the common belief? 
Q2 Do these philosophical traditions and habitudes represent Confucian humanism as a  
    foundation for societal cohesion and civility? 
Q3 Does the worldview associated with Confucian humanism mirror the concept and practices of  
 governance, especially in regard to the observance of human rights? 
Q4 Does Confucian humanism foster economic ethics? 
Q5 Is Confucian humanism compatible with the ideals and concerns of globalizing civil society, especially in 
    terms of human rights and economic ethics such as over the global ecological crisis?  
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Appendix 5-2: ‘Focus Group’ Discussants and Acronyms 
 
‘Focus Group’ Discussants  of Korea 
(1) Academics and Researchers  
KAP 
 
Specialists in East Asian Philosophy 
Presenter of  
Interfaith Study Group, Korea 
 
KAC 
 
Cultural Theorists 
 
Cross-cultural Writer 
 
KAH 
 
Educators (Human Development) 
 
Professor in Social Theory 
 
KAS 
 
Sociologists (Social Development) 
 
Sociologist 
 
KAE 
 
Science & Technologists 
 
Developer of Digital System 
 
KEH 
 
Economic Historians 
 
Knowledge Economy Theorist 
(2) Public Policy-persons 
KHR 
 
Human Rights Policy Specialists 
Policy Advisor of Human Rights 
Solidarity 
KPS 
 
Social Policy Developers 
Social Policy Developer of 
Relief Foundation 
KPR 
Research and Development Policy 
Specialists 
ICT Innovator 
KPH 
 
Human Resource Policy Developers 
Human Resource Development 
Policy Advisor 
KPE 
 
Economic Planners 
Presider of Development 
Economic Plan 
KCG 
 
Corporate Governance Policy Specialists 
Policy Advisor for Good 
Corporate Governance 
(3) Practitioners in Public and Private Sectors 
KHA 
 
 Human Rights Advocates 
Human Rights Legal Advocate 
KTE 
 
Ecology & Business Ethics Specialists 
Corporate Governance Advisor 
for Economic Justice Forum 
KSS 
 
 Social Policy and Welfare Advocates 
Policy Advisor for  Citizens' 
Coalition for Economic Justice 
KTS 
 
Industry Strategy Specialists 
Strategic Planner of Industrial 
Economics 
KTI 
 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship Specialists 
Enterprise Consultant for  
Innovation Capitalisation 
KMC 
 
Mass Media Contributors 
Advocate of People's Solidarity 
for Participatory Democracy 
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‘Focus Group’ Discussants  of Japan 
(1)  Academics and Researchers 
JAP 
 
Specialists in East Asian Philosophy 
 
Historian of Japanese Thought 
JAC 
 
Cultural Theorists 
 
Writer of Post-Meiji Era Culture 
JAH 
 
Educators (Human Development) 
Overseer for Model Education 
for the Nation 
JAS 
 
Sociologists (Social Development) 
Sociologist of Post-war Social 
Development 
JAE 
 
Science & Technologists 
Supporter for Centres of 
Excellence  
JEH 
 
Economic Historians 
 
Developmental Economy 
Historian 
(2) Public Policy-persons 
JHR 
 
Human Rights Policy Specialists 
Human Rights  
Policy Researcher 
JPS 
 
Social Policy Developers 
 
Welfare Policy Consultant 
JPR 
 
Research and Development Policy Specialists 
Policy-person for 
ICT Research  
JPH 
 
Human Resource Policy Developers 
Policy Advisor of Human 
Resource Development 
JPE 
 
Economic Planners 
Economic Policy Advisor for 
Global Sustainability 
JCG 
 
Corporate Governance Policy Specialists 
Policy Advisor for Corporate 
Governance  
(3)  Practitioners in Public and Private Sectors   
JHA 
 
 Human Rights Advocates 
Legal Volunteer of 
Democratic Lawyer's Forum 
JTE 
 
Ecology & Business Ethics Specialists 
Industry Representative 
for Corporate Ethics 
JSS 
 
 Social Policy and Welfare Advocates 
 
Social Policy Advisor 
JTS 
 
Industry Strategy Specialists 
 
Industry Strategy Consultant 
JTI 
 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship Specialists 
Enterprise Advisor for   
Innovator Venture Capitalists 
JMC 
 
Mass Media Contributors 
 
Social Critic and Writer 
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 ‘Focus Group’ Discussants  of the Republic of China  
(1)  Academics and Researchers 
CAP 
 
Specialists in East Asian Philosophy 
Researcher of Philosophy of 
East Asia  
CAC 
 
Cultural Theorists 
 
Scholar of Cross-Strait Culture 
CAH 
 
Educators (Human Development) 
Educator  for Model 
Entrepreneurship  
CAS 
 
Sociologists (Social Development) 
Scholar of Social Cohesion of 
Tiger Economies  
CAE 
 
Science & Technologists 
 
Scientist of Semi-conductor  
CEH 
 
Economic Historians 
Scholar of Developmental 
Economy Model  
(2) Public Policy-persons 
CHR 
 
Human Rights Policy Specialists 
Policy-person for Multi-ethnic 
Human Rights 
CPS 
 
Social Policy Developers 
Social Policy-person of Guest 
Workers  
CPR 
Research and Development Policy 
Specialists 
Policy-person of Global 
Innovation Network  
CPH 
 
Human Resource Policy Developers 
Policy-person for Science Park 
CPE 
 
Economic Planners 
Policy-person for Indigenous 
Community  
CCG 
 
Corporate Governance Policy Specialists 
Policy Advisor for Corporate 
Governance  
(3)  Practitioners in Public and Private Sectors   
CHA 
 
 Human Rights Advocates 
Advocate for Human Rights 
Solidarity 
CTE 
 
Ecology & Business Ethics Specialists 
Consultant for Corporate Social 
Responsibility  
CSS 
 
 Social Policy and Welfare Advocates 
Social Policy Advisor  for Welfare 
Agency 
CTS 
 
Industry Strategy Specialists 
Strategist for Semiconductor 
Manufacture  
CTI 
 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship Specialists 
Innovation Strategist for Venture 
Capitalists  
CMC 
 
Mass Media Contributors 
Indigenous Writer and Social 
Critic 
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Appendix 6-1: Korea National Statistical Office 2003, Religions of Korea: 
Number of Declared Participants per Each Religion  
Composition of Population by Religion (in percentages) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Population 
with 
Religion 
  
  
  
Buddhism 
  
  
Christianity 
  
  
Catholic 
  
  
Confucianism
  
Won- 
Buddhism 
   Others 
  
 
 
No 
Religion 
  
  
< 1 9 9 9 >          
  Whole country 53.6 49.0 34.7 13.0 1.2 0.4 1.7 46.4
  Male 45.9 49.3 34.0 12.5 2.1 0.5 1.6 54.1
  Female 60.8 48.8 35.1 13.4 0.6 0.4 1.7 39.2
< 2 0 0 3 >          
  Whole country 53.9 47.0 36.8 13.7 0.7 0.4 1.4 46.1
Male 46.4 47.4 36.4 13.3 1.3 0.4 1.2 53.6
  Female 61.0 46.8 37.0 14.0 0.3 0.4 1.5 39.0
Age            
15 ∼19 46.2 31.5 50.2 15.8 0.2 0.5 1.7 53.8
20 ∼ 29 44.7 37.7 44.7 15.5 0.2 0.3 1.5 55.3
30 ∼ 39 49.3 43.6 40.9 13.8 0.3 0.3 1.2 50.7
40 ∼ 49 58.2 50.5 33.5 13.7 0.6 0.5 1.2 41.8
50 ∼ 59 62.4 55.1 29.0 13.0 0.9 0.3 1.6 37.6
60 & over 63.1 54.4 30.2 11.7 1.8 0.4 1.5 36.9
    
 Source : Korea National Statistical Office, 
「Report on the Social Statistics Survey」Each year 
<http://www.nso.go.kr>, viewed 07 October 2006 
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Appendix 6-2: Religions of the Republic of China (2005) 
Statistics on Religions in Taiwan 
Religion Temples, 
Mosques & 
Churches 
Members Universities 
& Colleges  
Hospitals 
Daoism*  18,274 7,600,000 1 3 
Buddhism**  4,006 8,086,000 8 3 
I-Kuan Tao  3,260 810,000 -- -- 
Protestantism***  3,609 605,000 7 14 
Catholicism  1,151 298,000 4 12 
The Tienti Teachings  50 298,000 -- -- 
Tiender  14 200,000 -- -- 
Li-ism  138 186,000 -- -- 
Syuan Yuan Jiao 22 152,700 -- -- 
Islam 6 58,000 -- -- 
Tenrikyo  153 35,000 -- -- 
Baha'i  13 16,000 -- -- 
Mahikari Church  9 1,000 -- -- 
Confucianism  139 26,700 -- -- 
Hai Tze Tao  55 30,000 -- -- 
Da Yi Jiao 1 1,000 -- -- 
World Maitreya Great Tao  2,200 250,000 -- -- 
Jhonghua Sheng Jiao  7 3,200 -- -- 
Universe Maitreya Emperor Jiao 12 35,000 -- -- 
Pre-cosmic Salvationism  6 1,000 -- -- 
Huang Chung  1 1,000 -- -- 
The Church of Scientology 7 20,000 -- -- 
The Chinese Heritage and Mission Religion 5 5,000 -- -- 
Total  33,138 18,718,600 20  32 
* Number of temples includes 8,753 home shrines. 
** Including Tantric Buddhism 
*** Figures include those of the Unification Church and the Church of Jesus Christ of  
         Latter-day Saints. 
 
Source: Department of Civil Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, the Republic of Taiwan 
http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan%2Dwebsite/5%2Dgp/yearbook/contents.htm, viewed 5 December 2006. 
 
